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In this thesis, I attempt to show how the concept 
of reading as literary interpretation has been influenced 
by the insights of the psychoanalyst and theorist Jacques 
Lacan { 1901-1981). Broadly speaking, I call for a revised 
view of the role of the reader and the act of reading in 
the light of arguments such as the following: firstly, 
that the linguistic subject is "split" rather than "auto-
nomous"; secondly, that since language is a representa-
tional rather than transparent med i urn, "truth" can only 
ever be regarded as partial and irreducibly open to revision; 
and thirdly, that reading as an interpretive activity arises 
from the unconscious Desire to resolve the sense of incom-
pleteness which language acquisition produces in the lin-
guistic subject. 
Following the lead of various interpreters of Lacan's 
theory and psychoanalytic procedure, I offer an introduc-
tory outline of his thought and its relevance to literary 
theory and critic ism. Then in the four chapters which 
follow I attempt to demonstrate this relevance through 
readings of a selection of novels. 
In the first chapter, I come to the conclusion that 
reading should be viewed less as a quest after "the truth" 
of the text, than a quest to discover what "the truth" 
must disregard in order to be "the truth." In the second 
chapter, I conclude that narration is an effect of reading, 
that the relationship of the narrator and the reader is 
there fore supplementary, and that the notion of 1 i terary 
•truth" is established by consensus. In the third chapter 
I conclude that the attempt to satisfy Desire by an attain-
ment of a "full disclosure" of "truth" or "meaning" must 
result in a loss of meaning per se. Finally, in the fourth 
chapter, I attempt to synthesize the conclusions of the 
earlier chapters in the argument that the reader is poten-
tially both the unveiler of the authorial unconscious and 
the unwitting performer of the conflict of meaning drama-
tized in the discourse of narrative. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An important feature of 
has been the growth of 
literary studies in recent years 
interest in the reader. If con-
temporary theories of literary signification and criticism 
are numerous and confusing in their frequently incompatible 
activities, the majority of them seem to agree on the 
importance of offering some perspective on the activity 
of reading. In relation to the diversity of these investi-
gations of reading, the perspective I adopt in this thesis 
manifests a twofold partiality. It is necessarily partial, 
since the scope of the project compels the investigator 
to restrict her investigation to a limited field, and 
voluntarily partial in that it reflects a preference towards 
a perspective of reading that has developed recently from 
the psychoanalytic theories of Jacques Lacan. 
Another feature of recent literary theory and criticism 
has been the manifestation of interest in interdisciplinary 
studies which can be seen as a legacy of the intellectual 
movement loosely describable as •structuralism". The writ-
ings of leading anthropologists such as Claude L~vi-Strauss, 
of linguists such as Roman Jakobson, of philosophers such 
as Jacques Derrida and systems historians such as Michel 
Foucault, have become acknowledged as seminal influences 
upon literary theory. While French-Freudian psychoanalyst, 
Jacques Lacan, has also been widely acclaimed as an influence 
upon literary studies, his theories have proved a somewhat 
2 
less tractable tool for textual analysis than have the 
theories of, for example, Jacques Derrida. One reason 
for this is, I believe, the very particular nature of the 
difficulty with which his writing confronts the reader. 
Almost every text which aims to explicate Lacanian 
theory includes some prefatory or introductory remark upon 
the peculiar difficulty of the task of reading his work. 
Since this work has been chosen as the chief theoretical 
basis on which my investigation of the reader's quest will 
draw, and since its difficulty will be repeatedly confronted 
by both the writer and the reader of this thesis, it seems 
important to give some preliminary consideration to the 
difficulty of reading Lacan. 
One of the most protracted, but useful, comments on 
this difficulty is offered by Robert Con Davis in his edit-
orial introduction to the recent special issue of Modern 
Language Notes devoted to "Lacan and Narration. 111 Using 
the wellknown essay by George Steiner, "On Difficulty, " 2 
Davis identifies four types of difficulty in Lacan's dis-
course: contingent, modal, tactical and ontological. He 
argues: 
1 
Contingent difficulties, in brief, are those problems 
we might have with the obscurity of Lacan 's text, pos-
sibly psychoanalytical, linguistic, and philoso~hical 
terms that we, as Steiner says, "need to look up." 
Robert Con Davis, "Introduction: Lacan and Narration," 
Modern Language Notes, 98, No 5 (Dec. 1983) pp. 855-858. 
2 George Steiner, "On Difficulty, " in On Difficulty and Other 
Essays (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
3 Davis, "Introduction," p. 855. 
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As this remark suggests, the character of Lacan's work 
is interdisciplinary and he draws freely from sources as 
various as Hegel, Heidegger, Saussure and Levi-Strauss, 
to name only his most obvious influences. In itself, this 
problem need not prove insurmountable; however, in Lacan's 
case it is compounded by the exclusivity of the context 
in which his publications evolve. Most of his writings 
are transcripts either of lectures originally presented 
to colleagues or senior students at various academic con-
gresses and conferences, or of his weekly or bi-weekly 
Seminar delivered at the Ecole normale superieure and des-
cribed by Stuart Schneiderman as "one of the longest running 
Parisian fads in memory •.. a center of Parisian intellectual 
· • n4 act1v1ty. Speaking then, to in it ia tea audiences whom 
he expected to recognize his allusions and references, 
Lacan made little, if any, deference to the newcomer. Fur-
thermore, as Anthony Wilden, one of Lacan's best known 
and most respected explicators points out, Lacan rarely 
draws attention to a revision or contradictory innovation 
in his opinions. Instead, his theories are presented en 
bloc in each seminar and it is left to his followers to 
detect any such changes, even to recontextualize previously 
familiar terminology that is given an unpredictable appli-
t- . 5 ca_1on. I do not wish at this point, to digress to a 
4 Stuart Schneiderman, The Death of an Intellectual Hero 
----::=-----:--=---,---~---=----....,,....,~ (London and Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983) 
P. 28. 
5 Anthony Wilden in J. Lacan, Speech and Language in Psycho-
analysis, Trans., Notes and Commentary by Anthony Wilden (Balti-
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consideration of the professional validity of this approach. 
Suffice it to say that Lacan has been criticized on more 
than one occasion for his "intransigent" thinking and his 
"like it or lump it" attitude to his reader. 6 The fact 
remains that the uninitiated reader, most particularly 
the Anglo-American reader who is not accustomed to the 
comparatively homogeneous intellectual climate of Lacan 's 
Paris, is 1 iable to find the contingent difficulties of 
his texts overwhelming. Even if he overcomes this initial 
difficulty, another, modal difficulty, is liable to arise 
from the "Seminar" context of the Lacanian text. 
describes this as follows: 
Davis 
modal difficulty, rather than being an obscurity 
in the text, is a problem of receptivity for the reader 
in regard to a text's mode of presentation. Lacan 's 
major publications, mostly transcripts of lectures, are 
addressed to us as students who are supposedly in 
diligent pursuit of this Master's teachings (imagine 
the audacity of entitling one's own book simply Ecrits!). 
This magisterial mode can pose problems of tone and 
can generate resistance enough to become a great obstacle 
in reading. 7 
The reader who plunges himself into the spirit of the Parisian 
Seminar, studying Lacan' s sources, pursuing his teachings 
more and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968 pbk 1981) 
p. 182. ( This text is the revised version of The Language of 
the Self, Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1968). 
6 For example see Anthony Wilden's remarks in ·The 
the Imaginary and the Real," in System and Structure: 
Communication and Exchange ( London and New York: 
1972 rpt 1980) pp. 1 and 6. 





diligently, may nevertheless encounter tactical difficulty 
which is described by Davis as, 
. • • created by La can 's strategies for corn rn u nicating 
efficiently and powerfully. In his discourse Lacan 
may explain a point about the "gaze" quite fully and 
then refuse to expound on a related concept, or sudden-
ly break off all explanation. This practice, like his 
erratically short therapy sessions, is intended to prompt 
his listeners to a deep and direct engagement with 
psychoanalysis, to bring them face-to-face with "real" 
(impossibly continuous) discourse. 8 
It seems that this difficulty can be interpreted in two 
ways. On one hand it can be seen as the ideological chal-
lenge described by Juliet Mitchell: 
. . . Lacan 's style is a challenge to easy comprehension, 
to the popularisation and secularisation of psychoanalysis 
as it has occurred most notably in North America. 
Psychoanalysis should aim to show us that we do not 
know those things we think we do; it therefore cannot 
assault our popular conceptions by using the very idiom 
it is intended to confront; a challenge to ideology 
cannot rest on a linguistic appeal to that same ideology. 9 
On the other hand, and less obviously, it can be seen as 
itself a re-enactment, a dramatization, of the very ambiguity 
or divisiveness of meaning which calls for the interpre-
tation of Freud's work that Lacan' s theories undertake. 
In this respect, the tactical difficulty of Lacan's dis-
course is closely related to the fourth and perhaps most 
fascinating of the difficulties: the ontological difficulty. 
I return to Davis' argument: 
and 
Rose 
8 Davis, "Introduction," p. 856. 
9 Juliet Mitchell, In trod. , Feminine Sex uality_E Jacques Lacan 
the Ecole Freudienne, eds. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1982) p. 4. 
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The greatest difficulty in reading Lacan, and the far 
more interesting one to contemplate is ontological, the 
"difficulty," as Steiner writes, that breaks "the contract 
of ultimate or preponderant intelligibility between poet 
and reader, between text and meaning." 13 "Difficulties 
of this category," he continues, "cannot be looked up" 
because "... they confront us with blank questions 
about the nature of human speech [and] about the status 
of significance." 14 In other words, an ontological diffi-
culty arises - that is, the contract may break between 
writer and reader, text and meaning - when a text 
posits (in Thomas Kuhn's terminology) a whole new 
paradigm of understanding entailing a new grasp of 
phenomena, their relations, and the horizon of possi-
bility that moves up behind them. This "difficulty," 
though not inherently insurmountable, can be an absolute 
obstacle to understanding.10 
The particular paradigm of understanding which Lacan presents 
is, as Davis corroborates, characterized by the "split" 
that is the implication of linguistic representation, and 
that constitutes a division in the linguistic subject and 
in the discourse which he articulates. It is this revision 
of the status of the linguistic subject and the implication 
which it holds for the status of the reader and his activity 
of reading that this thesis attempts to explore. The first 
task would therefore necessarily seem to be to offer an 
introductory account of the genesis of the Lacanian "split". 
Before I undertake this task, may I say that, in the 
light of the "difficulties" of reading Lac an' s work described 
above, I am aware that my own undertaking to "introduce" 
or "explicate" even the fundamental points of his theory, 
may appear not only ambitious, but even an impertinence. 
lO · " trod . " 856 be Davis, In uction, p. • Footnotes num r 13 and 
14 in Davis's text refer to Steiner, "On Difficulty, " p. 40 and 
41 respectively. 
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Such an appearance may be modified by the following acknow-
ledgements: firstly, while an introduction of the kind 
which I shall presently undertake can attempt to lessen 
some of the difficulties described above - while it may, 
for example, attempt to explicate terminology that is foreign 
to traditional literary studies, or offer explications 
and systematic accounts where Lacan' s discourse is most 
elliptical and unsystematic - it must constantly remind 
itself that such actions are fundamentally non-Lacanian. 
If by eliminating the ambiguities in Lacan's text, this 
introduction is able to give the impression that we can 
"know what he means," it must simultaneously acknowledge 
that that very impression of "knowledge" depends on a loss 
of the meaning that has been eliminated. As Shoshana Felman 
argues, 
it is precisely the imposition of a limit beyond 
which vision is prohibited which dispels the "split 
of attention" and at the same time the split of meaning, 
and which hence makes possible the illusion of total 
mastery over meaning as a whole, as an unimpaired 
totality. 11 
As we shall see, •total mastery" is precisely the state 
of being which Jacques Lacan - ironically so often acclaimed 
"a Master• - most adamantly repudiates. 
The second acknowledgement I must make is that I have 
been able to give close attention to only the first of 
Lacan's major publications, known in its English translation 
11 Shoshana Felman, •Turning the Screw of Interpretation, " 
Yale French Studies 55/56 (1977) p. 167. 
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as Ecrits: A Selection, 12 and containing transcripts of 
seminars given between approximately 1949 and 1960. Since 
Lacan continued to teach virtually until his death on 
September 9, 1981, 13 this thesis excludes many developments 
in his thinking subsequent to Ecri ts. Al though I have 
drawn peripherally on many of his later publications, parti-
cularly where they have been rendered accessible by more 
experienced interpreters, I have been forced to suspend 
closer readings of these texts as beyond the scope of what 
is already a lengthy project. 
Finally, it will be evident in the following intro-
duction that I draw heavily on the work of Lacan's various 
interpreters and commentators. This seems to me the most 
satisfactory method of both ensuring the accuracy of my 
own reading of his texts, and at the same time demonstrating 
the diversity of thought to which his theories have already 
given rise. 
12 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, trans. A. Sheridan 
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1977). All subsequent references 
to this text will be included in brackets in the main body of 
the thesis using the abbreviation Ecrits followed by the relevant 
page number. 
13 See Stuart Schneiderman's account of the closing stages of Lacan's 
career in The Death of an Intellectual Hero, pp. 17-25. 
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LACANALYSIS: THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY AND PROCEDURE OF 
JACQUES LACAN 
• • • the originality of Jacques Lacan lies 
in his radical understanding of the radicality 
of Freud's discovery, and in his eagerness 
to carry the consequences of thjs discovery 
to their logical limits. In so doing, Lacan 
assesses and thinks out - as no one has 
done before him - not just the significance 
of psychoanalysis but, specifically, the signi-
ficance of the difference that it makes, of 
the difference it has introduced into Western 
culture. 
- Shoshana Felman 
The central project of Lacan's theory has become popu-
larly identified by the slogan which he himself coined, 
the "return to Freud" (Ecrits p. 114). On the face of 
it, the particular task which he set himself was to re-
read Freud's work in such a way as to prove that in spite 
of certain contradictions and ambiguities which had invited 
alterations and distortions by subsequent writers, this 
work could be seen as a cohesive theory for psychoanalysis. 
In Lacan 's opinion, one of the fundamental hindrances to 
Freud's research which a retrospective assessment could 
establish, was the unavailability to him of the insights 
of modern 1 inguistics ( see for example, Lac an' s comments 
in Ecri ts, pp. 259 and 284), for the groundwork of that 
discipline was only being mapped by Ferdinand de Saussure 
and others at the time that Freud was writing his Inter-
pretation of Dreams - a treatise which seems to call parti-
cularly for the support of linguistics, as will be demons-
trated in the course of this chapter. 14 
14 The first German edition of Die Traumdeutung was published 
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If from this initial description Lacan's project appears 
a comparatively simple exercise, the warning must be sounded 
that in fact the implications of his "return to Freud" 
are nothing short of revolutionary. 
this point as follows: 
Shoshana Felman makes 
Lacan 's well-known inaugural call for the "return to 
Freud" is in fact itself an operation - and a notion -
far more complex, far more original than the simple 
gesture which it customarily is understood to be: it 
is not simply a historical return to the authentic origin 
of a doctrine, nor even a return to Freud's original 
text as opposed, on the one hand, to its dogmatic, 
oversimplified interpretations and, on the other hand, 
to its dist.ortingly inaccurate translations. It is a 
return to Freud untranslated as a symptom of the essen-
tial untranslatability of his subject matter. Freud 
himself, indeed, has often oompared the unconscious 
to a foreign language and has literally defined repression 
as a constitutive "failure of translation." It is thus no 
coincidence that Lacan 's return to Freud is dramatized 
as a literal, concrete return to a foreign language, to 
something which defies, resists translation: it is a 
return whose function, paradoxically, is not so much to 
render Freud familiar as to renew contact with his 
strangeness: a return to a Freud oonstitutively foreign 
- even to himself; a return to Freud 's struggle with 
the radical impossibility of translation; a return to 
the unconscious - both in Freud's text and of Freud's 
text - not as a domesticated, reassuring answer, but 
as an irreducibly uncanny question.15 
in 1900. saussure, as Professor at the University of Geneva, gave 
his three courses in general linguistics between 1907 and 1911. 
These were published after his death (1913) when his students 
and colleagues constructed the text of Cours de Linguistique 
~n~rale out of various sets of lecture notes. These, edited by 
Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, were published in Geneva 
in 1915. For further information see Jonathan Culler, saussure, 
(Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1976). 
15 Shoshana Felman, "The Originality of Jacques Lacan," Poetics 
Today, 2, lb (Winter 1980/81) p. 46. 
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It is to this notion of the unconscious as an "irreducibly 
uncanny question" that this discussion of Lacan in its 
turn returns. 
The first task will be to establish and explain the 
most fundamental concepts and terminology used by Lacan, 
his theory of the genesis of the "split" subject, and the 
necessary relation between meaning and sexuality which 
he recognizes in Freud's work. Thereafter an account will 
be offered of his application of Saussurean linguistics 
to Freud's investigation of the unconscious. Finally, 
drawing on the material already delineated, an investigation 
will be made of the basic principles of the Lacanian psycho-
analytic procedure with an indication, where relevant, 
of the implications of these principles for the activity 
of reading. 
SECTION I: SPLIT-SUBJECTIVITY: 
THE BIRTH OF SELF AND OTHER IN LACANIAN THEORY 
In his early work, prior to 1953, Lacan, like Freud, 
manifested a certain preoccupation with the genetic features 
of psychoanalysis, with the various stages and processes 
of infantile development involved in the formation of the 
16 psyche. This apparent attention to •chronological" de-
velopment suggests a useful model on which an introducer 
of Lacan's theories might structure her introduction. Since 
16 For an elaboration of this point see Wilden in Lacan, 
Speech and Language, p. 162. See also Fredric Jameson, •Imaginary 
and Symbolic in Lacan," Yale French Studies, 55/56 (1977) p. 350. 
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the two most significant stages of development involved 
in the formation of the psyche appear to be the "Mirror 
Stage" or stade du miroir, and the "Oedipal Stage," it 
is with the former that this introduction will begin. 
These two stages also provide a convenient opportunity 
for outlining the three "orders" which Lacan introduced 
into psychoanalytic terminology in 1953: 
the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real. 
the orders of 
If these orders 
are identified alongside those stages of infantile develop-
ment when the particular features of each manifest them-
selves most clearly, a compromise seems possible between 
an inevitably false characterization of the orders as 
"separate" and an indication of their ultimate inseparability. 
The Mirror Stage and the Illusion of Self-Presence 
The most comprehensive description of the Mirror Stage 
is provided in Lacan's essay "The Mirror Stage as Formative 
of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 
Experience" (Ecrits pp. 1-7), which was the revision of 
an earlier paper and was presented before the sixteenth 
International Congress of Psychoanalysis in 1949. 17 In 
this essay, the Mirror Stage is described as an "event" 
which "... can take place • • • from the age of six months 
up to the age of eighteen months" (Ecrits pp. 1-2). 
17 Although this essay is apparently a revision of an earlier 
paper, "The Looking Glass Phase", which was presented in 1936, 
and supposedly published both in 1937 and as the first entry 
("The Mirror Stage") in the French version of Ecrits, Jane Gallop 
makes the interesting point that this "earlier version, " to which 
13 
In his later works, when Lacan becomes absorbed in his 
development of the logic of signification, the Mirror Stage 
assumes the status of a structural paradigm and its function 
lies in demonstrating the child's earliest relation to 
b . 18 o Jects. 
The order congruous with the Mirror Stage is the Imagi-
nary Order which could be described as a kind of preverbal 
register composed specifically of spatial and visual con-
figurations which are not yet perceived as organised around 
the subject's body, nor even differentiated by him as dif-
ferent from himself. While "difference", as will be demon-
strated shortly, is the organising principle of the Symbolic 
Orde·c, identification, or the urge to find similarity and 
resemblance is the strategy associated with the Imaginary. 
Since it would seem that for Lacan, the newborn ba~y 
exists as a totally solipsistic consciousness, "an 'absolute 
subject' in a totally intransitive relationship to the 
world he cannot yet distinguish from himself," 19 the Mirror 
Stage can be viewed as the paradigm which designates the 
first awareness of difference between absolute solipsism 
and the perceptions of "self-as-difference". However, 
this does not yet amount to an awareness of self objectified 
Alan Sheridan refers in the Bibliographical Note of Ecrits: A Select-
ion, does not in fact exist. For an account of this "lost origin" 
see Jane Gallop, "Lacan's 'Mirror Stage': Where to begin," Substance, 
37/38, (1983) p. 119. 
18 This development in Lacan 's theoretical perspective is 
identified by Wilden in Lacan, Speech and Language, p. 162. 
19 Wilden in Lacan, Speech and Language, p. 163. 
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in relationship to the other, but the primordial discovery 
of an image or form which the child had previously lacked, 
and which the paradigm of mirror recognition seems best 
suited to illustrate: 
This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the 
child at the infans stage, still sunk in his motor in-
capacity and nursling dependence, would seem to exhibit 
in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which 
the I is precipitated in a primordial form, before it 
is objectified in the dialectic of identification with 
the other, and before language restores to it, in the 
universal, its function as subject. {Ecrits p. 2). 
As this passage suggests, one of the most significant effects 
of the Mirror Stage is that the subject experiences through 
it the birth of the illusion of his wholeness, an illusion 
which significantly, is interpreted by Lacan as inspiring 
"jubilation." By identifying in the mirror's image attri-
butes which he sees as his own, the child internalizes 
for himself an Imaginary construct, an •rdeal r• or moi 
which is described by Lacan as situating •the agency of 
the ego, before its social determination, in a fictional 
direction, which will always remain irreducible for the 
individual alone ••• " (Ecrits p. 2). He continues, 
This development is experienced as a temporal dialectic 
that decisively projects the formation of the individual 
into history. The mirror stage is a drama whose internal 
thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation 
and which manufactures for the subject, caught up 
in the lure of spatial identification, the succession 
of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-
image to a form of its totality that I shall call ortho-
paed ic - and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour 
of an alienating identity, which will mark with its 
rigid structure the subject's entire mental development 
( Ecrits p. 4 ) • 20 
15 
As this description indicates, it is in the symmetrical 
dual structure of the mirror stage that the illusion is 
established that the self can reflect totally upon itself 
- the illusion that there can be a perfect symmetry between 
the "self-who-thinks" and the "self-thought-atout" that 
"subsumes all difference within a delusion of a totalizable, 
unified and homogenous individual identity." 21 It is this 
illusion of self-symmetry - an illusion which will haunt 
the subject in some degree throughout his life - that is, 
in Lacan's view, disrupted or dislocated by the "splitting" 
which occurs in the Oedipal Stage. 
What the Mirror Stage, as opposed to the Oedipal Stage, 
serves to emphasize then, is that the moi or ego as a fie-
tional "ideal image" constructed from a succession of 
imaginary identifications, is not to be confused with the 
concept of "subject" in Lacanian theory. The following 
comment by Malcolm Bowie may serve to elucidate this point: 
20 
The ego as a tension-point within Freud's Id-F.go-Superego 
toPCX3raphy is respected by Lacan as a necessary compon-
ent of a properly dialectical model of the human subject. 
But the ego envisaged as an end in itself, as a threatened 
residence of selfhood needing continually to be reforti-
fied against hostile incursions from the id and the 
superego, is treated with scorn: this stabilized and 
This implication of the Mirror Stage as the projection 
of the individual into history is particularly interestingly explicated 
by Jane Gallop who demonstrates the double status of the Mirror 
Stage as both "origin" of the self, yet paradoxically, also as •turn-
ing point" in a chrono~y - the natural maturation process - that 
is already in progress. See Jane Gallop, "Lacan's 'Mirror Stage': 
Where to Begin,• pp. 121-122. 
21 Felman, ·The Originality of Jacques Lacan," p. 51. 
tranquillized ego 
'soul managers' 
accounts of the 
their centre the 
16 
plays dumbly into the hands of the 
and the social engineers. Lacan 's 
psychical apparatus at work have at 
notion not of ego but of subject.22 
I shall return to a more comprehensive discussion of subject-
ivity in Lacan's theory shortly. 
Returning once again to the concept of the Mirror 
Stage as a phase of development in the child's psyche, 
it is clear that the child's relationship to his mother 
is of particular significance during this period. Although 
he is totally dependent on his mother for his needs, the 
child cannot as yet distinguish her as "other" than himself, 
with the needs and desires of an other. In Lacanian terms 
his identification with her is envisaged as representing 
a merging of self and other. Ideally, this relationship 
reaches the point where the child, not content merely to 
be cared for by the mother, wishes to be her all-absorbing 
occupation. It is this condition which is superseded by 
the "Oedipal Stage." 
The Oedipal Stage 23 
The Oedipal myth in Freud's work serves as an illus-
tration and validation of his theory of the individual's 
sexual and psychic evolution. When Lacan incorporated 
22 Malcolm Bowie, "Jacques Lacan," in Structuralism and 
Since, ed. John Sturrock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) 
p. 131. 
23 Since a systematic description of his view of the Oedipal 
Stage is nowhere to be found in his writings, what is presented 
here as Lacan 's view is a oonflati.on of oonclusions drawn from 
both his own texts and from those of his commentators. 
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into this reading the additional possibility that the myth 
might be used to illustrate the implications of the sub-
ject's language acquisition, he was effectively demonstrating 
the equivalence between rhetoric and Freud's view of sexu-
ality. The following account of the Oedipal Stage and 
its implications will include an attempt to explicate this 
equivalence. 
Broadly speaking, from a Lacanian perspective, the 
Oedipal process is instigated when the father, standing 
in the role of Symbolic Father or representative of the 
Law, the primal Other - I shall return to an explication 
of the plurisignificant term "the Other"shortly - intervenes 
in the dual relationship between the child and the mother, 
denying the child his wish to be the complement of the 
mother. In the terms of the Oedipal myth, this intervention 
is expressed in the form of a double veto which could be 
articulated as: 
to the child: "Thou shalt not sleep with thy mother." 
to the rrother: "'Ihou shalt not re-appropriate thy proouct.• 
24 
The veto, if accepted by the child 25 can, for clarity's 
sake, be seen to have three primary consequences: firstly, 
24 A . k Le . L D . d m. a ma.ire, Jacques acan, trans. av1 Macey (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977 pbk 1981) p. 82. 
25 Since the focus of this investigation is not intended to 
be psychoanalytical, the non-acceptance of the Oedipal veto and 
the psychosis which this may generate is not relevant and can 
therefore be passed over, although it may entail one of Lacan 's 
most significant contributions to contemporary psychoanalytical 
thinking. For the purposes of this discussion, only the ideal 
case of the child who accepts the Oedipal veto will be considered. 
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the subject will acquire access to, and a place within, 
the order of the Symbolic; secondly, as a result of this 
acquisition, he will suffer the Splitting or Spaltung which 
such membership to the Symbolic Order entails; thirdly, 
he will become the victim of unconscious Desire. Let us 
consider each of these consequences in turn. 
a. Membership to the Symbolic Order 
Capitalized to distinguish it from any conventional 
use of the term, •the Symbolic" refers to that Order, that 
network of cultural and 1 inguistic codes, convent ions and 
laws into which the infant is born and to which he is un-
avoidably initiated in the process of language acquisition. 
The Symbolic Father who is usually, but not invariably, 
the child's natural father, stands as representative of 
Symbolic Law, while the mother, in so far as she reinforces 
the Symbolic Law, may also play the role of Symbolic Parent. 
While the Imaginary Order referred to in the descrip-
tion of the Mirror Stage was described earlier as the Order 
associated with identification or •sameness•, the Symbolic 
Order is conceived of as a system which functions according 
to the principle of difference. 26 To clarify the notion 
26 The third term in the triad of Lacan 's Orders, the Real, 
is not given as great emphasis in Ecrits as are the other two terms. 
Malcolm Bowie, drawing on Lacan 's Seminaire which he views as 
providing the fullest and most challenging account of the Real, 
offers the following useful description of this Order: 
" ••• the Real is that which is radically extrinsic tn the pro-
cession of signifiers. The Real may be structured - 'created' 
even - by the subject for himself, but it cannot be named. 
It is the irremediable and intractable 'outside' of language; 
the indefinitely receding goal towards which the signifying 
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of the Symbolic Order, it is necessary at this point to 
explain and distinguish two of the most esoteric and con-
fusing of Lacanian terms: "the other" with a small "o", 
and "the Other" with a capital "O". Al though I at tempt 
here to enumerate and describe the various contexts in 
which these terms are used, it must be emphasized that 
in Lac an' s texts they are employed randomly; it is left 
to the reader to determine the particular sense in which 
they are applied. 
The "other" with a small "o" has a relatively simple 
application: it is used to designate the person or object 
involved in dual, immediate relationship with the subject 
where the mediating activity of the linguistic sign does 
not intervene. In other words, it can be regarded as the 
present counterpart to the subject. The "Other• with a 
capital "O" is a more subtle concept. Firstly, its distinc-
tion from the other, or opposite, must be emphasized: 
p. 3. 
It must be understood from the outset that the Other 
is not the Op_posite. The apposite is but the Sarne 
inverted or reversed: a verbal oontradiction, a negative 
image, a mirror-writing • • • • easily recognized and res-
tored to its reassuring familiarity. The opposite is a 
category of logical thought, which arranges the world 
in neat pairs of things and their oontraries, of theses 
and antitheses, interdependent and mutually exclusive. 
But the Other is irreducibly, inoorrigibly different; 
exceeding our 1.o:Jical categories, it escapes our appre-
hension. Hence the malaise provoked by alterity, whose 
irrepressible existence beyond the pale of our oonceptual 
domain casts doubt uQcm the hegemony and adequacy 
of our mode of thought. ""27 
chain tends; the vanishing point of the Symbolic and the 
Imaginary alike. As a restJ.lt of this view, the Real oomes 
close to neaning 'the ineffable' or 'the i.mp:>Ssible' in Lacan' s 
thought"- Bowie, "Jacques Lacan, • pp. 133-134. 
27 Carrlace Lang, "Aberrance in Criticism?" Substance 41 (1983} 
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The Other, then, can be understood primarily as a locus 
of difference, the locus from which the Symbolic Order 
and language receive their definition, or in Lacan's appli-
cation, it is "the locus in which is constituted the I 
who speaks to him who hears" (Ecrits p. 141). In other 
words, it is that absent difference which by its very ab-
sence or repression allows that which is present to be 
identified or defined. 
As a locus of difference, the Other can be regarded 
on the one hand, as a form of collective unconscious, a 
position of thirdness between the "I" and the "you" of 
the psychoanalytic exchange; a position towards which 
the analysand and analyst may project their discourse. 
On the other hand, the Other may be attributed a more limited 
application as the locus of the individual unconscious, 
that "excess" of "absolute" subjectivity which is alienated 
from the subject in the "splitting" which will be described 
shortly. This usage of the term by Lacan occurs for example 
in the following context: 
It speaks in the Other, I say, designating by the Other 
the very locus evoked by the recourse to speech in 
any relation in which the Other intervenes. If it speaks 
in the Other, whether or not the subject hearsit with 
his ear, it is because it is there that the subject, 
by means of a logic anterior to any awakening of the 
signified, finds its signifying place. The discovery 
of what it articulates in that place, that is to say, 
in the unconscious, enables us to grasp at the price 
of what splitting (Spaltung) it has thus been constituted 
( Ecrits p. 285). 
However, as Anthony Wilden points out, Lacan in the manner 
of L~vi-Strauss by whose work, as already mentioned, he 
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was considerably influenced - does not favour the concept 
of the unconscious as an individual, intrapsychic entity, 
but rather, seeks to interpret it as a function of the 
· 1 11 · · h' h d t · · 28 soc1a co ect1v1ty w 1c generates an sus a1ns 1t. 
Another use of the term, the Other, which has already 
arisen several paragraphs earlier in this d~cuss~n, occurs 
when reference is made to the parent of the child as the 
representative of the Symbolic Law. In such contexts the 
parent or an adult who takes the role of parent stands 
as the embodiment of the Other or the locus of difference, 
and may therefore be referred to as the Other. 
following example, Lacan quite unusually 
In the 
specifies 
his particular application of the term when he says "the 
refusal of castration is first of all a refusal of 
the castration of the Other (initially, the mother)" {Ecrits 
p. 267). 
As these various applications may indicate, the Other 
is one of the terms in Lacan's discourse which most strongly 
resists the reader's efforts to arrest and fix its meaning. 
This resistance is itself a dramatization of the challenge 
which Freud's postulation of the unconscious presented 
to the possibility of meaning as simple or 1 i teral, and 
the threat which it constituted to the "autonomy of reason.• 
Having outlined these applications of the t.erms the 
Other and the other, I wish to focus once more on the sub-
ject and his initiation into the Symbolic Order. If, in 
28 Wilden in Lacan, Speech and Language, pp. 264-265. 
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the Mirror Stage, the child experienced the illusion of 
himself as a totality or unified whole, in the Oedipal 
Stage he experiences a process of self-division. This 
entails the Symbolic "castration" or repudiation of the 
child as "he who is the phallus" (the complement and all-
absorbing occupation of the mother), in exchange for the 
privilege of identity as "he who has the Phal 1 us, " the 
power of Symbolic signification, the power to say "I". 
Obviously, a distinction is being made here between conven-
tional and specialized use of the term "phallus", but to 
avoid further digression, I suspend explanation of this 
distinction until a later stage of the chapter (vide pp. 
32-35). For the moment, closer consideration must be given 
to the concept of a "divided" or "split" subject. 
b. The Splitting (Spaltung) 
For the present I shall focus on the Oedipal paradigm 
as an illustration of the genesis of split-subjectivity, 
suspending consideration of its simultaneous illustration 
of the genesis of repressed sexual desires which will be 
discussed in the following section (c). 
The infant, having progressed through the Mirror Stage, 
reaches the point at which he is ready to express his Need 
verbally. 29 This Need can be described as the impulse 
to express aabsolute" subjectivity or "full" meaning equi-
29 At this point I introduce the con venti.on of capitalizing 
the initial letter of the terms Need, Demand and Desire where 
they have a s:pecialized Lacanian application. This is not however 
a convention which Lacan himself uses. 
valent to union with the mother as other. 
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In his attempt 
to express his Need, the subject encounters the Oedipal 
veto: he is compelled by Symbolic Law embodied in the 
Name-of-the-Father to translate the absoluteness of his 
Need into the representative linguistic signifiers of De-
mand, if he is to receive a place, a nomination as a subject, 
in the Symbolic Order. He is thereby forced to accept 
in the place of "absolute" subjectivity, a linguistic or 
representative subjectivity. In other words, he becomes 
split into a conscious self who is named and is represented 
as a subject in the signifying system by a signifier, "I", 
and an unconscious self, an "it" or~- The latter is 
constituted by that "excess", that Otherness of "absolute" 
subjectivity which must be repressed in the gain of linguis-
tic subjectivity that can only represent, but cannot re-
appropriate, the total presence of the "absolute" self. 
To illustrate the "loss" of meaning which takes place 
in the translation of Need by linguistic Demand, reference 
may be made to an analogy used by Anthony Wilden in his 
description of the loss which takes place when perception 
is translated as identity. He uses the analogy of the 
distinction between a digital computer such as an adding 
machine which computes in discrete steps, and an analog 
computer such as a sun-dial, which computes in continuous 
functions, and he argues as follows: 
identity is digital, whereas perception is anal.c)3: 
therefore any 'identity of perception' necessarily invol-
ves some process of TRANSLATION from the analog to 
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the digital. Such translations always involve a gain 
in signification ••• but a loss in meaning. 30 
This analogy is useful for describing the transformation 
of the moi that takes place as a result of language acquisi-
tion. Prior to the accession to language, the moi comprises 
that specular image constructed from attributes reflected 
in the other, which gives the child some sense of corporeal 
unity. Once the subject has access to language, he may 
attempt to translate those "analog" perceptions of himself 
into a linguistic identity which is "digital". While he 
may, by the translation, gain a moi of signified identity, 
in doing so he will lose his sense of totality. Thus the 
moi will prove a source of dissatisfaction to the subject, 
for no matter with what attributes he compounds this iden-
tity in his search for the missing piece of the total jigsaw, 
he will simply constitute an endless chain of signification 
in which the emptiness of his linguistic nomination is 
displaced from signifier to signifier. The extent of this 
dissatisfaction in the subject will depend on the extent 
to which he was captured by the attraction of the specular 
image in the first place. It is on this conception of 
the moi or ego that Lacan's most vehement attacks against 
"ego psychology• are based (see for example Ecrits pp. 
226-280). As Malcolm Bowie observes, 
30 
31 
• • • if the ego is no more than imaginary precipitate, 
how absurd it is for proponents of 'ego psychol03y' 
to appoint themselves to the task of developing and 
stabilizing that ghostly entity. 31 
Wilden, "The Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real," p. 24. 
Bowie, •Jacques Lacan," p. 123. 
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Returning to the concept of the subject as "split" 
or "divided": Lacan devoted considerable energy to the 
demonstration of the epistemological implications of Freud's 
"split-subject". For example, in his seminar "The Agency 
of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason Since Freud" 
( Ecri ts pp. 146-178), he challenges the conception of the 
subject as an "entity" which is implicit in the Cartesian 
cogito. Simplifying this complex and elusive argument, 
one might say that in Lacan's opinion, Descartes, in formu-
lating the aphorism Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore 
I am), begs the question of the existence of subjectivity 
in presupposing an "I" who can be the subject of the action 
of thinking. To suggest thereafter that "being" is con-
ce i vable on the basis of that th inking seems to compound 
the error of logic. Nevertheless, the Cartesian cogi to 
gives the illusion that self can be immediately present 
to itself, inviting Lacan's criticism that, 
. . • the philosophical cogito is at the centre of the 
mirage that renders modern man so sure of being himself 
even in his uncertainties about himself, and even in 
the mistrust he has learned to practise against the 
traps of self-love ( Ecrits p. 165). 
According to the Cartesian ~09 i to things directly perceived 
and present must be things privileged, and concepts such 
as "truth" and "meaning" which are supposedly fundamental 
or essential in nature, stem from this belief that "total 
presence• can be regained by man's consciousness. Inherent 
in such thinking is the unquestioning acceptance of language 
and furthermore of perception, as transparent. Lacan's 
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argument against the cogito, based on linguistic insights 
which, as al ready explained, were inaccessible to Freud, 
calls attention to the material nature of language as a 
representational medium. Language is necessary to the 
notion of conscious thought, yet once the subject has des-
cribed himself in words he has ceased to be a subject to 
himself. 
such as, 
Lacan expresses this conclusion in aphorisms 
In that which thinks (CO':}itans), I can never constitute 
myself as anything but object ( cogitatum) ( Ecrits p. 165). 
or more confusingly, 
I am not wherever I am the plaything of my thought; 
I think of what I am where I do not think to think 
(Ecrits p. 166). 
More simply stated, language and "being" as "essential" 
"absolute" subjectivity cannot co-exist. 
Now Freud, in describing the radical effect of his 
discovery of the unconscious on the Western conception 
of subjectivity, compared that discovery to the Copernican 
Revolution. Shoshana Felman offers a fascinating analysis 
of the implications of Lacan 's return to this "ingenious 
metaphor." Initially she points out, 
In the same way that Copernicus discovers that it is 
not the sun that revolves around the earth, but the 
earth that revolves around the sun, so Freud displaces 
the center of the human world from consciousness to 
the unconscious. "Human megalomania,• in Freud's 
terms, thus suffers another "wounding blow" from the 
psychoanalytical discovery that •the ego • • • is not 
even master of its own house, but must content itself 
with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously 
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in its mind." ( Freud 1916-1917: 285) Freud himself 
thus defines his own originality as subversive: as 
subversive of the principle of consciousness as a center, 
and, along_ with it, of man's narcissistic centrality 
to himself.~ 2 
In Lacan's interpretation of Freud, the emphasis shifts: 
in Felman' s opinion, Lacan is not concerned as much with 
the implications of a change of subjective centre from 
the conscious to the unconscious, as with the "process 
of decentering", in other words, the new manner of self-
reflection which Freud's insight implies and which cannot 
be divorced fran linguistic signification. As Felman argues, 
In Freud's emphasis, if the Copernican revolution re-
places one center with another, displaces the centrality 
fran earth to sun, one could still conceive of the planets 
as separable, self-contained spatial entities: one could 
still think of the two centers - the mistaken and the 
real one - as distinct from each other. In Lacan 's 
explicitly and crucially linguistic model of refl.exi vity, 
there are no longer distinct centers but only contra-
dictory gravitational pulls: the two pseudo-centers -
"the subject of the signifier" (of the utterance) and 
"the subject of the signified" (of the statement) - even 
though they are radically different from each other, 
are no longer entirely distinct and cannot be separated 
from each other: each can also be the Other, is "in-
mixed" with the Other. 3 3 
This view of the subject as containing within itself a 
cleft between the conscious, which is within its linguistic 
control, and the unconscious, which escapes such control 
32 Felman, "The Originality of Jacques Lacan," p. 54. The 
quotation of Freud is taken from "Introductory Lectures on Psycho-
analysis, " Part m: "General Theory of the Neuroses, " The Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, translated from the German 
under the general editorship of James Strachey, (London: The Ho-
garth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, Vol. XVI). 
33 Felman, "The Originality of Jacques Lacan, • p. 55. 
28 
yet paradoxically may support or, alternatively, subvert 
it, has radical implications for a study of the reader 
and the activity of reading. These implications are com-
pounded by Lacan's insight that the unconscious is not 
only structured like a language, but is itself "a reader". 
We must, however, suspend discussion of these issues for 
the present, in order to consider what I have for conveni-
ence called "the third effect of the Oedipal Stage", the 
birth of unconscious Desire. 
c. Need, Demand and the "whence" of Unconscious Desire 
Sexual desire is presented by Freud as the product 
of an inherent contradiction brought about when the primary 
force of the libido encounters the secondary force of re-
. 34 press ion. 
Oedipal myth. 
He illustrates his theory by means of the 
When Lacan describes unconscious Desire 
as the bi-product or excess of the translation of Need 
into linguistic signifiers of Demand, he retains the sexual 
terms of the Oedipal myth, thereby indicating the equi-
valence between rhetoric arXl Freudian sexuality. The "story• 
of the birth of unconscious Desire - and the genesis of 
split-subjectivity which may be pieced together from 
Lacan's writing is thus the story of the birth of the desire 
to make meaning, expressed in the terms of sexual myth. 
I offer the following version of this story while at the 
34 See Felman' s discussion of this issue in 
"Turning the Screw of Interpretation,• pp. 108-113. 
her article 
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same time, in the form of footnotes, I offer fragments 
of Lacan's text from which my version has been derived, 
the intention being to present in parallel the "original", 
or Lacan's text in its English translation, and its "trans-
lation", or the interpretation and paraphrase of the English 
translation. This may serve as a reminder that Lacan' s 
"original" French text is itself a "return" to that which 
was problematic in Freud's "original" text, which in its 
turn sought to "return" to the problematic in the discourse 
of his analysands, and so forth. The implication is there-
fore that the following paraphrase and the "original" from 
which it derives are links in an infinite chain of supple-
mentary interpretive activity which attempts to account 
for the effects of the Other as that difference which has 
been repressed from linguistic discourse. 
The "story" of the birth of unconscious Desire may 
be told then, as follows: the infant, progressing through 
the Mirror Stage, is endowed with a particular Need, the 
urge to be the phallus to the Mother/the urge to express 
"meaning". In seeking to express his Need, he encounters 
the terms of the Law, the veto of the Father/the laws of 
Symbolic Order. In order to avoid castration/In order 
to make himself understood, he is forced to adapt his primal 
Need to the Symbolic Law which permits him restricted ex-
pression of that Need and forces him to repress the excess 
as "forbidden 11 • 35 As a result the individual expresses/ 
35 In Lacan 's text this is expressed as follows: 
"In the first instance, they [the effects of the presence of the 
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articulates his Need but experiences a gap between his 
Demand and the urge or the desire which he set out to ex-
press. It is this gap, this absence of "full meaning" 
which gives rise to unconscious Desire. 
Henceforward it would seem t~at any Need/meaning ex-
pressed in language as Demand can never be guaranteed to 
be "simple" or literal for every Demand is potentially 
ambiguous, receiving its definition in terms of the "excess 
meaning" which has been repressed from it, or in Anthony 
Wilden's words, "any demand is essentially a demand for 
love." 36 Because the nature of the love demanded is not 
that which can be given - it is not accessible even to 
the parent in the place of the Other - the child is doomed 
to disappointment. Every fulfilment of a particular need 
expressed in Demand is reduced to the crushing of the Demand 
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as a request for love. 
signifier] proceed from a deviation of man's needs from the fact 
that he speaks, in the sense that in so far as his needs are sub-
jected to demand, they return to him alienated. This is not the 
effect of his real dependence ••• but rather the turning into signi-
fying form as such, from the fact that it is from the locus of 
the Other that its message is emitted. 
"That which is thus alienated in needs constitutes an Urver-
drangung (primal repression), an inability, it is supposed, to 
be articulated in demand, but it re-appears in something it gives 
rise to that presents itself in man as desire ( das Begehren)" ( Ecrits 
pp. 285-286). 
36 Wilden in Lacan, Speech and Language, p. 189. 
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"Demand in itself bears on something other than the satis-
factions it calls for. It is demand of a presence or of an absence 
- which is what is manifested in the primordial relation to the 
mother, pregnant with that Other to be situated within the needs 
that it can satisfy. Demand constitutes the Other as already pos-
sessing the 'privilege' of satisfying needs, that it is to say [sic], 
the power of depriving them of that alone by which they are satis-
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It is in the sense of loss that the failed Demands 
generate that there arises Desire. While Demand is uncon-
ditional in its application for love, Desi re imposes the 
"absolute" condition, namely, that it will be satisfied 
only by the filling of the lack, only by the reappropriation 
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of total presence. 
fied. This privilege of the Other thus outlines the radical form 
of the gift of that which the Other does not have, namely, its 
love. 
"In this way, demand annuls (aufhebt) the particularity of 
everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof 
of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are 
reduced (sich erniedrigt) to the level of being no more than the 
crushing of the demand for love .•• " ( Ecrits p. 286). 
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"It is necessary, t.1-ien, that the particularity th us abolished 
should reappear beyond demand. It does, in fact, reappear there, 
but preserving the structure contained in the unconditional element 
of the demand for love. By a reversal that is not simply a nega-
tion of the negation, the power of pure loss emerges from the 
residue of an obliteration. For the unconditional element of demand, 
desire substitutes the 'absolute' condition: this condition unties 
the knot of that element in the proof of love that is resistant 
to the satisfaction of a need. Th us desire is neither the appetite 
for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that 
results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the pheno-
menon of their splitting (Spaltung)" ( Ecrits pp. 286-287). 
The relation between Need, Demand and Desire is also indicated 
in the following passage: 
"Desire is that which is manifested in the interval that demand 
hollows within itself, in as much as the subject, in articu-
lating the signifying chain, brings to light the want-to--
be, together with the appeal to receive the complement from 
the Other, if the Other, the locus of speech, is also the 
locus of this want, or lack. 
"That which is thus given to the Other to fill, and which 
is strictly that which it does not have, since it, too, lacks 
being, is what is called love, but it is also hate and ig-
norance. 
"It is also what is evoked by any demand beyond the 
need that is articulated in it, and it is certainly that of 
which the subject remains all the more deprived to the extent 
that the need articulated in the demand is satisfied" ( Ecrits 
p. 263). 
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By definition, Desire is incompatible with language 
and must remain an unconscious, inexpressible impulse. 
Any attempt to express Desire entails its translation into 
signifiers which by their representative nature reduce 
the "absoluteness" which characterizes Desire. Similarly, 
the "lost object" of Desire, since it amounts to "full" 
or "unmediated" meaning or presence or subjectivity, eludes 
the mediational system of linguistic signification. Every 
object named through Demand as the object of Desire is 
doomed to prove inadequate to the satisfaction of Desire. 
As Anika Lemaire remarks, 
Every object of desire, every object of alienating identi-
fication will reveal itseli to be necessarily ephemeral 
and destined to be supplanted because it is incapable 
of stopping up the lack inscribed in the subject from 
the start by the very fact of his being ecJipsed in 
the signifier. 3 9 
It is in order to represent the . irreducible absence or 
lack which is the effect of signification, the absence 
which gives rise to Desire, that Lacan introduces his "sig-
nifier of signifiers", the Phallus. 
The Phallus as •unparalleled Signifier• (Ecrits p. 277) 
The phallus appears to be marching to 
its own tune, at times in discord with 
the will or intentions of the subject; it 
obeys, one might say, the Other; it func-
tions as a part of speech, as a signifier. 
- Stuart Schneiderman 
It is in the part played by the Phallus in Lacan's 
39 . Lemaire, Jacques Lacan, p. 175. 
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theory that the latter's interpretation of Freudian sexuality 
in terms of divisive, ambiguous, rather than simple or 
literal, meaning is particularly evident. Lacan himself 
makes no typographical distinction between "the phallus" 
as the image of the male sexual organs, and his own special-
ized conception of "the phallus" as a signifier - an omis-
sion which is in keeping with the general ambiguity and 
undecidability of his discourse. I have elected, however, 
to capitalize the latter, specifically Lac an i an usage of 
the term, for the purpose of clarifying my explanations, 
and in order to draw attention to its radical implications. 
The role of the Phallus as signifier is laid down 
by Lac an as fol lows in his seminar, "The S igni f ica ti on 
of the Phallus" (Ecrits pp. 281-291): 
'Ihe phallus reveals its function here. In Freudian 
doctrine, the phallus is not a phantasy, if by that 
we mean an imaginary effect. Nor is it as such an 
object (part-, internal, good, bad, etc. ) in the sense 
that this term tends to accentuate the reality pertaining 
in a relation. It is even less the organ, penis or 
clitoris, that it symbolizes. And it is not without 
reason that Freud used the reference to the simulacrum 
that it represented for the Ancients. 
For the phallus is a signifier, a signifier whose 
function, in the intrasubjective economy of the analysis, 
lifts the veil perhaps from the function it performed 
in the mysteries. For it is the signifier intended to 
designate as a whole the effects of the signified, in 
that the signifier conditions them by its presence as 
a signifier ( Ecrits p. 285). 
Now, in so far as the Mother does not possess a phallus, 
and therefore cannot love to the child's Demand in a physi-
cal sense, the Phallus, as signifier of absence, relates 
to the body. However, in so far as Demand is expressed 
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in language, and language cannot represent the absoluteness 
of the love that is required of the Other ( the Mother as 
Symbolic Parent) by the subject's Other (the Unconscious) 
the Phallus relates to the perfection which is absent from 
linguistic signification. As Barbara Johnson points out, 
the definition of the phallus can no longer bear 
a simple relation either to the body or to language, 
because it is that which prevents both the body and 
language from being simple: "The phallus is the privi-
leged signifier of that mark where l03os is joined toget-
her with the advent of desire. n40 
The Phallus, then, signifies the impossible perfection, 
the impossible object of Desire. However, when it is "un-
veiled" in the moment of psychoanalytic "recognition", 
it proves to be - like any other signifier no more than 
a signifying presence which has represented absence. In 
this role as signifier which represents the ultimate absence 
of the "full truth", the Lacanian Phallus, as the quotation 
above suggests, demystifies the role played by the phallus 
as a veiled transcendental presence in the • . n 41 mysteries • 
40 Barbara Johnson, "The Frame of Reference: Poe, Lacan, 
Derrida," Yale French Studies, 55/56 (1977) p. 497. Johnson quotes 
here from the French Ecrits, (Paris: Seuil, 1966) p. 692. The 
corresponding page in Ecrits: A Selection is p. 287. 
41 In his article "The Horizons of Psychocriticism , " Neal 
Oxenhandler offers a useful explication of the "mysteries" to which 
Lacan refers in the passage I have quoted from Ecrits. With the 
aid of diagrams and photographs, Oxen handler describes the frescoes 
found in the Villa of the Mysteries in Pompeii, and their inter-
pretation by Amedeo Maiuri which Lacan is reputed to have followed. 
The particularly relevant portion of the fresco is that which rep-
resents, in Oxenhandler' s words, 
"... a kneeling maiden who lifts one corner of a purple veil, 
which conceals a huge phallus resting in a tressed basket. 
This basket or mystica vannus is the winnowing fan carried 
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Instead the Phallus is the signifier of the inevitable 
absence of presence which is the effect of signification. 
It is on the question of the Phallus that Lacan 's 
critics have been particularly hostile. To avoid digression 
from the chief concern of outlining Lacan' s theories, I 
offer a summary of some of the more significant criticisms 
in the form of a footnote. 42 
in Dionysian harvest celebrations. 
"The lifting of the veil is halted by a winged figure 
whose left hand is extended across her body in a command 
of deferral, while her right, raised high above her head, 
holds a whip, about to descend on the naked back of the 
young bride . . • The winged demon, seen by M.aiuri as Pudor 
or Shame, may be outraged by the showing of the phallus, 
or perhaps encourages that deferral of the explicitly erotic 
that is known to fan desire"(Oxenhandler, p. 96). 
This arrested unveiling seems to illustrate for Lacan the endless 
deferral of closure on "the truth", the endless displacement of 
Desire along a chain of signifiers. (See N. Oxenhandler, "The 
Horizons of Psychocriticism, " New Literary History XIV, 1, (Autumn 
1982), pp. 89-103). 
42 Criticisms of Lacan 's theories: Because his work has 
considerable affinity with that of Lacan, one of the most interesting 
criticisms is that presented by Jacques D?rrida (see G:iyatri Spivak's 
useful summary of the chief areas of unease between Derrida and 
Lacan in her Translator's Preface to J. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 
(Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974 rpt 1978) 
pp. lxii-lxvii). Derrida's main objections are as follows: begin-
ning from his established standpoint that the general misconception 
of Western metaphysics is that "full presence" exists and is poten-
tially available for reappropriation, Derrida argues that to centre 
signification on "absence" is as much a misconception as to centre 
it on "presence". By postulating the Phallus as the signifier 
of signifiers representing the absence which arises from significa-
tion, Lacan is, in Derrida's terms, merely replacing Logocentrism 
or the "presence" presupposed by the Word, with Phallogocentrism, 
the "absence" presupposed by the Phallus as signifier. Lacan, 
then, is seen as founding his system on a "transcendental signifier". 
This signifier stands outside the class - the class: "signifiers" -
of which it is both a member, yet from which it differs. Its 
difference lies in the fact that it is the one signifier which is 
bound in a non-arbitrary relationship, a relationship of "full pres-
ence" to its signified: "absence". In reply to Lacan's Phallus, 
Derrida offers - to the delight of those feminist critics who view 
Lacan as Phallocentric - the hymen (see Spivak, p. lxvi). 
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From the preceding description of subjectivity in 
Lacanian theory, we are presented with a new view of the 
linguistic subject, and hence, of the reader. In Lacan' s 
terms, he can no longer be conceived of as a subject who, 
according to the model of the Cartesian cogito, has the 
potential to be fully present to himself - a self conscious 
being who is able to reconstruct and control "full meaning" 
The second issue on which Derrida takes Lacan to task is 
that his theories imply that there must be a "truth" towards which 
analysis ultimately works. This is not, as Spivak points out, 
"a simple question of objectification of a subjective position," 
but rather a challenge of the view that there is a point at which 
the analysand arrests the "otherwise endless movement (glissement) 
of the signification" ( Ecrits p. 303). However, Barbara Johnson, 
reviewing the transferential relation between Derrida's interpreta-
tion and Lacan's text, argues that the very undecidability of Lacan's 
own discourse, puts Derrida's reading of that discourse as in 
some way univocal, into doubt. She suggests that Derridc:1 is 
"framing" Lacan "for an interpretive malpractice of which he him.self 
is, at least in part, the author." (See Johnson, "The Frame of 
Reference," p. 478). 
Another critic who has levelled severe criticism at Lacan 
from a Marxist/Deconstructive perspective is Michael Ryan (see 
Ryan, Marxism and Deconstruction ( Baltimore & London: Johns Hop-
kins Univ. Press, 1982) pp. 104-112). Although it is not possible 
to do justice to his criticisms here, his arguments against Lacan 's 
"clearly antimarxist, roundly antifeminist and theocratic" writing 
are certainly to be taken seriously. In relation to Ryan's argu-
ment that "most women would have difficulty in accepting a turgid 
penis as the 'privileged signifier' of their sexuality " ( p. 108) 
an alternative perspective has been adopted by certain feminist 
critics who appear to use the Phallus as a useful weapon against 
Phallocentrism. As a signifier of "absence", of symbolic castration, 
the Lacanian Phallus mocks any male claim to sexual supremacy 
as "empty", founded on "absence". As Jacqueline Rose argues 
for example, "the phallus stands at its own expense and any male 
privilege erected upon it is an imposture 'what might be called 
a man, the male speaking being, strictly disappears as an effect 
of discourse, • . • by being inscribed within it solely as castra-
tion.'" (See Jacqueline Rose, "Introduction II", in Feminine 
Sexuality, p. 44. Her quotation of Lacan comes from his unpub-
lished seminar typescripts: Seminar XVIII, Week 12, p. 4 (1969-
1970). 
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in language. Instead, he is the split subject, irreducibly 
alienated from himself as the Other. Doomed to experience 
the manque-~-etre ( the •gap-in-being" that suggests both 
"want" as desire and "want" as lack) brought about by his 
acquisition of language, he is victim of the insatiable 
unconscious Desire for the "lost object", the "lost meaning" 
represented by the Phallus which, if attained, would seem 
to offer the promise of "full meaning", the jouissance 
of complete satisfaction. In the light of this view of 
the subject, the activity of reading might be viewed as 
another manifestation of the quest after the "lost object", 
the quest to unveil the Phallus and arrive at •the truth". 
Yet the postulation of the unconscious as "structured like 
a language" and moreover, as operating 1 ike a "reader", 
must alter our conception of both the process of questing 
and of "the truth" as quest object. In order to appreciate 
this altered conception it is necessary to study more closely 
the view of the unconscious adopted by Lacan. Since this 
view is dependent on certain concepts of Saussurean linguis-
tics, I shall begin by offering an outline of these. 
SECTION II: THE UNCONSCIOUS 
AS THE OTHER SCENE OF WRITING/READING 
Saussurean Linguistics in the Work of Lacan 
In laying down the general principles of his linguistic 
theory, one of Ferdinand de Saussure's primary concerns 
was to establish a fundamental linguistic unit. This he 
described as a double entity, formed by the association 
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of two terms which he represented with the diagram labelled 
below as "A". Referring to the entire unit as a linguistic 
"sign", he chose to designate the term "signifier" to the 
Sound Image, and the term "signified" to the Concept as 




Although Saussure declared that "the bond between the sig-
nifier and the signified is arbitrary," he nevertheless 
also referred to them as "intimately united, and each re-
calls 44 the other." Thus, while he maintained that the 
relation between the linguistic sign as a whole and the 
real object that it represented was arbitrary, in other 
words that the relation between the two was not a necessary 
relation, the implication remained that Sound -Image and 
Concept were inseparably yoked. 
When Lacan introduced the concept of the Saussurean 
linguistic sign into his seminar, "The Agency of the Letter 
in the Unconscious or Reason Since Freud" (Ecrits pp. 146-
178), he replaced Saussure's illustration of the linguistic 
43 F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. W. 
Baskin (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1974 rpt 1978) p. 66 and p. 114 
respectively. 
44 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, pp. 66-67. 
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"S" 
sign with the algorithm - , in which the upper capitalized 
8 
"S" stands for the signifier, the lower, small, italicized 
"s" for the signified, and the bar between them for the 
bar of signification which separates the two elements irre-
ducibly. 
The significance of this step is considerable. Firstly, 
the reversal of the positions of signifier and signified 
from their original positions in the Saussurean diagram 
is logically consistent with, and a useful illustration 
of Lacan's notion of the repression of the signified "below 
the barrier" of signification. The signifier, according 
to Lacanian theory, takes the place of the signified in 
the Symbolic Order, paradoxically indicating that which 
must simultaneously be absent or repressed since the signi-
fier cannot reappropriate the total presence of the signi-
fied. Furthermore, this reversal of the positions of sig-
nifier and signified illustrates Lacan's argument of the 
primacy of the signifier: the argument that the referent 
has no "proper place" or "meaning" until it has been granted 
nomination in the Symbolic. For Lacan, it is therefore 
the signifier which orders the signified, rather than the 
signified, which by its supposed prior existence determines 
45 the order to be given to the signifying system. 
45 See Spivak, pp. lxiv-lxv for an explication of Derrida's 
misgivings about this treatment of the signifier. She points out 
for example, 
"... Derrida cautions us that, when we teach ourselves to 
reject the notion of the primacy of the signified - of meaning 
over word - we should not satisfy our longing for transcen-
dence by giving primacy to the signifier - word over Il¥:!aning. 
And, Derrida feels that Lacan might have perpetrated pre-
cisely this"(!. !xiv). 
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A further, and perhaps more significant, consequence 
of Lac an' s algorithmic i 11 us tra tion is ind ica tea by his 
l · · · f h · 1 f h a· 46 e 1m1nat1on o t e enc1rc ement o t e 1agram. Instead 
of illustrating the signifier and the signified as two 
aspects of one unit, Lac an i 11 us tra tes them as belonging 
to two "distinct orders separated initially by a barrier 
resisting signification" (Ecrits p. 149). In other words, 
the linguistic sign, far from standing as a unit of original 
meaning, is itself constituted by the divisiveness of dif-
ference, the "bar" between present signifier and absent 
signified. As Vincent Leitch expresses it, 
At this point Lacan breaks up an old heroic affair, 
bows before the barrier and celebrates primordial dif-
ference as impassable. Ever more intensely his si9nifier 
doesn't represent the signified. The Lacanian signifier 
need not signify at all; it may float free. 4 7 
And in the words of Lacan himself, 
• . . we will fail to pursue the question further as long 
as we cling to the illusion that the signifier answers 
to the function of representing the signified, or better, 
that the signifier has to answer for its existence in 
the name of any signification whatever ( Ecrits p. 150). 
Returning once again to the work of Saussure: in 
defining what he referred to as "syntagmatic" and "associ-
ative" relations in language, Saussure had proposed that 
the relations and differences between linguistic terms 
46 I owe this observation to Colin Maccabe, James Joyce 
and the Revolution of the Word ( London & Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1979) p. 73. 
47 Vincent B. Leitch, Deconstructive Criticism (London: 
Hutchinson, 1983) pp. 11-12. 
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fall into two distinct groups, each of which generates 
a certain class of values. Elements arranged in sequence 
along the chain of speaking form combinations supported 
by linearity, and these can be called syntagms. Within 
a syntagm, which is always composed of two or more units, 
a term acquires its value only because it stands in opposi-
tion to everything that precedes it or fol lows it, or to 
both. Outside discourse, co-ordinations form on associative 
relations, the word acquiring value by virtue of its ex-
changeability with other words in a potential mnemonic 
series. Thus, while the syntagmatic relation occurs in 
praesentia, according to present relations and differences, 
the associative relation occurs in absentia according to 
remembered relations and differences. 48 
Years after Saussure, Roman Jakobson, analyzing what 
he refers to as the "twofold character of language," 49 
observes that any linguistic sign or structure involves 
two modes of arrangement: combination and contexture on 
one hand, and selection and substitution on the other. 
The first mode of arrangement implies that any sign is 
made up of constituent signs and may occur in-combination 
with other signs. Thus any linguistic unit may both serve 
as context for simpler units and/or find its own context 
48 Saussure, p. 123. 
49 Roman Jakobson, •Two Aspects of Language and Two Types 
of Aphasic Disturbance, " in R. Jakobson and M. Halle, Fundamentals 
of Language, (The Hague: Mouton, 1956) p. 58. 
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in a more complex 1 inguistic unit. The second mode of 
arrangement, substitution, implies the possibility of ex-
changing one alternative for another, equivalent to the 
original in one respect, but different from it in another. 
Jakobson relates combination and contexture directly to 
Saussure's concept of the occurrence in praesentia of the 
syntagmatic relation, since the linguistic entities are 
conjoined either in both the message and the code, or in 
only the message. Selection and substitution however, 
deal with entities conjoined only in absentia in the code. 50 
Finally, Jakobson identifies this combinative or con-
nective operation of language as "metonymic" since the 
figure of speech "metonymy" involves the substitution of 
one signifier for another on the basis of their contextual 
association. On the other hand, since "metaphor" involves 
the substitution of one signifier by another on the basis 
of their semantic similarity, Jakobson identifies the selec-
tive and substitutive operation of language as "metaphoric". 
Now Lacan, having introduced the notion of a floating 
signifier which does not answer to the function of repre-
senting a fixed signified, and the concept of glissement 
or the sliding of the signified under the signifier, applies 
these ideas to the functioning of metaphor and metonymy. 
Having established that the elements of the linguistic 
unit, the signifier and the signified, are divisible, he 
is able to propose that metonymy operates according to 
SO Jakobson, pp. 60-61 
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a word-to-word or signifier-to-signifier relation in which 
one signifier may replace another, al though the original 
signified slips from signifier to signifier, remaining 
essentially the same. Lacan summarizes this process by 
the following algorithmic formula, emphasizing that in 
the metonymic operation of language, the algorithmic bar 
cannot be crossed: 
f(S .... S')S ~ S(-)s (Ecrits p. 164) 
In this formula, the sign~ represents "equivalence"; (-) 
represents the barrier of difference; f means "functions"; 
S stands for the signifier and s for the signified. We 
may therefore read the formula as follows: metonymy func-
tions, f, by the equivalence between the first signifier 
and the second, S = S; the first signifier hides a dis-
placed original term, s •••• S', and the second signifier 
retains the bar of difference which prevents the signifier 
from ever grasping or merging with the signified, S(-)s. 51 
Lacan illustrates this rnetonymic operation with the 
example of "thirty sails" used rnetonymically to replace 
the phrase "thirty ships." He points out that in the state-
ment "Thirty sails were sighted," the replacement of one 
signifier ("ships") by another ("sails") on the basis of 
their frequent contextual association, appears to have 
51 This explication is composed with assistance from the 
interpretations offered by Leitch ( pp. 13-14) and by Maria Ruegg 
in her article, "Metaphor and Metonymy: The Logic of Structuralist 
Rhetoric," Glyph 6, (1979) p. 151. Ruegg translates fran P. Lacoue-
Labarthe and J-L. Nancy, Le Titre de la Lettre (Une Lecture de 
Lacan) (Paris: Editions Galil~, 1973}. 
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little, if any, effect on the signified (the idea of thirty 
vessels sailing). At most, metonymy could be said to fore-
ground one aspect of the signification ( the spectacle of 
numerous sails) while the original meaning ( the idea of 
thirty vessels sailing) continues to "insist" in spite 
of the occultation of the original signifier: 
. . . we can say that it is in the chain of the signifier 
that meaning 'insists', but that none of its elements 
'consists' in the signification of which it is at the 
moment capable ( Ecrits p. 153). 
It is this elision from one signifier to the next while 
the original signified continues to "insist" that Lacan 
identifies as typical of the operation of unconscious Desire. 
This Desire, generated in the subject, as we have already 
seen, by the sense of lack generated through the acquisition 
of language, propels him in a metonymic elision from lingu-
istic signifier to signifier of Demand in which unconscious 
Desire manifests itself, in search of the lost "presence", 
the potential existence of which seems promised in each 
new signifying chain. In Lacan's words, 
• • • it is the connexion between signifier and signifier 
that permits the elision in which the signifier installs 
the lack-of-being in the object relation, using the value 
of 'reference back' possessed by signification in order 
to in vest it with the desire aimed at the very lack 
it supports ( Ecrits p. 164). 
In contrast to metonymy, the operation of metaphor 
depends in Lacan's view on a word-for-word, or signifier-
for-signifier, substitution based on the semantic connection 
between the two signifieds represented. The ef feet of 
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this substitution is to compound the associations surround-
ing the original signifier which remains present by virtue 
of its metonymic connection with the other elements in 
the signifying chain. Lacan summarizes this operation 
with the algorithmic formula, 
f( 81 ) :it S (+)s s (Ecrits p. 164). 
This can be interpreted as, 
the signifying function of the substitution of one 
signifier for another ( §' ) is equivalent to a •crossing" 
s 
of the bar which permits the revelation of meaning, 
the "grasping" of the "signified"--S(+) 8 • 52 
This subs ti tut ion, viewed in isolation from the metonymic 
operation with which it occurs simultaneously, amounts 
to a "repression" of one signifier (S) by another (S') 
in a vertical chain which will eventually lead to the original 
signified. It is this relation which enables Lacan to 
describe the symptom of the analysand as a metaphor which 
maintains the repression, in the unconscious, of the original 
signifiers by which the psychic problem was represented. 
It is the combinative, syntagmatic operation of meto-
nymy as displacement and the selective, paradigmatic opera-
tion of metaphor as substitution that Lacan introduces 
to Freud's observations on the unconscious. 
52 M. Ruegg, p. 151. 
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The Unconscious: •structured like a Language• 
. . . what the psychoanalytic experience discovers in 
the unconscious is the whole structure of language. 
Thus from the outset I have alerted informed minds 
to the extent to which the notion that the unconscious 
is merely the seat of the instincts will have to be 
rethought (Ecrits p. 147). 
In Lacan's opinion, the frequent allusion to language 
in Freud's work 53 indicates that Freud had detected the 
correlation between the laws governing language and the 
laws governing the unconscious, but since his work pre-
dated the findings of modern linguistics, he was not able 
to establish the conclusion that to Lacan was so irrefutable: 
that· the unconscious is structured like a language. One 
of the areas of research that Freud had used to study the 
unconscious and to establish the laws by which the uncon-
scious appeared to be operating, was the field of dreams. 
As Lacan points out, 
One of the reasons why dreams were most propitious 
for this demonstration is exactly, Freud tells us, that 
they reveal the same laws whether in the normal person 
or in the neurotic ( Ecrits p. 163). 
It is therefore to The Interpretation of Dreams that Lacan 
devotes particular attention. I shall attempt to summarize 
as briefly as possible, the conclusions about the uncon-
scious to which Freud came, and the linguistic interpreta-
tion which Lacan is able to give to these conclusions. 
53 Lacan remarks, for example, 
•rn the complete works of Freud, one out of every three pages 
is devoted to philol03ical references, one out of every two pages 
to l03ical inferences • • • everywhere a dialectical apprehension 
of experience, the proportion of analysis of language increasing 
to the extent that the unconscious is directly concerned·(Ecrits p. 159). 
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Firstly, in Freud's view, dreams seem to function according 
to a general and precond i tional process of Distortion 
(Entstellung). The sensory intensity or vividness of par-
ticular dream images does not correspond to the psychical 
intensity of the elements in the dream-thoughts correspond-
ing to them. Instead, "a complete 'transvaluation of all 
psychical values' takes place between the material of the 
dream-thoughts and the dream." 54 This process of Distortion 
can, in Lacan' s view be equated to the process of glisse-
ment, or the sliding of the signifier, that general precon-
dition of 1 anguage that determines the signifier' s potential 
to represent "something quite other than what it says" 
(Ecrits p. 160). 
Secondly, according to Freud, the form assumed by 
dreams is in essence determined by two governing factors: 
dream Condensation (Verdichtung) and dream Displacement 
(Verschiebung). In his interpretation of this observation, 
Lac an associates, on one hand, the Condensation of many 
latent dream thoughts in one manifest dream image with 
the linguistic operation of Metaphor in which the substitu-
tion of one signifier for another brings about the com-
pounding of associations accruing to both manifest (substi-
tute) and latent (original) signified, but simultaneously 
condenses these associations in the single manifest (subs-
titute) signifier. On the other hand, he equates the 
54 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. James 
Strachey, ed. Angela Richards (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976 
rpt 1980) p. 443. 
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Displacement of latent dream thoughts on to manifest dream 
images with metonymy. Just as the latent dream thought 
may be displaced on to a manifest dream image which is 
only contiguously or contextually connected with the dream 
thought, so the signified may be displaced on to a substi-
tute signifier with which its original signifier is con-
tiguously or contextually, but not semantically, connected. 
What these correlations point to is, that the manifest 
content of the dream is only part of, or one ef feet of, 
an interpretive, •reading" activity the dream-work -
that produces through condensation (metaphor) and displace-
ment (metonymy), the pictographic "text• which represents 
the dream-thought. When this "text", this manifest content 
of the analysand's dream, is interpreted by the psycho-
analyst, it is effectively being subjected to the process 
of combination and selection, metonymy and metaphor, that 
produced it as manifest content in the first place. By 
giving attention to certain "gaps• or "lapses• in this 
manifest content, the analyst explores the Other, repressed 
scene of signification which is not overtly part of the 
manifest content, but which, by its absence, defines that 
present content. 55 Thus while the processes of Distortion, 
Displacement and Condensation indicate that the unconscious 
is structured like a language, and that the discourse of 
55 I am indebted for these conclusions to the discussion 
offered by Robert con Davis in his "Introduction: Lacan and Narra-
tion," pp. 852-853. 
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the unconscious is a •text" that may be "read", they suggest 
furthermore, that the unconscious itself is a "reader". 
Shoshana Felman, one of the first of Lacan' s expl icators 
to consolidate this implication in his theory, gives atten-
tion to the following observations offered by Lacan in 
an unpublished talk given at Yale University in 1975: 
Freoo 's first interest was in hysteria. ( ..• ) He spent 
a lot of time listening, and, while he was listening, 
there resulted something paradoxical, ( ••• ) , that is, 
a reading. It was while listening to hysterics that 
he read that there was an unconscious. That is, some-
thing he could only construct, and in which he himself 
was implicated; he was implicated in it in the sense 
that, to his great astonishment, he noticed that he 
could not avoid participating in what the hysteric was 
telling him, and that he felt affected by it. Naturally, 
everything in the resulting rules through which he 
established the practice of psychoanalysis is designed 
to counteract this consequence, to conduct things in 
such a way as to avoid being affected. 5 6 
Felman herself concludes, 
For Lacan, indeed, the unconscious is not only that 
which must be read, but also, and primarily, that which 
reads. Freud's discovery of the unconscious is the 
outcome of his reading of the hysterical discourse of 
his patients, i.e., of his being capable of reading in 
this hysterical discourse his own unconscious. The 
discovery of the unoonscious is therefore Freud's dis-
oovery, within the disoourse of the other, of what was 
actively reading within himself: his discovery, in other 
words, or his reading, of what was reading - in what 
was being read. The gist of Freud 's disoovery, for 
Lacan, thus consists not simply of the revelation of 
a new meaning - the unconscious - but of the disoovery 
of a new way of reading. 5 7 
56 J. Lacan, transcribed from a recording of his talk at 
the •Kanzer Seminar• (Yale University, Nov. 24, 1975) translated 
from the French by Barbara Johnson and quoted by Shoshana Felman 
in •Turning the Screw of Interpretation," p. 118. 
57 Felman, •Turning the Screw of Interpretation," p. 118. 
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Clearly, the question which such conclusions prompt is, 
how does this psychoanalytic discovery affect our view 
of reading from the perspective of literary theory and 
criticism? In order to offer some answer to this question, 
it is necessary to have some conception of the basic princi-
ples of the Lacanian analytic procedure in which this "new 
way of reading• is put into practice. The next and final 
two segments of this introductory chapter will therefore 
focus on these principles and the implications they hold 
for a literary investigation of the reading activity. 
The Principles of the Lacanian Psychoanalytic Procedure 
To attempt to "outline" a process as subtle as the 
Lacanian psychoanalytic procedure would seem to be an ambi-
tious undertaking best left to experienced explicators 
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of Lacanian theory. All that I can claim to do in the 
following, concluding sections of this introductory chapter 
is to indicate some of the fundamental principles which 
Lacan laid down as the basis for his analytical procedure, 
and to suggest what implications these principles might 
have for the investigation concerning the reader and his 
reading quest which follows. 
Any psychoanalytic procedure which attempts to lead 
the subject towards "adaptation• or •adjustment" to a par-
58 See, for example Stuart Schneiderman, Death of an Intellec-
tual Hero, in the Prologue of which the author describes the subject 
of his book as a rhetorical enact:m:!nt of his experience of psychoanal-
ysis with Ja<XJUes Lacan. Particularly helpful is Olapter 4, pp. 65-80, 
in which Schneiderman discusses the prcx:edure by which the Lacanian 
analyst himself gtajuates frcm analysis - the requirem:!nt that he 
passe la passe. 
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ticular set of social norms thereby implies that such norms 
are to be privileged as "authoritative" and evades the 
recognition that they are the arbitrary constructs of an 
equivalently arbitrary and modifiable Symbolic Order. It 
is not surprising therefore that the Lacanian perspective 
of psychoanalysis denounces any notion of adaptation as 
being "the complacent ally of the blemishes that burden 
society." 59 One of the primary concerns of Lacanian psycho-
analysis would seem to be instead, the reduction of the 
alienation of the conscious subject from his unconscious. 
Such alienation is seen to be intensified by the condition 
of misrecognition (m~connaissance) - a failure to recognize 
that the sense of lack or loss which causes and continues 
to accompany alienation, has its roots, not in any defici-
ency of the subject himself, but in the very nature of 
language as a representative system. Speaking in very 
general terms, one might say then, that the Lacanian analyst, 
as "director of the proceedings", must attempt to direct 
the analysand away from his state of rnisrecognition (mfcon-
naissance), towards the recognition (reconnaissance) of 
his relationship to the Other, and of the implications 
which this relationship entails implications which I 
hope will become clear in the course of this discussion. 
Two points, which emerge from Anthony Wilden's discuss ion 
of the relation between misrecognition and recognition, 
are of particular note here. Wilden argues, 
59 Antoine Vergote, Foreword, Jacques Lacan, by Anika 
Lemaire, p. xxi. 
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• • • the distinction between Knowledge (savoir) and 
truth repeatedly emphasized by Lacan points up the 
function of m~nnaissance and reconnaissance in human 
life. Truth for the subject is not knowledge but recog-
nition. Mental illness on the other hand is precisely 
the refusal to recognize that truth; the mechanisms 
of negation, disavowal, rejection, isolation, and so 
forth fl.ow from it. But a certain m~nnaissance -
which we might call sublimation - is essential to health; 
Dostoievskian hyperconsciousness is no solution. The 
point is of course that hyperconsciousness or hyper-
reoognition simply corresponds to the intensity of the 
loss [the primal •1oss" of "full subjectivity", "full 
meaning" and so forth that accompanies the accession 
to language ].6 0 
In the light of these observations it would seem that, 
firstly, from a Lacanian perspective, all linguistic sub-
jects are regarded as possessing knowledge of the "truth" 
(the term "truth" here is used in the specialized sense 
of the discovery that "full truth", •absolute subjectivity" 
or "full meaning" can never be accessible to the linguistic 
subject) al though this knowledge may nevertheless be ob-
scured by misrecognition. It therefore seems that the 
aim of psychoanalysis is to direct the subject towards 
a recognition of the "truth" which paradoxically, he already 
knows. Furthermore, Wilden seems to establish here a fine 
distinction between two kinds of m~connaissance. On one 
hand, there is m~connaissance which refuses to see the 
•truth", which refuses to acknowledge the fictional nature 
of the ego and is therefore doomed to an endless quest 
after the •1ost object• which will supposedly complete 
the jigsaw of identity. In contrast to such m~connaissance 
is the experience of reconnaissance which subverts the 
60 Wilden in Lacan, Speech and Language, p. 166. 
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construct of the ego and instigates a recognition of the 
nature of split subjectivity and Desire as the irreducible 
products of language acquisition. Wilden indicates the 
problem that such reconnaissance cannot in practice be 
a sustained experience since it would then become the hyper-
recognition which would simply correspond to the intensity 
of the subject's sense of loss or alienation from himself. 
He therefore hypothesizes what might be called "informed 
misrecognition" or in his own words, "a certain m~connais-
sance - which we might call sublimation." This seems quite 
distinct from the uninformed misrecognition of one who 
is frustrated by his sense of "lack", and who experiences 
his Desire as a problematic, alienated impulse arising 
from the yearning after that which has been forbidden. 
It is rather that sublimation which permits the redirection 
of the impulse of Desire away from its primary aim ( the 
attainment of the lost object) towards a substitute. This 
sublimation is not imposed upon the subject by any authority, 
but is a choice available to one who accepts that "absolute 
subjectivity," and "absolute truth" must be relinquished 
if the representative system of language is accepted. This 
raises one of the central issues with which the principles 
of Lacanian analysis are concerned: 
authority. 
the issue of analytic 
It might be assumed that at the start of an analysis, 
the analyst is visualized as the authority who is in pos-
session of the object of the analysand's quest - the means 
of identifying the problem aril a prescription for its solution. 
54 
Lacan however, forestalling any such assumption, dismisses 
the possibility that the analyst's position is authoritative: 
Let us set out from the conception of the Other as the 
locus of the signifier. Any statement of authority has 
no other guarantee than its very enunciation, and it 
is pointless for it to seek it in another signifier, which 
could not appear outside this locus in any way. Which 
is what I mean when I say that no metalanguage can 
be spoken, or, more aphoristically, that there is no 
Other of the Other. And when the Legislator ( he who 
claims to lay down the Law) presents himself to fill 
the gap, he does so as an imposter (Ecrits pp. 310-311). 
In other words, the analyst in Lacan's view must take the 
place, not of the analysand's other or alter ego, but of 
the Other. This however, does not entail taking upon him-
self the power of the Other, but rather, standing in the 
place of the Other as the locus of difference. As has 
already been suggested earlier in this introduction (see 
pages 15 - 16 and 24 ) , Lac an at tacks vehemently, the con-
ception of the ego - both the ego of the patient and that 
of the analyst as an agent of adaptation. He dismisses 
outright, notions of analysis as "striving for 'an emotional 
re-education of the patient'" (Ecrits p. 226); or as opera-
ting according to "the principles of a training of the 
'weak' ego, by an ego that one pleases to believe is capable, 
on account of its 'strength', of carrying out such a project" 
(Ecrits p. 229). If the analyst seeks to "strengthen" 
the ego of the analysand, on the basis of the •strength" 
of his own ego, he is in fact imposing the arbitrary auth-
ority of what is no more than a fictional construct (his 
ego}, or alternatively, the arbitrary authority of a par-
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ticular psychoanalytic perspective, onto the similarly 
fictional and arbitrary construct of the ego of the ana-
lysand. He therefore, not only overlooks the arbitrariness 
of his own authority and of the analysand's identity, but 
at the same time ignores the repressed aspects of the ana-
lysand's unconscious, and in Lacan's view, it is indubitably 
in that which is repressed that the source of the analysaoo's 
problem is to be found. Thus Lacan argues, "Certainly 
the psychoanalyst directs the treatment. The first princi-
ple of the treatment . • . is that he must not direct the 
patient" (Ecrits p. 227). 
From a Lacanian perspective then, analysis is not 
to be viewed as a one-way, "univocal" communication between 
two persons: the analysand who is in the position of ig-
norance and subservience, consul ting the analyst in the 
position of knowledge and mastery. Instead, it can be 
seen as taking the shape of a two-way, plurisignif icant 
communication involving four "persons": the conscious 
and unconscious "selves" of both 
This view is clearly illustrated 
analysand and analyst. 
in Lacan' s use of the 
analogy of a game of bridge where the place of "dummy" 
is taken by the analyst's conscious self who remains "dumb" 
or silent to the analysand's Demands for prescriptive ad-
vice ( Ecri ts pp. 229-230). I shall return to the question 
of this silence shortly. The progress of the Lacanian 
analysis can be envisaged therefore as dialectical, rather 
than linear. In Anthony Wilden's words, 
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It is in the sense that the dialectical movement of the 
analysis is not linear, but progressively and cumulatively 
spiral, and in the sense that the relationship of the 
two subjects involved is mediated in both directions 
by subjects who are not present, that Lacan can speak 
of a "reform" - not so much a reform of psychoanalysis, 
since the forms upon which it depends are to be found 
in Freud, but of a reform of our view of the subject 
from both sides of the couch. 61 
The dialectical movement of the analysis, entailing 
a passage through the Other as a position of "thirdness" 
is instigated, it would seem, by the transference. For 
Lacan, this is the process whereby the analysand attempts 
to change the position of the analyst from that of auditor, 
to that of interlocutor, by addressing Demands towards 
h . 62 1m. These Demands give an indication of the "image" 
that the analysand has unconsciously imposed onto the per-
son of the analyst - an image which amounts to the alter 




At the most elementary level, the silent "neutrality" 
of the analyst {his role as "dummy") enables the subject 
to project onto him the image of the significant other 
to whan the subject is addressing his parole viaeJ63] This 
alter ego of the subject is the ego of the subject him-
self insofar as his ego is the product of a capture ~ 
the other {ultimately reducible to the ideal of the ego.} 
Wilden in Lacan, Speech and Language, p. xii. 
See Wilden in Lacan, Speech and Language, p. xi. 
The parole vide, the "empty word" or "vacuous discourse" 
is described elsewhere by Wilden as •an Imaginary discourse, or 
discourse impregnated with Imaginary elements which have to be 
resolved if the subject and analyst are to progress to the ideal 
point of the parole pleine [full Word]. For Lacan, the main features 
of this Imaginary discourse are the demands (intransitive in fact} 
which the subject makes of the analyst" {Speech and Language, 
p. 185). 
64 Wilden in Lacan, Speech and Language, pp. 167-168. 
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The Demands or questions of the analysand, as has already 
been explained ( see pp. 28 - 32), are translations of uncon-
scious Desire directed towards the analyst as "he who is 
supposed to know" or in Lacan's more memorable French phrase, 
le-sujet-suppos~-savoir. It is the analysand's belief 
that the analyst has the answers to his search for the 
"truth" which grants the analyst his power to support the 
transference: 
It is insofar as he is "supposed to know" - however 
incorrect this is, of course - that the analyst becomes 
the support of the transference. 65 
The manner in which the analyst supports the transference 
is paradoxically by his silence, his refusal to respond 
to, or attempt to satisfy, the Demands which the analysand 
addresses to him in the transference. Lacan argues adamantly: 
To what I hear, I have nothing more to say if I under-
stand nothing, and if I do understand something I am 
sure to be mistaken. However, this is not what would 
stop me from replying. It's what happens outside ana-
lysis in such a case. I keep quiet. Everybody agrees 
that I frustrate the speaker, him first, but me too. 
Why? 
If I frustrate him it is because he asks me for some-
thing. To answer him, in fact. But he knows very 
well that it would be mere words. And he can get 
those from whomever he likes. It's not even certain 
that he'd be grateful to me if they were good words, 
let alone if they were bad ones. It's not these words 
he's asking for. He is simply asking me ••• from the 
very fact that he is speaking; his demand is intransi-
tive, it carries no object with it. 
Of course, his demand is deployed on the field 
of an implicit demand, that for which he is there: 
the demand to cure him, to reveal him to himself, ••• 
But, as he knows, this demand can wait. His present de-
65 mm Lacan, Speech and Language, p. 72, footnote 
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mand has nothing to do with this, it is not even his 
own, for after all it is I who have offered to speak 
to him. (Only the subject is transitive here.) 
In short, I have succeeded in doing what in the 
field of ordinary commerce one would dearly like to 
be able to do with such ease: with supply I have 
created demand ( Ecrits p. 254). 
It is evident that, were the analyst to respond to the 
Demands of the analysand by, for example, prescribing to 
him through the metalanguage of an analytic theory, he 
would effectively be fixing the analysand's subjective 
position as "he who must receive the Law," and maintaining 
the repression of the analysand's Desire as "that which 
must be forbidden." However, since the analyst is not 
the alter ego of the analysand, he remains silent to the 
latter's Demands. 
It is through his refusal to assume the role of alter 
ego in which the analysand casts him that the analyst passes 
to the role of the Other, the place of "thirdness" in the 
discourse. This process is described by Wilden as follows: 
the analyst is himself neither an object nor an 
alter ego; he is the third man. Although he begins 
by acting as a mirror for the subject, it is through 
his refusal to respond at the level consciously or un-
consciously demanded by the subject ( ultimately the 
demand for love) , that he will eventually ( or ideally) 
pass from the role of "dummy", whose hand the subject 
seeks to play to that of the Other with whom the barred 
subject of his patient is unconsciously communicating. 
The mirror relationship of ego and alter ego which was 
the obstacle to recognition of his unconscious desire 
which the subject has set up and maintained will be 
neutralized , the subject's mirages will be •cons urned• , 
and it will be possible for the barred subject to accede 
to the authenticity of what Lacan calls "the language 
of his desire" through his recognition of his relation-
ship to the Other. 6 6 
66 Wilden in Lacan, Speech and Language, p. 168. 
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This "recognition of_ his relationship to the Other" would 
seem to entail for the analysand, among other things, an 
acceptance of his Desire as that which must, by definition, 
always be elsewhere: it is the Desire of the Other. 67 
Coupled with this is the acceptance of the unconscious, 
the Other, as that "knowledge" of which nobody can be the 
subject, the authority. It is "authorless and ownerless, 
to the extent that it is a knowledge which no consciousness 
can master or be in possession of, a knowledge which no 
conscious subject can attribute to himself, assume as his 
own knowledge. 1168 The silence of the analyst, his refusal 
to assume the power of one who knows, is effectively a 
refusal to crush or repress with words, the "silence" of 
67 The following r~sum~ of the analytical progress offered 
by Stuart Schneiderman may be helpful here: 
"At the beginning of an analysis the analyst is an enigma, 
a being of desire, whose desire is indefinite. The analyst's 
desire is not for this or for that; there is no object that 
can satisfy it. We call it pure desire; it wants • . • • • but 
not this or that. In the transference the analysand takes 
this desire for his own, in the two senses of the word "takes." 
At first he believes that it is his own; he sees in the 
analyst's desire the desire that would be his were he not 
alienated from it. And eventually he will take this desire 
away from the analyst, reducing the latter to something like 
an old rag. At the termination of a psychoanalysis there 
is no identification of analyst and analysand; the analysand 
discards his analyst and buries his analysis because he 
has assumed the Other's desire and has learned to negotiate 
with a desire that is elsewhere. He no longer desires to 
continue his psychoanalysis; he wants to get on with things, 
to reenter the oourse of things, its discourse (Death of an 
Intellectual Hero, pp. 83-84). 
68 Felman, "Turning the Screw of Interpretation,• p. 128. 
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the unconscious as that knowledge which cannot name itself. 69 
Since there is no "Other of the Other,• no safe, authori-
tative place outside Otherness - in the analytic situation, 
outside •madness• - any attempt to interpret the discourse 
of the analysand must find itself repeating, redramatizing, 
the very structure which it seeks to analyze. For to inter-
pret the discourse, to make "meaning• where there has been 
ambiguity or contradiction, involves the refusal of such 
ambiguity, the repress ion of "difference• and it is pre-
cisely such repressed material which has rendered the ana-
lytic exercise necessary. 
The analysand must recognize furthermore, that to be a 
linguistic subject is not to be an •entity•, but rather to 
occupy a particular position and function in language which 
itself is defined by those positions and functions which 
are repressed as different. 
it, 
As Malcolm Bowie expresses 
• • • the subject is no thing at all and can be grasped 
only as a set of tensions, or mutations, or dialectical 
upheavals within a continuous, intentional, future-
directed process. 7 0 
The progress of analysis then entails the analysand's in-
vestigation, through his own dis course, of the variable-
positions which are accessible to him in language. In 
69 Lacan remarks, ·The unconscious is knowledge; but it 
is a knowledge one cannot know one knows, a knowledge which 
cannot tolerate knowing it knows.• - •1,es Non-dupes errent, • 
(unpublished) quoted by Felman, •Turning the Screw of Interpreta-
tion,• p. 166. 
70 Bo · ·J • 131 w1.e, acques Lacan, p. • 
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the course of this procedure, he is effectively being ini-
tiated - through the silence of the analyst, through the 
latter's assumption of the position of the Other - into 
the "new way of reading" described earlier. The quest 
object of this "new way of reading" is no longer the dis-
covery of the answer to the analysand's problem, or the 
"truth" as solution to the mystery of his frustration (what 
his discourse means), but rather discovery of the conditions 
necessary for "meaning" or "truth" to be apparent at all 
(how his discourse mean). 71 The supporting of the can 
transference enables the subject to return, through the 
process of regression, to the "primal scene" in which his 
frustrations had their "origin." Whether this "primal 
scene" is viewed as a "real" remembered event or as a neces-
sary product of the analysand's discursive requirements, 
and is therefore fictional or tropological, is not impor-
72 tant. What is important is its function: rather than 
a literal occurrence, a "phallus" to be "unveiled" as ulti-
mate truth, it is an experience of "primary reading" in 
which the repression of difference or ambiguity permits 
the possibility of interpretive meaning. What is unveiled 
is "absence", or in other words, what is recognized is, 
71 This oonclusion is drawn with the assistance of Felman 's 
ideas in "Turning the Screw of Interpretation," p. 119. 
72 See Jonathan Culler's interesting discussion in "Story 
and Disoourse in the Analysis of Narrative,• in The Pursuit of 
Signs, (London and Henley: Routledge and Regan Paul, 1981) in 
particular pp. 169-181. He outlines two principles of narrative 
in Freudian psychoanalytic theory, one moving from cause to the 
relation of effects, the other moving from effects to the deduction 
of cause. 
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that in order for discourse to have meaning, alternatives 
to that meaning must be excluded or repressed. 
This brings us to the vital role of narrative as a 
form of conscious discourse. As I have already explained, 
the excluded Other, or repressed meaning of unconscious 
knowledge is inaccessible to the subject. One of the only 
ways then, in which he can be made aware of this repressed 
meaning - this Other scene of writing/reading - is through 
conscious discourse or narration. Only through the order 
and continuity of narration can evidence of unconscious 
interpretive activity manifest itself in the verbal slip, 
the lapsus, the "gap" or joke which indicates that which 
has been excluded, that "non-sense" which, by its absence 
supports the present sense of the utterance. 
Con Davis's words, 
In Robert 
Narration - irremediably diachronic and synchronic -
repeats and represents unconscious discourse in the 
only way the unconscious can be known; as a sequence 
of opportunities for linguistic substitution and (re)ccmbi-
nation. The potential for continuity and unity in such 
sequences makes possible the "gaps" or "lapses" that 
indicate the "Other" scene of signification, the repressed 
scene of writing not a part of manifest narration but 
which (like a buoy, or series of buoys) holds it up 
and enables it to exist at all. 7 3 
It is this view of narration that has particularly inter-
esting implications for a study of reading. en the one 
hand, the narrative text can be attributed authority: 
traditionally, the author is regarded as "the master," 
the one presumed to know. Yet, if we argue that the very 
73 D · " trod . L d . • avis, In ucti.on: acan an Narrati.On, p. 853. 
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continuity and order of narrative "knowledge" is what re-
veals the "gaps" or "lapses" indicating the Other scene 
of writing, then it becomes clear that in the very process 
of expressing what it "knows", the narrative text paradoxi-
cally must also reveal the bl ind-spots of its knowledge, 
that which it does not know, that which it cannot resolve 
or translate through its discourse. In the process of 
authorizing its knowledge, it unconsciously displaces, 
or transfers, its authority onto the reader as the sujet-
suppos~-savoir, or he who is in a position to unveil/trans-
late that which the narrative does not know. Yet the reader, 
in the very act of responding to _ this interpretive chal-
lenge is himself forced to assume the paradoxical role 
of a knowing/blind narrator. It is this strangely para-
doxical nature of the reader as interpreter of narrative 
discourse that this thesis undertakes to explore. 
THE QUEST OBJECT OF THIS THESIS AS A READING 
Having attempted to delineate the fundamental concepts 
underlying Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, I shall now 
briefly map out the course I shall try to follow in explor-
ing the implications of these concepts for reading as text-
ual interpretation. 
Since one of the most radical implications of Lacan's 
insights appears to be the discovery of a •new way of read-
ing" arising from the hypothesis that the unconscious is 
both structured like a language and is itself a reader, 
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the first issue I should like to explore is the possibility 
that certain literary texts might authorize a •traditional 
reading" - the pursuit of what a text means while others 
might provoke a reading equivalent to the •new way of read-
ing" to which the Lacanian psychoanalytic procedure points 
- a reading which pursues the question of how a text means. 
The first chapter of the thesis will therefore involve 
a comparison of the textual strategies employed by two 
texts which, I shall argue, provoke two radically different 
modes of reading. The first of these texts is a contempo-
rary detective novel, The Blue Hammer (1976), by Ross Mac-
donald. Like most detective fiction, this novel can be 
seen as a metaphorization of the literary quest after "the 
truth" or the conclusive meaning. It does not, however, 
concern itself with questions about the nature of truth 
or the nature of the authority by which truth is established. 
By way of contrast, the second novel, chosen from the ranks 
of the French nouveau roman, The Erasers (Les Gommes) (1953) 
by Alain Robbe-Grillet, might be described as an •anti-
detective novel" which undertakes to expose precisely those 
conditions upon which the successful attainment of the 
quest object in the first text depends. 
The second issue I shall investigate is the supple-
mentari ty of the relationship between the narrator as •au-
thor• of textual discourse and the reader as interpreter 
or translator. Using William Faulkner's Absalom, Absalom! 
(1936), I shall explore the possibility that narration 
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is an effect of reading; that the Other as the unknowable, 
is transferred from narrator to reader as an experience 
of conflict between accessible and repressed meaning 
a conflict which reproduces itself in the reader as the 
Desire to resolve the conflict, 
Vladimir 
or make meaning. 
Nabokov's Lolita 
In the 
(1955), third chapter, using 
I shal 1 explore the implications of Lacan's translation 
of Freudian sexual mythology in linguistic terms. If "the 
Other" is forbidden/that which is beyond expression in 
conscious discourse, what does this imply about the aspira-
tions of art or for our purposes, the aspirations of 
literary art to satisfy Desire, attaining "the Other" 
and achieving "full disclosure" of "the truth"? 
In the fourth chapter, I shall attempt to synthesize 
and elaborate on the arguments presented in the preceding 
chapters, in a reading of Henry James's What Maisie Knew 
(1897). 
As this resum~ shows, the novels I have chosen to 
work with in this thesis are selected from a fairly wide 
temporal spectrum. Notably then, while- the novels of Mac-
donald, Robbe-Grillet and Nabokov may be regarded as con-
temporary with the early and intermediate phases of Lacan's 
career, Faulkner's Absalom, Absalom! although post-Freudian, 
predates the publication of Lacan' s Ecri ts (Paris: Seuil, 
1966), and Henry James's What Maisie Knew predates Freud's 
seminal publication on the unconscious, The Interpretation 
of Dreams (1900). This spectrum is intended to reflect, 
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firstly, an equivalence between Lacan's insights and those 
of certain authors such as Robbe-Grillet and Nabokov work-
ing contemporarily with him. At the same time, it is in-
tended to demonstrate that, fascinating as these equiva-
lences may be, they by no means outshine the achievements 
of earlier writers, who without the advantages of recent 
epistemological insights, nevertheless noticed an:J attempted 
to account for the effects of that manifestation which 
was to be named "the unconscious" by Freud and which was 
subsequently to be recognized as an effect of language 
by Lacan. 
* * * * * 
As an afterword to this introduction and a foreword 
to the thesis proper, a final/prefatory Lacanian warning 
must be re-echoed: 
• • • there is no Other of the Other. And when the 
Legislator (he who claims to lay down the law) presents 
himself to fill the gap, he does so as an imposter 
(Ecrits pp. 310-311). 
Throughout the course of this thesis, the reader who writes 
it and the reader who reads it must be reminded that as 
an investigation of the reader's quest, the discourse of 
the thesis has been compelled to assume a discursive posi-
tion outside that quest, from which to draw its conclusions. 
However, even from this position, it cannot escape the 
paradox that it is itself a quest - a "meta-quest• - which 
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repeats the very activities upon which it seeks to comment. 
Consequently, even as it performs the role of "commentary-
upon-the-quest" it must find itself forgetting or repres-
sing its simultaneous role of "performance-of-the-quest", 
and therefore of "material-under-scrutiny". If it is to 
recognize the latter roles, it must simultaneously disrupt 
its authoritative status as commentary. Thus, the thesis 
must find itself redramatizing the very split in the reading 
position which is one of its objects of scrutiny. 
* * * * * 
CHAPTER ONE 
WHODUNIT OR WHODONUT: READING AS CONSUMPTION? 
Le roman policier a ceci de particulier que 
la figure narrative qu 'il ernbl~matise est celle-
1a meme d 'une question interpr~tative: puisque 
l 'histoire du crime qui fait l 'objet du roman est, 
au d~part, enrob~ de mys~re pour le d~tective 
comme pour le lecteur, et ne sera comprise, ~lair-
cie, reconstitu~ qu •a la fin; puisqu 'il incombe 
done au d~tective - accompagn~ du lecteur - d '-
interpr~ter les donn~s lacunaires pour en d~-
chiffrer l'histoire, c'est-a-dire pour trouver 
mais seulement a la fin - la position de savoir 
qui perrnette de raconter l' histoire en tant que 
~cit classique, le policier met en acte la lecture 
et th~rnatise la figure du lecteur ~ 1' interieur 
meme de son r~cit. 
1 
- Shoshana Felman 
1 
"The particularity of the detective novel is that the nar-
rative shape which it eml:x:xHes is precisely that of an interpretive 
question: since the story of the crime which forms the object 
of the novel is from the outset clothed in mystery, for the detec-
ti ve as for the reader, and will not be understood, illuminated, 
reconstructed until the end; since it is therefore encumbent upon 
the detective - acoompanied by the reader - to interpret the 
lacunary givens in order to decipher the story, that is tn say, 
to find - but only at the end - the position of knowledge which 
permits the relating of the story as conventional narrative, the 
detective novel enacts reading and thematizes the figure of the 
reader in the very interior of its narration.• (Shoshana Felman, 
"De Sophocle a Japrisot ( via Freud), ou pourquoi le policier?" 
Li~rature, 49 ( f~vrier 1983) p. 24, my translation). 
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In the preceding Introduction I have tried to demonstrate 
that according to Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, man's 
world receives meaning in terms of that network of cultural 
and linguistic codes that constitutes what we may call 
the Order of the Symbolic. Intrinsic to this view is the 
recognition of language as a representative, material system 
rather than a transparent medium. By virtue of the same 
recognition, leaders in 1 i terary theory and practice have 
come to question the relationship between the literary 
text and the "reality" it supposedly represents. The popu-
lar conception of the realistic novel as the product of 
careful representation or mirroring of the reality which 
precedes it, has been challenged by statements such as this: 
For a particular society, . • • the work that is realistic 
is that which repeats the received forms of 'Reality'. 
It is a question of reiterating the society's system 
of intelligibility. 2 
Just as Lacanian theory has focused on the Symbolic Order 
as a system of arbitrary conventions supported by, and 
conversely subvertible by, the Other as repressed difference, 
so literary practitioners have given considerable atten-
tion to the operation of linguistic and literary conventions 
in literary discourse; to the effects and implications 
of conforming to, or subverting such conventions. 
Now, for many years, detective fiction, largely by 
virtue of its formulaic, uniform structure, has been treated 
2 Stephen Heath, The Nouveau Roman, (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1972) p. 21. 
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perfunctorily by literary critics, many of whom dismiss 
the detective novel as presenting, 
• • • predictable problems of no intrinsic interest, stereo-
typed characterisations, and undistinguished writing -
in short, a literature for puzzle addicts and thrill seekers 
produced at best by ingenious purveyors of ccmn::xhties. 3 
With the recent increase of attention to literary conven-
tions and their operation, the highly conventionalized 
structure of the detective novel has proved of central 
interest, not only to avant-garde novelists who wish to 
explore the effects of subverting convention, but to literary 
theorists and critics who seek to identify and describe 
the processes and implications of both conformity and sub-
version. 
It is because the detective novel provides a relatively 
simple model of the operation of the conventions of realist 
fiction and, more significantly, because, in the words 
of Shoshana Felman, it •enacts reading and thematizes the 
figure of the reader in the very interior of its narration, 114 
that I have chosen to proceed now with a •detective investi-
gation". The first task will be to investigate the textual 
conditions which permit the sleuth in the conventional 
3 Dennis Porter, The Pursuit of Crime, (New Haven and Lon-
don: Yale University Press, 1981) p. 3. This resum~ of common 
attitudes of literary critics should not be read as an indication 
of Porter's own approach to the subject. On the contrary, his 
oomprehensive discussion of crime fiction has proved extremely 
useful to this investigation. 
4 
•. • • le policier met en act la lecture et th~matise la figure 
du lecteur a l 'interieur m~me de son recit• - Felman, •ne SOphocle 
A Japrisot• p. 24, my translation. 
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detective novel to arrive at •the truth•, the final •explo-
sion de la verit~. • 5 The second task will be to investigate 
how such conditions might be subverted by the authorization 
of the very possibilities which the conventional detective 
novel conscientiously represses, and what the implications 
of such subversion might reveal about the reader and his 
quest for •truth•. 
* * * * * 
At the start of the detective story, the detective 
is in the position of an interpreter or reader who is con-
fronted with a mystery, a failure in meaning or rupture 
of order in the •text" of the world. The task he under-
takes is to unearth concealed evidence or to recognize 
and translate ambiguities, and to resolve his findings 
into a solution, a reading, that will restore order satis-
factorily. Since, then, the detective can be seen as a 
paradigm of the reader, and since the focus of this thesis 
is the reader and his interpretive activity, it seems appro-
priate to begin this inquiry with a study of the detective-
hero of a popular detective novel, The Blue Hammer by Ross 
Macdonald. 
Macdonald belongs to a tradition of detective story 
writers commonly referred to as •hard-boiled" and first 
represented in America in the late 1920's and early 1930's 
by Raymond Chandler and Dashiell Hammett. The works of 
5 Michel Butor quoted by Stephen Heath in The Nouveau Roman, 
p. 34. 
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these writers are generally regarded as less formulaic 
and more novelistic than the •classical• detective stories 
of •pure puzzle, pure ratiocination associated with Poe, 
Conan Doyle, Agatha Christie. • 6 Particularly useful to 
my purposes is Macdonald's practice of incorporating refer-
7 
ences to Freudian psychology into his novels. Such refer-
ences are evident in The Blue Hammer which in its setting 
on the West Coast of California and its descriptions of 
the further exploits of detective-hero Lew Archer, is typi-
cal of Ross Macdonald's fiction. Let us beg in then, by 
investigating the credentials of Lew Archer. 
The Detective as Questing Reader 
From the outset of his quest through the text of The 
Blue Hammer, the reader is assured of the presence of an 
experienced guide and mentor. Lew Archer takes the place 
of a first-person narrator, an authoritative, originating 
•1•, antecedent to the text, not only describing clearly 
what he himself sees, but being himself seen and addressed 
by name as a •real• character who has a proper place in 
a •real• world: 8 
6 Michael Holquist, •whodunit and Other Questions: Metaphysi-
cal Detective Stories in Post-War Fiction,• New Literary History, 
3 (1971/2) p. 139. 
7 This observation is oorroborated by Geoffrey Hartman in 
his essay, •Literature High and Low: The Case of the Mystery 
story,• in The Fate of Reading and Other Essays, ( Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1975) p. 209. 
8 See Dennis Porter's discussion of the function of the •highly 
visible narrator, ·-The Pursuit of Criae, pp. 91-92. 
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I drove up to the house on a private road that widened 
at the summit into a parking apron. When I got out 
of my car I could look back over the city and see the 
towers of the mission and the courthouse half submerged 
in smog. The channel lay on the other side of the 
ridge, partly enclosed by its broken girdle of islands. 
The only sound I could hear, apart from the hum 
of the freeway which I had just left, was the noise 
of a tennis ball being hit back and forth. The court 
was at the side of the house, enclosed by high wire 
mesh. A thick-bodied man in shorts and a linen hat 
was playing against an agile blonde woman. Something 
about the trapped intensity of their game reminded 
me of prisoners in an exercise yard. 
The man lost several points in a row and decided 
to notice my presence. Turning his back on the woman 
and the game, he came towards the fence. 
'Are you Lew Archer?' 
I said I was. 
'You 're late for our appointment.' 
'I had some trouble finding your road.' 9 
If, as Jonathan Culler argues, "the basic convention which 
governs the nove 1 is our expectation that the novel 
·11 a ld • 10 h. · · 1 1 ·a w1 pro uce a wor , t 1s convention 1s c ear y ev1 ent 
in this introduction. Not only does the text provide the 
reader with a world, but in Archer, it also provides him 
with a clear means of orientation to it. 
That Archer is a perceptive and accurate interpreter 
of the •text" of the world before him is almost immediately 
confirmed. For example, he is quick to detect that the 
•game• of tennis which the Biemeyers are playing is a means 
of diversion from their mutual sense of frustration and 
oppression in each other's company: "Something about the 
9 Ross Macdonald, The Blue Hammer, (Glasgow: Fontana Collins, 
1976 rpt. 1978) p. 5. All subsequent references to this text will 
be included in the body of the chapter using the abbreviation 
"BH" followed by the relevant page number. 
lO Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics, (London and Henley: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975 rpt. 1980) p. 189. 
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trapped intensity of their game reminded me of prisoners 
in an exercise yard." The accuracy of his reading is sup-
ported by the acerbity of their subsequent dialogue: 
'I'm Ruth Biemeyer. You must be thirsty, Mr Archer. 
I know I am.' 
'We won't go into the hospitality routine,' Biemeyer 
said. 'This man is here on business. ' 
'I know that. It was my picture that was stolen.' 
'I'll do the talking, Ruth , if you don't mind. ' 
(BH p. 6) 
If •every detective novel constitutes as it were, a 
school of suspicion, in which the lesson is a warning against 
naive reading • 11 Lew Archer is a well-trained, experi-
enced scholar and as such an admirable mentor to the reader 
who accompanies him in his quest. One of the lessons Archer 
has learned most thoroughly, is to mistrust literal signi-
fication, and to anticipate the possibility of concealed, 
alternative meaning. This interpretive expertise is mani-
fested, for example, when Ruth Biemeyer, describing the 
painting which has been stolen from her house and which 
she is in the process of engaging Archer to recover, men-
tions the mysterious disappearance of the Californian artist 
Richard Chantry who was reputed to have painted the picture: 
'Where did Richard Chantry disappear from?' 
'From here, ' she said. 'From Santa Teresa. ' 
'Recently?' 
'No. It was over twenty-five years ago. He simply 
decided to walk away from it all. He was in search 
of new horizons, as he said in his farewell statement. ' 
11 
•... tout roman policier oonstitue • • • en quelque sort.e, 
une ~ de sou~n, dont 1' instruction est un averti~nt oontre 
la lecture naive.• - Felman, •0e Sophocle ! Japrisot,• p. 32, 
my translation. 
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'Did he make the statement to you, Mrs Biemeyer?' 
'Not to me, no. He left a letter which his wife 
made public. ' ( BH p. 7) 
If Ruth Biemeyer reads Richard Chantry's disappearance 
as the signifier of a "simple decision", Archer perceives 
the possibility of alternative signifieds. While she finds 
Chantry's letter to his wife touching, Archer, on reading 
it himself, is sceptical: 
I handed the framed letter back to Ruth Bierneyer. She 
held it against her body. 'It's beautiful, isn't it?' 
'I'm not sure. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. • •• 
(BH p. 13) 
It is this interpretive scepticism which enables Archer 
to unveil meaning where previously there had appeared to 
be mystery, or conversely, to reveal corruption where there 
had appeared to be respectability. This scepticism is 
particularly manifested in his demystifying descriptions 
of the society and surroundings in which he moves. In 
the two extracts quoted below for example, he reveals 
his awareness of the difference underlying what might at 
first sight appear to be the panoramic manifestations of 
the realized "American Dream": 
A. I drove along the waterfront towards the lower town. 
There were white sails on the water, and gulls and 
terns in the air like their small flying counterparts. 
I stopped on impulse and checked in at a motel that 
faced the harbour. 
The lower town was a blighted area standing above 
the waterfront about ten blocks deep. There we re 
blighted men wandering along the main street or leaning 
against the fronts of the secondhand stores. 
(BB pp. 14-15) 
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8
• The university had been built on an elevated spur 
of land that jutted into the sea and was narrowed at 
its base by a tidal slough. Almost surrounded by water 
and softened by blue haze, it looked from a distance 
like a medieval fortress town. 
Close up, the buildings shed this romantic aspect. 
They were half-heartedly modern, cubes and oblongs 
and slabs that looked as if their architect had spent 
his life designing business buildings. (BH p. 23). 
In passage A, Archer demystifies the apparent gaiety and 
sense of freedom in the lower town by the juxtaposition 
of the blithely carefree •white sails on the water• and 
•their small flying counterparts," against the ·blighted" 
town, its "blighted" inhabitants and its "secondhand stores" 
where novelty and frivolity are alien. In passage B, the 
university, compared to a "medieval fortress town• might 
be expected to stand for the custodianship of the community's 
values and ideals. To Archer's experienced eye, the values 
which this institution preserves are contemporaneity without 
innovation and the sterility of mass production next to 
which individualism is irrelevant. Nevertheless, if Archer, 
as professional sceptic unveils •otherness", it is always 
"the other• as logical opposite, the other side of the 
same coin, rather than "the Other• as irreducibly strange, 
untranslatable difference (vide my discussion of the Other 
and the other on pp 19 - 21 of the preceding Introduction). 
Such ambiguity is therefore always interpretable in rational 
terms. If, on occasion Archer is confronted by a multi-
plicity of signs which he is temporarily at a loss to re-
solve into a coherent pattern, this condition only persists 
long enough to foreground his ultimate interpretive success. 
His disdain towards mass production and capitalism, his 
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indifference to money - except where it serves as a means 
to his investigative ends - his operation as a "private 
eye" who succeeds in spite of, rather than with the help 
of, society's own problem-solvers, the police: all these 
factors contribute to the characterization of Archer, and 
the detective investigator in general, as independent and 
self-sufficient agent "the latest of the uncooptable 
12 heroes." If the reader recognizes a world besieged by 
inefficient bureaucracy, obtuse judiciaries and corrupt 
legal administration as familiar to his own experience, 
he receives the comforting reassurance from the detective 
novel that there may still be individualists and heroes 
like Lew Archer, who can coerce meaning from the world's 
apparent disorder. 
The world presented by the detective novel is not 
only "real" then, it is also "significant". It is a net-
work of signs permitting only that which contributes to 
the jigsaw of meaning. Any lack of meaning which occurs 
in the detective novel is the product, not of inherent 
undecidability, an unexpected emergence of an Otherness 
that has been repressed, but rather of inadequate reading, 
or faulty interpretation, and since the detective, a Master-
reader, does not misinterpret, lack of meaning cannot per-
sist under his scrutiny. As Michael Holquist remarks, 
The detective, the instrument of pure logic, (is] 
able to triumph because he alone in a .orld of credulous 
men, holds to the Scholastic principle oc adequatio 
12 Geoffrey Hartman, "Literature High and Low,• p. 221. 
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rei et intellectus, the ad equation of mind to things, 
the belief that the mind, given enough time, can under-
stand everything. There are no mysteries, there is 
only incorrect reasoning.13 
I shall be returning in the course of this discussion to 
the figure of the detective, in order to consider at what 
price his rationality succeeds what signs he cannot afford 
to scrutinize and what questions it is not worth his while 
to raise. For the moment, let us consider the nature of 
the mystery that he does undertake to investigate. 
Pursuing the Lack in the Detective Novel 
The constitutive centre of the detective novel is 
the crime - the mysterious event which sets in motion the 
questioning process of which the narrative is composed. 
The question which the detective novel both poses and simul-
taneously answers is determined by the crime, and since 
life is the highest value at risk, the most provocative 
and easily identifiable crime is murder. The component 
which is invariably missing and which is therefore necessary 
in order to recuperate the meaning of the crime, is the 
identity of the criminal; thus the detective novel is 
commonly structured around the question of identity: who 
is the criminal? Who is the murderer? 
In the case of The Blue Hammer Lew Archer is initially 
employed to investigate the theft of a valuable painting, 
reputed to be the work of an acclaimed Californian artist, 
Richard Chantry. His questions about the painting do not 
13 Michael Holquist, •whodunit and Other Questions,• p. 141. 
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initially lead to •the truth•, but rather to other questions. 
Thus "Where is the painting?" becomes displaced by the 
question, •where is the painter?" and "Who stole the paint-
ing?" by •who killed the art-dealer Paul Grimes, the artist 
Jake Whitmore, the artist William Mead, the anonymous per-
son buried in the Chantry greenhouse, and perhaps the miss-
ing artist, Richard Chantry?" To borrow an analogy of 
Lacanian theory, we might say that the detective's wish-
to-know, and implicitly the reader's too, is displaced 
along a chain of metonymic or contiguously linked signifi-
cation in which the "truth" seems always to be slipping 
away. The detective and the reader seem doomed to be always 
a few steps behind, always facing the absence of meaning 
produced by the emergence of the next question. 
frey Hartman argues, 
As Geof-
• . . it is clear that life is always in some way too 
fast for us, that it is a spectacle we can't interpret 
or a dumbshow difficult to word • • • •mystery" means 
that something is happening too fast to be spotted. 
We are made to experience a consciousness (like Oedipa' s 
in Thomas Pynchon's Crying of Lot 49) always behind 
and running; vulnerable therefore, perhaps imposed 
on. But we are also allowed to triumph (unlike Oedipa) 
over passivity when the detective effects a catharsis 
or purgation of consciousness, and sweeps away all 
the false leads planted in the course of the novei.14 
The detective's arrest of this flight of meaning which 
threatens to diffuse into an irreducible hole in the fabric 
of the text, is determined by a very particular set of 
conditions. The next task must therefore be to explore 
14 Hartman, •Literature High and Low,• p. 207. 
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these conditions and their implications for the interpretive 
activity of reading. 
Boundaries and Identities: 
The Conditions of Meaning in the Detective Novel 
The reading of fiction can be regarded as a participa-
tion in a form of con tract, the terms of which should be 
implicitly recognized by both writer and reader. While 
these terms may vary from one genre of text to another, 
there are certain codes which readers have come through 
tradition to expect of fiction. In her article ·The Ques-
tion of Readability in Avant-Garde Fiction,• Susan Suleiman 
offers a useful summary of some of the most essential of 
these: 
• • • a readable text corresponds to a familiar order, 
a previously learned code. In the case of the novel, 
the chief expectations that generations of readers have 
internalized concern some fundamental notions in our 
culture, and perhaps in all cultures: the principle 
of noncontradiction (an event cannot occur and not 
occur at the same time, and thing cannot exist and 
not exist at the same time), the not.ions of temporal 
succession and causality (events foll.ow each other and 
are related to each other consequentially) , a belief 
in the solidity of the phenomenal world (a table is 
a table is a table} , and a belief in at least a relative 
unity of the self (a name designates a person who has 
certain fixed characteristics and a set of identifiable 
ancestors } • 15 
Without wishing to set up this particular summary, or the 
principles it identifies as in any way complete, I do main-
tain that it incorporates some of the most fundamental 
15 Susan Suleiman, 
Garde Fiction,• Studies 
(1982} p. 19. 
·The Question of Readability in Avant-
in Twentieth Century Literature, 6, 1-2 
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presuppositions upon which Western epistemology has been 
based. On these grounds I judge it to be a useful index 
against which to assess a text's conformity to conventional 
expectations. 
With regard to The Blue Hammer, as a conventional 
detective novel, its conformity to the •principle of non-
contradiction• and •belief in the solidity of the phenomenal 
world" seem givens which hardly require elaborate demons-
tration. Suffice it to say that invariably •contradiction" 
in detective fiction is treated as an index of deception, 
misunderstanding or ignorance, while the activity of ques-
tioning the solidity of the phenomenal world would, from 
the outset be regarded as appropriate to the field of philo-
sophy rather than to criminal investigation. However, 
the application of the other two principles which Suleiman 
names are more interesting particularly in comparison with 
their treatment in the second text to be discussed in this 
chapter, Robbe-Grillet's The Erasers. 
Considering first the treatment of •temporal succes-
sion and causality" in The Blue Hammer: it is possible 
to demonstrate the text's conformity to the norm by using 
G~rard Genette's temporal categories of Order, Duration 
and Frequency. 16 Considering first temporal Order: in 
16 Since Genette' s own presentation of these categories in 
his Narrative Disoourse is both lengthy and minutely thorough, I 
have found it more practical for the purposes of this brief discus-
sion to use the st.mmary of his analysis offered by Olristine Brooke-
Rose in her work, A Rhetoric of the Unreal, (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1981) pp. 312-320. See al.so G. Genette, 
Narrative Disoourse, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Oxford: Basil Black-
well, 1980). 
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Genet te 's analysis of Time, this refers to the order in 
which events are related as opposed to the order in which 
they supposedly "occur". It is conventionally accepted 
that the narrative order of events may be changed as long 
as the transitions - the prolepses or movements forward 
in relation to the time of narration, and the analepses 
or movements back in t:iire - are clearly indicated. Temporal 
Order in the detective novel is complicated by the peculi-
arity of the narrative structure which constitutes both 
the posing of a question, "What is the truth?" or "Who 
is the murderer?" and the narration of the answer, "The 
truth is that X murdered Y for the following reasons n • 
• • • I 
in other words, the text of detective fiction manifests 
a doubled narrative structure. 17 Because of this doubled 
structure, it is particularly necessary that prolepses 
17 This point is particularly clearly made by Alain-Michel 
Boyer: 
"In the detective novel, the coexistence of two narratives has 
often been observed: the narrative of the crime and the narrative 
of the investigation. Michel Butor, in Passing Time remarks notably 
• • • that 'in the detective novel the narrative is calp)Sed by counter-
flow or more exactly, it superimposes two temporal successions: 
the days of the detection which begin with the crime, and the 
days of the conflict which leads to it.' * It is true that every 
detective novel exposes two versions of the same story which arise 
and progress inversely one to the other; and the two versions 
only rejoin each other and only coincide at the very last page. 
But these two overlapping narrati. ves depend on each other: being 
given that the crime is the condition, the sine 9ua non of the 
narrati. ve of the investigation, the investigation is the bringing 
to light of the narrative of the crime, the narration of the nar-
rative.• - Alain-Michel Boyer, "L'Enigme, l'enqu~te et la qu~te 
de recit: la fiction polici~re dans Les Gorn mes et Le Voyeur d ' 
Alain Robbe-Grillet,• French Forum 6, 1, (1981) p. 81, my trans-
lation. *In this extract Boyer refers to Michel Butor, L'Ernploi 
du Temps (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1957) p. 171. 
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and analepses are clearly defined if confusion is to be 
avoided. As the following example of analepsis illustrates, 
such temporal shifts are clearly indicated in The Blue 
Hammer, both by adverbial shifters and by changes in verb 
tense. Archer, in search of information about Mildred 
Mead, the model of the missing painting, interrogates Juanita 
Grimes, former wife of one of the murder-victims, the art-
dealer, Paul Grimes: 
'Were you close to Mildred?' 
'As close as any other woman in town. She wasn't 
she isn 't a woman 's woman. She's a man 's woman 
who never married. ' 
'So I gather. Wasn't William an illegitimate son?' 
Mrs Grimes nodded. 'She had a long love affair 
with Felix Chantry, the man who developed the copper 
mine. William was his son.' 
'How well did you know William, Mrs Grimes?' 
'Paul and I saw quite a lot of him. He was a budding 
painter, too, before the army took him. Paul thought 
he had more potential talent than his brother Richard. 
He didn't live to develop it. He was murdered by 
an unknown hand in the summer of '43.' 
'The same summer that Richard and his wife went 
to California. ' 
'The same summer,' she repeated solemnly. 'I'll 
never forget that summer. Mildred drove over from 
Tucson - she was living with a painter in Tucson then 
- and she drove over from there to view pcx:,r William's 
body in the morgue. Afterwards she came to my adobe, 
and it turned out she spent the night. She was strong 
and healthy in those days, no more than forty, but 
the death of her son came as a terrible shock to her. ' 
(BH pp. 123-124) 
In this passage it may be noted that verbs which apply 
to the narrative of the investigation such as •Mrs Grimes 
nodded• and •she repeated solemnly• are in the preterite, 
while verbs which apply to the narrative of the investiga-
tion that are used in direct discourse, are in the present 
tense, for example, •she isn't a woman's woman,• and •she's 
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a man's woman.• On the other hand, verbs in the direct 
discourse which apply to the narrative of the murder, are 
related in the preterite such as •he had more potential 
talent," "he was murdered," and (although there are no 
illustrations in this extract) verbs in the narrative of 
the murder are in the pluperfect tense in the indirect 
speech, being thereby distinguishable from the preterite. 
Deictic markers such as "tha t summer," "in Tucson then," 
•in those days," support the temporal shift fran the present 
of the investigation to the past of the murder. 
Conventions of temporal Duration are also closely 
observed in The Blue Hammer. Duration in Genette's analy-
sis refers to the variable relation that can exist between 
narrative time and story time. For example, in the •summary" 
narrative time is less than story time while in the "Ellip-
sis" narrative time is elided as story time continues. 
Such conventions are employed in The Blue Hammer, their 
use being evident in certain textual markers. For example, 
at the close of Chapter 30, Archer apprehends Francine 
Chantry's butler Rico who is on the point of heaving the 
remains of a skeleton, exhumed from the Chantry greenhouse, 
into the sea. While Chapter 30 concludes on the pier from 
which Rico had attempted to dispose of the skeleton, the 
next chapter commences in the office of Captain Mackendrick, 
the detective of police in charge of the recent murders. 
The elision of events between the time of arrest and the 
time of interrogation is signalled firstly by the chapter 
division, and secondly by the conformity of the two scenes 
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to expectations of succession and causality: first arrest, 
followed by interrogation. 
Finally, with regard to narrative Frequence - which 
refers to the number of times an event is related in con-
trast with the number of times it supposedly occurs - in 
general, incidents which occur once in The Blue Hammer 
are, according to the conventional norm, narrated once. 
If this pattern is altered, it is with clear reason. For 
example, while William Mead's "death" obviously occurs 
only once, a variety of different accounts are offered 
of the incident. Since each account is offered by a dif-
ferent narrator - such as the Arizonan artist, Simon Lashman; 
the police officer in charge of the case, Sheriff Brother-
ton; Archer himself, and so on - and each contributes 
new information to the narrative, the repetition is justi-
fied as a means of refining and perfecting evidence. 
Let us now consider the second expectation of the 
reader, "belief in at least a relative unity of self." 
I mentioned earlier in this chapter than Macdonald's novels 
frequently incorporate references to Freudian psychology. 
In The Blue Hammer, this is apparent in various references 
to the issue of split subjectivity. It is for example, 
possible to identify passages in the novel when Archer 
is invited to investigate himself as "the unknown" and 
"the mysterious". In the following instance, his ref lee-
tions on Fred Johnson lead him to reflect on himself: 
Like other lost and foolish souls, Fred had an urge 
to help people, to give them psychotherapy even if 
it wrecked them. When he was probably the one who 
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needed it most. Watch it, I said to myself, or you'll 
be trying to help Fred in that way. Take a look at 
your own life Archer. 
But I preferred not to. My chosen study was other 
men, hunted men in rented rooms, ageing boys clutching 
at manhood before night fell and they grew suddenly 
old. If you were the therapist, how could you need 
therapy? If you were the hunter, you co•1ldn 't be 
hunted. Or could you? (BH pp. 114-115). 
However, if Archer raises this question of the "interior 
unknown", he can only afford to give thorough investigation 
to the question of the "exterior unknown". While Freudian 
thought has become sufficiently familiar to Western Culture 
to be superficially incorporated into popular detective 
fiction, its epistemological implications remain too sub-
versive to be explored. Nevertheless, if the "interior 
unknown" is repressed in this text, its possibility is 
at least raised and the repression itself to some extent 
acknowledged by its very dramatization in the discourse. 
To use another illustration, Doris Biemeyer, the daughter 
of Archer's client, raises the possibility that Archer's 
position as analyst cannot fail to involve him in the very 
"corruption" or sordid confidences which he attempts to 
unveil: 
She narrowed her eyes and stuck out her lower lip 
like a stubborn child on the verge of tears. 'Nobody 
asked you for your advice. You are a shrink, aren't 
you?' She sniffed. 'I can smell the dirt on you, 
from people's dirty secrets.' 
I produced what felt from the inside like a lopsided 
smile. The girl was young and foolish, perhaps a little 
addled, by her own admission drugged. But she was 
young, and had clean hair. I hated to smell dirty 
to her ( BH p. 26 ) • 
Doris Biemeyer's remarks momentarily question Archer's 
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authority as resolver of problems and establisher of "the 
truth"; she raises the possibility that he might be ambig-
uously both the source of order and a participant in cor-
ruption. However, this ambiguity is dismissed by a reminder 
of the •authority" from which the challenge stems: Doris 
Biemeyer is •young and foolish, perhaps a little addled, 
by her own admission drugged." If her mistaken identifi-
cation of Archer as a "shrink" does at least raise the 
question of the similarity in the roles of detective and 
psychoanalyst, the epistemological problems which may haunt 
the psychoanalytic quest for hidden •truth" cannot be per-
mitted to complicate the quest of Archer. If, in Felman's 
words, "The question 'Who am I?' is in a way, a complication 
of the question 'Who is the other?' How much other is the 
other? Is the other exterior or interior to the 'I' ?" 18 
these questions are ultimately repressed as "irrelevant". 
The •split-subject must be effaced by the image of the 
independent, autonomous hero. 
Thus, if Archer's interiority to the mystery he inves-
tigates is "impossible", his exteriority to it is repeatedly 
confirmed. The geographical setting of the investigation 
for example, defines him clearly as an outsider. Although 
he himself is Californian - we are told that he was born 
in the district of Long Beach (BH p. 236) - he is unfamiliar 
18 
"La question 'qui suis-je?' se complique, de la sorte, de 
la question, 'qui est l 'autre?' Combien autre est l' autre? L' 
autre est-il a l'ex~rieur ou a l'in~rieur du 'je'?" - Felman, 
"De Sophocle a Japrisot," p. 35, my translation. 
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with the locality of Santa Teresa where the mystery he 
investigates appears to have originated. It is for example, 
useful to him to elicit the assistance of two residents 
of the area, Betty Jo Siddon aoo Mrs Fay Brighton, a reporter 
and a librarian working for the local newspaper. Since 
his investigations take him to the even more distant ter-
rain of Arizona, his exteriority to the case is emphasized 
as the plot thickens. His repeated references to maps 
and his observations about the unfamiliar geography of 
Arizona foreground this al ienism; al though, of course, 
his ability to move efficiently in alien surroundings is 
further proof of the point made earlier, that Archer is 
a competent reader and decoder. 
Another factor which serves to emphasize Archer's 
exteriority to the case he investigates, is the high density 
of connections and relatedness existing between those char-
acters who have been involved in the events of the case. 
To give some indication of this relatedness, it may be 
remarked for instance that Jack Biemeyer, husband of Arch-
er's client Ruth Biemeyer, was related to the painter Richard 
Chantry since Biemeyer 's mother was the cousin of Richard 
Chantry's father, Felix. Mildred Mead was mistress of 
both Felix Chantry and Jack Biemeyer, and the mother of 
William Mead. Although the latter's father is believed 
to be Felix Chantry, it transpires that his father is act-
ually Jack Biemeyer. Although Richard Chantry marries 
Francine, it is revealed that she is actually in love with 
William Mead, while her husband is involved in a clandestine 
89 
homosexual affair with the art dealer and instructor, Paul 
Grimes; and so the connections proliferate. If, as Geof-
frey Hartman argues, 
The thrill of a •thriller" is surely akin to the fear 
that the murderer will prove to be not an outsider 
but someone there all the time, someone we know only 
too well - perhaps a blood relation 19 
the involvements and intrigues of The Blue Hammer seem 
to provide precisely the network in which such a familiar 
character, unrecognized as criminal, might hide. However, 
since the reader's position with Archer as problem-solver 
who stands outside this network, is never called into ques-
tion, he may derive the thrill of experiencing the threat 
of unrecognized internal danger, while at the same time 
being assured of his own comfortable distance from it. 
It is because the exteriority of the detective and 
the reader is clearly distinguished from the interiority 
of their counterparts - the other as criminal and implied 
author respectively - that their roles as makers of meaning 
or restorers of order are clearly distinguished from the 
criminal and authorial roles as instigators of mysteries. 
As a conclusion to this discussion of the conventional 
detective novel, let us turn then to a consideration of 
the final interpretive solution, the ultimate •explosion 
of the truth.• 
19 Hartman, •Literature High and Low,• p. 221. 
90 
The Beginning as the End: 
Coapleting the Interpretive Circle 
It has been pointed out earlier in this argument that 
the detective novel manifests a double narrative structure, 
comprising the narrative of the investigation which poses 
the question •what is the truth?" and the narrative of 
the crime which provides the answer, "'!he truth is that •.• ". 
The arrival at the truth which concludes the narrative 
of the investigation is then simultaneously the discovery 
of the origin of the narrative of the murder. The detective 
or reader is seen to have moved in a circle, back to the 
beginning, the •primal scene", prior to which there is 
no more to know. This circular movement of the quest back 
to the •source", from which the quester can see, in retro-
spect, the segments of meaning taking up their places in 
the final "whole", is clearly evident in The Blue Hammer. 
Towards the close of the novel, for example, Archer remarks, 
As I followed Purvis' s wagon across town into the 
hospital area, I felt that the thirty-two-year case was 
completing a long curve back to its source (BH p. 228, 
my emphasis). 
A little later he tells Francine Chantry that he has re-
covered Ruth Biemeyer's stolen picture, 
' • • • I found it this morning in Johnson's attic, where 
it ori~nated. \ttlere the whale current case originated. 
That picture seems to be the central thing in the case ••• 
( BH p. 240, my emphasis). 
The return to the ultimate "origin• takes place in the 
last three pages of the text when Archer, producing his 
own version of the oft-repeated story of William Mead's 
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death, reveals that Mead is in fact the murderer and Richard 
Chantry the victim. Then, to crown this return to origins, 
Jack Biemeyer names himself as the "true" father of the 
murderer. 
In this "explosion of the truth" all shadows of mys-
tery are suddenly illuminated, disjointed fragments of 
narrative fall into a coherent whole and the ghost of Rich-
ard Chantry is buried for good. If the threat of the un-
canny has disturbed the reader he can once more rest assured 
that mysteries are explicable, ghosts can be laid, reason 
will inevitably triumph, and the quester's Desire can be 
satisfied. 
However, what I hope will have begun to emerge from 
this investigation of the conditions of meaning governing 
the detective novel, is that such an illuminating denouement 
is only possible if certain alternatives are repressed 
in the course of the detective's quest. As long as boun-
daries are clearly drawn between the self and the other, 
between the detective and the criminal and so forth - as 
long as these are seen as "opposites", it will be possible 
for the question "What is the truth?" to return to the 
quester at the end of his quest as a completed, resolved 
answer. When however, boundaries become blurred, when 
for example, the unconscious manifests itself as the unknown 
of the self which intrudes as the verbal slip, the lapsus 
or the joke into the rational order of the conscious dis-
course; when the ghost manifests itself as the dead which 
intrudes as the uncanny into the world of the living, it 
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must become apparent that the conception of identities 
as separate, unified and homogeneous, is an illusion. In-
stead it must become apparent that identity - in particular 
the identity of the •self" - is defined, not by being oppo-
site to •the other" in a neat rational system, but by its 
interplay with Otherness as a difference that is an interior 
and irreducible unknown. This status of the Other, not 
only as irreducibly different, but as situated within the 
self, calls for a new method of self-reflection, or to 
use Felman's phrase, •a new mode of reflexivity• and is 
one of the most productive of Lacan's •return to Freud." 
As Felman argues: 
••• the new Freudian (psychoanalytic) reflexivity substi-
tutes, for all traditional binary, symmetrical oonceptual 
oppositions - that is, substitutes for the very founda-
tions of Western metaphysics - a new mode of interfering 
heterogeneity: this new reflexive mode, instituted 
by Freud's way of listening to the disoourse of the 
hysteric and which Lacan will call •the inrnixture of 
the subjects" ( E 415) - divides the subjects differently, 
in such a way that they are neither entirely distinguished, 
separate from each other, nor, oorrelati vely, entirely 
totalizable, but rather, interfering from within with 
and in one another.20 
Now, thus far, I have at tempted to demonstrate how the 
detective novel, in adhering to certain conventions, in 
delineating identities and boundaries explicitly and re-
pressing that which does not conform to such delineation 
as marginal or unimportant, is able to constitute in the 
process of its writing, the question •what is the truth?• 
20 Felman, •The Originality of Jacques Lacan, • p. 52. 
reference ·E 415• refers to the French publication of Lacan 's 




a quest ion which the reader wi 11 be able to resolve in 
the process of his interpretive reading activity. If, 
however, the new mode of reflexivity disrupts the concept 
of "the truth", or "the meaning", or "the self" as never 
fully accessible, if it presents the circle of the quest 
as never fully closing upon the "origin", what implications 
does this have for the reader's quest? This is the question 
which the next section of this chapter will investigate, 
using as its illustrative material The Erasers (Les Gorn.mes) 
by Alain Robbe-Grillet. 
DEFUSING THE EXPLOSION OF THE TRUTH: 
THE ERASERS BY ALAIN ROBBE-GRILLET 
It concerns a precise, concrete, essential event: the 
death of a man. It is an event of a detective natlire -
in other words there is a murderer, a detective, a 
victim. In one sense, their roles are likewise respected: 
the murderer fires at the victim, the detective resolves 
the question, the victim dies. But the relations which 
bind them are not as simple once the last chapter 
concludes. For the book is precisely the narration 
of the twenty-four hours which elapse between the 
pistol-shot and this death, the time which the bullet 
has taken to travel three or four metres - twenty-
four hours "in excess." 
- Alain Robbe-Grillet21 
21 
"Il s'agit d'un ~v~I"lEm:?nt precis, concret, essentiel;. 
la mort d'un homme. C'est un ~v~nement ~ cara~re policier 
o'est-3-dire qu'il y a un assassin, un d~ve, une 
victime. En un sens, leurs r6les sont meme res~s: 
! 'assassin tire sur la victime, le d~tective r~sout la question, 
la victime meurt. Mais les relations qui les lient ne sont 
pas aussi simples qu' une fois le dernier chapitre terrain~. 
Car le livre est justement le recit des vingt-quatre heures 
qui s ·~ulent entre ce coup de pistolet et cette mort, le 
temps que la balle a mis pour parcourir trois ou quatre 
metres - vingt-quatre heures "en trop." - Alain Robbe-
Grillet quoted by Bruce Morrissette in "Oedipus and Exis-
tentialism: Les Gommes of Robbe-Grillet," Wisconsin Studies 
in Contemporary Literature, 1, 3 ( 1960) p. 45, my trans-
lation. 
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I have argued in the preceding section of this chapter, 
that the constitutive centre of the detective novel is 
the crime the mysterious event which sets in motion the 
questioning process of which the narrative is composed. 
Furthermore I have argued that since the missing or mysteri-
ous component is customarily the identity of the criminal, 
the detective novel is commonly structured around the quest-
ion, "Who committed the crime?• 
In the Prologue of The Erasers both these conventions 
are subverted. From the outset of the narrative, there 
is confusion not only as to the precise nature of the crime, 
but also as to the identity of the victim. In part 1 of 
the Prologue, the reader is informed through the interior 
monologue of the manager of the Caf~ des Al 1 i~s, that a 
crime has been committed. Wiping down tables in preparation 
for the day's business he remarks to himself, 
Funny little spot; this marble's no good, everything 
stains it. It looks like blood. Daniel Dupont last 
night; a stone's throw from here. Funny business: 
a burglar would never have gone into a lighted room 
on purpose, the man must have wanted to kill him. 
Revenge, or what? Clumsy in any case. 22 
The manager seems confident that because of the clumsiness 
of the intruder, the victim - Daniel Dupont - is still 
alive; yet his first customer of the day, Antoine, announces 
22 Alain Robbe-Grillet, The Erasers, trans. Richard Howard 
(London: Calder & Boyars, 1966) p. 4. All subsequent references 
to this text will be included in the body of the chapter using 
the abbreviation •E• followed by the relevant page number. Refer-
ences in French are taken from Les Gommes, (Paris: Les Editions 
de Minuit, 1953) and will be indicated by the abbreviation "G· 
followed by the relevant page number. 
that according to 






paper, one Albert Dupont 
right at the end of the 
streetl" (~ p. 7). Since neither Antoine nor the manager 
is in possession of the newspaper, these contradictions 
cannot for the present be resolved. 
If the reader does not initially know whether there 
has been a murder or who the dead man might be, in the 
second part of the Prologue he is introduced without further 
ado to the murderer: "This man's name is Garinati .••• He 
is the clumsy murderer of the day before who only slightly 
wounded Daniel Dupont• (E pp. 10-11). He is also given 
a detailed account, from the perspective of Garinati, of 
how the attempted murder failed. 
Part 3 returns the reader to the bewildered manager, 
who reads the report in a second newspaper which contra-
dicts both Antoine's earlier reading and the manager's 
own experience of the previous evening. He reads that 
Daniel Dupont, • ••• critically wounded and taken at once 
to a nearby clinic, died there without regaining conscious-
ness• ( E p. 19) ; yet Dupont's housekeeper, telephoning 
from the Caf~ des Alli~s for a doctor the previous evening, 
had told the manager that her employer had received only 
a graze on the arm from a bullet. 
Part 4, a scene involving the wounded Dupont, Dr Juard 
and an acquaintance of Dupont, the merchant Marchat, re-
solves the mystery of the earlier sections. Dupont is 
revealed to be the ninth victim of a murder-plan conducted 
by a politically motivated terrorist gang against an under-
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ground organization of which the minister Roy-Dauzet is 
the conductor. Since Garinati, the appointed killer, has 
failed in his assassination attempt, Dupont has fled to 
Dr Juard 's clinic whence he will be removed to safety the 
following evening. In order to protect Dupont from further 
attacks, the police and the press will be advised by the 
Ministry that he is dead and that the body has been removed 
from Juard's clinic for investigation by the central serv-
ices - the Bureau of Investigation. 
In part 5, Commissioner Laurent, the chief of police 
initially in charge of the case, is at tempting, not to 
solve the mystery, as might be anticipated, but to determine 
what exactly the mystery is. Following the routine investi-
gations of murder, he finds himself not only without clues 
or leads, but without the prime sign of a violation of 
order - the body of the victim. He is tempted to consider 
the possibility that Dupont committed suicide, or even 
more absurdly, that no crime has taken place at all. Iron-
ically, this detective novel seems to be structuring itself 
less around the question, •who committed the crime?" than 
around the question •what is the crime?• or •Is there any 
mystery to investigate at all?· To borrow Geoffrey Hart-
man's joke, •instead of a whodunit, we get a whodonut, 
a story with a hole in it.• 23 
It is likely to be with some relief that the reader 
comes to the closing words of the Prologue which suggest 
23 Hartman, •Literature High and Low,• p. 206. 
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the imminent arrival of that infallible maker of meaning: 
the detective, 
Wallas. 
•special agent .... • (! p. 28). 
The Detective as Maker of Meaning 
The reader who is expecting the introduction into 
the text of an experienced mentor and guide who, like Lew 
Archer, will provide perceptive and indubitably accurate 
interpretations from an authoritative perspective, is lia-
ble to be bewildered by the figure of Wallas. From the 
outset it is apparent that the Special Agent is not as 
well-informed as the reader, for he appears to believe 
that• ••• Daniel Dupont was killed yesterday by a bullet 
in the chest. For the time being Wallas does not know 
more than that• (! p. 32). In addition, he is remarkably 
inexperienced and appears to have no special claim to in-
vestigatory expertise: 
Wallas has worked for the Bureau of Investigation only 
a short time, before that he was in another branch 
of the Ministry of the Interior, and it is an accident 
that he happens to have this job ( E p. 44). 
This experience, furthermore, seems clearly evident to 
those he interrogates. For example, Dupont's old house-
keeper remarks to herself, 
This gentleman has a nicer look about him than the 
other two who came last night, with their red faces 
and their big boots. • • • This one lcx>ks less shrewd -
and keeps getting mixed up in a lot of nonsense before 
coming to the point - but certainly he is better brought 
up (E p. 68). 
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Not only has Wallas been hired on probation (E p. 151), 
but his forehead lacks •one square centimetre of the fifty 
square centimetres of frontal surface• required by a detec-
tive investigator(~ p. 133), and his watch has stopped. 
Perhaps one of the most radical differences between 
Wallas and Archer is the former' s indulgence in the self-
reflection which the latter does not permit himself. Wallas 
appears to have given consideration to his own motives 
for undertaking the investigatory, interpretive quest. 
For example, early in his investigation we are informed 
that, 
Wallas likes walking. In the cold, early winter air 
he likes walking straight ahead through this unknown 
city. He looks around, he listens, he smells the air; 
this perpetually renewed contact affords him a subtle 
impression of continuity; he walks on and gradually 
unrolls the uninterrupted ribbon of his own passage, 
not a series of irrational, unrelated irnc:tges, but a snooth 
band where each element immediately takes its place 
in the web, even the most fortuitous, even those that 
might at first seem absurd or threatening or anachronis-
tic or deceptive; they all fall into place in good order, 
one beside the other, and the ribbon extends without 
flaw or excess, in time with the regular speed of his 
footsteps. • • • It is of his own free will that he is 
walking towards an inevitable and perfect future. In 
the past, he has too frequently let himself be caught 
in the circles of doubt and impotence, now he is walk-
ing; he has recovered his continuity here (E i:p. 36-27). 
Wallas's questing activity is presented in this passage 
as a means of restoring his faith in •order•. •continuity• 
is presented not as natural, real or inherent to his experi-
ence, as it might appear to be to Lew Archer's, but as 
a •subtle impression• which enables him to escape the threat 
of •irrational unrelated images,• or the •absurd or threat-
ening or anachronistic or deceptive.• Now since it has 
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been argued that the detective is the textual paradigm 
of the reader, it seems that the reader, following Wallas's 
lead, is being invited to question his own activity of 
guesting through the novel. Is his reading guest, like 
Wallas's, an attempt to reassure himself of the possibility 
of finding order, continuity and meaning in the world? 
As Wal las' s guest progresses it becomes increasingly 
apparent that any sense of continuity or linear progression 
in his investigation has been a momentary illusion. If 
the detective and the reader, in their capacity as inter-
preters, are the unve i lers, or makers, of meaning, they 
are liable to find this role ironically subverted in the 
course of this investigation. For instead of pursuing 
•meaning" along the metonymic path of its flight, they 
seem fated to find themselves at every turn, confronted 
with yet another Pandora's box of excess meaning or narra-
tive possibilities whose multidirectional flight defies 
pursuit and mocks any linear progression of interpretation. 
Let us examine how the text operates to produce this effect. 
Writing and Erasing Excess Meaning 
Earlier in this chapter, I drew upon Susan Suleiman's 
suggestions of some readerly expectations governing the 
intelligibility of literary texts - in brief, the princi-
ples of noncontradiction, of temporal succession and caus-
ality; a belief in the solidity of the phenomenal world 
and a belief in the unity of the self. Once again, attri-
buting authority to these principles on the assumption 
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that they constitute among the most elementary principles 
of rational thought, I propose to use them as an index 
against which to assess the subversiveness of various text-
ual strategies used in The Erasers. 
Firstly, examples of the subversion of the principle 
of noncontradiction are numerous in The Erasers. Descrip-
tions of objects may, for example, be given which appear 
to conform to the convention of "realism" but which are 
subsequently contradicted by alternative descriptions. 
This occurrence can be demonstrated by the example of the 
"metamorphosing" cube of lava on the desk of Daniel Dupont. 
On its first appearance in the text, the cube of lava seems 
to serve no more significant narrative function than to 
contribute to the "reality effects" of the room that is 
being described from the perspective of Garinati prior 
to his attempted murder of Dupont: 
A kind of cube, but slightly misshapen, a shiny 
block of grey lava, with its faces polished as though 
by wear, the edges softened, compact, apparently hard, 
heavy as gold, looking about as big around as a fist; 
a paperweight? It is the only trinket in the room 
(E p. 15). 
In its second appearance, the cube is attributed different 
properties; its edges, previously described as "softened" 
and "compact" are now described as "sharp,• so that, effec-
tively, it is transformed into a potential murder-weapon. 
This description forms part of the reconstruction and inter-
pretation of events that took place on the night of Monday, 
26 October, at the Dupont home, compiled by an enthusiastic 
young police officer who investigates the case prior to 
101 
the arrival of Wallas: 
Jean picks up the first thing he finds within his 
reach: the heavy paperweight with sharp edges. He 
brandishes it, ready tx> strike (~ p. 166). 
In the third description, presented from the perspective 
of Wallas, the cube of lava which now has •deadly corners" 
as well as "sharp edges" seems to symbolize the threat 
of imminent violence: 
The white sheet on which the professor had as yet 
written only four words ha$ disappeared, filed away 
in a folder or in some drawer. The cube of vitrified 
stx>ne, with its sharp edges and deadly corners, is 
lying harmlessly between the inkwell and the memo 
pad (~ p. 201). 
As I have argued earlier, contradictory information which 
places in question the identity of a person or an object 
or an event, is treated in the conventional detective novel 
as a sign of misunderstanding, ignorance or deception. 
The authority of the detective as comprehending, well-
informed pursuer of the truth is present to confirm the 
falsity of such contradiction. In The Erasers the absence 
of any single, authoritative narrative perspective consti-
tutes the withdrawal of a yard-stick whereby the • true" 
may be distinguished from the •false". Just as all the 
narrative perspectives offered above - the positions of 
Garinati, the police officer and Wallas are credible, 
so each of the descriptions of the cube of lava offered 
from these perspectives constitutes a credible narrative 
possibility. Yet how is the reader who expects to arrive 
at the •meaning of the text• to determine which of these 
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possibilities he should accept as "true" and which he should 
discard as "false"? Instead he may find himself asking 
whether the notions "true" and "false" are even possible. 
A second example of overt contradiction in The Erasers 
can be found in the notorious description of the tomato-
quarter: 
A quarter of tomato that is quite faultless, cut up 
by the machine into a perfectly symmetrical fruit. 
The peripheral flesh, compact, homogeneous, and 
a splendid chemical red, is of an even thickness bet-
ween a strip of gleaming skin and the hollow where 
the yellow, graduated seeds appear in a row, kept in 
place by a thin layer of greenish jelly along a swelling 
of the heart. This heart, of a slightly grainy, faint 
pink, begins - toward the inner hollow - with a cluster 
of white veins, one of which extends towards the seeds 
somewhat uncertainly. 
Above, a scarcely perceptible accident has occurred: 
a corner of the skin, stripped back from the flesh 
for a fraction of an inch, is slightly raised 
( E pp. 129-130) 
Although at first this quarter of tomato is described as 
"quite faultless," and "a perfectly symmetrical fruit," 
the minute qualifications and adjustments that follow this 
initial statement define the tomato as quite Other than 
it had initially appeared to be. It is as if linguistic 
discourse, in attempting to represent the concept of per-
fection, must either repress details - such as the evidence 
of an accident - which by their exclusion contribute to 
the defining of perfection - or must, by the very inclusion 
of all details, eventually write itself into aeaningless 
contradiction. In other words, a description of perfec-
tion seems paradoxically to depend on a process of omission 
or exclusion or repression. The reader, confronted with 
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the description of the tomato-quarter quoted above may, 
like Wallas, experience the urge to digress from his ori-
ginal quest to search for a device, an "eraser," with which 
to eliminate such puzzling excesses of signification. 
Moving next to the question of the treatment of Time 
in The Erasers: the conventions of temporal succession 
and causality are repeatedly subverted in this text. One 
of the initial indications of such subversion is the sub-
stitution of the customary narrative preterite tense with 
the present tense. 'Ihis peculiarity is particularly notice-
able in the original text since in French the traditional 
narrative tense is the pass~ simple - a specifically liter-
ary verb tense indicating temporal distance or the absence 
of any relation between the time of the events of the nar-
t · d th t · f h · t · 2 4 ra 1ve an e 1me o t e1r narra 10n. The use of the 
present tense seems to suggest on the contrary, that the 
events of The Erasers have by no means begun and concluded 
in the past with no relation to the present: they are 
not events related retrospectively, but are in the process 
of unfolding through the action of the reader's reading. 
24 
·The pas~ simple expresses an act which has taken place 
in the past and which is considered from its beginning b'.:> its 
conclusion, but without any relation with the present. It corres-
ponds b'.:> the perfect past, . but the latter has a relation b'.:> the 
present.• 
"Le pas~ simple ex prime un fait qui a eu lieu dans le pas~, 
et qui est consid~r~ de son d~but jusqu '~ sa fin, mais sans aucun 
rapport avec le present. Il correspond au pas~ composl! mais 
celui-ci a un rapport avec le pr~sent." - Jacqueline Ollivier, 
Grammaire francaise, ( New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1978) p. 370, my translation. 
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Another effect which this use of the present tense produces 
is described by Christine Brooke-Rose in her work A Rhetoric 
of the Unreal. She points out: 
Writers have always changed the narrative order of 
the events they recount, from the epic beginning in 
medias res to the present day, but the transitions are 
clearly marked, if not by narrator comment, at least 
by adverbial shifters and by tense (e.g., the pluperfect 
for the analepsis, the future for the prolepsis). 
The use of the present tense throughout, first by 
Dujardin, then by Gertrude Stein, then by Joyce in 
Finnegans Wake, and later by Robbe-Grillet and others, 
clearly flattens out all such clear markings in a per-
petual present. • • • Robbe-Grillet exploits this fusion 
of time in his novels by using the present whatever 
the or<~er of events, so that • • • we never quite know 
when (and whether) something is occurring, or recurring 
( or being recalled) , the only time markers being contin-
gent ones, such as slight differences in the retelling, 
in the position of objects, or in the climate . • • • Th us 
it is never clear whether events are lived or re-lived, 
an ambiguity used by these novelists to challenge the 
traditional notion of representation in fiction, where 
nothing is 'lived ' except by the author in his writing 
experience and the reader in his reading experience. 25 
In addition to this use of the present tense, an overt 
warning in the third paragraph of the Prologue alerts the 
reader to the unusual treatment to be given to time: 
Unfortunately ti.me will soon no longer be master. 
Wrapped in their aura of doubt and error, this day's 
events, however insignificant they may be, will in 
a few seconds begin their task, gradually encroaching 
upon their ideal order, cunningly introducing an occa-
sional inversion, a discrepancy, a confusion, a warp, 
in order to accomplish their work: a day in early 
winter without plan, without direction, incomprehensible 
and monstrous ( E p. 3). 
As this paragraph predicts, events in this text unfold 
regardless of expectations about linear order or sequence. 
25 C. Brooke-Rose, pp. 313-314. 
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Expectations of temporal patterns such as the convention 
that the past has preceded the present which in turn will 
be succeeded by that which is in the future, or the succes-
s ion of cause by effect, are thwarted. Now the question 
which arises from such irregularities is this: how does 
temporal subversion operate to produce "excess meaning"? 
G~rard Genette, in his article "Vertige fix~" offers a 
useful discussion of this issue. He argues as follows: 
26 
Roman Jakobson has shown that the conception of 
literature, like all linguistic performance (parole) can 
be named according to two essential and complementary 
functions: the selection of similarities and the combi-
nation of contiguities. The first operation is located 
at that pole of language which rhetoric names metaphor 
( the transfer of sense by analogy) , the second at the 
pole of metonymy (the transfer of sense by contiguity). 
Poetic art relies essentially on the play of metaphor 
(these are the Baudelairian or symbolist 'corresponden-
ces'), whereas narrative art, and therefore especially 
the art of novel-writing relies on metonymic play, the 
description and narration developing along the order 
of spatial and temporal contiguities. If one adopts 
this convenient classification, it is observable that 
Robbe-Grillet' s skill lies in organizing in the metonymic 
order of narrative, material which is of a metaphorical 
nature, since it results from analogies between different 
elements, or from transformations of identical elements. 
After any given scene in a novel by Robbe-Grillet, 
the reader is entitled to expect - according to the 
traditional order of narrative - another scene that is 
contiguous either in space or in time. What Robbe-
Grillet offers him instead is the same scene, slightly 
modified, or another analogous scene. In other words, 
he spreads out horizontally ( syntagmatically) in spatio-
temporal continuity, the vertical (paradigmatic) relation-
ships which connect the many variations on a theme; 
he organizes in sequential order, the alternatives of 
a choice; he transposes coincidence into ooncatenation 
like an aphasic who declines a noun or conJugates a 
verb believing that he constructs a sentence. 26 
•Roman Jakobson a montr~ que l' imagination li~raire, 
comme toute parole, fait appel ~ deux functions essentielles et 
oompl~mentaires: la ~ection d 'uni~s similaires, et la combinaison 
d 'uni~s oontigues. La premi~re o~ration se situe ~ ce pOle du 
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In order to execute this strategy described by Genette, 
Robbe-Grillet arrests the temporal continuum within the 
•world" of the novel, thereby producing a rupture or breach 
in the narrative network. The various narrative possibili-
ties usually repressed by the choices which the temporal 
continuum of traditional narrative demands, are thus per-
mitted to manifest themselves sequentially. In the second 
section of the Prologue, the potential effect of such a 
breach is suggested. The narrated monologue in which Gari-
nati 's attempted murder is being described is disrupted 
by the following interpolation: 
Suddenly the limpid water grows cloudy. In this 
setting determined by law, without an inch of land 
to the right or left, without a second 's hesitation, 
without resting, without looking back, the actor suddenly 
stops, in the middle of a phrase .•.•• He knows it by 
langage que la rh~torique appelle rn~taphore (transfer de sens par 
analogie), la seconde au p5le de la m~tonymie (transfert de sens 
par contigui~). L 'art de la ~sie rel?()se essentiellement sur 
le jeu de la m~taphore (ce sont les •corres~ances• baudelairiennes 
et syrnbolistes), l 'art du r~cit, et done s~ialement l 'art du ranan, 
rel?()se sur le jeu des m~tonymies, la description et la narration 
suivant l 'ordre des contigui~s spatiales et temporelles. Si l 'on 
adopte cette classification commode, on observe que l 'art de Robbe-
Grillet consiste ~ disposer dans l 'ordre m~tonymique de la narra-
tion et de la description romanesques un ma~riel de nature m~ta-
phorique, puisque resultant d 'analogies entre fil~ments diff~rents 
ou de transformations d 'fil~ments identiques. Apres une ~ne 
d 'un roman de Robbe-Grillet, le lecteur attend l~itimement, selon 
l 'ordre classique du recit, une autre ~ne contigue dans le temps 
ou l 'espace; ce que lui offre Robbe-Grillet, c'est la meme ~ne 
Mg~rement modifi~, ou une autre ~ne analogue. Autrement dit, 
il ~e horizontalement, dans la continui~ spatio-temporelle, la 
relation verticale qui unit les diverses variantes d 'un th~me, il 
disl?()se en ~rie les termes d 'un choix, il transpose une CXlnCUrr'ence 
en conca~nation, came un aftlasique qui ~linerait un ran, ou con-
juguerait un verbe, en croyant construire une phrase.•-Gerard Genette, 
•vertige fix~,· Figures, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966) pp. 84-85. 
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heart, this role he plays evening~ but today he refuses 
to go any farther. Around him the other characters 
freeze, arm raised or leg half bent. The measure begun 
by the musicians goes on and on, , ••. He would have 
to do something now, speak any words at all, words 
that would not belong to the libretto, .•• ( E pp. 13-14). 
What had seemed the immediacy of a realistically narrated 
event, is suddenly distanced. Garinati 's actions are no 
longer the "real" actions of an assassin, but the sequence 
of moves which has been planned by an antecedent authority. 
Within the context of the story, this authority could be 
identified as Bonaventure, the leader of the terrorist 
gang, but the theatrical analogy, the focus of attention 
on role-playing, on the actor's articulation of a fictional 
discourse, foregrounds Garinati's status as a character 
in a fictional text. The hesitation of such a character 
implies a break or rupture in the metonymic chain of the 
narrative discourse and a consequent gap in the temporal 
continuum of the fictional world. A multitude of alter-
native possibilities threatens to flood into this gap: •ee 
would have to do something now, speak any words at all, 
words that would not belong to the libretto •••• • Although 
in the Prologue this hesitation in the continuum of time 
is only threatened - the actor does resume his act, •the 
phrase begun concludes in the prescribed form, the arm 
falls back, the leg completes its stride (E p. 14) - in 
Chapter One, the hesitation is sustained. Its effects, 
the transposition of the paradigmatic choices onto the 
syntagmatic axis, are realized, 
this hesitation closely. 
It is worthwhile examining 
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The textual index which signals the arrest of the 
temporal continuum and suggests that the investigation 
of the detective, Wallas, takes place in a temporal vacuum, 
is the stopped watch introduced in the second paragraph 
of Chapter One: 
He [Wallas] glances mechanically at his watch and notices 
that it has not started again; it stopped last night 
at seven-thirty, which has not made things easier for 
this trip or for anything else. It stops every once 
in a while, he does not really know why - sometimes 
after a shock, not always - and then starts again after-
wards, all by itself, with no more reason. Apparently 
there is nothing broken inside, it can also run for 
several weeks at a stretch. It is unpredictable, which 
is rather annoying at first, but you can get used to 
it ( E p. 31). 
Initially, this stopped watch might appear to be no more 
than one of the details which cast doubt on the degree 
of efficiency that might be expected of Wallas as Special 
Agent. As the narrative progresses, however, it becomes 
apparent that this is part of a textual strategy which 
subverts the treatment of time as a continuum. As the 
following paragraph suggests, for example, time is not 
necessarily experienced as •naturally• or "inherently" 
continuous. Since the notion of continuity is a social 
and therefore literary convention, it is possible - by 
waiving the convention - to conceive of a variation between 
corporate and individual experiences of time: 
He [Wallas] walks on. Around him life has not yet 
begun. Just now, on the parkway, he has passed the 
first wave of workmen riding towards the harbour, but 
since then he has not met anyone else: the employees, 
the businessmen, the mothers, the children on their 
way to school, are silent inside the closed houses. 
The bicycles have vanished and the day which they 
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had inaugurated has retreated behind a few gestures, 
like a sleeper who has just stretched out his arm to 
turn off the alarm clock and grants himself a few min-
utes' reprieve before opening his eyes for good. In 
a second the eyelids will rise, the city emerging from 
its false sleep will catch up at once with the rhythm 
of the harbour and, this dissonance resolved, it will 
again be the same time for everyone. 
The only pedestrian, Wallas advances through this 
fragile interval (§_ p. 35). 
Just as, on this occasion, social, conventional time stops 
while the individual advances in the temporal vacuum, so 
it is possible to infer that the entire investigatory quest 
takes place in a 27 temporal •excess". This inference is 
supported by the repetition of the image of Wallas's watch 
in juxtaposition with the image of the stopped clock in 
the Dupont home: 
Wallas looks at his watch: it still shows seven-thirty. 
In Dupont's bedroom, the bronze clock on the mantel-
piece, between the empty candlesticks, had also stopped 
(E pp. 72-73). 
It is also supported by the reinstatement of time as a 
continuum at the close of the last chapter, after Wallas 
has "concluded• his investigation and has •discovered" 
the murderer of Dupont: 
Wallas looks at his watch; it shows seven thirty-five. 
Then he remembers that it had stopped at seven-thirty. 
He raises it to his ear and hears the faint ticking. 
It must be the detonation that has started it going again 
27 Bruce Morrissette corroborates this view with the remark, 
•rn a sense, the entire twenty-four hours of the main action is 
•outside of time ( • vingt-quatre heures 'en trop' •) , as objectified 
or reinforced by the stopping of Wallas' watch fro• the moment 
of Garinati 's shot to the instant of Dupont's death when Wallas 
fires, returning the situation substantially to that which seemed 
to prevail the night before.• - •Oedipus and Existentialism, 1 p. 
53-54. 
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- or else the shock, if he bumped it when he threw 
himself tD the floor (~ p. 209). 
In this •world" where time has stopped, the narrative 
possibilities repressed by the customary choices of tradi-
tional narrative are permitted to manifest themselves, 
for there is no longer any need to preserve the convention 
of time as a continuum composed of consecutive events. 
Thus, for example, the text offers at least six alternative 
causes which might have produced the death of Dupont: 
he might have committed suicide (~ p. 51; 113-114; 138-139); 
he might have been murdered for his money by his wife (~ 
p. 55); he might have been killed by the housekeeper Madame 
Smite (E p. 55), or by Dr Juard (E p. 69) or by both in 
collusion (E p. 55); he might have been murdered by his 
illegitimate son (~ pp. 162-167); he might have escaped 
the first attempt on his life by an underground political 
group (~ pp. 15-16) in which case he might eventually be 
killed by Wallas himself (Epp. 206-209). 
Now, it might not be unusual for an investigator to 
speculate on the numerous possible sequences which his 
case might have followed, if these are clearly defined 
as speculations. In The Blue Hammer it may occur to Archer 
for example, that Francine Chantry and her butler, Rico 
are murderers: 
A black thought bit at the edge of my mind and gradu-
ally eclipsed it. The people in the greenhouse had 
dug a grave and now they were filling it in. It didn't 
seem quite possible. But if it was, then it was possi-
ble that Betty Siddon' s body was under the dirt 
(BB p. 159, my emphasis}. 
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However, the speculative nature of this observation is 
clearly indicated by the reference to •possibility• rather 
than •fact" and to "thought" rather than "knowledge". When 
in The Erasers, Commissioner Laurent relinquishes the case 
of the Dupont "murder" to Wallas he offers the latter his 
own speculations about the crime which in this context 
are not likely to be disconcerting to the reader. When, 
however, such possibilities are subsequently explored as 
if they were indeed "real", the reader, with no orienting 
narrative authority to assist him is liable to find that 
the boundaries between the "real" and the "speculative" 
are confusingly blurred. To illustrate this effect, I 
shall examine extracts from two of the three versions of 
Daniel Dupont's suicide: that which occurs on pages 113-
114 and that which occurs on page 140. Since comments 
about the narrative discourse in these extracts may lose 
credibility when applied to translations, I shall refer 




Dupont fait quelques pas sur la moquette vert d 'eau, 
qui ~touffe les bruits. Il n' y a gu~re de place pour 
marcher dans le petit bureau. De tous les ~s les 
livres le cernent: droit, l~islation sociale, &x:>nomie 
politique •••• ; dans le bas a gauche, au bout du grand 
rayonnage, s'alignent les quelques volumes qu'il a 
lui-m~me ajou~s a la ~rie. Peu de chose. Il y avait 
deux ou trois id~s malgre tout. Qui les a oomprises? 
Tant pis pour eux (Q pp. 141-142). 
Il se l~ve et fait quelques pas sur la moquette vert 
d 'eau, qui ~touffe les bruits. Il n 'y a gu~re de place 
pour marcher dans le petit bureau. De tous les ~ 
les livres le cernent: droit, l~islation sociale, ~ 




du grand rayonnage, s'alignent les quelques volumes 
qu 'il a lui-meme ajou~s ! la ~rie. Peu de chose. 
ll y avait deux ou trois id~s malgr~ tout. Qui les 
a comprises? Tant pis pour eux; ce n 'est pas une 
raison pour se tuer de d~sespoir! (§_ p. 173). 
Dupont takes a few steps on the water~reen carpet 
that muffles every noise. There is not much r<:x:>m to 
walk in the little study. Books hem him in on all 
sides: law, social legislation, political economy •••• 
Down below, to the left, at the end of the long shelves, 
stands the row of books he himself has added to the 
series. Not much. There were two or three ideas 
there, even so. Who has understood them? Too bad 
for them (~ p. 113). 
He stands up and takes a few steps on the water-
green carpet that muffles every sound. There is scarce-
ly any rcx:>m to walk in the little study. On every 
side books surround him: law, social legislation, p::>liti-
cal economy . . • . Down below, to the left, at the 
end of the long shelves, stands the row of books he 
himself has added to the series. Not much. There 
were two or three ideas nevertheless. Who has under-
stood them? Too bad for them; that's no reason to 
kill oneself in oespair ! (~ p. 140). 
Both the descriptions from which these extracts are taken 
are introduced into the text without any anchorage in a 
narrative perspective other than that of Dupont. Textual 
markers such as the pronouns ".!l se l~ve• ("He stands up"), 
•il a lui-meme ajout~s· (•he himself has added"), deictics 
•de tous les c8t~s • ( •on al 1 sides•), • ! gauche• (•to the 
left), and phrases recorded in free indirect speech, "Qui 
les a comprises?• (Who has understood them?") and •Tant pis 
pour eux• (·Too bad for them"), lead the reader to believe 
that he is witnessing the actions and thoughts of Dupont. 
In each case however, a sudden change in perspective re-
contextualizes the passage as the interpretation of the 
suicide of Dupont offered first by Commissioner Laurent 
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and then by Wallas. Once again it is not unusual in tradi-




same story: we are, 
accounts of William 
as already remarked, 




Such repetitions are justified by variations in 
the content of the narrations, variations which are relevant 
to the detective's quest. Repeated information might imply 
corroboration; differing information might imply deception, 
and so on. In the examples cited above, however, the in-
forrna tion offered by the two versions is almost exactly 
repeated. Those differences which do arise take the form 
of paradigmatic alternatives, for example, "SOllf'rl" or "noise"; 
"not much" or "scarcely any"; "On every side,• or "on 
all sides"; "even so" or "nevertheless," and so on. It 
is as if the narrative possibilities or paradigmatic alter-
natives of describing the scene are being explored. Since 
there is no compulsion to preserve time as a continuum, 
the need to select and retain certain narrative possibili-
ties and to reject or repress others no longer applies. 
The choices available to the writer are made accessible 
to the reader. The convention that the writer takes the 
role of problem-maker who formulates the mystery and autho-
rizes the course of its solution, while the reader takes 
the role of problem-solver who follows the detective in 
identifying the mystery and its decipherment, is subverted. 
In other words, the boundary between the reader and the 
writer, like other boundaries already examined, becomes 
blurred. It becomes apparent that the writer, in order 
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to write, must first be a reader, an interpreter of, and 
selector from numerous narrative choices, while the reader, 
on the other hand, in the process of interpreting, is him-
self rewriting the story he reads. This is an issue to 
which I shall be giving closer attention shortly. For 
the present let us return to the third norm of textual 
intelligibility: just as the boundaries between "the true" 
and "the false" are blurred by the subversion of ilie princi-
ple of noncontradiction, or the boundaries between "reality" 
and "possibility" are blurred by the subversion of temporal 
conventions, so the boundaries between "the real" and "the 
representation al" or "fiction al" are blurred by the sub-
version of the belief in the sol id i ty of the phenomenal 
world. In the following description for example, the dis-
tinction between the "real" as substantial origin and the 
"representational" 
is blurred: 
as imaginary, ephemeral derivation, 
Usually iliis landscape has little relief and looks 
railier unattractive, but iliis morning ilie greyish yellow 
sky of snowy days gives it unaccustomed dimensions. 
Certain outlines are emphasized, others are blurred; 
here and iliere distances open out, unsuspected masses 
appear; ilie whole is organized into a series of planes 
silhouetted against one another, so iliat ilie depili, 
suddenly illuminated, seems to lose its natural look -
and perhaps its reality - as if iliis over - exactitude 
were possible only in a painting ( E p. 79). 
With the progression of this description, a landscape which 
initially seems to be identified as "the real", "the solid", 
comes to appear more and more fictional and ephemeral. 
The very process of describing the world as •real• or •solid" 
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seems to foreground the nature of this "reality" as a pro-
duct of symbolic conventions such as the blurring or empha-
sis of outlines, or the organisation into planes. In other 
words the medium of representation, language, manifests 
itself as part of the "solidity", the "reality" which it 
seeks to describe; as Stephen Heath expresses it: 
Instead of effacing itself before a 'Reality ' projected as 
its precedent, language • • • is grasped as specific locus 
of the articulation of the real, of its real-ization. 28 
We now come to Suleiman's fourth and final norm of 
textual intelligibility, "the belief in at least a relative 
unity of self." If in The Blue Hammer the issue of "split-
subjectivity" is treated as irrelevant to the chief concerns 
of the text, in The Erasers, the possibilities of its rele-
vance are explored. How is this exploration executed? 
In the comparison between Wallas and the figure of 
the conventional detective embodied by Lew Archer, a variety 
of differences has already been observed. One marked simi-
larity however, is that both detectives are outsiders who 
arrive in cities that are unfamiliar to them, to investigate 
crimes committed prior to their arrivals. As professionals, 
each may be supposed to conduct his investigation from 
an exterior locus of authority. While in Archer's case, 
his position as exterior to the crime becomes more clearly 
defined with the progression of his investigation (vide 
p.88 of this chapter), Wallas's position becomes increasingly 
28 Heath, p. 24 
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ambiguous. As his investigations proceed, he encounters 
with alarming frequency, evidence that his position in 
relation to the mystery is not exterior but interior. The 
first suggestion of this interiority takes the form of 
a joke made by Commissioner Laurent during his conversation 
with Wallas to whom he is relinquishing the Dupont file. 
Referring to the Caf~ des Alli~s, Wallas asks: 
•... Suppose the murderer had slept there last night, 
what would you know about it?" 
·The landlord would have registered him and reported 
to me, as he' 11 do for you - he has until noon. • 
•And if he doesn 'tr Wallas asks. 
•well, in that case, we would have to admire your 
perspicacity in having found the only clandestine rocming 
house in the town so quickly. It would even be bad 
for you in the long run; you'd be the first serious 
suspect I've found: recently arrived in town, living 
twenty yards from the scene of the crime, and complete-
ly unknown to the police!• 
•aut I only arrived last night, at eleven!• Wallas 
protests. 
•If you weren't registered, what proof would there 
be?· 
•At the time the crime was committed, I was a hundred 
kilometres from here; that can be verified. • 
•of course! Don't good murderers always have an 
alibi?• (E p. 57). 
If initially this joke seems marginal in relation to the 
more serious concerns of the investigation, it gradually 
manifests itself to be that Other, that •non-sense• or 
triviality which is repressed only to return again with 
greater subversive force. It becomes apparent for example, 
that Wallas's 7.65 millimetre automatic revolver which 
has one bullet missing from its chamber is both identical 
to the weapon used to kill Daniel Dupont, and to the weapon 
which Dupont owned himself. Furthermore, a little later 
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in the investigation, a potential witness, Madame Bax, 
who occupies an apartment overlooking Dupont's house, when 
questioned by Wallas, declares that she has seen a man 
in a 1 ight raincoat loitering in front of the house on 
the evening of Monday 26 October, pursued by a shouting 
drunkard. When the drunk who haunts the Caf~ des Alli~s 
corroborates this evidence with the claim that he himself 
pursued none other than Wallas the night before, the latter, 
in spite of his claim to have arrived in the city after 
the murder, once again is confronted with the suggestion 
that he is implicated in the crime. Since the drunk claims 
to have pursued "Wallas" to a post-office in the Rue de 
Jonas (~ p. 97), Wallas himself follows this lead, only 
to be identified at the post-office without hesitation, 
as the regular client, Monsieur Andr~ WS (E p. 135). 
Now the possibility that the detective might himself 
prove to be the murderer is not in itself unprecedented 
in detective fiction - Agatha Christie's The Murder of 
Roger Ackroyd being perhaps one of the best known examples 
of this artifice. 29 What is more subversive about this 
possibility in The Erasers is that, if the detective is 
indeed the murderer, he has no knowledge of his crime. 
In other words, he is to discover that the unknown, the 
criminal, is itself a part of - or to use Lacan's phrase, 
an "inmixing of" - that which is known: the self as detec-
29 This issue is explored by Felman in her discussion of 
Oedipus Rex by Sophocles and Trap for Cinderella ( PiAge pour 
Cendrillon) by ~bastien Japrisot in •ne Sophocle ! Japrisot, • 
p. 32. 
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tive. This condition of misrecognition in Wallas is fore-
grounded by the references to the Oedipal myth which are 
woven into the text as part of the excess of meaning which 
he fails to interpret. 
consideration. 
These references are worth some 
Most of the Oedipal "clues• impinge on Wallas's con-
sciousness as strange, but untranslatable signs which at-
tract his attention during his wanderings on his quest 
through the city. He repeatedly observes, for example, 




ground-floor window, the curtains are decorated 
mass-produced allegorical subject: shepherds 
an abandoned child, or something of the kind 
(E p. 35). 
In addition to this motif which is repeated several times 
(~ pp. 84-85; p. 176), there are references to a sculpture 
named "The Chariot of State• the name of whose sculptor 
•v. Daulis• can be read as an anagram of •Laius• father 
of Oedipus. 30 This sculpture is described as, 
• • • a bronze group representing a Greek chariot drawn 
by two horses, in which are staooing several individuals, 
probably symbolic, whose unnatural positions · are out 
of harmony with the presumed rapidity of their equipage 
(E p. 45) 
a description which evokes the fracas between Oedipus and 
the unidentified traveller - later believed to be his father 
Laius - at •a place where three roads meet.• 
30 I owe this observation to Bruce Morrissette in •0eaipus 
and Existentialism.• p. 56. 
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Other Oedipal signs are the references to the ruins 
of the city of Thebes (Epp. 104; 143); to the statuette 
of a blind old man led by a child (~ pp. 177-178); to 
Wallas's numb, and later, painful, swollen feet (Epp. 124; 
18 5); to the paradox of double identity in the argument 
of whether a line can be both straight and oblique (Epp. 
191-193); and perhaps the most oft-repeated references, 
the riddles produced by the drunk in the Caf~ des Alli~s 
(~ pp. 8; 94; 192-193 and 217). 
If Wallas does not seem able to fit these signs into 
a coherent pattern of meaning, the reader who is given 
the advantage of the overt clue in the epigraph taken from 
Sophocles's Oedipus Rex - •Time that sees all has found 
you out against your wi11• 31 - may recognize these apparent-
ly superfluous signs as various segments of the Oedipal 
myth, and may observe the parallels between Oedipus's quest 
and that of Wallas. To explicate each of these parallels 
would seem unnecessary for this discussion. I shall con-
sider only one of the most striking - the riddles of the 
drunk - and refer my reader to Morrissette' s thorough ex-
ploration of this issue, for further information. 32 
31 As Morrissette points out, this is a slight variation of 
the Sophoclean text which, in its English translation reads, 
•Time sees all; and now he has found you, when you least 
expected it;• - King Oedipus in The Theban Plays, trans. E. F. 
Watling (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1947 rpt 1974) p. 59. 
32 See •Oedipus and Existentialism,• pp. 54-63. My own 
comments on this theme reflect my indebtedness to this article. 
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The drunk in the Caf~ des Alli~s repeatedly confronts 
Wallas with riddles, one of which mirrors, not only the 
riddle of the Sphinx, 33 and the structure of the Oedipal 
tragedy, but also echoes the pattern of Wallas's own quest: 
•what animal is parricide in the morning, incestuous 
at noon, and blind at night?• 
At the bar the discussion has become a general one, 
but the five men are all t.a.lking at once and Wallas 
can hear only snatches of their remarks. 
•wen,• the drunk insists, •can't you guess? It's 
not so hard: parricide in the morning, blind at noon 
• • • • No • • • • blind in the morning, incestuous at noon, 
parricide at night. Well? What animal is it?• 
(E pp. 192-193). 
If Wallas is at a loss, the reader may recognize the irony 
of the riddle: firstly, it has already been remarked that 
Wallas, at the start of his quest on the morning of Tuesday 
27 October, is ·blind" to the possibility that Dupont is 
not dead - has not been killed "by a bullet in the chest" 
(E p. 32) - a possibility which has been made accessible 
to the reader through the Prologue. Secondly, in the course 
of Wallas's wanderings through the unfamiliar city, it 
has been suggested that he has never known his own father, 
that he has visited the city as a child with his mother, 
but that they had failed to rendezvous with his father 
(E p. 197). Since Dupont has been recorded in a police 
report has having an illegitimate son (E p. 164) and later 
a young wife Evelyn, whom Wallas interviews (E FP· 147-154), 
33 
·The Sphinx now asked what animal walked on four legs 
in the noming, two at rxx>n, aoo three in the evening.• - •Sphinx,• 
Oxford Companion to English Literature, 1978 ed. 
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the implication is that Dupont might well be Wallas's father, 
and, furthermore, that Wallas, sensing in Evelyn - perhaps 
his stepmother - an erotic fascination, implicitly performs 
the action of •incest at noon.• Finally, he shoots Dupont 
on the evening of Tuesday 26 October, thereby becoming 
•parricide at night.• 
Although these implications that Dupont might be Wal-
las's father, or that Evelyn might be his stepmother, are 
never overtly confirmed by the text, what is more important 
is the possibility that such information might exist beyond 
Wallas's conscious knowledge, that instead of standing 
outside or comprehending the solution to his investigation, 
he can come to find that the solution stands outside or 
comprehends him. In other words, what The Erasers reveals 
is, that the interpretive consciousness, since it can never 
be fully present to itself, can never be fully aware of 
its own position in relation to the problem it interprets. 
In Felman's words, ·That which by definition the inter-
pretive intelligence itself always misrecognizes is its 
proper place in relation to the empty slot of the enigma. • 34 
For what Wallas's quest ultimately reveals to him is that 
he both is, and is not, whom he thought he was at the start 
of his quest; he both controls and does not control the 
meaning which he produces in the course of his investigation. 
34 
•ce que par dffinition l' intelligence m~me de l 'interp~te 
toujours m~nnatt, c'est sa propre place par rapport ~ la case 
vide de l'~nigme. • - Felman, ·~ Sophocle ~ Japrisot,• p. 35, 
my translation. 
122 
Let us now consider closely the events and implications 
of the revelatory scene, the wfinal explosion of the truthw 
in The Erasers. 
Arresting the Play of Difference or Repressing the Other: 
the Detective as Murderer, the Reader as Writer 
On Tuesday night, 27 October at 7.30, Wallas's quest 
ends as follows: he has returned to the deserted Dupont 
home in his vain search for some clue that might help him 
to begin to solve this mystery, to arrest this play of 
differences which seems to proliferate with each step of 
his investigation. While he is inspecting Dupont's study, 
he hears a car stop outside and somebody enter the house. 
The reader from his privileged position outside the text 
knows that this w intruderw is Dupont himself who, on es-
caping the city, has come to fetch a file of papers which 
his acquaintance Marchat failed to retrieve for him. The 
reader is also aware that the revolver which Dupont takes 
from the drawer of the night-table in his own room, is 
jammed. 
intruder 
Thus, when Dupont, entering his study, finds an 
Wallas - waiting in the dark where the night 
before the original intruder, Garinati, had lain in wait, 
he attempts to fire at the intruder, although his jammed 
revolver does not respond. Wallas, flinging himself to 
the floor, fires in self-defence only to discover afterwards 
that he has killed the man whose murder he thought he was 
investigating. In playing the role of detective or inter-
preter, he finds that he simultaneously plays the role 
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of murderer or instigator of the crime, the very failure 
in meaning that he sought to resolve. In his Desire to 
fill the lack of meaning, he finds himself to be the victim 
of that Desire. 
Thus, the blurring of the boundaries between "true" 
and "false", "real" and "representational" and so forth, 
is repeated in the ironic discovery of the detective as 
murderer. In this blurring of boundaries, "meaning" becomes 
suspended yet again in the play of difference which is 
no longer repressed by the order of binary oppositions. 
No longer can the reader's quest be formulated as the ques-
tion "What does the text mean?" or "What is the missing 
piece of the jigsaw?" for before any "jigsaw" or "totality 
of meaning" can be conceived from which such a piece might 
be missing, it is necessary to repress the difference or 
hide the excess pieces of puzzle, whose absence will give 
definition or a sense of totality to that which is present. 
In other words, before the reader can determine what the 
text might mean, he has first to discover the conditions 
which make meaning possible at all: how the text can come 
to mean. 
While in the traditional detective novel this repres-
sion of differences has already been performed in the nar-
rative choices made by the implied author, in The Erasers, 
such repression has only been partially executed. Suffi-
cient choices have been made by the writer, the problem-
maker, for the reader, the problem-solver, to recognize 
certain patterns of "meaning" in the text before him. In 
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other words, certain choices must be made for the reader 
to expect the text of The Erasers to conform to the con-
ventions of detective fiction. Only when his quest begins 
does he discover that such expectations are being invited 
only to be subverted. 
If the detective finds himself lured into the trap 
of his own suspicion, if he fails to recognize the Desire 
of the Other, the Desire to arrest the play of difference 
and "make meaning", the reader too is doomed to be "caught" 
in this trap. Like Wallas, he is confronted with the "ex-
cess meaning", the plethora of pa rad igma tic al terna ti ves 
which have been permitted to manifest themselves on the 
syntagmatic axis. Like Wallas he is to discover that in 
attempting to resolve the failure of meaning, the mystery 
of the text, he finds himself repeating the "crime" - the 
repress ion or "arrest" or even "murder" of the play of 
difference - which he thought himself to be investigating. 
Just as the detective is to dis cover that he is the murderer, 
so the reader is to discover that he is the writer. In 
making meaning of the text, in becoming "no longer a con-
sumer, but a producer of the text,• 35 the reader rewrites 
it, silencing or repressing contradictions and differences 
in order to give definition to the narrative choices he 
privileges. In this discovery that his role as •reader" 
involves a participation in the •otherness• of the role of 
writer, the re~r is effectively encountering the linguistic 
35 Ro1 - d Barth S/Z A E tr Richard Miller cJ.Cln es, : n ssay, ans. 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1974) p. 4. 
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model of reflexivity so radically insisted upon by Jacques 
Lacan. 
that: 
In Felman' s words, he could be said to discover 
••• there are no longer distinct centers but only contra-
dictnry gravitational pulls: two pseudo-centers - •the 
subject of the signifier" (of the utterance) and •the 
subject of the signified" (of the statenent) - even though 
they are radically different from each other, are no 
longer entirely distinct and cannot be separated from 
each other: each can also be the Other, is "inmixed" 
with the Other. 3 6 
There is, moreover, no way in which he can make sense of 
the text without becoming a part of the interpretive para-
dox, for in the very act of interpretation, his repression 
of difference will manifest itself to the detecting eye 
of another reader as a flaw, a lack in meaning, which calls 
once again for interpretive activity. This is an issue 
to which I shall be returning repeatedly in this thesis. 
For the present, let us consider what the implications 
of this "new way of reading" might be. 
IN CONCLUSION 
Since •meaning• and the •play of difference", or in-
terpretation and the divisiveness of meaning, seem mutually 
exclusive, does the practice of •a new way of reading" 
imply abandoning the quest for •truth" and discarding the 
question •What does the text mean?•? If so, what of the 
reader? Is his task no longer to interpret, to clarify, 
•the meaning• or "the truth• of the text? Exactly what 
36 Felman, ·The Originality of Jacques Lacan. • p. 55. 
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activity does he engage in? 
In order to respond to such questions, I wish first 
to return to certain comments made by Anthony Wilden on 
the matters of "knowledge" and "the truth", •misrecognition" 
and •recognition•, to which I have already referred in 
my Introduction (vide p. 52 ) • Wilden argues as follows: 
Since the discovery of the lack of object is for Lacan 
the condition and the cause of desire, the ad ult quest 
for transcendence, lost ti.me, lost paradises, lost pleni-
tude, or any of the myriad forms the lack of object 
may take • • • can be reduced , if one wishes, to the 
question at the root of neurosis and psychosis, the 
question asked by Oedipus: "Who (or what) am I?" The 
subject, like Oedipus, always knows the answer, but 
the distinction between Knowledge (savoir) and truth 
repeatedly emphasized by Lacan :points up the function 
of m&x>nnaissance and reconnaissance in human life. 
Truth for the subject is not knowledge but recognition. 
Mental illness on the other hand is precisely the refusal 
to recognize that truth; the mechanisms of negation, 
disavowal, rejection, isolation, and so forth fl.ow from 
it. But a certain m&x>nnaissance - which we might 
call sublimation - is essential to health; Dostoievskian 
hyperconsciousness is no solution. The :point is of 
course that hyperconsciousness or hyperrecogniti.on simply 
corres:ponds to the intensity of the loss [the primal 
loss of "full subjectivity," "full truth• and so forth 
that is an irreducible outCCJte of language acquisition].37 
Now if, in this context, one interprets "the subject" more 
specifically as "the reader of fiction,• one might argue 
that if such a reader believes that "the truth", as some 
finally satisfying •message" does indeed await him in the 
contents of the text, he is suffering from a misrecognition 
of the nature of •truth" and of the operation of language 
as a representative system. On the other hand, if the 
same reader abandons any hope of achieving a meaningful 
37 Wilden, in Lacan, Speech and Language, p. 166. 
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interpretation of the literary text on the basis of his 
recognition that such "meaning• can only ever be partial 
and therefore unsatisfactory, he does indeed seem doomed 
to a condition of "Dostoievskian hyperconsciousness. • In 
terms of the reading of fiction, what Wilden's suggestion 
of a "certain m~connaissance - which we might call sublima-
tion "would seem to suggest is, that the reader's inter-
pretive activity should entail a dialectical process whereby 
his Desire for "full meaning" and the subsequent recogni-
tion of the impossibility of satisfying that Desire, be 
sublimated into a state of "knowing misrecognition" through 
the construction of meaning which, if never fully satisfy-
ing, is at least an unconditionally repeatable consolation 
for the "primal loss" resulting from language acquisition. 
The "new way of reading" should not then be seen as 
a "change of focus" or a "change of centre• from the quest 
after the "truth" to the recognition that there can be 
no such truth. It should rather, like Lacan's new mode 
of ref lexi vi ty, be seen as a "process of decentering, • 
a process whereby the reader, in a repetition of the authori-
al activity, participates in, or performs the division 
of "meaning" which allows "the truth" to stand as an il-
lusionary centrality that is sustained by, or conversely, 
that might be subverted by, the Other as marginal difference. 
Instead of standing outside the text then, as the detached 
"witness" who asks "What does the text mean?" "What is 
its 'truth'?" the reader may be conceived of as necessarily 
involved in the text, decentering "the truth" in order 
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to discover at what price it stands. Bis question thus 
becomes, "Bow does the text mean?" "What does 'the truth' 
disregard or fail to account for in order to be 'the truth'?" 
* * * * * 
CHAPTER TWO 
NARRATION AS A READING EFFECT: 
THE OTHER AS THE UNKNOWABLE IN FAULKNER'S 
ABSALOM, ABSALOM! 
Reading is dramatized not as an emotive reaction to 
what language does, but as an emotive reaction to 
the impossibility of knowing what it might be up 
to. 
- Paul de Man (Yale French Studies, 1977) 
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In the preceding chapter, my chief concern was to 
investigate the way in which narrative conventions operate 
to produce literary •truth• and to propose that the recog-
nition and understanding of this operation invites a new 
conception of the activity of reading. In the course of 
this investigation, two other issues were raised: firstly, 
the question of the supplementarity of apparently opposing 
identities both at the level of the story - the relation 
between detective and criminal - and at the level of the 
discourse - the relation between reader and writer. Second-
ly the question was raised of the implications of the Other 
as the ·blind-spot•, the unknown, of any particular subjec-
ti v e po s i t ion . These issues having been only raised in 
the previous chapter, it will be the task of this chapter 
to pursue them further, examining in particular the view 
of the narrative as •an effect of reading,• and the impli-
cations for the reader of the Other as an irreducible mys-
tery or irrecoverably lost •origin• in the literary text. 
William Faulkner's Absalom, Absalom! is a particularly 
appropriate text for this investigation for the following 
reasons: it is a text which has frequently been described 
as having the characteristics of a detective novel, 1 and 
1 Some critics who have described the text as having charac-
teristics of detective fiction are: Cleanth Brooks, William Faulkner: 
The Yoknapatawpha Country (New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press, 1963 rpt 1977) p. 311; Peter Brooks, •rncredulous Narration: 
Absalom, Absalom1• Contemporary Literature, 34, 3 (1982) pp. 247-
268; C. Hugh Holman, • Absalom, Absalom 1: The Historian as Detec-
tive,• The Sewanee Review, 79, 3 (1971) pp. 542-553: Susan Hesneck 
Parr, •The Fourteenth Image of the Blackbird: Another Look at 
Truth in Absalom, Absaloml • Arizona Quarterly, 35, 2 ( 1979) pp. 
154-164. 
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insofar as it is structured around the mystery of a murder 
- the murder of Charles Bon by Henry Sutpen - and is cons-
tituted by the attempts of various narrators to reconstruct 
the events relevant to the murder, this description is 
acceptable. Absalom, Absalom! then, lends itself to a 
continuation of the discussion started in Chapter One. 
However, it is also a text which by its very questing in-
vestigative structure raises questions about interpretation 
and narration, about the nature of "truth" and the nature 
of "mystery", about authority, succession, boundaries, 
identities and differences, which seem less germane to 
detective fiction than to anti-detective fiction (such 
as The Erasers) and tragedy (such as Oedipus Rex on which 
The Erasers draws for so much of its ef feet). These are 
the concerns which make Absalom, Absaloml particularly 
illuminating to the argument which this chapter will follow. 
To clarify what is liable to be a complex and lengthy 
discussion, I shall now offer an introductory overview 
of the central questions which I want to consider in this 
chapter. In a reading of Absalom, Absalom ! one of the 
first issues which calls for attention is the multiple 
perspective of the narrative structure, which raises many 
interesting debates - particularly with regard to reading -
as is suggested by the volume of critical work devoted 
h . . 2 tot 1s issue. The most easily identifiable of the various 
2 The volume of critical material on this aspect of the novel 
is extensive. The following articles were found particularly useful 
to this discussion: Cleanth Brooks, ·The Narrative Structure of 
Absalom, Absalom1• The Georgia Review, 29 (Summer, 1975), pp. 
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narrative perspectives are those of the four first-person 
dramatized narrators, Miss Rosa Coldfield, Hr Compson, 
Quentin Compson and Shreve Mccannon. Now, while many crit-
ics accept without question that the "truth" of the text 
is unveiled by the combined narrative activity of Quentin 
and Shreve, others are at pains to demonstrate that no 
indication is given that any one of the discourses present-
ing the story is overtly privileged as more truthful than 
any other. This question will be closely investigated 
as the various versions of the Sutpen story are explored; 
however it is worth considering initially how much narrative 
authority is attributed to other more peripheral discourses 
in the text. 
Besides the four primary narrators already mentioned, 
there is also an overt narrator who coordinates the dialogue 
of narrator and narratee and who occasionally recedes to a 
covert position as, for example, in the scene between Thomas 
and Henry Sutpen in the Confederate Army tent in the closing 
weeks of the Civil War. 3 Although this narrator is more 
366-394; Thomas Connolly, •point of View in Faulkner's Absalom, 
Absalom1• Modern Fiction Studies, 27, 2 (1981) pp. 255-272; Lynne 
Gartrell Levins, ·The Four Narrative Perspectives in Absalom, 
Absalom!• PMLA 85, l (1970) pp. 35-47; and Shlomith Rimmon-
Kenan, • From Reproduction to Production: The Status of Narration 
in Faulkner's Absalom, Absaloml • Degres: Revue de Synthese D' 
Orientation Semiolcx;ique, 16 (1978) pp. 1-19. 
3 William Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom ! ( New York: Random 
House, 1964) pp. 352ff. All subsequent references to this text 
will be included in the body of the chapter using the abbreviation 
AA followed by the relevant page number. 
133 
privileged than the four dramatized narrators, having what 
Wayne C. Booth describes as "the most important single 
privilege ••• of obtaining an inside view of another char-
4 
acter, • - he is able, for example, to give the reader 
insight into Quentin's thoughts (AA pp. 10-11) - he never 
offers his own version of the Sutpen story, nor does he 
appear to be attributed knowledge of "the truth". Instead 
he seems content to regard the status of •truth" as approxi-
mate rather than absolute. This is illustrated for example, 
when he judges Quentin and Shreve's description of Charles 
Bon' s mother - "the slight dowdy woman with untidy gray-
streaked raven hair coarse as a horse's tail, with parchment-
colored skin and implacable pouched black eyes which alone 
showed no age because they showed no forget ting,• (AA p. 
335) to be an •invention• which was •probably true enough.• 
From the overt narrator's perspective then, •the truth" 
remains open to further speculation and refinement. 
Another narrative point of view is presented in the 
letter which is reputed to have been writ ten by Charles 
Bon to Judi th Sutpen towards the end of the war. While 
as •1etter• this text might be assumed to have the status 
of •authentic historic document", its description as being 
•without date or salutation or signature• (AA p. 129), 
foregrounds its representational and therefore iterable 
nature, calling into question the compatibility of the 
4 Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago & London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1961) p. 160. 
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notions •authenticity• and "textuality•. 
Further perspectives are offered in the five tomb-
stones, and the again supposedly documentary texts of the 
Chronology, the Genealogy and the Map which are appended 
to the narrative text. Here the •truth-value• of the "docu-
mentary• is called into question, for while the evidence 
on the tombstones corroborates the evidence in the narra-
tive discourse, it is frequently contradicted by the "docu-
mentary" evidence. For example, while the tombstone of 
Ellen Coldfield/Sutpen states her dates of birth and death 
as follows: "Born October 9, 1817. Died January 23, 1863," 
the Genealogy describes her as •Born in Tennessee, 1818, ••• 
Died Sutpen's Hundred 1862.• The Chronology agrees with 
the Genealogy. Then in the case of Thomas Sutpen, while 
Quentin Compson states in the course of his narrative that 
Sutpen "became confused about his age and was never able 
to straighten it out again, so that he told Grandfather 
that he did not know within a year on either side just 
how old he was,• (AA p. 227), while he repeats this point 
twice (AA pp. 228 and 229), and while no birthdate appears 
on Sutpen' s tombstone, the Chronology and Genealogy both 
record his birthdate as 1807. Yet again, while on his 
tombstone the name of Bon's son is spelt •charles Etienne 
Saint-Valery Bon,• the Genealogy spells it •charles Etienne 
De Saint Velery Bon.• While Judi th and Charles Bon are 
described by Mr Compson as dying of yellow fever (AA p. 
210), the Chronology describes them as dying of smallpox. 5 
5 Interesting research of this point is provided by Susan 
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Without an authoritative narrative perspective to verify 
any particular information as •the truth", these discrepan-
cies raise two inevitable questions: firstly, is •the 
truth" presented as •accessible• in this text, and if so, 
what is the nature of this "truth"? 
Returning once again to the discourse of the four 
first-person dramatized narrators, what I wish to propose 
in this chapter is that Absalom, Absalom! presents a view 
of narration which supports the proposition that narrative 
is an effect of reading. Now, as discussed in the intro-
ductory chapter of this thesis (see pages 61-63 ), Lacanian 
analysis has presented us with a model of interpretation 
or reading as a "return to the Other," or an attempt to 
translate into rational terms that which in a preceding 
discourse appears to escape such translation. In Absalom, 
Absalom! each narrator, addressing a drama ti zed narratee, 
Resneck Parr. She writes: 
• Almost a decade after Absalom, Absalom ! was published, 
in 1945, Faulkner added a similarly factually inaccurate Genealogy 
to The Sound and the Fury. In the appendix which he wrote 
for Malcolm Cowley's Portable Faulkner, Faulkner once again pro-
vided a history of characters and events which differed from that 
given in the novel itself. Faulkner's explanation of the factual 
discrepancies to his distraught editor, COwley, seems equally awlic-
able to Absalom, Absalom ! To begin with, Faulkner described 
the appendix's narrator as the town historian, the Garter King-
at-Arms who •knew only what the town could have told him.'* 
flt:>reover, despite COwley's efforts to the contrary, Faulkner insisted 
on keeping in the appendix the discrepancies between it and the 
novel. • • • The point here is that in both novels Faulkner's append-
ed genealogies are themselves part of the larger narrative structure. 
In each instance, they provide one more example of an unreliable 
narrator's version of events arxl not details with •auctorial sanction" 
as Brooks asserts about the genealogy in Absalom, Absalom 1 **• -
·The Fourteenth Image of the Blackbird,• pp. 155-156. Parr's 
footnotes refer to the following texts: 
* Maloolm Cowley, ed., The Faulkner-Cowley File: Letter and Memo-
ries, 1944-1962 (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), p. 44. 
** Cleanth Brooks, William Faulkner: The Yoknapatawpha Country, 
p. 433. 
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attempts, as knowing, rational subject, to make meaning 
of the unknowable, irrational Other which erupts as an 
unanswered question into the •biography" of Thomas Sutpen 
threatening to transform "his-story• into meaningless catas-
trophe. In so doing, each narrator can be seen to transfer 
onto his 1 istener/reader, the ef feet of the unknowable. 
This ef feet repeats itself in the reader as his Desire 
to make meaning of, or to narrate, the story of Thomas 
Sutpen. Thus the chain of narration handed from speaker 
to speaker for example, from Miss Rosa to Quent ion to 
Shreve, or from General Compson to Mr Compson to Quention 
to Shreve - is simultaneously a chain of readings. As 
Shoshana Felman points out, 
In the chain transmission of the story, each narrator, 
to relay the story, must first be a receiver of the 
story, a reader who at once records it and interprets 
it, simultaneously trying to make sense of it and under-
going it, as a lived experience, an •impression,• a 
reading effect. 6 
Clearly, the chain of narration is a chain in which the 
reader himself must become implicated, for if - as has 
already been suggested of Absalom, Absalom! the text 
refuses to authorize any particular interpretation as •con-
clusive•, the reader must himself be provoked, by the fail-
ure of meaning or the repetition of the question, to the 
action of telling, of replying. In other words, the very 
action of telling which this chapter itself embodies, can 
6 Felman, •Turning the Screw of Interpretation,• p. 124. 
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be regarded as a reading effect which in its turn will 
produce in its reader an ef feet to reproduce. 
again from the insights of Felman, 
To borrow 
The very act of telling, of narration, proceeds then 
from the potentially infinite repercussion of an effect 
of reading; an effect that, once produced, seeks to 
reproduce itself as an effect yet to be produced - an 
effect whose effect is an effect to produce. Narrative 
as such turns out to be the trace of the action of a 
reading; it is, in fact, reading as action. 7 
At the level of the discourse then, it can be argued that 
the text of Absalom, Absalom! subverts the opposition of 
the activities of narrating and listening, or writing and 
reading, and thereby implicitly deconstructs the binary 
oppositions of narrator/narratee or writer/reader, present-
ing such supposedly separate "identities" as the products 
of their reciprocal "inmixing" or mutual participation 
in each other. 
The validity of arranging difference according to 
binary oppositions is similarly placed in question at the 
level of the story. As a text which concerns itself with 
a mythical account of the causes and effects of the American 
Civil War, the collapse of the plantation society in the 
deep Southern "world" of Yoknapatwpha County, but most 
particularly with the story of Thomas Sutpen's tragic fail-
ure to establish the Sutpen dynasty, Absalom, Absalom! 
concerns itself with the hierarchical arrangements of oppo-
sitions such as paternity/filiality, male/female, wealthy/ 
7 Felman, "Turning the Screw of Interpretation," p. 126. 
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impoverished, white/black and so forth, upon which notions 
of social order such as •authority• and •succession• depend. 
More particularly, it repeatedly addresses itself to the 
problem of the "undecidable", the ambiguity or excess of 
meaning which refuses translation into a Symbolic Order 
that is founded on such hierarchical arrangement of opposi-
tions. 
These then, are the issues raised by Absalom, Absalom! 
on which this chapter will focus: the nature and accessi-
bility of textual "truth"; the supplementarity of the 
narrative and interpretive activities; and the problems 
arising from the ordering of difference according to a 
system of hierarchical binary oppositions. 
THE IRREDUCIBLE STRANGENESS 
OF THE OTHER IN MISS ROSA'S DEMON MYTH 
The text of Absalom, Absalom! opens with the overt 
narrator's description of the setting of Miss Rosa Cold-
field's narrative to Quentin Compson on a late summer after-
noon in September. Miss Rosa's narrative constitutes a 
twofold problem for Quentin as her narratee. Firstly, 
her own identity is strangely ambiguous. As a "ghost• 
of the past occupying "the off ice a dim hot airless 
room ••• • pervaded by "the dim coffin-smelling gloom ••• 
and the rank smell of female old flesh long embattled in 
virginity• (AA pp. 7-8), she intrudes unexpectedly into 
Quentin's 1 ife, summoning him by means of a small, note-
bearing negro (AA p. 10), in order to recount her story 
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to him for the strange reason that it might be of use to 
him in his future literary career (AA pp. 9-10). Not only 
does she straddle the worlds of "living• and "dead" - she 
is "one of the ghosts which had refused to lie still even 
longer than most had, telling him about old ghost-times" 
(AA p. 9) but she also straddles the roles of "male" 
and "female" being a sixty-five year old spinster daughter 
who takes upon herself the "off ice" the locus and the 
function - of her father. 8 Miss Rosa's narrative is, fur-
thermore, a return of, and a return to, Thomas Sutpen as 
unlaid ghost; it is the product of the effect on Miss 
Rosa of Sutpen as an untranslatable, irreducible mystery. 
As Quentin listens to Miss Rosa's attempt to interpret 
the story of Sutpen, the effect of Sutpen as mystery repeats 
itself in him as an irresolvable contradiction in his own 
interpretive consciousness - a contradiction between his 
inherited knowledge of the Sutpen myth and the strangeness 
of the interpretation which he is being coerced into hearing 
from Miss Rosa: 
• • • the two separate Quentins now talking to one another 
in the long silence of notpeople, in notlanguage, like 
this: It seems that this demon - his name ivaa Sutpen -
(Cotonel SutpenJ - Colonel Sutpen. Who oame out of nOI.Jhere 
and z.nthout OOPrZing upon the iand z.nth a band of strange 
niggers and built a ptantation - (Tore viotently a ptanta-
tion, Miss Rosa CoUfieU says) - tore viotentiy. And 
nnl'Pied her sister Etlen and begot a son and daughter which 
- (Without gentleness begot, Mias Rosa CotdfieU says) -
8 I am indebted to Robert Con Davis for this ant>iguous reading 
of •office•. He writes, •... Rosa's rage fulfills the father's office 
- that is, 'office' as a function - in a profound way.• - ·The 
Symbolic Father in Yoknapatawpha County,• The Journal of Narrative 
Technique, 10 (1980) p. SO. 
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without gentieneas. Which shou1,d have been the jewe7,s 
of his pr>ide and the shield and comfo1't of his old age, 
only - (Only they destPoyed him 01' something 01' he destpoy-
ed them 01' something. And died) - and died. Without Pe-
gPet, Mias Rosa Co7,dfie7,d says - (Save by hep) Yes, save 
by heP. (And by Quentin Corrrpson) (AA p. 9). 
This passage evokes two conflicting interpretations of 
Sutpen: on one hand, as Colonel, he commands the respect 
of society, building a plantation and "begetting" a family 
who are to be 
of his o7,d age." 
"the jewe7,s of his pr>ide and the shie7,d and comfo1't 
In other words, Sutpen seems to conform 
to the Old Testament ideal of the father who seeks to per-
petuate himself and his values in his children. Interfering 
with this version are the interjections of Miss Rosa's 
interpretation. In her terms, "Co1,one7, Sutpen" is a "demon"; 
to her he did not "buiid a ptantaticm" but "toPe vio7,ent7,y a p7,arz-
tation"; his action of having • begot a son and daughtep • is 
qualified as "without gentleness begot." Sutpen then, seems to 
evoke a direct contradiction between a view of construction 
and perpetuation and that of destruction and damnation. 
If Quentin's interior discourse reflects the effect of 
his reading as a desire to narrate however, this desire 
is not to be permitted any expression in Miss Rosa's pres-
ence. In the face of her unfaltering, unquestionable 
authority, Quentin can only be a 1 istener who utters the 
acquiescent noises "Yessum" and "No 'me,• and the reader, 
taking this cue from Quentin can expect to find himself 
cast in the role of textual •consumer• as long as Miss 
Rosa asserts her authority as its •producer.• This asser-
tiveness seems to stem from her furious determination to 
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make meaning of, and thereby control, the subversive Other-
ness of Thomas Sutpen, which all her 1 i fe has evaded her 
understanding. In other words, Miss Rosa's narrative drama-
tizes the act of reading as an attempt to dominate, to 
gain control over knowledge of the Other. As Felman argues: 
If it is precisely out of lack of knowledge that the 
reading-process springs, the very act of reading implies 
at the same time the assumption that knowledge is, 
exists, but is located in the Other; in order for read-
ing to be possible, there has to be knowledge in the 
Other • . • and it is that knowledge in the Other, of 
the Other, which must be read which has to be appro-
priated, taken from the Other • • • The comprehension •.. 
of the meaning the Other is presumed to know, which 
constitutes the ultimate aim of any act of reading, is 
thus conceived as a violent gesture of appropriation, 
a gesture of domination of the Other. Reading, in other 
words, establishes itself as a relation not only to know-
ledge but equally to power; it consists not only of 
a search for meaning but also of a struggle to control 
·t 9 1 • 
Thoaas Sutpen as Devilish Other 
Miss Rosa's narrative proper begins with the categori-
cal assertion: 
He wasn't a gentleman. He wasn't even a gentleman. 
He came here with a horse and two pistols and a name 
which nobody ever heard before, knew for certain was 
his own any more than the horse was his own or even 
the pistols, seeking some place to hide himself, and 
Yoknapatawpha County supplied him with it 
(AA pp. 14-15) 
The signs of "horse,• "two pistols" and the need for "some 
place to hide,• identify Sutpen as •outlaw• in the mythical 
9 Felman, "Turning the Screw of Interpretation,• p. 157 aM 164. 
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Symbolic Order of Yoknapatawpha 10 County. Because his 
name is an empty signifier within this society, because 
he manifests no claim to any property nor to any achieve-
ment, he cannot easily be placed in an Order which upholds 
amongst its ideals, genealogical identity, evidence of 
property and a record of pioneering achievement. Conse-
quently he becomes identified, particularly in Miss Rosa's 
eyes, as an embodiment of the untranslatable, inexplicable 
Other. This Otherness of Sutpen is corroborated by the 
foreign nature of the henchmen he introduces into the com-
munity - the French architect and the foreign negroes whom 
Miss Rosa describes as, 
•... a herd of wild beasts that he had hunted down 
singlehanded because he was stronger in fear than even 
they were in whatever heathen place he had fled from, 
and that French architect who looked like he had been 
hunted down and caught in turn by the negroes ••. • 
(AA p. 16). 
The difference of Su tpen and his henchmen from the other 
inhabitants of Yoknapatawpha County is particularly empha-
sized by the language they speak amongst themselves which, 
being initially unidentified, is the source of great sus-
picion al though it is eventually revealed to be "a sort 
lO It is important to emphasize that the interpretation of 
the Symbolic Order of the deep Southern plantation society present-
ed in this chapter is founded specifically on the description of 
the South that the text of Absalom, Absalom! presents. I shall 
undertake to clarify certain histx:>rical issues by way of footnotes 
where such issues are relevant to the arguments I am offering. 
No evaluation of Faulkner's •historical accuracy• is intended. 
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of French and not some dark and fatal tongue of their own" 
(AA p. 36). It is possibly on this common bond of language 
that Sutpen's amiable relationship with his negroes depends, 
for as Cleanth Brooks 11 argues, if Sutpen observes the 
colour bar which prevails in the plantation community, 
he does so without the usual Southern animosity towards 
negroes which Miss Rosa might judge to be the norm. 
Once Miss Rosa has identified Sutpen as an embodiment 
of Otherness, it is no longer necessary for her to inter-
pret him or his actions in rational terms. Instead, she 
casts him in the role of an Agent or Force of evil - a 
"fiend blackguard and devil" (AA p. 15) whose actions 
are a series of outrages threatening order. In other words 
her narrative takes the form of a myth in which a community 
on earth is harrassed by the machinations of the devil 
incarnate. She views her sister, her nephew and her niece 
as the particular victims of these machinations. As the 
appended analysis of the role structure of a portion of 
Miss Rosa's discourse ·11 12 1 ustrates, the roles which she 
most commonly attributes to her sister and the Sutpen child-
ren are those of Experiencer and Patient who suffer the 
actions of an Agency and Force of evil that is beyond their 
control. On the occasions on which these victims are attri-
buted the roles of Agents, they are interpreted as imple-
11 Cleanth Brooks, William Faulkner: The Yoknapatawpha 
Country, pp. 298-300. 
12 (see next page) 
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12 The following role structure analysis works within a "case-
grammar" framework of the type developed by Charles Fillmore 
in "The Case for the Case," in Universals in Linguistic Theory, 
ed. Emmon Bach and Robert Harms (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1968). 
I saw what happened to EUen, my sistel'. I saw hel' a'lmost a 
- -
AGENT EXPERIENCER AGENT EXPERIENCER 
Pec'luse, watching those two doomed chi'ldl'en gPOI.Jing up whom she was 
EXPERIENCER EXPERIENCERS PATIENT AGENT 
he'lpless to save. I saw the pl'ice which she had -paid fol' that house 
AGENT PATIENT AGENT PATIENT 
and that pl'ide; 
PATIENT 
I saw the notes of hand on pPide and contentment 
AGENT PATIENT PATIENT 
and peace and a'll to which she had put hel' signatupe when she walked 
PATIENT AGENT PATIENT AGENT 
into the chuPch that night, begin to faU due in succession. I saw 
LOCATION AGENT 
Judith's M1I'1'iage fo1'bidden u>ithout rhyme or reason 01' shadow of ex-
PATIENT PATIENT PATIENT PATIENT 
cuse; I saw EUen die u>ith on1..y me, a ,~hi'ld, to turn to and ask to 
AGENT EXPERIENCER INSTRUMENT 
protect hel' renriining chi1..d; !_ saw HenP]f repudiate his home and birth-
PATIENT AGENT AGENT PATIENT PATIENT 
I'ight and then return and pro.ctioo7, 'ly f1,ing the bloody corpse of his 
PATIENT 
siste1'' s sweetheart at the hem of hel' wedding gor,m; I saw that m:in 
AGENT AGENT PA TI ENT LOCATION 
retur-n - the evil' s souPce and head which had outlasted aU its victims 
FORCE PATIENTS 
- z.,ho had apeated two chi1..d1'en not only to destPoy ~ anothe1' and 
AGENT PATIENT AGENT PATIENT 
his a.m tine, !Jut my Une as weU, yet I agPeed to TW11'1'Y him. (Mp. 18). 
PATIENT PATIENT AGENT PATIENT 
The role types used in this analysis are derived from the descrip-
tions offered by E. C. Traugott and M. L. Pratt in their work Lingu-
istics for Students of Literature. They are describable as follows: 
1. AGENT: The "agent" function is that of the doer who 
is responsible for an action or event taking 
place. 
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menting their own or each other's destruction. To herself 
however, in the repeated statement "I saw", Miss Rosa attri-
butes the role of Agent, the eye-witness who bases her 
claim to authority on the immediate experience of events 
which are now lost in the past, but which she seems to 
believe are fully recuperable in the discourse of her nar-
rative. 
Particularly noticeable, both in the appended passage 
and elsewhere in her narrative are the presuppositions 
of the narratee's familiarity with information as yet un-
narrated. For example, the first sentence in the appended 
passage - • I BCll,) !,)hat happeried to Ellen., my siste!'. 11 presup-
poses awareness that Ellen was victim of some misfortune. 
The second sentence - • I BCll,J he!' aLmost a !'ecLuse., u>atching those 
two doomed chiLd!'en g!'a.Jing up whom she was heLpLess to save." - pre-






This is the role of the being or thing that 
is affected by an action or event, or that 
is simply present in it. 
This is the role of things which initiate acti-
ons without the volition that could be attri-
buted to humans or animals. 
An animate being affected inwardly by an event 
or characterized by a state can be identified 
as an EXPERIENCER. 
This is the role applied to the object or article 
used to achieve a particular end. Usually it 
is combined with the prepositional construction 
"with + NP". 
Location is the role of 




of prepositions which 
about dimensional re-
- E. L. Traugott and M. L. Pratt, Linguistics for Students 
of Literature (New York: Baroourt, Brace, Jovanovich Inc., 1980) 
pp. 192-198. 
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ill-fated. While these presuppositions may present no 
difficulty to Quentin Compson who has inherited knowledge 
of the Sutpen myth, for the uninitiated reader, Miss Rosa's 
narrative must appear a dense network of enigmas and tanta-
lizingly witheld information which is liable to stimulate 
the reader's Demand-to-know without contributing greatly 
to the progress of his quest for "the truth". 
The Symbolic Order of the Deep Southern Plantation Society 
As Miss Rosa elaborates her description of Sutpen 
and his family, she simultaneously presents the reader 
with a picture of the Symbolic Order of Yoknapatawpha County 
which she regards as subverted by his sinister activities. 
Her narration focuses on two particular recollections, 
the first of these being Sutpen' s wild carriage races to 
church of a Sunday which Miss Rosa regards as clear mani-
festations of his devilry. After the Methodist minister 
prohibits these races, Sutpen stops attending church, but 
the carriage, drawn by the wild-eyed horses and driven 
by a wild-eyed negro continues to transport the rest of 
the family to the weekly service. When one day the usual 
equipage is replaced, presumably under Ellen's instructions, 
by her own phaeton, her old gentle mare and the stableboy, 
Judith Sutpen, then a little girl of six, throws a tantrum 
of fury and frustration. To Miss Rosa, the implication 
that Judi th not only enjoyed, but was possibly the insti-
gator of the wild rides, is appalling: 
• ••• it had been Judith, a girl of six, who had insti-
gated and authorized that negro 
away. Not Henry mind; not 
have been outrageous enough; 
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to make the team run 
the boy, which would 
but Judith, the girl" 
(AA p. 25). 
In Miss Rosa's eyes Judith's behaviour subverts the expec-
tations of restraint and submission congruent with the 
place of female and child in the Symbolic Order of deep 
Southern Yoknapatawpha County of 1847. She is therefore 
regarded by Miss Rosa as the devil's progeny doomed to 
allegiance with the Otherness of her demon father. 
In Miss Rosa's second anecdote a clearer indication 
is given of the place not only of women but of children 
and of negroes in the Symbolic Order. This anecdote des-
cribes Ellen Sutpen's discovery one night of both her child-
ren watching their father's wrestling match with one of 
his negroes in the stable: 
•Yes. It seems that on certain occasions, perhaps at 
the end of the evening, the spectacle, as a grand finale 
or perhaps as a matter of sheer deadly forethought 
toward the retention of supremacy, domination, he would 
enter the ring with one of the negroes himself. Yes. 
That's what Ellen saw: her husband and the father 
of her children standing there naked and panting and 
bloody to the waist and the negro just fallen evidently, 
lying at his feet and bloody too, save that on the negro 
it merely looked like grease or sweat - Ellen running 
down the hill from the house, bareheaded, in time to 
hear the sound, the screaming, hearing it while she 
still ran in the darkness and before the spectators 
knew that she was there, hearing it even before it 
occurred to one spectator to say, 'It's a horse' then 
'It's a woman' then 'My God, it's a child' - ran in, 
and the spectators falling back to permit her to see 
Henry plunge out from among the negroes who had been 
holding him, screaming and vomiting - not pausing, 
not even lo::>king at the faces which shrank back away 
from her as she knelt in the stable filth to raise Henry 
and not lo::>king at Henry either but up at him as he 
stood there with even his teeth showing beneath his 
beard now and another negro wiping the blood from 
his body with a towsack. 'I know you will excuse 
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us, gentlemen,' Ellen said. But they were already 
departing, nigger and white, slinking out again as they 
had slunk in, and Ellen not watching them now either 
but kneeling in the dirt while Henry clung to her, 
crying, and he standing there yet while a third nigger 
prodded his shirt or coat at him as though the coat 
were a stick and he a caged snake. 'Where is Judith, 
Thomas?' Ellen said. 
"'Judith?' he said. Oh, he 
own triumph had outrun him; 
better in evil than even he could 
Isn't she in bed?' 
was not lying; his 
he had builded even 
have hoped. 'Judith? 
n ' ron' t lie to Ire, 'Ibanas, ' Ellen said. 'I can urrler-
stand your bringing Henry here to see this, wanting 
Henry to see this; I will try to understand it; yes, 
I will make myself try to understand it. But not Judith, 
Thomas. Not my baby girl, Thomas. ' 
"'I don't expect you to understand it,' he said. 
'Because you are a woman. But I didn't bring Judith 
down here. I would not bring her down here. I don't 
expect you to believe that. But I swear to it.' 
"'I wish I could believe you,' Ellen said. 'I want 
to believe you.' Then she began to call. 'Judith!' 
she called in a voice calm and sweet and filled with 
despair: 'Judith honey! Time to come to bed.' 
"But I was not there. I was not there to see the 
two Sutpen faces this time - once on Judith and once 
on the negro girl beside her - looking down Uirough 
the square entrance to the loft" (AA pp. 29-30). 
The contest on which this scene focuses could be interpre-
ted as a form of ritual demonstration in overt physical 
terms, of the supremacy of the white master over his negro 
slaves. This contest does not appear to be founded on 
any necessary aggression between the contestants, but rather 
on Sutpen' s acknowledgement that in a Southern plantation 
society his ownership of and mastery over his slaves will 
expedite the "design" he sets out to implement. He there-
fore demonstrates his right to the role of master through 
his skill in wrestling. The immediate dispersal of the 
gathering on Ellen's arrival suggests that the presence 
of women, black or white, at such male "rites" is strictly 
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taboo. This is emphasized by Sutpen's acknowledgement 
to Ellen, •r don't expect you to understand it ... Because 
you are a woman.• While the presence of children at such 
contests is not desirable, it would seem from Ellen's dis-
course with Sutpen that Henry, as potential initiate to 
the paternal role might be permitted to at tend: "I can 
understand your bringing Henry here to see this, wanting Henry 
to see this; I will try to understand it; yes, I will 
make myself try to understand it." These words suggest 
moreover that Ellen is conscious of the demands of obeisance 
to the patriarchal authority which her role as woman in 
this Symbolic Order entails. In spite of her suspicion 
that Sutpen is failing in his duty as protector of his 
offspring, particularly of his daughter, Ellen confirms 
her allegiance to him when she says •r will make myself 
try to understand it,• and •r want to believe you.• When 
Sutpen on the other hand argues that he is unaware of his 
daughter's presence, he verifies the unpred ictabi 1 i ty and 
non-conformity of the Sutpen children's behaviour in rela-
tion to the norms of the society. In Miss Rosa's opinion, 
his apparent ignorance of Judi th' s whereabouts indicates 
that the child has become even more corrupt than her demon 
father had anticipated. Thus while Henry, the apparently 
legitimate successor to the authoritative paternal role 
is revel ted to the point of vomiting by the spectacle of 
the confrontation of white male with his black other, Judith 
and her companion, whom the reader will discover to be 
Judith's half-sister Clytemnestra, are apparently fascinated 
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by that which is forbidden them by the laws of social order, 
namely the exercise of "author-ity". 
From the first chapter of Miss Rosa's narration then, 
it seems clear that authority in this plantation society 
of Faulkner's mythical deep South is invested in the figure 
of the white land-owning patriarch. His masculinity defines 
him as master of his female dependants; his antecedence 
and therefore paternity defines him as authority over his 
sons as heirs to the dynasty; his whiteness distinguishes 
him as the master of his negro slaves; and his weal th 
defines him as lord over impoverished "white trash". In 
this Symbolic Order then, binary oppositions are arranged 
hierarchically so that one component of the opposition 
is privileged over the other: white is privileged over 
black; male over female; weal thy over impoverished; 
the temporarily antecedent over the subsequent. These 
differences are then translated into a wider hierarchy 
in which white, male, property-owning father stands as 
the ideal of authority, while the black, female, impover-
ished child stands as his diametrical opposite. 
Frequently it is demonstrated that those who are op-
pressed within the Symbolic Order by virtue of their diff-
erence from the ideal authority, seek to emulate that ideal 
to which they aspire. In so doing they unwittingly per-
petuate the very oppression to which they themselves have 
been subjected in the hierarchical order. This is illus-
trated for example in • the language clloice of .Wash Jones 
whose lowliness is evident in his identification as •white 
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trash" (AA p. 181). For Jones, Thomas Su tpen, his master, 
is idealized - • A fine pPoud m:in. If God Himseif was to come dwn 
and :ride the naturui eal'th, that' a what He wou.1.d aim to 1.ook Uke" 
(AA p. 282) - and is therefore addressed with meticulous 
respect as "Mister Tawm" (AA p. 183) or "Kernel" (AA pp. 
184-185). However, Jones uses less respectful terms when, 
for example, he addressed the negroes as "niggers" (AA 
p. 281); similarly he addresses Miss Rosa Coldfield who 
is unmarried and a young woman as "Rosie Coldfield" (AA 
p. 133); Henry Sutpen who is too young yet to succeed 
to his father's office as "Henry" (AA p. 133); and Charles 
Bon who is an outsider and who is later described as both 
possibly effeminate and possibly part-negro, as "that durn 
French feller• (AA p. 133). Following the same convention, 
Miss Rosa refers to Wash Jones as "that brute progenitor 
of brutes• ( AA p. 134), addressing him to his face as "fool" 
(AA p. 135), while Clytie she addresses as "nigger" (p. 
140). Clytie in her turn, by virtue of her own white Sutpen 
blood, and their mutual femininity apparently regards Miss 
Rosa as her equal when she commands "Don't you go up there, 
Rosa" ( AA p. 138). She refers to Henry and Judi th as her 
siblings when she says, "Whatever he [Henry] done, me and 
Judith and him have paid it out (AA p. 370). Wash Jones 
she addresses as a rank inferior: "Stop right there, white 
man. Stop right where you is. You aint never crossed 
this door while Colonel was here and you aint going to 
cross it now." (AA p. 281). Thus, by denying respect to 
those considered to "less• than the ideal, each of the 
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oppressed members of the society perpetuates the hierarchy 
which determines his own oppression. Noticeably Clytie 
does not address or refer to Sutpen as her father - a point 
to which I shall return later. 
Miss Rosa: Woman as Author-ity 
Miss Rosa's narrative is interrupted by the three-
chapter narration of Mr Compson, and when she resumes her 
story, the sources of ambiguity in her own identity are 
more thoroughly explored. This second segment of narrative 
begins with Wash Jones's announcement outside Miss Rosa's 
home that Charles Bon has been murdered. Returning with 
Jones by buggy to Sutpen 's Hundred, Miss Rosa enters the 
Sutpen mansion encountering first Clytie and then Judi th. 
She describes herself as wakening from a dream state: 
I, the dreamer cflinging yet to the dream as the patient 
clings to the 7,ast thin unbearoble ecstatic instant of 
agony in o'l'd.er to sharpen the savor of the pain's surcease, 
ooking into the reality, the more than reality, not to 
the unchanged and unaltered old time but into a time alter-
ed to fit the dream which, conjunctive i.rith the dreamer, 
becomes irmiolated and apotheosized ••• (Ay, ooke up, Rosa; 
ooke up - not from what oos, what used to be, but from 
what had not, cou7,d not have ever, been; u>a.ke, Rosa -
not to what shou1,d, what might have been, but to what can-
not, what must not, be; ooke, Rosa, from the hoping, who 
did believe there i a a seemliness to bereavement even 
though gr>ief be absent; believed there L>OUui be need for 
you to save not 7,ove perhaps, not happiness nor peace, 
but what oos 7,eft behind by i.ridObJing - and found that there 
oos nothing there to save; who hoped to save her as you 
promised Ellen • • • ( AA p. 141 ) • 
Rosa does not experience this "awakening" as a transition 
from a past set of circumstances when Charles Bon was alive, 
to a new set in which he must be accepted as dead. Instead 
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it is a transition from a state of expectation, in which 
she believed that her role would be that of "saviour" to 
the bereaved Judith, to a realization that her role is 
superfluous since Judi th does not appear to grieve over 
Ben's death. In order to explain the nature of the dream-
state in which she has been living, Miss Rosa reverts to 
a description of her youth and the "miscast" summer of 
wistaria. The reader has al ready been given some view 
of this youth in Mr Compson's narrative: 
She ( Miss Rosa) was born in 1845, with her sister 
already seven years married and the mother of two 
children and Miss Rosa born into her parents' middle-
age (her mother must have been at least forty and she 
died in that child bed and Miss Rosa never forgave her 
father for it) • • • She was raised by the same spinster 
aunt who tried to force not only the elder sister's 
bridegroom but the wedding too down the throat of a 
town which did not want it, growing up in that closed 
masonry of females to see in the fact of her own breath-
ing not only the lone justification for the sacrifice 
of her mother's life, not only a living and walking 
reproach to her father, but a breathing indictment, 
ubiquitous and even transferable, of the entire male 
principle (that principle which had left the aunt a 
virgin at thirty-five) (AA pp. 59-60). 
If, as has already been established, the "male principle" 
is the authoritative ideal of the society into which Miss 
Rosa is born, its failure in her case lies in its inability 
to provide her with a proper place in the Symbolic Order. 
Since the hierarchical difference of antecedent/subsequent 
on which the roles of paternity and filiality and the laws 
of succession depend, are so rigidly defined, Miss Rosa 
presents an irreducible paradox or excess of meaning to 
the Symbolic Order of Yoknapatawpha County. For as the 
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daughter of Goodhue Coldfield and sister of Ellen Sutpen, 
Rosa should be named "aunt• in an antecedent relation to 
Judith and Henry Sutpen. However, being younger than both 
her nephew and her niece, she should be named "child" in 
a subsequent relation to them. From birth Miss Rosa seems 
to straddle two worlds: that of children and that of adults. 
She belongs to both, yet to neither, so that even as a 
sixty-five year old woman she is described as resembling 
"a crucified child" (AA p. 8), yet as an adolescent she 
is described as wearing "a shawl over her head like she 
might have been fifty instead of fifteen" (AA p. 73). 
Being excluded from the world of adults by virtue 
of her youth, yet isolated from her rightful generation 
of children by her late birth, Miss Rosa attempts to efface 
herself in the role of silent inactive listener: 
••• instead of accomplishing the processional and measured 
milestones of the childhood's time I lurked, unapprehended 
as though, shod !J){,th the very damp and velvet silence of 
the womb, I displaced no air, gave off no betl'G.ying sound, 
from one closed forbidden door to the next and so acquired 
alt I kne?,J of that tight and apace in which people moved 
and breathed as I (that same child) might have gained con-
ception of the sun from seeing it through a piece of smoky 
glass ••• (AA p. 145). 
Miss Rosa's comparison between the •norm" of childhood 
as a period of exploration and progressional discovery, 
"the processional and measured milestones of the child-
hood's time,• and her own experience of childhood as a 
state of soundless, passive suspension or "lurking•, sug-
gests the contrast between the activity of digital organi-
sation of experience through the use of language and the 
activity of analog perception extrinsic to 
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13 language. 
In other words, instead of exploring the world using her 
own signifying power as a linguistic subject to digitalise 
or arrange it into patterns of meaning, she silently ac-
cepts a world that has already been mediated through con-
versations she has overheard. 
It is in her fourteenth year that Miss Rosa experi-
ences, in her "summer of wistaria," a sudden consciousness 
of the urge and power to create meaning - a power which 
she correlates with the authority of the dynamic •male 
principle". She describes her experience as follows: 
- Once there was (they cannot have told you this either) 
a swmter of wista:ria. It was a pervading everr:J7.Jhere of 
wista:r>ia ( I was fourteen then) as though of aH sp:rings 
yet to capi tu Late condensed into one sp:ring, one swmter: 
the sp:ring and swmter>time whic,h is eve:r>y fe.rrr:ile's who 
br>eathed above dust, beholden of all betl'G.yed sp:rings held 
over from all irrevocable time, repe:r>cussed, bloomed again. 
It was a vintage yeaP of wista:r>ia: vintage yeaP being that 
BWeet c,onjunction of root bloom and urge and houP and weath-
er; and I (I was fourteen) - I wiH not insist on bloom, 
at whom no nnn had yet to look - nor> would ever - tz.nc,e, 
as not as c,hiid but less than even child; as not mor>e 
child than wonr;zn but even as less than any f erm"le jlesh. 
Nor do I say Leaf - warped bitter pale and crimped ha"lf-
jledging intimidate of any c,laim to gr>een whic,h might have 
drai.m to it the tender nnyfly childhood BWeetheart games 
or given pause to the nnle predacious wasps and bees of 
tater> lust. But Poot and ur>ge I do insist and c,laim, for 
had I not heired too from a"l l the unsistered Eves since 
the Snake? Yes, ur>ge I do: war>ped c,hrysalis of what b1,ind 
per>fect seed: for who sha"l 1, say what gnar"led forgotten 
13 The association of the linguistic conscious self with the 
digital, and the non-linguistic unconscious self with the analog 
is established by Anthony Wilden when he explains that the Lacani-
an observation, "it is impossible in language for the 'I' of any 
sentence to properly and entirely talk about the 'I' who emits 
the sentence,• oould be expressed in another terminology as, •the 
subject of digital knowledge can never fully represent the subject 
of analog knowledge, as poets and artists have always known.• 
System and Structure, pp. 21-22. 
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Poot might not bLoom yet with some gLobed concentl'ate more 
[;'lobed and concentl'ate and heady-perfect beoouse the neg-
Lected Poot was planted warped and Lay not dead but mereLy 
sLept forgot? 
That was the misaast swm,ep of my lxi.ITen youth which 
(fol' that short time, that short br>ief unPeturning spr>ing-
time of the fenr:zLe heart J I Lived out not as a Wo171'.ln, a 
girL, but rather as the nr:zn which I perhaps should have 
been (AA pp. 143-144). 
For Miss Rosa, the wistaria seems to represent the mani-
festation of female productive energy that has been latent, 
that has accumulated and finally erupts in a display of 
fecundity. She regards spring and summer, the time of 
floral burgeoning in the plant world, as the seasons iden-
tifiable with the maturation or blossoming of girlhood 
into womanhood: "the spring and summertime which is every 
female's who breathed above dust.• Her description of 
the perfection of the wistaria plant depends on the combi-
nation of both "female" and •male" principles in "that 
sweet conjunction of root bloom and urge and hour and weath-
er." The female principle is dominant and overt in the 
wistaria, being represented in the blossom and foliage 
of the plant which correspond to the attributes of quies-
cent attractiveness recognized as "feminine• in the Symbolic 
Order of the mythic South. The male principle represented 
in the •root and urge• of the plant, is concealed under 
the earth in a recessive and covert position just as the 
attributes regarded as "masculine• in the Symbolic Order 
of the South, the attributes of origination, authority 
and the productive impulse are expected to be recessive 
in woman, if they are recognized as present in her at all. 
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However, Miss Rosa is careful to establish that the simi-
larity between herself and the wistaria plant is not a 
similarity in the female principle. She denies any compari-
son between her own physical appearance and the allure 
of the blossoms which invite the agents of fertilisation. 
She claims no similarity between her own fragile and puny 
frame and the vitality of the robust green foliage of the 
plant. Instead the similarity to which she lays claim 
is the discovery in herself of an urge to authorize, the 
impulse to create meaning which is the prerogative of the 
male role in the Symbolic Order in which she lives. 
To translate this into Lacanian terms, one might say 
that she discovers in herself the power of the Phallus, 
the power to signify, the right to adopt a subjective posi-
tion from which to establish a pattern of meaning and simul-
taneously, the Desire that is the by-product of the attain-
ment of subjective identity. The catalyst of this sudden 
burgeoning of self-awareness in Miss Rosa appears to be 
the signifier, •charles Bon.• 
Charles Bon and Miss Rosa Coldfield: 
the Male Principle and Love's Androgynous Advocate 
•charles Bon• is never more than a signifier to Miss 
Rosa: the verbal signifier of his name which she hears 
in conversation, and the pictorial signifier of his photo-
graph which she sees on Judith's dressing-table. Although 
she never sees him in the flesh, either at Sutpen's Hundred 
or on the one occasion when he and Henry call at her home 
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only to find her out, his presence as a name is sufficient 
to transform her: 
••• it was as though that oosuai pause at my door had ieft 
some seed, some minute vi1'Uienoe in this oeHar earth of 
mine • • • beoouse I who had iearned nothing of love, not 
even parents' fove - that fond dear constant viotation 
of privacy, that stuitification of the burgeoning and in-
corrigible I which is the meed and due of all 11l'l1Tl1tlliarz 
meat, beoome not mistress, not beloved, but more tharz even 
love; I became all potymth love's androgynous advooote 
( AA p. 146 ). 
The signifier "Charles Bon" represents the male principle 
which has the power to transform Judi th Sutpen from an 
eighteen year old girl into a woman "in love", the "bride-
to-be". Participating vicariously in the romance of Ju-
dith's courtship, Miss Rosa sees herself as likewise trans-
formed into "love's advocate.• While as the aunt/child 
she had no clearly defined place in the Symbolic Order, 
Miss Rosa now accedes to an identity, a subjective position 
which entitles her to signifying power and the use of the 
Phallus in the Symbolic Order. With this newfound "author-
ity" she becomes the "producer" of a fictional romance 
which she believes to be reality. While she identifies 
with Judith Sutpen's female, submissive role in this romance, 
she simultaneously identifies herself in the authorial 
role of the male protagonist Charles Bon. 
The fiction which Miss Rosa constructs becomes for 
her "that might-have-been ~hich is the single rock we cting 
to above the maelstrom_of .unbearable reality• (AA p. 149-
150). If during the years of the war she has no absent 
sweetheart, husband, father or brother who might stand 
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as the "lost object" onto whom she can displace her Desire 
and from whom she might thereby derive a purpose for living, 
the figure of Charles Bon, the absent hero, stands as fie-
tional substitute. Yet Miss Rosa does not, as might be 
expected, Desire the return of the hero that will consummate 
the love she mediates. Instead she accepts that the death 
of the hero in battle will immortalize love presumably 
by both deferring but promising its consummation eternally. 
What shocks Miss Rosa therefore is not the discovery 
that Charles Bon has indeed died, but that he has not died 
heroically in battle - he has been murdered by the brother 
of his bride-to-be. Worse still is her realization that 
the bride-to-be shows no apparent signs of distress or 
mourning. Hurrying to take up her position as comforter 
of the bereaved, Miss Rosa finds •no grieving widowed bride" 
(AA p. 142), but Judith, 
• • • standirtg before that cl,osed door which I was not to 
enter • • • her face absolutely calm, Looking at me for a 
moment and just roising her voice enough to be hearod in 
the haU below: nciytie. Miss Rosa will be here for 
dinner; you had better get out some more meal": then 
"ShaU we go down stairs? I wiU have to speak to Mr Jones 
about some planks and nai"lsn (AA p. 150). 
When Charles Bon is shot by Henry Sutpen, his authority 
as a representative of the male principle is repudiated. 
The Symbolic Order which, through the mediation of Henry 
refuses to accept Bon's authority - for reasons which will 
be considered in due course - also thereby refuses implicit-
ly to accept the definition which he had provided for Miss 
Rosa. •All polymath love's androgynous advocate• has no 
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place in a world where the romantic hero is •dead as a 
beef• and the romantic heroine speaks not of love or grief 
but of •more meal• and •planks and nails.• Miss Rosa is 
thus faced with the realization that her identity as •1ove's 
advocate• was the product of a dream-world, a world of 
wish-fulfilment Other than the •real• Symbolic Order to 
which she is rudely awakened. Here she has no proper place, 
but must become once more an overdetermined signified who 
is both "aunt• and "child" yet neither, an •undecidable" 
in the •text• of Yoknapatawpha County. 
Thomas Sutpen: Ogre - War Bero - Demon 
It is only after Charles Bon' s death that Miss Rosa 
takes up residence permanently at Sutpen's Hundred. In 
spite of the variety of reasons which she might convincing-
ly claim for her move from Jefferson, she declares finally, 
• • • I don't say any of these. I stayed the-Pe and wi ted 
for Thorrr:is Sutpen to oome home. Yes. You i,,i"l1, say (or 
believe) that I wited even then to become engaged to him; 
if I said I did not, you woutd believe I lied. But I do 
say I did not. I wited for him e::r:aotiy as Judith and 
Ctytie wited for him: because now he ws aU we had, 
all that gave us any reason for continuing to exist, to 
eat food and sleep and wke and Pise again: knowing that 
he woutd need us, knowing as we did (who knew him) that 
he woutd begin at onoe to salvage what ws left of Sutpen's 
Hund-Ped and restore it ( AA p. 15 4 ) • 
With the unexpected annihilation of her romantic hero and 
the consequent cancellation of her identity as •1ove's 
advocate• Miss Rosa turns to the only other representative 
of the male principle accessible to her - the hero of an 
earlier myth, the ogre-husband of her sister. Discarding 
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the identity of Sutpen as the ogre or djinn,which she had 
inherited as a child, she •re-writes" him in the role of 
war-hero who possesses in the eyes of the nineteen year 
old girl which she was at the end of the Civil War, 
• • • even if only from association with them, the stature 
and shape of a hero too, and now he also emerging 
from the same holocaust in which she had suffered, 
with nothing to face what the future held for the South 
but his bare hands and the sword which he at least 
had never surrendered and the citation for valor from 
his defeated Commander-in-Chief. Oh he was brave 
(AA p. 19-20). 
Miss Rosa describes the period of waiting for Sutpen, with 
Judith and Clytie as a period of dormancy. The three women 
exist " • • . in an a[Xlthy which was almost peace, Uke that of the 
blind unsentient earth itself ••• not aa two white women and a negress, 
not as th1'ee neg1'oes 01' th1'ee 1.t1hite, not even as th1'ee 1,,omen, but 
merely as th1'ee creatures ••• • (AA p. 155). The absence of 
the male principle, in its ideal form as the patriarchal 
presence, suspends the process of differentiation which 
produces meaning in the Symbolic Order. Without the white 
male patriarch, distinctions such as womanhood, sisterhood 
and racial pigmentation become empty terms in a significant 
vacuum.
14 Just as •aex was some forgotten atr>ophy Like the rudi-
menta1'y giUs we caU the tonsils or the still-opposable thumbs for> 
14 Robert Con Davis identifies this mutual definition which 
the male and female principle derive from one another as follows: 
•By h:i.nself, Sutpen is an assertion of nothing, but in 
relation to the three women he becomes - whether demon 
or pto3enitor - an irresistible stimulant, one that produces 
change if not growth. As abstractions, these terms of Rosa's 
sexual mythology, cohesion (the women's community) and 
disruption (the male principle), are mutually dependent for 
definition: without an expectation of the male, the women 
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o"ld cUmbing" (AA p. 155), so Desire, and the power to produce 
meaning or signify seems dormant in Miss Rosa. It is only 
when Sutpen returns to the Hundred and to "that triumviPate 
motherhood which we three, Judith, CLytie and I, rrr:ide ••• " {AA p. 162) 
that Miss Rosa once again receives subjective definition 
from which she can resume her signifying power. This defi-
nition arises from her difference f rem Su tpen, Judi th and 
Clytie. Unlike them she has no Sutpen blood, an attribute 
which defines her as a potential mate for Sutpen. Thus, 
when Sutpen, recognizing in her a last chance of re-estab-
lishing his dynasty, proposes marriage to Miss Rosa, giving 
her Ellen's wedding ring as the sign of their betrothal, 
she once again is rescued from the indeterminacy of her 
position as "aunt/child" and receives the new identity 
of prospective wife. 
In this new role, Miss Rosa conceives of herself as 
a source of energy and warmth to Sutpen in a relationship 
which she believes to be "love": 
••• I was that sun, who believed that he (after that evening 
in Judith' B Poom) was not obUvious of me but on Ly uncons-
cious and Peceptive Uke the 8u)(JJ1ff)-freed piLgPim feeling 
earth and tasting sun and Light again and aware of neither 
but on"ly of darkness' and moPass' "lack - who did believe 
thePe was that rragic in unkin b"lood 1Jhich 1Je cai i by the 
[><1Uid name of "love that 1JouLd be, might be sun for him 
( though I the youngest, 1Jeakest J 1Jhere Judi th and CLytie 
both 1JouLd cast no shadow; yes, I the youngest there yet 
potsnt"ly without measu!'ed and measu!'ab"le age since I aLone 
of them eouLd say, 'O fuPious 1Jrld oLd rran, I hoLd no sub-
are simply unsentient, and without the binding of the women, 
the male (Sutpen) is an absurd and i11potent gesture." 
·The Symbolic Father in Yoknapatawpha County,• p. 43. 
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stan!Je that 11nU fit youro dl"eam but I aan give you ail"y 
spaae and saope faro your detiroium.' And then one aftePnoon 
- oh theroe was a fate in it; afte!"noon and aftel'noon and 
afte!"noon: do you see? the death of hope and fove, the 
death of pride and proinaip"le, and then the death of evel"y-
thing save the o"ld outPaged and aghast unbeiieving whiah 
has tasted f oro foPty-th!"ee yeal"s • • • ( AA pp. 16 7-16 8 ) • 
Just as in her adolescence Miss Rosa experienced the dis-
covery in herself of a productive energy which she described 
through the metaphor of the •root and urge• of the summer 
wistaria, so in her relationship with Sutpen she once again 
envisages herself as the origin of a generative energy 
identified in the metaphor of the sun: a concentration 
of warmth and illumination which fills the • daPkness' and 
moross' 1,aak• that she imagines to be the experience of the 
war veteran. Al though she is accurate in identifying the 
•unkin b"lood • as the source of her new identity, she ironic-
ally believes in some inexplicable or • magic • component 
of that difference which translates her into the position 
of the object of Desire. If for Miss Rosa •nes ire• is 
expressed as the Demand for the complement that will bring 
about perfect conj unction in • 1ove•, for Sutpen •nesire• 
is expressed as the Demand for a suitable mate by whom 
to breed an heir to his dynasty. In Sutpen 's terms the 
•magia" of Miss Rosa's "unkin b"lood" is no more than the 
necessary attribute of a breeding partner. 
When without warning, Sutpen confronts Miss Rosa with 
the • 'l>a"ld outrogeous wo?'ds • which, the reader is to discover 
some eight pages later, constitute the suggestion that 
•they breed together for test and sample and if it was 
a boy they would marry• (AA p. 177), Miss Rosa leaves Sut-
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pen's Hundred, returning to her former home in Jefferson. 
It is possible to attribute Miss Rosa's desertion of Sutpen 
to her outraged Methodist . 15 consciousness. Certainly, 
her narrative is presented from the perspective of a Christ-
ian whose nineteenth century Methodist morality would most 
likely be seriously offended by the baldness of Sutpen' s 
suggestion which is so subversive to Symbolic Order. How-
ever, a further dimension could be added to the interpre-
tation of her outrage. Since throughout her narrative 
Miss Rosa has showed a marked preoccupation with the concept 
of romantic love, Sutpen's proposal of copulation, like 
Bon's death, must come as a brutal demystification of the 
fantasy she had composed. The interpretation of their 
relationship as coupling necessary to reproduction is to 
Miss Rosa a very inadequate translation of her vision of 
sublime union in •the airy space and scope for delirium.• 
Withdrawing from her the identity of •prospective bride•, 
15 Various critics express this opinion. Ralph Behrens for 
example argues, 
•since his wife Ellen has died during the war, he [Sutpen] 
proposes to her sister Rosa that she try breeding with him, 
and if their child is a son, they will be married. Miss 
Rosa of course refuses, since that proposal is the final and 
undeniable evidence to her of the absence of all humanistic 
and moral concern in Sutpen 's pursuit of his ambitions.• -
•collapse of Dynasty: The Thematic Centre of Absalom, Absa-
lom1 • PMLA 89 (1) 1974, p. 27. 
Lynn Gartrell Levins argues, • ••• Thomas Sutpen insulted the Puri-
tan foundation by means of which Rosa COldfield had weighed and 
judged her world. Rosa, though a •ghost• for forty-three years, 
refuses to let the memory of the insult die.• - ·The Four Narrative 
Perspectives in Absalom, Absalom 1 • p. 37. 
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Sutpen effectively offers her in exchange the unnameable 
position of •human brood mare.• This affront amounts to 
a refusal to acknowledge that Miss Rosa has either claim 
to a position in the Symbolic Order, or the power to signify 
in that order. While her sense of rnorali ty may be out-
raged, I suggest that it is also her final discovery of 
her indeterminacy and failure to signify in the eyes of 
the patriarch that causes Miss Rosa to consider her efforts 
to establish and verify her subjectivity as concluded on 
•that afternoon in April forty-three years ago" (AA p. 
18). 
It is only once she has returned to Jefferson and 
is able to redefine Sutpen as the devil-incarnate that 
Miss Rosa can interpret her position in relation to Sutpen 
meaningfully as that of an unfortunate victim of the demonic 
plan to which her sister Ellen, and the Sutpen children 
are also prey. From this interpretive distance she is 
able to "forgive• Sutpen until he commits his final outrage: 
he dies. Yet again Miss Rosa finds her subjective position 
and hence her authorial power subverted by the Otherness 
of reality which contradicts the meaning she had estab-
lished in her demon myth. If Sutpen were, as she charac-
terizes him, the devil incarnate, he could not have died 
without bequeathing his demonic powers to an heir. Yet 
Miss Rosa is not aware of the existence of any heir, since 
it is in striving to beget a male heir that Sutpen has 
met his end. If she concedes that he has died heirless 
however, she thereby denies the credibility of her demon 
myth for she concedes that Sutpen is mortal. 
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It is thus 
the discovery that "There's something in that house 
Something living in it. Hidden in it " (AA p. 172) , 
that inspires Miss Rosa with a new belief in the continuing 
presence of the Devil or Other who gives definition both 
to herself as victim of demonic intrigue, and to her myth 
as the tale of the devil incarnate. Thus in the late sum-
mer of "twice-bloomed wistaria" she once more returns to 
her interpretive quest, attempting to establish the "mean-
ing" of the Sutpen mystery, permitting no interruption 
or interjection from her listener. It is only in the final 
pages of the text that the outcome of her quest, the con-
clusion of her myth is revealed. 
* * * * * 
INCEST, HOMOSEXUALITY, BIGAMY: 
THE LOGICAL NARRATIVE OF MR COMPSON 
Miss Rosa's narrative, related to Quentin during the 
course of a late summer's afternoon, is followed by that 
of Mr Compson, related the evening of the same day, while 
Quentin waits on the gallery after supper for the time 
he is to fetch Miss Rosa in the Compson buggy and escort 
her to Sutpen's Hundred to investigate the mysterious pres-
ence in the old mansion. In terms of textual arrangement, 
Miss Rosa's narrative is presented in Chapters One and 
Five, while the greater part of Mr Compson' s is inserted 
between these two segments in Chapters Two, Three and Four. 
This sequentiality of the two narratives in the arrange-
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ment of story and of discourse, invites comparisons at 
both these levels. Before focusing then, on Mr Compson' s 
attempts to translate or •read" in rational terms, the 
irrationality of the Sutpen myth, I shall first pursue 
this comparison. 
Let us consider then, at the level of the discourse, 
the claim to narrative authority of each narrator, and 
on the basis of this, the relationship between narrator 
and narratee. Miss Rosa, as participant in most of the 
events she relates, can adopt the first person discourse 
and the authority, of an eye-witness. Furthermore, in 
terms of the mythical code of Southern chivalry by which 
antecedence is privileged over subsequence, she, as a sixty-
five year old woman, is justified in claiming respect from 
her twenty year old listener. This, Quentin, with his 
acquiescent responses of •yessum• and •No'me" is quite 
ready to proffer. Thus, in Miss Rosa's segments of narra-
tive, the boundary between narrator as authoritative dis-
penser of meaning, and narratee as submissive recipient 
of that meaning, is clearly defined. 
Mr Compson, on the other hand, belonging to a genera-
tion later than Miss Rosa's cannot claim the authority 
of eye-witness, but must draw on a variety of informative 
sources and therefore a variety of narrative perspectives 
amongst which he, as narrative authority, establishes mean-
ingful connections. As a lawyer, he approaches the activity 
of narration as a guest after convincing evidence; docu-
menting the sources of his information carefully, he draws 
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on the prerogative of his profession to supplement the 
text he derives with rational and logical conjecture. 
Like Miss Rosa, Mr Compson derives authority from 
antecedence in that he is father to his narratee, Quentin. 
Furthermore, by virtue of his legal training, he also car-
ries the authority of an educated man. Correspondingly, 
Quentin's respect for his father is manifest both in his 
reference to him as "sir", and for example, in his action 
of "half-rising" to receive from Mr Compson the text of 
the old letter written by Charles Bon to Judi th Sutpen 
during the Civil War. While, then, the hierarchy of oppo-
sition between narrator and narratee is still maintained 
in Mr Compson's narrative, while his discourse invites 
no more interjection or interpretive contribution from 
the narratee than does Miss Rosa's, it does constantly 
draw the narratee's attention to the conjectural and there-
fore arbitrary nature of its authority. For example, first-
ly the reader is constantly reminded of the diversity of 
Mr Compson's sources by interjections such as "I have this 
from something your grandfather let drop one day" (AA p. 
49) , or, "And then something happened. Nobody knew what 
and so the tale came through the negroes ••• " (AA p. 
79). Where he introduces his own conjecture into the nar-
rative, modifiers such as "doubtless, • "apparently, " "in 
all probability," warn the reader of the interpretive acti v-
i ty in operation. Another reminder of the hypothetical 
nature of Mr Compson's discourse, is his frequent use of 
modal auxiliaries with verbs, for example, "He may even 
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have known Bon that well by then • • • and so would in all 
probability not change later" {AA p. 91), or •so it must 
have been Henry who seduced Judi th not Bon" {AA p. 99). 
Occasionally he identifies his statements overtly as his 
own opinion, for example, • [Henry] loved grieved and 
killed, still grieving and, I believe, still loving Bon" 
(AA p. 97), or "I don't believe it was just to preserve 
Henry as an ally • (AA p. 107). 
Occasionally, Mr Compson's conjecture becomes assimi-
lated into his narrative as "fact•, for example, describing 
Bon, Mr Compson overtly indicates his own pleasure in fabu-
lation: 
• ••• this man whan Henry first saw riding perhaps through 
the grove at the University on one of the two horses 
which he kept there or perhaps crossing the campus 
on fcx)t in the slightly Frenchified cloak and hat which 
he wore, or perhaps {I like to think this) presented 
formally to the man reclining in a flowered, almost 
feminized gown, in a sunny window in his chambers ••• • 
(AA p. 95). 
Shortly after the overt admission of fabulation "I like 
to think this,• the fabulated material itself becomes as-
similated into Mr Compson's account as an •authentic" com-
ponent of the narrative: 
•. • • And the very fact that, lounging before them in 
the outlandish and almost feminine garments of his sy-
baritic privacy, he _professed satiety only increased 
the amazement and the bitter and hopeless outrage• 
(AA p. 96). 
This kind of assimilation may remind the reader that it 
is impossible for him to distinguish •tact• from •tabulation• 
unless such distinctions are made by the narrative authori-
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ty, or unless the material is repeated from a different 
perspective which might disclose its arbitrariness. 
Now, at the level of the story, the comparison invited 
between Mr Compson's narrative and Miss Rosa's demonstrates 
that while both narrators present the same narrative events, 
by virtue of the difference of their subjective positions 
and their narrative discourses, the •truths" which they 
establish through their narratives are markedly different. 
To illustrate this, a brief consideration may be given 
to Miss Rosa's and Mr Compson' s respective presentations 
of Ellen Coldfield, Goodhue Coldfield and Thomas Sutpen. 
Ellen Coldfield/Sutpen 
The impression of Ellen Coldfield offered by Miss 
Rosa's narrative is that of a deeply unhappy woman. She 
is "this Niobe without tears who had conceived to the demon 
in a kind of nightmare, who even while alive had moved 
but without life and grieved but without weeping •.. • (AA 
pp. 13-14). The undemonstrative quiescence attributed 
to Ellen in this description seems the product of a re-
pressed suffering which Miss Rosa assumes to be the unques-
tionable lot of the demon's wife. 
However, Mr Compson's description of Ellen, the •swamp-
hatched butterfly• rising •into a perennial bright vacuum 
of arrested sun• (AA p. 70), interprets her not as undemon-
strative so much as vacuous. 
What Miss Rosa interprets as the helplessness of an 
isolated recluse, Mr Compson interprets as selfish irres-
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ponsibility, for it is only from him that the reader hears 
firstly of the condescension and shrieks of •peacock amuse-
ment" which Ellen bestows on her impoverished and lonely 
younger sister {AA p. 71), and secondly of the thought-
less proclamation of an engagement between two young people 
who have barely had time to become acquainted {AA. p. 103-
104). 
If Miss Rosa sees Ellen as heroically fighting with 
Sutpen "for those children's souls on a battleground where 
she could be supported not only by Heaven but by her own 
family and people of her own kind" (AA p. 23), Mr Compson 
interprets her as the frivolous affecter of a matriarchal 
role which she envisages will complement the social position 
of her husband. She acts as, 
•. • • chatelaine to the largest, wife to the wealthiest, 
mother of the most fortunate • • • speaking her bright 
set meaningless phrases out of the part which she had 
written for herself, of the duchess peripatetic with 
property soups and medicines among a soilless and un-
compelled peasantry - " {AA p. 69). 
Finally, in Miss Rosa's opinion Ellen's death is the 
outcome of her inability to withstand the forces of corrup-
tion with which Sutpen overwhelms her; in Mr Comps on ' s 
eyes she is indeed overwhelmed by unfortunate circumstances, 
but her final succumbing to them is the outcome of her 
own insubstantial i ty rather than the effect of Sutpen' s 
devilry. The •swamp-hatched butterfly• becomes 
•... the moth caught in a gale and blown against a 
wall and clinging there beating feebly, not with any 
particular stubborn clinging to life, not in particular 
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pain since it was too light to have struck hard, not 
even with very much remembrance of the bright vacuum 
before the gale, but just in bewildered and uncompre-
hending amazement-• (AA p. 85). 
Goodhue Coldfield 
Both Miss Rosa and Mr Compson present Goodhue Coldfield 
in terms of his relationship with Thomas Sutpen. For Miss 
Rosa this relationship can only be regarded as the devil's 
inexplicable choice of his first victim: 
"How could he have approached papa, on what grounds; 
what there could have been besides the common civility 
of two men meeting on the street, between a man who 
came from nowhere or dared not tell where and our 
father; what there could have been between a man 
like that and papa - a Methodist steward, a merchant 
who was not rich and who not only could have done 
nothing under the sun to advance his fortunes or pros-
pects but could by no stretch of the imagination even 
have owned anything that he would have wanted, even 
picked up in the road - a man who owned neither land 
nor slaves except two house servants whom he had freed 
as SCX)n as he got them, bought them, who neither drank 
nor hunted nor gambled - (AA p. 20). 
For Mr Compson on the other hand, the relationship between 
Coldfield and Sutpen seems founded chiefly on the respecta-
bility which Coldfield can offer Sutpen. When Coldfield, 
with General Compson, signs Sutpen's bond of release from 
jail, this, in Mr Compson's opinion is •the best possible 
moral fumigation which Sutpen could have received at the 
time in the eyes of his fellow citizens• (AA p. 50). Cold-
field according to Mr Compson's account of him, could even 
be described as covertly similar to Sutpen. While Sutpen 
aspires towards the ideal of earthly patriarch, directing 
his energy towards the accumulation of the material wealth 
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that will guarantee his social respectability and authority, 
Coldfield aspires towards the ideal of spiritual patriarch, 
directing his energy towards what he envisages as the ac-
cumulation of spiritual capital which will ensure his res-
pectability in a life hereafter. While Sutpen sanctions 
slavery as an institution which defines his authority and 
economic power, Coldfield, denouncing slavery nevertheless 
practises a parsimony which demonstrates his respect for 
divine providence but which is effectively as repressive 
as slavery. As Mr Compson recounts, 
Even the two negresses were gone now - whom he had 
freed as soon as he came into possession of them 
(through a debt, by the way, not purchase), writing 
out their papers of freedom which they could not read 
and putting them on a weekly wage which he held back 
in full against the discharge of their current market 
value - and in return for which they had been among 
the first Jefferson negroes to desert and follow the 
Yankee troops" (AA p. 84). 
According to Mr Compson,Coldfield, like Sutpen, expects 
the submissive allegiance of his female dependents, re-
fusing to tolerate any manifestation of insubordination; 
for example, "He refused to permit his sister to come back 
home to live while her horse-trader husband was in the 
army ••• • (AA p. 81), a refusal that seems based partially 
on the sister's rebellious action of elopement, and parti-
ally on her husband's involvement in a war of which Mr 
Coldfield disapproves. 
On the basis of these similarities, Mr Compson seems 
to interpret the association between Sutpen and Coldfield 
as that of like minds, rather than that of demon and prey. 
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Thoaas Sutpen 
While Miss Rosa's description of Sutpen' s sudden ap-
pearance with no other possess ions but his horse and two 
pistols, evokes the stereotype of the Outlaw, Mr Compson 
colours such stereotyping with irony. For example, des-
cribing the speculations of the Jefferson townsfolk on 
Sutpen's mysterious acquisition of the sumptuous furnishings 
for his mansion he comments wryly, 
".. . doubtless this time there were more men than women 
even who pictured him during this absence with a hand-
kerchief over his face and the two pistol barrels glint-
ing beneath the candelabra of a steamboat's saloon, 
even if no worse: if not something performed in the 
lurking dark of a muddy landing and with a knife from 
behind" (AA p. 44). 
These allusions to the somewhat obvious characteristics 
of the "bare-faced hold-up" and the "attack by the cut-
throat," suggests an ironic mimicry of the hushed specula-
tion amongst gossips. 
Miss Rosa's account of Sutpen as anti-hero and diabolic 
orchestrator of mysterious intrigues, has been compared 
to the genre of Gothic novel, while in Mr Compson's narra-
tive the influences of Greek tragecy have been noted. 16 
A significant point that can be made from this observation 
is that while for Miss Rosa, Sutpen himself is the untrans-
latable devilish o·ther of the Symbolic Order of the deep 
16 The identification of various genre characteristics is made 
very clearly by Lynn Gartrell Levins, and is supported in the 
argument of Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan. See Levins, ·The Four Narra-
tive Perspectives in Absalom, Absalom1• p. 35-39; Rimmon-Kenan, 
• Fran Reproduction to Production,• p. 9. 
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South, the source of dark mystery of which his wife and 
family are victims, to Mr Compson, Sutpen, who attempts 
to establish a place for himself in the Symbolic Order 
of the deep South, is himself a victim of the Other, the 
force of a "Fate" which is beyond his power to control. 
In Mr Compson's words: 
• ••. while he was still playing the scene to the audience, 
behind him Fate, destiny, retribution, irony - the 
stage manager, call him what you will - was already 
striking the set and dragging on the synthetic and spuri-
ous shadows and shapes of the next one" 
(AA pp. 72-73 ). 
These contrasting interpretations of Sutpen express a dis-
parity in the broader epistemological views of the two 
narrators. While Miss Rosa's mythical narrative implies 
a world in which man, as God's emissary contends with the 
opposing forces of the Devil, Mr Compson's narrative of 
reason implies a world in which man as a rational, logical 
establisher of meaning, contends with the power of the 
irrational. 
These discrepancies in interpretation raise the follow-
ing issues at the level of the narrative discourse: first-
ly, if the reader/narratee is presented with various inter-
pretations of the same set of events, if no narrative posi-
tion is presented . as more privileged than any other, is 
there any indication in the text of Absalom, Absaloml that 
"the truth" may ever be determined, and if so, what is 
the nature of that •truth"? 
Although the quest for truth in Absalom, Absalom! 
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is sometimes treated as a matter of judging the reliability 
of the various narrators, it would seem that the issues 
raised by this text are more radical than the issue of 
narrative reliability. To question a narrator's reliabili-
ty is to question his presentation and interpretation of 
the truth rather than to question the existence of truth 
per se. In Absalom, Absalom! the reader is not so much 
invited to ask "which narrator tells the truth?" as "Can 
anyone ever tell the truth?" 
With these issues in mind, let us now consider the 
interpretation that Mr Compson gives to the mysterious 
events which take place at Sutpen 's Hundred fifty years 
before his narration. 
Translating the Untranslatable: Mr Coapson's Quest 
for Reason in the Story of Thomas Sutpen 
While Miss Rosa, presenting the Sutpen story as a 
myth of the devil incarnate, treats the enigmas of this 
myth as the unaccountable dark mysteries of devilry, Mr 
Compson attempts to solve these mysteries by logical deduc-
tion. In so doing he isolates the figure of Charles Bon 
as the enigmatic focal point. 
According to Mr Compson's interpretation, Charles 
Bon appears as the.antithesis or dark Other of Henry Sutpen. 
While Henry is apparently the first-born Sutpen son and 
thereby heir to the Sutpen dynasty, Bon is described as 
•phoenix-like, fullsprung from no childhood, born of no 
woman and impervious to time• (AA p. 74). While the speci-
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ficity of Henry's place in the Symbolic Order of Yoknapa-
tawpha County stems from his father's success in establish-
ing the Sutpen estate as the basis for a dynasty, the in-
determinacy of Bon' s place in the Symbolic Order is the 
effect of his absent father's anonymity. Ironically how-
ever, the appearance of Bon as the Other, the outsider, 
has the effect of challenging the very assurance of Thomas 
and Henry Sutpen' s positions in the Symbolic Order, for 
Bon is "a man with an ease of manner and a swaggering gal-
lant air in comparison with which Sutpen's pompous arrogance 
was clumsy bluff and Henry actually a hobble-de-hoy" (AA 
pp. 7 4). It is Bon's very indeterminate identity that 
stands as a reminder of that absence or vacuum from which 
Thomas Sutpen's commanding patriarchal presence arose, 
"He [Bon] came into that isolated puritan country household 
almost like Sutpen himself came into Jefferson: apparently 
complete, without background or past or childhood •.• com-
pletely enigmatic" (AA p. 93). 
The mystery with which Mr Compson's interpretation 
is preoccupied is Thomas Sutpen's veto of Judith and Bon's 
marriage, Henry's consequent renunciation of his rights 
as Sutpen's heir and finally Henry's murder of Bon. As 
Peter Brooks observes, Mr Compson's narrative centres on 
the horizontal relationships of courtship and siblingship: 
the conjectured relationships between Henry~ Bon, between 
Henry and Judith and between Judith and Bon. 17 
17 P. Brooks, p. 259. 
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Between Henry and Bon, Mr Compson conjectures a rela-
tionship of love founded on the country boy's admiration 
for the sophisticated maturity of his friend. While Henry 
is "the provincial, the clown, almost, given to instinctive 
and violent action" (AA p. 96), Bon is his sophisticated, 
indolent antithesis: 
"... - this man whom Henry first saw riding perhaps 
through the grove at the University on one of the two 
horses which he kept there or perhaps crossing the 
campus on fcX)t: in the slightly Frenchified cloak and 
hat which he wore, or perhaps (I like to think this) 
presented formally to the man reclining in a flowered, 
almost feminized gown, in a sunny window in his cham-
bers - this man handsome elegant and even catlike 
and too old to be where he was, too old not in years 
but in experience, with some tangible effluvium of know-
ledge, surfeit: of actions done and satiations plumbed 
and pleasures exhausted and even forgotten. So that 
he must have appeared, not only to Henry but to the 
entire undergraduate l:x:)ljy of that small new provincial 
college, as a source not of envy, • • • but of despair· 
Yes, he loved Bon, who seduced him as surely 
as he sea uced Judith the country boy born and bred 
who, with the five or six others of that small under-
graduate body composed of other planters' sons whom 
Bon permitted to become intimate with him, who aped 
his clothing and manner ana (to the extent which they 
were able) his very manner of living, looked upon 
Bon as though he were a hero out of some adolescent 
Arabian Nights" (AA pp. 95-96). 
As a product of a culture foreign to Henry Sutpen - the 
French culture of Louisiana and specifically, of New Or-
leans - Bon, in Mr Compson' s view, is likely to have appeared 
fascinating to Henry. His exoticism, suggested in his 
identification as a •hero out of some adolescent Arabian 
Nights• with a •Frenchified cloak and hat•; his effeminacy 
suggested in the details of the •flowered, almost feminized 
gown•; his "satiations plumbed• which the reader is to 
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discover include the maintenance of an octoroon mistress 
and her child, all contribute to identify him as the embodi-
ment of the •otherness• forbidden to Henry as heir to the 
ideal of white land-owning patriarchy. Clearly evident 
in Bon are the indolence, effeminacy and fraternization 
with negroes, which challenge the strictness of the bounda-
ries of difference by which the violent action, male chauvi-
nism and slavery of the plantation owner are defined. 
Effectively Bon is the representative of the Otherness 
which Henry finds lacking in himself and therefore Desires. 
Only later, in Quentin and Shreve's interpretation, is 
the converse conclusion drawn that Henry, identified as 
the first-born and heir to his father, embodies the Other-
ness of recognized identity which Bon in his turn, lacks 
and Desi res. 
Having hypothesized that a particularly close relation-
ship existed between Bon and Henry, Mr Compson then argues 
that a similarly close relationship existed between Henry 
and Judi th, • the town knew that be tween Henry and Judi th 
there had been a relationship closer than the traditional 
loyalty of brother and sister even; a curious relation-
ship: something of that fierce impersonal rivalry between 
two cadets in a crack regiment • (AA pp. 79-80). He 
proposes this closeness as a possible justification for 
the engagement between Judi th and Bon after so brief a 
courtship, 
•5o it must have been Henry who seduced Judith, not 
Bon: seduced her along with himself from that distance 
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between Oxford and Sutpen 's Hundred, between herself 
and the man whom she had not even seen yet, as though 
by means of that telepathy with which as children they 
seemed at times to anticipate one anothers' actions 
{AA p. 99). 
It is on the basis of this apparent closeness, that Mr 
Compson describes Judi th and Henry as mutually attracted 
to Bon: they constitute "the single personality with two 
bodies both of which had been seduced almost simultaneously 
by a man whom at the time Judith had never even seen" (AA 
pp. 91-92). 
While Judith's union with Bon would appear to be pef-
fectly acceptable to society, Henry's union with Bon would 
be clearly taboo since in a patriarchal society it would 
constitute an excess of manhood or an excess of "sameness" 
where there should be •difference". Judi th is therefore 
"the one with hope, even though unconscious, of making 
the image [of Bon] hers through possession,• while Henry 
is •the other with the knowledge of the insurmountable 
barrier which the similarity of gender hopelessly inter-
vened .•. • (AA p. 95). 
On the basis of the closeness between Judith~ Henry, 
Mr Compson then introduces the suggestion that through 
her relationship with Bon, Judith might be interpreted 
as taking the role of mediator who makes possible the vicari-
ous consummation of the homosexual affection between Bon 
and Henry: 
"Bon not only loved Judith after his fashion but he 
loved Henry txx> and I believe in a deeper sense than 
aerely his fashion. Perhaps in his fatalism he loved 
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Henry the better of the two, seeing perhaps in the 
sister merely the shadow, the woman vessel with which 
to consummate the love whose actual object was the 
youth ••• " {AA pp. 107-108). 
On the other hand, it is equally possible to hypothesize 
that Bon, by virtue of his attraction for both brother 
and sister is the mediator who makes possible the vicarious 
consummation of an incestuous affection between Judith 
and Henry: 
"In fact, perhaps this is the pure and perfect incest: 
the brother realizing that the sister's virginity must 
be destroyed in order to have existed at all, taking 
that virginity in the person of the brother-in-law, 
the man w horn he would be if he could become, meta-
morphose into, the lover, the husband; n { AA p. 96). 
Like homosexuality, the taboo of incest entails the threat 
of too much "sameness" with in an order of difference. While 
in incest the excess of "sameness", being genetic, is lia-
ble to threaten the heal thy continuance of the familial 
line by perpetuating weaknesses in the genetic strains, 
in homosexuality, the excess of "sameness" being sexual 
fails to produce progeny at all. 
However for all the covert suitability to the hypo-
thesized passions of the three young people which Mr Comp-
son deduces in the marriage between Charles Bon and Judith 
Sutpen, it is nevertheless forbidden by Thomas Sutpen. 
The only possible reason that Mr Compson can proffer for 
this veto is the existence of an unorthodox marriage con-
tract between Bon and his octoroon mistress whom he keeps 
in New Orleans. Although Mr Compson goes to considerable 
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effort to visualize how the taboo of bigamy might in Henry's 
eyes outweigh the value of the marriage in which the for-
bidden but desired satisfaction of both homosexuality and 
incest stand to be successfully achieved, he is finally 
forced to admit that the carefully constructed logic of 
his narrative is unconvincing. It might be argued that 
bigamy or the taking of two wives is taboo in a patriarchal 
dynastic society since the duplication of the dynastic 
line which it implies might constitute a threat to the 
order of linearity which the laws of succession aim to 
preserve. Furthermore, it might be argued that, al though 
miscegenation was an accepted practice in Louisiana and 
other French-influenced Gulf port communities, it was treated 
as strictly taboo in the interior Anglicized colonies. 18 
Yet, if Henry idolized Bon in the manner in which Mr Comp-
son describes, it would seem that he would be more 1 ikely 
18 In his sociological study of slavery and emancipation 
in the Southern States, Ira Berlin describes this difference in 
attitudes towards miscegenation as follows: •Early French adven-
turers in this region [Louisiana and the Gull ports] , unlike English 
mainland colonists, did not settle with their families, and the 
preponderantly male population quickly formed liaisons with black 
slave women. By the middle of the eighteenth century, such mat-
ches had become so commonplace that whites customarily recognized 
their mulatto children, and some provided for their upbringing 
and education. Few white men thought it necessary to hide what 
English mainland colonists called •shameful• and "unnatural" re-
lations. Although the children of these mixed racial unions fol-
lowed the status of their mother, a liberal manumission policy 
encouraged masters to free their black mistresses and their light-
skinned children.• - Slaves Without Masters: The Free Negro 
in the Antebellum South (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974) p. 
109. 
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f h . fri d 19 to accept, than to reject, the alien morality, o 1s en. 
Even if Henry was shocked by the discovery of Bon's first 
marriage, murder seems an unconvincingly extreme measure 
of repudiation for him to have adopted. 
Finally then in spite of the care and interpretive 
effort he expends in conflating the evidence of his various 
sources, Mr Compson's narrative fails to resolve the enigma 
of why Sutpen vetoed the marriage of Judi th and Bon, why 
Henry denounced his father and his birthright in support 
of Bon only to murder his friend later. 
himself observes, 
As Mr Compson 
19 
It's just incredible. It just does not explain. Or 
perhaps that's it: they dont explain and we are not 
supposed to know. We have a few old mouth-to-mouth 
tales; we exhllll¥? f ran old trunks and boxes arrl drawers 
letters without salutation or signature, in which men 
and women who once lived and breathed are now merely 
initials or nicknames out of some now incomprehensible 
affection which sound to us like Sanscrit or Chocktaw; 
•• • Yes, Judith, Bon, Henry, Sutpen: all of them. 
They are there, yet something is missing; they are 
like a chemical formula exhumed along with the letters 
from that forgotten chest, carefully, the paper old and 
faded and falling to pieces, the writing faded, almost 
Again, this argument could be suppori..ed by evidence 
that in the "real" world of the South, such liaisons were not un-
heard of: 
•r..ower-cl.ass whit.es were probably most likely to reject South-
ern sexual standards, but the white elit.e did so as well. Some 
wealthy planters and merchants took black mistresses. Most doubt-
less kept these relations discreetly out of view, but some flaunted 
their illicit conduct. 'There are large numbers of our young men 
and several of our merchants,' wrote a North Carolina plant.er 
from New Bern, 'who have negro wives or "misses" and keep them 
openly, raising up families of mulattoes.' Such mixed racial unions 
were even more commonplace in the Lower South." - I. Berlin, 
p. 266. 
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indecipherable, yet meaningful, familiar in shape and 
sense, the name and presence of volatile and sentient 
forces; you bring them together in the proportions 
called for, but nothing happens; you re-read, tedious 
and intent, poring, making sure that you have forgotten 
nothing, made no miscalculation ; you bring them to-
gether again and again nothing happens: just the \IIOrds, 
the symbols, the shapes themselves, shadowy inscrutable 
and serene, against that turgid background of a horri-
ble and bloody mischancing of human affairs" 
(AA pp. 100-101). 
Earlier, the discrepancies of interpretation between Miss 
Rosa's narrative and Mr Compson' s raised the issue of whether 
it is possible for the reader - given several perspectives 
of an event none of which is identified by the text as 
more privileged than another - to determine •the truth". 
Now the question becomes more radical: given a series 
of events, is it possible for the reader, or more generally 
the linguistic subject, to establish within them a pattern 
of meaning at all? As Peter Brooks expresses it, 
• • • how can narrative know what happened, and make 
sense of the motives of events? And if it cannot, what 
happens to lines of descent, to the transmission of 
knowledge and wisdom, and to History itself? Is His-
tory finally simply a ·bloody mischancing of human 
affairs"? If, for Barthes, the resolution of all enigmas 
ooincides with the full and final predication of the nar-
rative sentence, Mr Compson here appears to question 
the possibility of ever finding a predicate: the sub-
jects - the proper names - are there, but they refuse 
to accede to meaning20 
Thus far then the reader has followed two versions 
of the Sutpen story. The first, a myth describing the 
20 
P. Brooks, p. 251. It may be noted that while Brooks 
refers the reader to Roland Barthes' text S/Z at an earlier stage 
of his article, he offers no page references. I suggest that the 
above reference to Barthes applies to p. 209 ff of S/Z, trans. 
Richard Miller, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974). 
185 
incarnation of the devil and his activities amongst the 
men of Yoknapatawpha County is unable to interpret the 
enigmas of the myth as anything more than unaccountable, 
devilish machinations. The second version, confronting 
these enigmas by systematic, logical deduction, fails to 
produce any more convincing interpretive "truth" than the 
earlier version. 
It is only with the transformation of the narrative 
process itself in the interpretation of Quentin and Shreve 
that the possibility of "predicating the narrative sentence" 
begins to appear accessible. 
* * * * * 
THE RECOGNITION OF OTHERNESS 
IN THE NARRATIVE OF QUENTIN AND SHREVE 
While the narration of the first five chapters of 
Absalom, Absalom! takes place on an afternoon and evening 
in the late summer of a dusty Mississippi September, Chapter 
Six marks a change to the context of a winter's evening 
in January in the snowy Northern state of Massachusetts. 
With this change in the spatial and temporal location of 
the narrative, Quentin's status as narratee also changes 
to that of narrator. While in the earlier contexts the 
authoritative status of the narrators was reinforced by 
the hierarchy of authority evident in the Southern Symbolic 
Order, in the latter context the narrator's authority is 
less clearly defined, for both narrator and narratee are 
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of the same age and the same social identity, being first-
year students at Harvard. Al though initially Quentin's 
narrative authority depends on his Southern birthright 
and his consequent knowledge of Southern history, Southern 
conventions and most particularly the story of Sutpen, 
it is not long before his authority is challenged by Shreve. 
It is evident from Shreve's interjections that he, 
as a Northerner, not only finds Quentin's story strange, 
but he also finds the strictly hierarchical arrangement 
of difference manifested in the Symbolic Order of deep 
Southern Yoknapatawpha County unfamiliar. For example, 
his references to Miss Rosa Coldfield as •this old gal• 
and •this old dame• (AA p. 176) illustrate his unawareness 
of the Southern mystification of •1adies• as the fragile 
other according to which the authoritative •gentleman• 
is defined. Similarly he is unfamiliar with the rigid 
class distinction which is manifest for example, in the 
particularity of the signifier attributed to the impoverish-
ed white man: •what is it? the word? White what? - Yes 
trash" (AA p. 181 emphasis added). 
Shreve's incredulity towards the Southern Symbolic 
Order and the Sutpen story has the ef feet of subverting 
what Quentin regarded as "the norm•, presenting it instead 
as •the Other,• the strangeness of which Shreve strives 
to reduce through his own interpretive effort. His incre-
dulity also has the effect of subverting the interpretations 
of Sutpen offered in Miss Rosa's and Mr Compson's respective 
narratives. Miss Rosa's destructive demon for exa11ple, 
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becomes a figure of comedy in Shreve' s hands, •t11is Faustus, 
this demon, this Beelzebub •.. who hid horns and tail be-
neath human raiment and a beaver hat• (AA p. 178). Mr 
Compson' s account on the other hand seems to Shreve the 
incredible story of a man who repeatedly undermines the 
very objectives he apparently sets out to achieve. The 
effect of Thomas Sutpen as mystery, then, once more repeats 
itself not only in Quentin, but also in Shreve. Yet if 
the latter is to pursue his Desire to find "the truth" 
or narrate the story himself, he implicitly thereby requires 
Quentin to relinquish the role of narrator or "author of 
the truth" and take instead the place of narratee, •recipi-
ent of the truth.• This Quentin is loath to do since he 
has not yet resolved for himself the failure of meaning 
in the Sutpen myth. For him, Shreve threatens to take 
the place of his authorial father, casting him once again 
in the role of acquiescent son: 
nYes. I have hea:rd too much, I have been toui too rruch; 
I have had to listen too much, too Long thinking Yes, 
Shreve sounds al.most exactZ.y Like father ••• " (AA p. 207). 
Initially then, the narrative of Quentin and Shreve is 
generated by their respective determination to rewrite 
the Sutpen history in order to resolve the questions it 
poses. One might see in this narrative rivalry between 
Northerner and Southerner a textual re-enactment of the 
historical conflict between North and South. Yet if initi-
ally the two young men are rivals, this relationship of 
opposition is gradually transformed as their narrative 
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progresses. 
Charles Etienne St Valery Bon: the Problea of Miscegeny 
The narrative of Quentin and Shreve appears to have 
been initiated by Mr Compson's letter announcing the death 
of Miss Rosa Coldfield. The letter re-evokes in Quentin's 
memory his journey with Miss Rosa to Sutpen' s Hundred the 
previous September night. Quentin's visualization of the 
journey through the suffocating summer dust suggests a 
return to origins, the dust standing as an obscuring veil 
guarding a mystery whose revelation threatens to be over-
whelming rather than illuminating, •the dust-cloud moving 
on, enclosing them with not threat exactly but maybe warn-
ing, bland, almost friendly warning ... • {AA p. 175). How-
ever, before Quentin's reminiscence progresses to the point 
of revelation, it is interrupted and suspended by Shreve's 
interjection, re-iterating and attempting to make sense 
of the story that Quentin has told him up to this point. 
As Shreve re-interprets Quentin's story, he introduces 
the reader to new portions of narrative material, an impor-
tant segment being the account of events at Sutpen's Hundred 
after Thomas Sutpen's death in 1869. This account is pro-
voked by the spectacle of the tombstones which Quentin 
and Mr Compson encounter during a quail-shooting expedition 
near the derelict Sutpen mansion •authoritative texts 
h . h t . d · h .21 w 1c ye require ec1p erment. 
21 P. Brooks, p. 257. 
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The tombstone or text which requires particular de-
cipherment is that of Charles Etienne Saint Valery Bon. 
As Mr Compson recounts to Quentin how Charles Etienne, 
the sone of Charles Bon and his octaroon mistress came 
to be buried at Sutpen's Hundred, several unanswered ques-
tions arise from the narrative: for example, why did Judith 
and Clytie feel responsible for this little boy whose only 
apparent connection with them appears to have been that 
he was the son of the man whom their brother had murdered? 
Did they feel responsible as the murderer's sisters, or 
did Judith perhaps regard the child as her surrogate son 
since he was the child of her dead suitor? 
two women treat the boy so protectively? 
Why did the 
Besides raising these questions which are only resolved 
towards the end of the novel, this segment of narrative 
focuses on an issue which has been implicit but understated 
in the preceding narrative material, namely, the question 
of whether the progeny of miscegenation can be regarded 
as having a place within the Symbolic Order of the mythical 
deep South and if so what this place might be. 
For the reader, Charles Etienne Bon, like his father, 
Charles Bon, is presented as an enigmatic, •other-worldly" 
child, having "had no childhood ••. as if he had not been 
human born, but instead created without agency of man or 
agony of woman and orphaned by no human being• (AA p. 196). 
As a French-speaking, part-negro he clearly does not belong 
to the society of Jefferson. That the townsfolk regard 
him as •other• or beyond the Law of their society is sug-
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gested by their speculations that he is the illegitimate 
son of Judith Sutpen and Charles Bon, or even that he is 
the offspring of the incestuous union of Clytie and Thomas 
Sutpen (AA p. 201). 
The indeterminacy of his status in the Sutpen home 
is illustrated in the position of his trundle bed between 
Judith's more elevated bed and Clytie's pallet - a position 
from which he might have felt the two women thinking, 
"You ar>e not up her>e in this bed with me, wher>e thr>ough 
no fauU nor> wiUing of your> 01.Jn you should be, and you 
a:re not down he:re on this paLLet fLoo:r with me, 
wher>e th:rough no fauU no:r wiUing of your> 01.Jn you must 
and wiU be, not th:rough any fauU o:r lviHing of our> 01.Jn 
who wou 7,d not what we aannot" ( AA p. 19 8 ) • 
On a wider scale, the problem of identification with which 
he presents the Law of the Symbolic Order governing Yokna-
patawpha County is particularly clearly illustrated in 
the Jefferson courthouse when he is being indicted for 
disturbing the peace. The speech of the judge, Justice 
Jim Hamblett, runs as follows: 
"At this time, while our country is struggling to rise 
from beneath the iron heel of a tyrant oppressor, when 
the very future of the South as a place bearable for 
our women and children to live in depends on the labor 
of our own hands, when the tools which we have to 
use, to depend on, are the pride and integrity and 
forbearance - of black men and the pride and integrity 
and forbearance of white; that you, I say, a white 
man, a white -" and your grandfather trying to reach 
him, stop him, trying to push through the crowd, saying 
"Jim. Jim. Jim!• and it already too late, as if Hamb-
lett' s own voice had waked him at last or as if some-
one had snapped his fingers under his nose and waked 
him, he looking at the prisoner now but saying "white" 
again even while his voice died away as if the order 
to stop the voice had been shocked into short circuit, 
and every face in the room turned toward the prisoner as 
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Hamblett cried, "What a1'e you? Who and whe1'e did you 
c,ome f 1'om? ( AA p • 2 0 3 ) • 
While Hamblett identifies the source of order in the South 
as "the pride and integrity and forbearance of black men 
and the pride and integrity and forbearance of white," 
this binary opposition fails to recognize the identity 
of one who is neither "black" nor "white" and is therefore 
22 
an undecidable within the Symbolic Order. In other words, 
when Hamblet asks "What are you?" there can be no satisfac-
tory answer in terms of the opposition "black" or "white", 
for Charles Etienne can only be identified as "white" if 
his equal claim to blackness, manifest in his tawny skin 
colour is repressed and conversely, he can only be identi-
fied as "black" if his apparently "white" appearance is 
repressed. This undecidability which Charles Etienne em-
bodies threatens the meaningfulness of the binary opposition 
black/white, since he represents both an excess of meaning 
which neither term can accommodate, and paradoxically, 
a deficiency of meaning since he conforms fully to neither 
description. Effectively this status is the same as that 
of Miss Rosa Coldfield: the status of an overdetermined 
signified. 
22 Ira Berlin describes the problem which "mixed-bloods" 
presented to the Symbolic Order of the "real" south which recog-
nized only "black" and "white": 
"... hostility was reflected in the increased difficulties 
light-skinned free Negroes encountered when trying to slip under 
the color line. Many whites were no longer willing to tolerate 
the silent passage of mixed-bloods into the white cast.e. In Virginia, 
the old mixed-blood law, which had permitted hundreds of fair-
skinned persons of African ancestry to prove they were less than 
one-quarter black in oourt and thereby escape their legal disabili-
ties, met increased opposition •••• The mayor [of Richmond] grumbled 
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At the root of Charles Etienne's problem would seem 
to be the taboo of " . " 23 m1scegeny. Although this taboo 
might be treated as an equivalent to the incest taboo, 
there is a marked dissimilarity between the two prohibi-
tions. While incest, as already discussed, prohibits the 
production of too much "sameness" thereby forestalling 
the weakening of genetic strains and the subsequent natural 
culling of such weakness, miscegeny prohibits the mixture 
of difference that would weaken the distinction between 
black and white. The fact that no natural elimination 
process reinforces such a veto, the fact that the progeny 
of black and white union manifest no perpetual congenital 
malfunction indicates that this law is based on the need 
to sustain the status quo of the Symbolic Order rather 
than on the need to forestall weakening of the organism 
itself. The taboo against mixed marriage would therefore 
seem to be based on the over-differentiation of black and 
white which, creating too much difference, "sets up a per-
petual slippage of meaning where one cannot find any 
points of fixity in the signifying chain. 1124 
that the mixed-blood law befogged caste lines and undermined white 
supremacy. There were only two castes, white and black, 
stormed one Richmond journal. If the legislature wanted to make 
a third, it should prescribe their status; otherwise, mixed-bloods 
would soon ·~ governers, judges, jurors, soldiers, or lawyers.'" 
- Berlin, p. 365, my emphasis. 
23 As already indicated in :footnote 18 this taboo prevailed 
in the English-influenced states of the "real• South - of which 
Yoknapatawiila is a fictional representation - al though in the French-
influenced states, attitudes towards miscegenation were less strict. 
24 P. Brooks, p. 266. 
193 
Although in the post-war South as presented in Absalom, 
Absalom! the hierarchical arrangement of difference which 
privileges white over black has theoretically been waived, 
it is evident from Charles Etienne's position that free 
integration of the two groups is by no means accepted. 
While the fraternization of a part-negro, but apparently 
white, man with negroes is considered cause for suspicion 
amongst both negroes and whites, the same man's claim to 
the status of white is likely to be considered presumptuous. 
Thus Charles Etienne Bon becomes the scapegoat or outcast 
who bears the failure of his Symbolic Order to account 
for the excess of meaning which is the effect of its over-
differentiative laws. 
Thoaas Sutpen's Design: 
the Quest for Autonomous Subjectivity in a Closed Text 
A vital portion of narrative material which has been 
withheld and is now recounted in Quentin and Shreve's dia-
logue is the story of Thomas Sutpen before his arrival 
in Yoknapatawpha County. Originally narrated by Sutpen 
himself to Quentin's grandfather, General Compson, during 
their hunt for the runaway French architect, who had been 
directing the building of Sutpen's mansion, the story is 
now reiterated by Quentin. 
The context in which Sutpen' s history begins seems 
characterized by a lack of differentiation - translated 
into Lacanian terminology, a context of •pre-1 inguistic• 
and therefore •presubjective• nondifferentiation. 25 
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This environment, being unnamed at the time of Sutpen's 
childhood, is extrinsic to any clearly defined Symbolic 
Order - a point foregrounded by Quentin and Shreve's debate 
on its identity: 
•aecause he was born in West Virginia, in the mountains 
• ( "Not in West Virginia,• Shreve said. - •what?" 
Quentin said. "Not in West Virginia,• Shreve said. 
"Because if he was twenty-fl ve years old in Mississippi 
in 1833, he was born in 1808. And there wasn't any 
West Virginia in 1808 because - " "All right,• Quentin 
said. "- West Virginia wasn't admitted -• "All right 
all right," Quentin said. "- into the United States 
until -" • All right all right all right," Quentin said. ) 
" - he was born where what few other people he knew 
lived in log cabins boiling with children like the one 
he was born in • . • where he had never even heard 
of, never imagined, a place, a land divided neatly 
up and actually owned by men who did nothing but 
ride over it on fine horses or sit in fine clothes on 
the galleries of big houses while other people worked 
for them; ••• " (AA pp. 220-221). 
Only when the Sutpen family moved from their mountain 
home back to the coast whence they had originally come, 
does the young Sutpen become gradually aware of his sur-
roundings as differentiated and systematized: 
•... the country flattened out now with good roads 
and fields and niggers working the fields while white 
men sat fine horses and watched them, and more fine 
horses and men in fine clothes, with a different look 
in the face from mountain men about the taverns where 
the old man was not even allowed to come in by the 
front door • • • He had learned the difference not only 
between white men and black ones, but he was learning 
that there was a difference between white men and white 
25 This view is corroborated by John T. Matthews who writes, 
•when Sutpen tells his story to General Compson, he looks 
back on his mountain childhood as a place beyond social differ-
entiation, noral ant>igui ty, an:3 caiplexi ty" - '!be Play of Faulkner's 
Language (Ithaca aoo I.ordon: Cornell University Press, 1982) p. 154. 
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men, not to be measured by lifting anvils or gouging 
eyes or how much whiskey you could drink then get 
up and walk out of the room" (AA pp. 225-226). 
"Difference", Sutpen must discover, is not only defined 
in physical terms at the level of the signified, but also 
at the level of the signifier according to laws of a Sym-
bolic Order which is as yet unfamiliar to him. It is only 
when he is rebuffed by the negro butler at the Pettibone 
mansion that Sutpen realizes that this system of "differ-
ence" has been translated into a hierarchy within which 
his position is barely worthy of . . 26 recogn1t1on. It is 
this denial of recognition that shapes Sutpen's experience: 
neither he, nor the message he conveys, nor his father 
as sender of the message is recognized as having a signifi-
cance that can cancel even momentarily, the lowliness of 
their status in the hierarchy. Since he is barely recog-
nized within this Symbolic Order, Sutpen realises that 
correspondingly, his power to signify or to convey signifi-
cation, is likewise dismissed: 
26 k "d tif" S I • th • Peter Broo s 1 en 1es utpen s expenence at e Petti-
bone mansion as the initial discovery of difference: 
"In this moment of barred passage, Sutpen discovers the 
existence of difference: difference as an abstract and formal pro-
perty which takes precedence over all else - since, for instance, 
it is more important than the content of the message he was sup-
posed to deliver. Good and evil, morality, social position, worth 
are not substantial, but belong rather to the order of the signifier" 
(p. 260). 
It would seem however from for example, the last passage quoted 
on the previous page of this thesis ( p. 194 ) ending above, that 
Sutpen 's discovery of difference ~ se has been more gradual 
than Brooks' interpretation would imply. 
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•I went up to that door for that nigger to teii me never 
to c,ome to that front door again and I not on!y wasn't 
doing any good to him by teHing it or any ha'l'm to him 
by not teUing it, there airrt any good ozt ha1"111 eithezt in 
the Uving wor!d that I <'an do to him" (AA pp. 237-238). 
Through a process of tortuous deduction, Sutpen comes to 
the conclusion that the power to control the hierarchy 
of difference, which he visualizes to be the power that 
Pettibone possesses, depends on the acquisition of property, 
"You got to have land and niggers and a fine house to corn-
bat them with" {AA p. 238). He therefore conceives of 
a •design" to establish himself as an autonomous authority 
by acquiring this property. As his subsequent experience 
implies, Sutpen's mistake lies in his assumption that the 
opposite or •other" of his own insignificance and helpless-
ness is absolute power, absolute autonomy. It is his naive 
belief in the possibility of attaining incontrovertible 
authority that Quentin describes as, 
• that innocence which believed that the ingredients 
of morality were like the ingredients of pie or cake 
and once you had measured them and balanced them 
and mixed them and put them into the oven it was 
all finished and nothing but pie or cake could come 
out" (AA p. 263). 
This "innocence" prevents Sutpen from taking into account 
the constant play of difference or Otherness which has 
the potential to subvert the order of meaning over which 
the subject may believe he has full control. As soon as 
he sets about accomplishing his design, he is faced with 
manifestations of the unexpected Other. Travelling to 
the West Indies which, he had learned during a period of 
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err a tic schooling, was where a poor man could become rich 
"so long as that man was clever and courageous" (AA p. 
242), he is confronted first by linguistic Otherness. 
He discovers that "all people did not speak the same tongue 
and realized that he would not only need courage and skill, 
he would have to learn to speak a new language, else that 
design to which he had dedicated himself would die still-
born" (AA p. 248). On this occasion Sutpen succeeds in 
reducing the strangeness of the Other by incorporating 
it into his design: he apparently learns both French and 
the patois necessary to communicate with the Negro slaves 
on Haiti. Sometimes however he is forced to repress Other-
ness when it threatens to subvert the Symbolic Order on 
which his design is founded. One of the initial illustra-
tions of this is his participation in the suppression of 
the slave uprising which occurs on the sugar plantation 
where he holds the position of overseer. Identifying him-
self with the white man's law and the authoritative position 
of the French planter, Su tpen fights with the latter and 
his daughter in their barricaded homestead. When the water 
supply is exhausted on the eighth night of the siege, Sut-
pen subdues the uprising singlehanded. Since he does not 
explain how he performs this suppression Quentin, narrating 
the story, can only establish the method by conjecture: 
"Not how he did it. 
of no moment to the 
musket down and had 
bar it behind him, 
and subdued them, 
by standing, bearing 
He did n 't tell that either, that 
story either; he just put the 
someone unbar the door and then 
and walked out into the darkness 
maybe by yelling louder, maybe 
more than they believed any bones 
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and flesh could or should (should, yes: that would 
be the terrible thing: to find flesh to stand more 
than flesh should be asked to stand); maybe at last 
they themselves turning in horror and fleeing from 
the white arms and legs shaped like theirs and from 
which blood could be made to spurt and flow as it 
could from theirs and containing an indomitable spirit 
which should have come from the same primary fire 
which theirs came from but which could not have, could 
not possibly have" (AA p. 254). 
It seems that on this occasion, Sutpen's unwavering dedica-
tion to the advancement of his design, his oblivion to 
the questionability of the law on which that design and 
its advancement depends, or the limitations of his right 
and power to impose that law give him the commanding pres-
ence of a god. It is this presence, admitting to no weak-
ness or lack, that Quentin visualizes would determine Sut-
pen's victory. 
As a reward for his achievement of quelling the up-
rising, Sutpen receives the hand of the planter's daughter 
in marriage. At this point his story is interrupted by 
the capture of the runaway architect and it is only thirty 
years later, when his design has apparently failed that 
he turns to General Compson once more and, attempting to 
account for the failure of the design, recounts the rest 
of the story. 
While at the level of the story the topic under dis-
cussion is Sutpen's quest after the ideal of incontrover-
tible authority, at the level of the discourse the related 
issue of narrative authority is raised by Shreve's impatient 
interjection as Quentin introduces the second instalment 
of Sutpen's biography: 
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•oon't say it's just me that sounds like your old man," 
Shreve said. •aut go on. Sutpen 's children. Go 
on• ( AA p. 2 61 ) • 
This reverberation of his own earlier accusation stimulates 
in Quentin the following consideration of the nature of 
narrative identity: 
Yea • .. Maybe we are both Father. Maybe nothing ever 
happens once and is finished. Maybe happen is never onae 
but Uke ripp'les maybe on z.vater after the pebb7,e sinks, 
the ripp7,e moving on, spreading, the poo7, attached by a 
naI'1•ow umbi ti ca 7, z.vater-cord to the next poo7, which the 
first poo1, feeds, has fed, did feed, 7,et this second poo7, 
contain a different temperature of z.vater, a different mo7,e-
au7,arity of having seen, feU, Pemembered, Pef1,ect in a 
different tone the infinite unchanging sky, it doesn't 
matter: that pebb1,e 's watery echo whose faU it did not 
even see moves across its surface too at the 
originat rippte-space, to the o1,d inePadi~ab1,e rhythm 
(AA p. 261). 
It seems that what Quentin establishes here is an analogy 
between water and language; between the chain of trans-
mission of disturbance as a ripple-effect from pool to 
pool and the chain of transmission of mystery as a reading 
effect from reader to reader. 
Just as a series of pools are connected by •a narrow 
umbilical water-cord,• that is the common medium whereby 
both communication and difference - •different temperature•, 
•aifferent molecularity" and so on - between pools is estab-
lished, so language is the common medium whereby linguistic 
subjects are both connected to, but differentiated from, 
each other. Just as the ripples produced in one pool by 
the stimulus of a pebble are communicated through the medium 
of the water thereby disturbing all the surfaces of the 
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other pools, so the response or effect produced in one 
linguistic subject or reader by a "disturbance• in the 
order of meaning may be communicated to other linguistic 
subjects or readers through the medium of language, as 
narrative. In language, each subjective identity is there-
fore established by its difference from others manifest 
in differing responses to the same stimulus; responses 
which are expressed through language. Thus Quentin elabo-
rates, 
Yes, we are both Father. Or nriybe Father and I are both 
Shreve, rrr::r.ybe it took Father and me both to rrnke Shreve 
or Shreve and me both to 1'7l1ke Father or rru.ybe Thonris Sutpen 
to 1'7l1ke aU of UB {AA pp. 261-262). 
In other words, one might say that Mr Compson's identity 
is established as father and narrator by virtue of his 
d . ff f Q . h. d 1 · t 27 1 erence rom uent1n as 1s son an 1s ener. Simi-
larly, Shreve is constituted as the Northerner, the dis-
interested listener, by virtue of the common ties of South-
ern birthright and kinship of Quentin and Mr Compson as 
narrators. Furthermore, it is only through the narratives 
27 I te ti' . th. ecti' . h T I . ' n res ng 1n is conn on is Jo n • rwm s comment 
on the relation between father and son a uring his discussion of 
Faulkner's The Fable: 
•. • • the father and the son, through their very opposition, 
mutually constitute one another, define one another, indeed, 
exist in and by one another through that opposition - that 
opposition between a real world of social order achieved 
by authority at the expense of any given individual and 
ideal world of individual worth, of the uniqueness and sac-
redness of every person, a world whose highest expression 
is the hope of personal immortality guaranteed by Christ's 
death• - Doublin and Incest Re titian aoo Rev (Baltinore 
aoo Lorrlon: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1975 rpt 980) p. 139. 
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of Quention and Mr Compson that Shreve has the opportunity 
to define himself in the subjective position which his 
own interpretation of their story demands. On the other 
hand, it is only because he has 1 isteners, Quentin and 
later Shreve, that Mr Compson' s place as preceding narra-
tor is defined. Finally, it is the name ·Thomas Sutpen", 
the enigmatic sign of "truth" that is constantly deferred, 
which constitutes "ati of us" who attempt to arrest that 
deferment through the activity of interpretation and there-
by constitute ourselves in the activity of our writing/ 
speaking. 
If Quentin expresses here an appreciation of alterity 
as the basis of •identity•, it seems to be this apprecia-
tion which is lacking from the consciousness of Thomas 
Sutpen. Because he fails to acknowledge his own authority 
or subjective position as a product of difference, because 
he fails to recognize that he can never achieve autonomous 
subjectivity but must always depend on the Other for the 
definition of his subjective position, because he can never 
fully repress or fully control the play of difference, 
Sutpen finds his design repeatedly frustrated. 28 
'!'he Return of the Other as Subversion of Order 
It is the repeated frustration of his design that 
28 As T. H. Adamovski argues, •sutpen is seeking, through 
his Design, to be autonomous, 'more than a man in a world of 
men, ' • • • The novel records the ultimate failure of this passion 
to be a life in oontrol of itself.• - T.H. Adamovski, •children 
of the Idea: Heroes and Family Romances in Absalom, Absalom1• 
Mosaic 10, 1(1976) pp. 116-117. 
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Sutpen describes to General Compson during the war when 
he returns to Jefferson briefly, to deposit the tombstones 
at Sutpen' s Hundred. The first insurmountable obstacle 
he had encountered was the discovery that neither his wife 
- the daughter of the French sugar planter and his osten-
sibly Spanish wife - nor his first-born son, was "adjunctive 
to the forwarding of the design" ( AA p. 26 2). While he 
had entered into the marriage in good faith, he explains 
that the planter and his daughter had, 
•... deliberately withheld from me the one fact which I have 
reason to know they were aware would have caused me to 
decline the entire matter, otherwise they would not have 
withheld it from me - a fact which I did not learn until 
after my son was born. And even then I did not act hastily. 
• • • I merely explained how this new fact rendered it impos-
sible that this woman and child be incorporated in my design, 
••• • (AA p. 264). 
What the "one fact" was, Sutpen never reveals to General 
Compson; nevertheless it causes Sutpen to resign all claim 
to the property he had acquired on Haiti. Leaving his 
wife a weal thy woman, he returns to the North American 
mainland to begin his design anew. Firmly believing that 
if he does his wife and child an injustice by abandoning 
them, he absolves himself from guilt by leaving them well 
provided for, Sutpen is baffled when, years later, the 
supposedly closed issue of this first marriage presents 
itself again. It seems that the source of his bafflement 
lies in his failure to see that the resolution of a problem 
can never be final or indisputable, but only ever amounts 
to a conventional agreement between the parties concerned 
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to regard it as resolved. This conventional agreement 
is therefore perpetually open to revision by either party. 
If Sutpen believes that he has resolved the problem of 
his first marriage which represented a difference or Other-
ness that threatened his design, he now discovers that 
his resolution was by no means final, as the recurrence 
of the problem indicates. 
That Charles Bon is Sutpen's repudiated, but re-emer-
gent son, is deduced by Quentin after his journey to Sut-
pen's Hundred with Miss Rosa Coldfield. 
to this segment of narrative shortly. 
I shall return 
For Sutpen, the 
unexpected appearance of his first-born son presents him 
with an irresolvable problem: 
•.. • either I destroy my design with my own hand, 
which will happen if I am forced to play my last trump 
card, or do nothing, let matters take the course which 
I know they will take and see my design complete it.self 
quite normally and naturally and successfully to the 
public eye, yet to my own in such fashion as to be 
a I10Ckery and a betrayal of that little ooy who approached 
that door fifty years ago and was turned away, for 
whose vindication the whole plan was conceived and 
carried forward to the moment of this choice, this second 
choice devolving out of the first one which in its turn 
was forced on me as the result of an agreement ••. • 
(AA p. 274). 
These two choices with which Sutpen is faced are distingu-
ishable by the contrasting attitudes to difference which 
they respectively demand of him. The rebuff faced by •that 
little boy who approached that door fifty years ago• arose 
from the refusal of the authority which he confronted, 
the white property-owning patriarch implicit in the figure 
of the Negro butler, to recognize the significative power 
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of one who by his difference - his youth and his poverty -
defined that authority. Sutpen's design aims to elevate 
the rebuffed poor boy to the position of patriarchal autho-
rity from which he himself can vindicate his earlier posi-
tion by demanding that he be recognized as an indisputably 
authoritative signifying power. If Sutpen plays his "trump 
card," if he tells Henry to prevent the marriage of Bon 
to Judith, he will be rebuffing Bon, refusing to recognize 
his right to signify, in a repetition of the rebuff which 
he himself received from Pettibone's authority. From the 
reader's perspective, this could be judged as a perpetuation 
of the misconception that authority can be fully autonomous. 
On the other hand, if he "lets matters take the course 
which I know they will take," his declining to act against 
Bon will be an implicit recognition of that difference 
in Bon which previously he had repudiated. Such a recog-
nition of difference would amount to the acknowledgement 
that his own authority is not autonomous and to Sutpen, 
such an acknowledgement would be a compromise defeating 
the ideality of his original design. What remains an enigma 
is the precise nature of the "difference" which caused 
Sutpen to repudiate Bon and his mother initially. 
Barration and Interpretation: •1naixing• with the Other 
Let us return again to the question of the discourse: 
if, as I suggested earlier, narrating is seen to be reading 
as action, and if reading is the effort to dominate or 
control the mysterious Other, Quentin initially resents 
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the interference of Shreve who threatens to usurp, by alter-
native interpretation, the "power-hold" which Quentin is 
attempting to establish over the Sutpen myth through his 
own interpretive activity: 
"So he got his choice made, after all," Shreve said. 
"He played that trump after all. And so he came home 
and found -" 
"Wait," Quentin said. 
"- what he must have wanted to find or anyway what 
he was going to find -" 
"Wait, I tell you!" Quentin said, though still he 
did not move nor even raise his voice - that voice 
with its tense suffused restrained quality: "I am telling." 
(AA p. 277). 
Yet as their quest for the truth progresses, Quentin comes 
to recognize the value of Shreve's contribution as one 
who can read from an "Other" or alternative interpretive 
position. Just as Quentin, after his journey to Sutpen's 
Hundred with Miss Rosa acquired "knowledge of the Other" 
that could inform his father's narrative, so Shreve as 
Northerner occupies an alternative subjective position 
which can inform Quentin's interpretation. Gradually then, 
the positions of Quentin and Shreve become less the sepa-
rate identities of binary oppositions the Southerner 
and the Northerner, or the narrator and the narratee so 
strictly defined as "opposites" in Miss Rosa's narrative 
- than an "inmixing" of subjective positions. This shift 
in their relationship can be illustrated by their recon-
struction of Sutpen's last-ditch attempt to produce a son 
and heir with Milly Jones, the fifteen year old grand-
daughter of Wash Jones. 
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While Quentin assumes the role of narrator, Shreve 
from the position of narratee points to the gaps in Quentin's 
discourse that suspend the revelation of •the truth.• 
Quentin knows, for example, why Sutpen rejects Milly Jones 
just as he knows that Jones kills Sutpen with a scythe 
because Sutpen refuses to recognize Milly and her child 
as his responsibility. Yet it is only after Shreve has 
repeatedly interjected, in an attempt to clarify this reason 
for Sutpen's rejection, that Quentin reveals the detail 
necessary to complete the pattern of meaning and reveal 
''WiU you wait?" Shreve said. •- that with the son he 
went to all that trouble to get lying right there behind 
him in the cabin, he would have to taunt the grandfather 
into killing first him and then the child too?• 
•- What?· Ouentin said. •It wasn't a son. It was a 
girl.• (AA p. 292). 
Yet, even as they account for Sutpen's death - a death 
which is, ironically, the direct result of Sutpen's refusal 
to recognize the •otherness• of his female child as any-
thing but the •opposite• of the male heir he wanted - Quen-
tin and Shreve have still to unveil the mystery of the 
•one fact• which not only prevented Charles Bon and his 
mother from being accepted as part of Sutpen's design, 
but which seemed ultimately the cause of the design's fail-
ure. 
The •one Pact•: The Reason for Charles Bon'a Repudiation 
As the reader works towards the scene in which the 
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reason for Charles Bon's repudiation is presented it seems 
crucially important that he pay attention to the authori-
tative perspective from which the scene is presented. The 
scene itself takes place between Henry and his father in 
the tent of the commanding officer of Henry's regiment, 
during the closing stages of the Civil War. While General 
Compson knew of this meeting between father and son, he 
apparently never discovered the precise nature of their 
conversation: "He just learned one morning that Sutpen 
had ridden up to Grandfather's old regiment's headquarters 
and asked and received permission to speak to Henry and 
did speak to him and then rode away again before midnight" 
(AA p. 276). It must therefore be accepted that the scene 
described is not founded on inherited information. More-
over the changes in discursive style which it manifests 
suggest that it is not simply to be accepted as part of 
Quentin and Shreve' s discourse. For where the latter 
is characterized by overt signs of conjecture, by the tag-
ging of dialogue, by interjections from the listener and 
by the use of the epic preterite to indicate the status 
of the discourse as narrated and interpreted information, 
the characteristics of the discourse presenting Henry's 
meeting with his father are markedly different. For example, 
the use of italic print foregrounds the temporal location 
of the scene as a "flashback"; the epic present tense 
replaces the epic preterite; the absence of quotation 
marks suggests the erasure of spatio-temporal distance 
between the articulation of the dialogue and the report 
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of its articulation. Most significantly, Quentin and Shreve 
themselves are described by an overt narrative voice as 
having become •transmogrified into the spirits' travail 
of the two young men during that time fifty years ago" 
(AA p. 345). In this identification of both narrative 
participants with the protagonists of the text, the distinc-
tion not only between narrator and narratee, but between 
events and their interpretation becomes lost in the colla-
borative production of meaning. This strategy seems to 
illustrate precisely the activity of reading described 
by Felman when she argues that each narrator must first 
be a reader who interprets the story, "undergoing it, as 
a lived experience, an 'impression,' a reading effect. • 29 
Not only do Quentin and Shreve •undergo• or re-enact the 
Sutpen conflict, but the reader too, is by implication 
assimilated into this re-enactment. If the reader is to 
make sense of the Sutpen story, he too is to find himself 
participating in the "clash of meanings,• the ambiguity 
which has generated the conflict of interpretations sur-
rounding the Sutpen story. 
Because the "revelation• scene is both lengthy and 
raises numerous significant issues, I have selected three 
passages for close attention. The first of these describes 
the reunion between the father, Thomas Sutpen, and his 
alienated son Henry. The second passage covers the re-
iteration of Charles Bon's claim to paternal recognition~ 
29 Felman, •Turning the Screw of Interpretation,• p. 124. 
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the revelation of the "one fact" which causes Thomas Sutpen 
to deny that recognition. The third passage describes 
the reaction of the two sons, Charles Bon and Henry Sutpen, 
to their father's authoritative standpoint. 
The first passage is as follows: 
The sentry gestures him [Henry] into the tent. He stoops 
through the ent!'CZnce, the canvas fatis behind him as some-
one, the onty occupant of the tent, Pises from a camp chair 
behind the tabte on which the candie sits, his shadow swoop-
ing high and huge up the canvas waU. He (Henry) comes 
to saiute facing a groy steeve with coionei 's bro.id on 
it, one bearded cheek, a jutting nose, a shaggy droop of 
iron-Piddte hail' - a face which Henry does not recognise, 
not because he has not seen it in four years and does not 
expect to see it hel'e and now, but rather because he is 
not Looking at it. He just saiutes the bru.ided cuff and 
stands so untii the other says, 
-Henry. 
Even now Henry does not start. He just stands so, the 
two of them stand so, Looking at one another. It is the 
otder nr:zn who moves first, though they meet in the center 
of the tent, whe:re they embrace and kiss befor>e Henry is 
aware that he has moved, was going to move, moved by what 
of cioae btood l.t)hich in the refiex instant abrogates and 
reconciles even though it does not yet (pe:rhaps never witt) 
forgive, who stands now "'hite his father houis his face 
between both hands, Looking at it (AA~- 352-353). 
This confrontation between father and son opens on a juxta-
position of the roles of paternity and filiality in the 
patriarchal Symbolic Order. The authority of the father 
is foregrounded by his position as occupant of the tent 
which, being the tent of the commanding officer Colonel 
Willow, is defined as the locus of authority. The shadow 
of the father "swooping high and huge up the canvas wall," 
the colonel's braid on the sleeve, the ageing gray of the 
•iron-riddle" hair, could all be read as signs signifying 
the patriarchal eminence and power. The son on the other 
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hand is he who is summoned, who must stoop to approach 
the locus of authority, and must salute that authority 
before him. Since he may not meet the eye of his superior, 
he is not in a position to recognize the father until he 
himself has been recognized. 
The father, calling the son by name, "Henry", expres-
ses recognition of the son's right to respond and the lat-
ter's movement and participation in the mutual embrace 
earns him paternal recognition and forgiveness for his 
earlier defection in the words " Henry My son." 
This scene evokes the biblical scenes in which David as 
King of the Jews and founder of the dynastic House of David, 
recognizes and forgives his recalcitrant son 30 Absalom. 
The title of the text Absalom, Absalom! evoking directly 
the story of David and Absalom, seems implicitly to acknow-
ledge that Quentin and Shreve's interpretation of the Sut-
pen story as a quest after paternal recognition is the 
interpretation with the most narrative force. 
Sutpen's recognition of Henry as his son, and by impli-
cation, his legitimate heir, is the preface to their debate 
of Ben's claim to paternal recognition. 
place as follows: 
This debate takes 
n - You are going to 'let him rrt:ZP'l"'!f Judith, Henry. 
Stitt Henry does not answer. It has aU been said before, 
and now he haa had four years of bitter struggle fotlOl.u'ing 
which, whether it be victory or defeat which he has gained, 
at Least he has gained it and has peace now, even if the 
30 The Holy Bible 
King James Version) see 
xxxiii. 
(London: Cambridge 
2 Samuel 14, xxxili 
University Press, 
and 2 Samuel 18, 
peace be mostly despair. 
- He oonnot mrry her>, Henrry. 
Nau Henry speaks. 
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- You said that beforae. I told you then. And nOl.cJ, and 
now it wont be muc,h Longer now and then we wont have any-
thing left: honor nor pride nor God sinc,e God quit us 
four years ago only He never thought it necessary to teH 
us; no shoes nor clothes and no need fora them; not only 
no Land to mke food out of but no need for the food and 
when you dont have God and honor> and pride, nothing nritters 
except that there is the o1,d mindless meat that dont even 
oor>e if it was defeat or> victory, that wont even die, that 
un.U be out in the woods and fields, grubbing up roots 
and weeds. - Yes. I have decided, Brother> or not, I have 
decided. I wi7,7, I un.7,7,. 
- He must not m:irry her, Henry. 
- Yes. I said Yes at first, but I was not decided then. 
I didn't 7,et him. But now I have had four years to dec,ide 
in. I z,n.7,L. I am going to. 
- He must not rrt:J.r>ry her,, Henry. His mother's fat her 
told me that her mother had been a Spanish wom::zn. I be-
lieved him; it was not until after he was born that I 
found out that his mother was part negron (AA pp. 354-355). 
This dialogue is introduced by the reiteration of the pater-
nal challenge of four years earlier: Sutpen enjoins Henry 
as his emissary to protect his sister Judith from an unlaw-
ful suitor, her half-brother. Henry's response challenges 
his father to recognize that the Symbolic Order of the 
ante-bellum South which might have been threatened by the 
incest implied in Bon and Judith's marriage, no longer 
exists to be defended. Concepts such as the patriarchal 
deity, the familial dynasty with the white land-owning 
patriarch at its head, the laws of succession, concepts 
on which the Symbolic Order of the South had been founded, 
have been discredited by the Civil War and its major achieve-
ment, the emancipation of the slaves on which the cotton 
dynasties had depended. 31 As Henry implies, incest, which 
31 The effects of the Civil War on the Southern economy 
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could be said to threaten the Symbolic Order with an excess 
of "sameness", can surely be overlooked when neither the 
Symbolic Order nor the genealogical line, nor the authority 
of the patriarch which it supposedly threatens retain any 
value. 
However, when Sutpen reveals to Henry that Bon, by 
virtue of his negro blood represents an element of that 
very Otherness which subverted the Symbolic Order, he effec-
tively forces onto him a choice between the old and the 
new dispensation. Is Henry to support the view of authority 
which his father embodies - the ideal of the Southern pat-
riarch who has the autonomous authority to oppress his 
other - or is he to deny the authority of the patriarch 
and support instead the concept of authority as democratic 
by acknowledging the Other as the source of difference 
whereby authority is defined? 
The third passage presents the response of the two 
sons to the paternal revelation and decree: 
presented in Faulkner's mythical reconstructions are not necessarily 
supportable by accounts of real events. It has for example, been 
argued by social historians and economists that slave-labour was 
an economic failure. George P. Rawick argues: 
"Slavery was maintained in the South even though in the 
long run it was not the most economically profitable method of 
utilizing Southern resources. There is no doubt, after the work 
of. Eugene Genovese and others, that while individual planters 
certainly did make profits from slavery, American slavery was 
ultimately very inefficient and Southern planters were constantly 
in debt to Yankees and English merchants. 25• - George P. Rawick, 
The American Slave: a Composite AutobiograJ;>hY (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Publishing Co, 1972) p. 137. Raw1ck 's footnote 25 refers 
to Eugene Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies 
in the Economy and SOciety of the Slave South (New York: Pantheon, 
1966) pp. 275-287. 
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There witi be a tittle time yet for them to sit side by 
side upon the Log in the mking Light of daivn, the one 
in the cloak, the other in the b1,anket; their voices are 
not 111Uch Louder than the silent daivn itself: 
- So it 's the miscegenation, not the incest, which you 
oont bear>. 
Henry doesn't answer. 
- And he sent me no word? He did not ask you to send 
me to him? No word to me, no word at a1,1,? That i.>as all 
he had to do, now, today; four years ago or at any time 
duPing the four year>s. That i.>as aii. He would not have 
needed to ask it, require it, of me. I wouui have offered 
it. I would have said, I wilt never see her again before 
he aou1,d have asked it of me. He did not have to do this, 
Henr>y. He didn't need to te7,1, you I am a nigger to stop 
me. He aou1,d have stopped me without that, Henry. 
- No! Henry cries. - No! No! I wiU - I'U -
••• Now it is Bon who i.>atahes Henr>y; he aan see the 
whites of Henry's eyes again as he sits Looking at Henr>y 
with that expression whiah might be ooUed smiting. His 
hand vanishes beneath the blanket and reappears, ho1,ding 
his pistol by the barrel, the butt extended toward Henry. 
- Then do it now, he says. 
Henry Looks at the pistol; now he is not on7,y -panting, 
he is trembling; when he speaks now his voiae is not even 
the exhalation, it is the suffused and suffoooting inbreath 
itself: 
- You are my brother. 
- No I'm not. I'm the nigger that's going to sleep with 
your sister. Unless you stop me, Henr>y (AA pp. 357-358). 
Sutpen has not only ref used to recognize Bon as his son, 
but in refusing to address Bon directly, he denies him 
any right to a place or identity as a signifying subject 
in the Symbolic Order. As commented earlier, this refusal 
replicates the very rebuff which Sutpen himself had experi-
enced as a boy at the Pettibone mansion. When Bon offers 
Henry the pistol, he effectively invites the latter to 
exercise the signifying power which has been recognized 
as his and thereby reinforce his father's act of conscious 
repression. However, while Henry is prepared to recognize 
Bon as his brother, he cannot accept that his brother is 
part-negro. Ironically, while he can reconcile himself 
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to the prospect of incest between his half brother and 
his sister, al though this taboo is supported by natural 
law, he cannot reconcile himself to the prospect of misce-
geny even though the latter is a taboo determined only 
by Symbolic Law. The irony of his choice is foregrounded 
by the statement and rejoinder with which the passage se-
lected concludes: 
- You are 111!f brother. 
- No I'm not. I'm the nigger that's going to steep with 
your sister. Vntess you stop me, Henry. 
As these lines suggest, Charles Bon is an embodiment of 
the recurrent •undecidability• - the contradiction "brother/ 
nigger" - the unpredictable excess of meaning which threat-
ens to contradict the cohesion of Sutpen's design or "text" 
by manifesting itself as an alternative meaning or plural-
ity which Sutpen as the supposedly autonomous author of 
the design believed he could repress. Al though on his 
first confrontation with this undecidability in Haiti, 
Sutpen believed he could consciously repress such subversive 
difference and begin his design anew thereby achieving 
eventually a perfect coincidence between his intention 
and his product, he discovers that this difference once 
again manifests itself, threatening to seduce the progeny 
or meaning which he has produced. He therefore enjoins 
that progeny or meaning which he recognizes as legitimate -
his son Henry - to contradict or suppress the meaning which 
he regards as illegitimate - the person of Charles Bon -
thereby preserving the cohesion of his text. However this 
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activity which constitutes the eradication of difference 
must destroy meaning per se in Sutpen's design for without 
the notion of the "illegitimate" Other, the "legitimate" 
self cannot be defined. With the murder of Bon, the Sutpen 
dynasty is destroyed, for Henry, the legitimate heir, by 
at tempting to eradicate the Other thereby places himself 
outside the Symbolic Order as an Outlaw. The problem of 
the "undecidable" is meanwhile perpetuated in the over-
determined signifieds which the social misfits and outcasts 
such as Charles Etienne Bon and Miss Rosa Coldfield typify. 
Miscegeny as •Fact• or Conjecture: Clytie as Textual Sign 
Many critics accept without question firstly, that 
the revelation of Charles Bon's identity as "Sutpen/negro" 
is the "final truth" produced by Quentin and Shreve's nar-
rative interpretation, and secondly, that this interpreta-
tion is founded on the knowledge which Quentin acquires 
on his journey to Sutpen's Hundred with Miss Rosa. Since 
other critics are at pains to demonstrate that there is 
no evidence in the text to justify this acceptance, it 
is worth giving close consideration to the authority on 
which this "truth" is based. 32 
32 Examples of critics who accept Quentin and Shreve' s ver-
sion as narrative truth can be listed as follows: Irwin, p. 93ff; 
Levins, p. 44; Ilse Dusoir Lind, "The Design and Meaning of 
Absalom, Absaloml" PMLA, (December 1955), pp. 887-912, rpt. William 
Faulkner: Three Deca~ of Criticism, ed. F. J. Hoffman and Olga 
Vickery {East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1960), 
pp. 278-304, in particular p. 296. Cleanth Brooks in his William 
Faulkner: The Yoknapatawpha Country does question the authority 
of Quentin and Shreve's narrative, but eventually resorts to the 
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If the "knowledge" which enables Quentin to assume 
narrative authority over his father is acquired at Sutpen's 
Hundred the night of his excursion there with Miss Rosa, 
the reader is forced to wait to the closing pages of the 
text before he is presented with the following account 
of Quentin's experience: 
• • • waking or sleeping he walked down that upper hall 
between the scaling walls and beneath the cracked ceiling, 
toward the faint light which fell outward from the 
last door and paused there, saying 'No. No' and then 
'Only I must. I have to' and went in, entered the 
bare, stale room whose shutters were closed too, where 
a second lamp burned dimly on a crude table; waking 
or sleeping it was the same: the bed, the yellow sheets 
and pillow, the wasted yellow face with closed, almost 
transparent eyelids on the pillow, the wasted hands 
crossed on the breast as if he were already a corpse; 
waking or sleeping it was the same and would be the 
same forever as long as he lived : 
And you a1'e -? 
Henry Sutpen. 
And you have been he1'e -? 
Fou1' years. 
And you oo.me home -? 
To die. Yes. 
To die? 
Yes. To die. 
And you have been he1'e -? 
Fou1' years. 
And you a:re -? 
Henry Sutpen. (AA pp. 372-373). 
suggestion that this authority depends on the assumption that not 
all the material of the conversation between Henry and Quentin 
need have been included in the text before the reader. Peter 
Brooks seems justified in judging this the work of "an active inter-
preter overanxious to fill the gaps and arrest the indeterminacies 
of the text - to the point of rewriting it" - P. Brooks, p. 259. 
Examples of critics who emphasize the conjectural nature of Quentin 
and Shreve's interpretation are: P. Brooks, pp. 262-268; S. 
Resneck Parr, pp. 154-164. 
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This meeting between Quentin and Henry which might seem 
to promise a return to origins - a direct revelation of 
•truth" from one of the surviving protagonists of the Sut-
pen history - instead meets any expectations of a revela-
tion with a textual vacuum. As Peter Brooks observes, 
the circular palindromic pattern of the dialogue in this 
passage constitutes "a kind of hollow structure, concave 
mirror or black hole at the center of the narrative," 33 
or to echo once again Geoffrey Hartman's joke, •a whodonut, 
a story with a hole in it." Faced with this "hole", the 
reader is left to search the text for the clue which sug-
gested to Quentin the issue of miscegeny as the determining 
factor behind the collapse of the Sutpen dynasty. 
From Shreve's interjections comes the suggestion that 
Clytie is the source of Quentin's knowledge: 
•your old man,• Shreve said. "When your grandfather 
was telling this to him, he didn't know any more what 
your grandfather was talking about than your grandfather 
knew what the demon was talking about when the demon 
told it to him, did he? And when your old man told 
it to you, you wouldn't have known what anybody was 
talking about if you hadn't been out there and seen 
Clytie. Is that right?" (AA p. 274). 
The crucial point in this argument is that Quentin has 
"been out there and seen Clytie.• 34 The verb •seen" sug-
gests ambiguously either that Quentin had had a conversation 
with Clytie which revealed his privileged information, 
33 P. Brooks, p. 264. 
34 The argument which follows is a development of Peter 
Brooks's idea that •c1yti.e is used, as hermeneutic clue, throughout 
the novel.• See Brooks, pp. 258-259. 
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or that his visual perception of Clytie constituted a reve-
lation. When Shreve subsequently summarizes Quentin's 
experience, he confirms that Quentin's knowledge was based 
on observation and intuition rather than on any verbal 
communication: 
• ••• you saw that Clytie's trouble wasn't anger nor 
even distrust; it was terror, fear. And she didn't 
tell you in so many words because she was still keeping 
that secret for the sake of the man who had been her 
father too as well as for the sake of the family which 
no longer existed, whose here-ti:rfore inviolate and 
rotten mausoleum she still guarded - didn't tell you 
in so many words anymore than she told you in so 
many words how she had been in the room that day 
when they brought Bon 's body in and Judith took from 
his pocket the metal case she had given him with her 
picture in it; she didn't tell you, it just came out 
of the terror and the fear • • • not nigger terror because 
it was not about herself but was about whatever it 
was that was upstairs, that she had kept hidden up 
there for almost four years; and she didn't tell you 
in the actual words because even in the terror she 
kept the secret; nevertheless she told you, or at least 
all of a sudden you knew -" 
(AA pp. 350-351, my emphasis). 
Shreve' s fourfold repetition of the statement "she didn't 
tell you• foregrounds the inaccuracy and immediate correc-
tion in the last 1 ine: Clytie did not tell Quentin anything. 
As " ••• the worn coffee-colored face staring at him, the 
match held in one coffee-colored and doll-like hand above 
her head" (AA p. 368) she seems instead to stand as a sign 
which stimulates in Quentin a process of recognition. 
The repetition of the word "coffee-colored" seems to fore-
ground her signifying value as the excess of meaning which 
Quentin interprets as the source of frustration to the 
Sutpen design. 
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In retrospect it is possible for the reader to trace 
the "coffee-colored face" of Clytie as a sign of the repeated 
irruption of "Otherness" into the Sutpen design. The first 
manifestation of this sign can be identified in the con-
cluding point of Chapter One narrated by Miss Rosa. Sut-
pen' s ritual affirmation of his right of authority over 
his negro slaves in the stable fight closes on the image 
of "the two Sutpen faces": 
But I was not there. I was not there to see the two 
Sutpen faces this time - once on Judith and once on 
the negro girl beside her - looking down through ti.'1.e 
square entrance to the loft ( AA p. 30}. 
The suggestion here is that Judith as white Sutpen girl 
is accompanied by her dark Sutpen double, a configuration 
implying the possibility of an equivalent dark counterpart 
to Henry as white Sutpen boy. While the two girls watch 
their father's struggle for ascendency over his dark counter-
part with equanimity, the same struggle dis tresses their 
white brother to the point of making him vomit. This could 
be interpreted as a prognostication of the conflict which 
Henry will have to face as the inheritor of a patriarchal 
role that refuses to recognize the status of the dark Other 
as anything more than the "opposite," the other. 
Clytie 's face as a sign can be identified again in 
two passages from the second segment of Miss Rosa's nar-
rative. On the occasion of Charles Bon's death, Miss Rosa, 
having been summoned and driven to Sutpen 's Hundred by 
Wash Jones, enters the mansion half expecting to meet Henry, 
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returned from the War. However, 
" it was not Heney' s face. It was Sutpen face enough, 
but not his; Sutpen coffee-colol'ed face enough thel'e in 
the dim Ught, 'barring the stail's: and I running out of 
the bright afternoon, into the silence of that bl'ooding 
house whel'e I cou1,d see nothing at fil'st: then groduaUy 
the face, the Sutpen face not appl'oaching, not 81..i)imming 
up out of the g'loom, but a1,ready thel'e, rock'like and fil'm 
and antedating time and house and doom and ai 1,, waiting 
there ( oh yes, he chose we 1, i; he bettered choosing, who 
cl'eated in his own im::zge the o1,d Cerberus of his private 
heU) - the face without sex Ol' age because it had nevel' 
possessed either: the same sphinx face which she had been 
born with, which had Looked down fl'om the Loft that night 
beside Judith's and which she stilt, weal's now at seventy-
four, looking at me with no change, no aUerotion in it 
at aU, as though it had known to the second when I was 
to entel' ••• " (AA p. 136). 
As an undecidable element in Sutpen' s text that is both 
the product of his authorship yet not acknowledged as a 
significant meaning, a Sutpen yet a slave, Clytie also 
stands as the play of difference that cannot be excluded 
from any discourse, and that ultimately denies the possi-
bil i ty of a fully cohesive text. While she is a vital 
element in an interpretation which recognizes the play 
of difference such as the reading of Quentin and Shreve, 
she may also be the obstacle preventing the final closure 
of interpretation on "full truth". This obstructive effect 
of Clytie as textual "undecidable" is drama ti zed at the 
level of the story by her action of preventing Miss Rosa 
access to the "truth" behind the closed door of the bedroom 
that contains Judi th and the body of Charles Bon. It is 
evident again in her protection of Charles Etienne Bon 
and Jim Bond from the interrogation of intruders (for exam-
ple, AA pp. 200-201; 214-216), and Henry, returned from 
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exile, from exposure to the judgement of the law. 
In the following passage, Miss Rosa expands on her 
description of Clytie: 
"Clytie, not inept, anything but inept: perverse inscru-
tab7,e and fX11'<1.dox: fraee, yet inca[Xlble of freedom who 
had never once ooUed herself a slave, hot.ding fidelity 
to none like the indolent and soUtary wolf or bear ••• -
Clytie who in the very pigmentation of her f1,esh repraesen-
ted that debacle which had brought Judi th and me to what 
we were and which had made of her (C7,ytie) that which she 
declined to be just as she had declined to be that from 
which its purpose had been to emancipate her, as though 
presiding aloof upon the new, she deliberately renv.ined 
to represent to us the threatful portent of the o'ld" 
(AA pp. 156-157). 
Once again allusions to Clytie's paradoxical undecidability 
are apparent. Even more significant however, is Miss Rosa's 
identification of Clytie's negroid blood as the sign of 
the social debacle of the Civil War, an identification 
which suggests unwittingly the connection between the col-
lapse of the plantation society which, in this mythical 
account, is represented as dependent on slavery, and the 
collapse of Sutpen's patriarchal authority which had depen-
ded on the oppression of the slave as other. As a product 
of a waiving of boundaries between black and white, Clytie 
does indeed seem to anticipate or "preside aloof upon" 
the new Symbolic Order's recognition of Otherness, while 
simultaneously representing the excess of meaning produced 
by the inflexibility of the old Order's refusal to recognize 
the marriage or equal value of black and white. 
The final description of Clytie occurs in Quentin's 
visualisation of the inferno at the Sutpen mansion: 
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He, Quentin, could see it, could see the deputy holding 
her [Miss Rosa] while the driver backed the ambulance 
to safety and returned, the three faces all a little 
wild now since they must have believed her - the three 
of them staring, glaring at the doomed house: and 
then for a moment maybe Clytie appeared in that window 
from which she must have been watching the gates cons-
tantly day and night for three months - the tragic 
gnome's face beneath the clean head rag, against a red 
background of fire, seen for a moment between two 
swirls of smoke, looking down at them, perhaps not 
even now with triumph and no more of despair than 
it had ever worn, possibly even serene above the melt-
ing clapboards before the smoke swirled across it again 
- and he, Jim Bond , the scion, the last of his race, 
seeing it too now and howling with human reason now 
since now even he could have known what he was howling 
about (AA pp. 375-376). 
Presented through the mediation of an overt narrative voice, 
the status of this description as conjecture is indicated 
by modifiers such as "maybe,• "perhaps," and "possibly," 
and the modal auxiliaries in the verbs "must have been 
watching" and "could have known.u Thus even in this final 
interpretation, Clytie's face as a sign is given no final, 
closed interpretation. It is interpreted as signifying 
neither triumph nor despair, but "possibly" serenity. 
There is no suggestion that Clytie regards herself as either 
the victim of, nor the plaintiff against, the "injustices" 
of the antebellum South. Like Charles Etienne Bon she 
seems to stand simply as the stoical scapegoat who bears 
the failures of the Symbolic Order within which she is 
a misfit. 
In terms of Miss Rosa's mythical interpretation of the 
Sutpen story, the image of the inferno which consumes the 
last of the devil's progeny and the remnants of his handi-
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work while the "old Cerberus" remains on guard at the window 
or "gate" of this hell, seems to provide the final closure 
of narrative meaning. This closure of the text which had 
defined Miss Rosa as a signifying subject, and the elimina-
tion of the Otherness which had defined her as its victim, 
are accompanied 
eventual death. 
by Miss Rosa's loss of consciousness and 
One undecidable for which her demon-myth 
does not account, and which survives to subvert the closure 
of her text is the figure of Jim Bond - the "One nigger 
Sutpen left" (AA p. 378). 
From the reader's perspective, what is particularly 
interesting about Clytie as "hermeneutic clue" is that 
it is only possible to identify her "coffee-colored face" 
as a sign of the repeated irruption of Otherness into the 
Sutpen "text" in retrospect. It is only once a "primal 
scene" has been posited - Sutpen' s refusal to accept Bon 
as "Sutpen" on the grounds of his identity as "part-negro" 
- that meaning can be attributed to Otherness - the Sutpen-
negro-female - as that which has been repressed. If the 
tragedy of Thomas Sutpen lies in his failure to recognize 
the role of the Other as that without which his authority 
can have no definition, the reader, looking back along 
the path of his quest for "the truth", is liable to find 
that he too has failed to recognize the power of the Other 
as the locus of the mystery, because of its apparent mar-
ginality or insignificance. In other words, the reader, 
like Miss Rosa Coldfield and Mr Compson, has been as much 
a dupe of the unrecognized Other as Thomas Sutpen was. 
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Furthermore, even if at the conclusion of the story the 
reader accepts Quentin and Shreve' s reconstruction of the 
•primal scene" in the Confederate Army tent, no privileged 
narrative perspective exists to authorize this scene as 
•real". Instead, any hope of verifying this "return to 
origins" is consumed in the flames of the final inferno 
at Sutpen's Hundred. 
IN CONCLUSION 
In the introduction to this chapter, I proposed to 
focus on the nature and access ibi 1 i ty of textual "truth"; 
the supplementarity of the narrative and interpretive act-
ivities, and the problems arising from the ordering of 
difference according to a system of hierarchical, binary 
oppositions. What conclusions can now be drawn about these 
issues? 
If the opinion is sustained that the narrative of 
Quentin and Shreve is as much based on conjecture as the 
other versions of the Sutpen tragedy, it nevertheless seems 
admissible that this particular version of the story is 
- in the words of the overt narrator - •probably true enough" 
(AA p. 335). In this phrase there seems a twofold implica-
tion: firstly, that it is possible in narrative to arrive 
at some kind of •truth", but secondly that the status of 
that truth retains an element of undecidability which ren-
ders it irreducibly open to rev is ion. In other words, 
if the Other as the unknowable remains irreducibly beyond 
225 
the reach of conscious knowledge, "the truth" must be de-
fined as that solution which by consensus is seen to account 
for the most aspects of a particular mystery. What then, 
does this perspective on "truth" imply about the narrative 
and interpretive activities which produce it? 
Firstly, it is clear that if "truth" calls for "con-
sensus" then the notion of "autonomous authority" as a 
source of truth is challenged. As I hope the preceding 
discuss ion has shown, "authority" is an issue with which 
Absalom, Absalom! is concerned at the level of both the 
story and of its narration. Let us consider then the con-
clusions that can be drawn at the level of narration: the 
discourse of Absalom, Absalom! can be said to map a develop-
ing perspective of interpretive narrative activity, begin-
ning with the concept of an "autonomous" authoritative 
narrating figure - Miss Rosa Coldfield who attempts to 
produce an irrefutable interpretation of events through 
a "closed" discourse of which "myth" is the textual product. 
The very closure which such a discourse attempts to secure 
renders it particularly vulnerable to subversion by the 
Other, for the range of ambiguity or Otherness which it 
attempts to exclude, being correspondingly wide, is all 
the more difficult to control. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that even the most fundamental claims of such a nar-
rative (for example, the claim that Sutpen is a demon) 
are subverted by alternative accounts the description, 
for example, of the rebuffed "white trash" boy at the Petti-
bone mansion. 
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The second pattern of narrative interpretation presen-
ted is that of the logical rationalist who establishes 
•the truth" - or ironically, sometimes fails to establish 
it - by careful investigation of all available evidence 
and thereafter the deduction of a conclusion. This method 
is recognizable as that adopted by the figure of the detec-
tive investigator already discussed in Chapter One. If 
in conventional detective fiction the position adopted 
. th "th . nl . . "3 5 is at ere are no mysteries, o y incorrect reasoning, 
Absalom, Absalom! challenges this view, presenting Mr Comp-
son, a legal man, confounded by the failure of the rational. 
The third perspective of narrative interpretation 
presented by the text is one in which the positions of 
narrator and narratee, or writer and reader, although dis-
tinguishable as different, are inseparable, interacting 
with and informing each other while differing from or pul-
ling against each other. This model of narrative inter-
pretation evokes the model of subjectivity postulated by 
Lacan in which the subject of the signifier or utterance 
and the subject of the signified or statement are described 
not as two distinct "gravitational centres" but as two 
"gravitational counter-forces" ( see my Introduction, p. 27). 
It would seem that, where Freudian psychoanalytic theory 
as interpreted by Lacan replaces the concept of the auto-
nomous Cartesian cogito who has the potential to produce 
•truth-fu11• discourse with the split-subject and the split 
35 Holquist, •whodunit and Other Questions,• p. 141. 
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discourse, literature, as embodied in Absalom, Absalom!, 
relinquishes the concepts of the autonomous narrator and 
the "true" story and explores the possibility of narrative 
interpretation as dialectical interaction, producing "truth" 
as that which is "most probable." 
Just as the shortcomings of "autonomous", "indepen-
dent" authority are exposed at the level of the discourse, 
so at the level of the story, the tragedy of Thomas Sutpen 
can be read as the failure of an individual and a Symbolic 
system to recognize or accommodate the possibility of that 
which is unnameable in the terms of that system. The par-
ticular subtlety of Absalom, Absalom! lies in its implicit 
inclusion of the reader within its narrative framework 
so that he, like the other narrative interpreters of the 
Sutpen story, finds himself caught by the very "blind-
spot" of the unrecognized Other which caused the failure 
of Thomas Sutpen's design. And even if the reader, at 
the close of the tale believes that eventually, he has 
recognized the Other and therefore "knows the truth", he 
is reminded of the excess signification which lurks beyond 
his interpretive consciousness: 
•you've got one nigger left. One nigger Sutpen left. 
Of course you can't catch him and you don't even always 
see him and you never will be able to use him. But 
you've got him there still. You still hear him at night 
sometimes. Don't you?" (AA p. 378). 
**** **** 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE NYMPHET AS THE FORBIDDEN OTHER: 
QUESTING AFTER THE SATISFACTION OF DESIRE 
IN NABOKOV'S LOLITA 
Desire is that which is manifested in the interval 
that demand hollows within itself, in as much as the 
subject, in articulating the signifying chain, brings 
to light the want-to-be, together with the appeal to 
receive the complement from the Other, if the Other, 
the locus of speech, is also the locus of this want, 
or lack. 
- Jacques Lacan 
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In the Introduction to this thesis, I pointed out 
that one of Lacan' s undertakings in his "return to Freud" 
was to translate Freudian sexual mythology into linguistic 
terms. One implication which this translation brings to 
light is the relationship between linguistic law and social 
law, of which morality, or the codes governing sexual be-
haviour, is one aspect. To recapitulate briefly, in Lacan's 
terms, language is a principal part of the Symbolic Order 
of exchange which holds society together by allocating 
roles to individuals within the system. In other words, 
because linguistic nomination determines the place, and 
therefore, the exchange value of the individual, because 
linguistic order determines social order, a threat to the 
former must also constitute a threat to the latter. In 
Julia Kri steva 's words, "There is oo equivalence, but rather, 
identity between challenging official linguistic codes 
and challenging official laws. 111 
Now, one of the ways in which the order of the linguis-
tic system can be subverted is by the kind of verbal play 
that is identifiable as the joke, the pun, the witty retort 
and so on. Lacan argues that in Freud's work Jokes and 
Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
• • • the effect of the unoonscious is demonstrated to 
us in its most subtle confines. And the face which 
it reveals to us is that of the spirit in the ambiguity 
oonferred on it by Language, where the other side of 
its regalian power is the "pointe" [Footnote: "Witty 
phrase• or "conceit"] by which the whole of its order 
is annihilated in an instant - the pointe, in fact, where 
1 Julia Kristeva, "Word, Dialogue, and Novel," in Desire 
in Language (Oxford: Basil Black well, 1980) p. 65. 
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its creative activity unveils its absolute gratuitousness, 
where its domination over the Real is expressed in 
the challenge of non-sense, where humour, in the mali-
cious grace of the esprit libre, symbolizes a Truth 
that has not said its last word. 2 
In other words, the joke can be seen as an irruption of 
Otherness or "non-sense" into the order and sense of con-
scious discourse - an irruption which threatens to subvert 
the Symbolic Order which can only be sustained by the re-
pression of such Otherness. Just as the preservation of 
linguistic meaning depends on prohibitions which outlaw 
the disruptive "play" of the Other in discourse, so the 
preservation of social harmony depends on prohibitions 
which 
• • • maintain a sort of sanctuary at the heart of the 
community, an area where that minimum of nonviolence 
essential to the survival of the children and the com-
munity's cultural heritage essential, in short, to 
everything that sustains man's humanity - is jealously 
preserved.3 
Now, in this chapter, I wish to argue that it is pre-
cisely this identity between linguistic transgression and 
social, or more specifically, sexual transgression, which 
Vladimir Nabokov challenges his reader to recognize in 
his novel Lolita. This novel confronts its reader with 
a paradox arising from the apparent disparity between the 
playfulness or artifice of its discourse, an:3 the undeniable 
2 Jacques Lacan, Speech and Language, p. 33. 
3 Ren~ Girard, Violence an:3 the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1977) p. 221. 
seriousness of the moral issues it raises. 
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As the confes-
sion of a forty-two year old sexual pervert who is to be 
tried for the crimes of child-seduction and murder, Lolita 
is a shocking novel. Yet as the "masterpiece" of an articu-
late, well-read and witty 1 i terary scholar who not only 
is aware of the representational nature of language, but 
delights in linguistic games, it is also a fascinating 
network of parody, literary allusion and word-play. With-
out on the one hand diminishing the novel's shocking impact, 
or on the other hand condemning the subtlety of its lingu-
istic play, I shall try, then, in this chapter to investigate 
the implications of Lolita as a quest to attain the for-
bidden perfection, to raise the veil from the sacred mystery, 
to satisfy Desire. 
The Foreword 
Let me begin by commenting briefly on the Foreword 
to Lolita since this is one of the first "jokes" which 
the reader is likely to encounter in his reading of the 
novel. I refer to it as a "joke" because John Ray Jnr 
PhD who writes it is no "real" editor, but is as much a 
fictional creation as Humbert Humbert the "confessant" 
who writes the main text of Lolita. This is indicated 
by John Ray's claim that he is a "good friend and relation" 
of Clarence Choate Clark who is named both in the Foreword 
and in the main text as Humbert Humbert's lawyer. In other 
words, John Ray, Clarence Clark and Humbert Humbert are 
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of the same fictional status, and the Foreword is an exten-
sion of the main fictional text. Implicit in this "trick" 
is the ironic possibility that any Foreword to a narrative 
text must be a part of, a participation in, the narrative 
conflict it seeks to comment on, for - as I hope was illus-
trated in Chapter Two - any interpretation of a narrative 
constitutes a "return" to the conflict which the narrative 
itself articulates, and therefore a continuation of the 
effect of that conflict. 
Now, one might argue that the point of a Foreword 
is to provoke the reader's interest, and to offer him some 
guidelines for the reading he is about to undertake, from 
the perspective of one who already has a knowledge of the 
text's contents. Ambiguously, it precedes the text, but 
its commentary is retrospective. An effective Foreword 
must then, stimulate and inform its reader without reveal-
ing the "truth" of the text prematurely. According to 
these criteria, John Ray's Foreword is effective, but iron-
ically, this is through no editorial skill of his own. 
Oblivious to the possibility that he may forestall the 
reader's quest, he on the one hand, garrulously divulges 
the conclusions of the novel's plot. To the reader, how-
ever, these premature revelations will have little meaning 
until the novel has been read; thus the •mystery" of the 
novel remains intact. On the other hand, John Ray is too 
prudishly inhibited to do more than allude to •scenes that 
a certain type of mind might call aphrodisiac,• - allusions 
which are guaranteed to provoke the reader's interest and 
spur him on to discover "the truth" of Lolita. 
WHO OR ~HAT IS LOLITA? 
Lolita, light of my life, fire of my loins. 
my soul. 4 
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My sin, 
This opening 1 ine with its carefully matched syntax, its 
poetic use of metaphor, alliteration and assonance, says 
as much about its author, Humbert Humbert, as it does about 
its subject-matter, "Lolita." While the latter is presented 
as a powerful and ambivalent effect upon the author - both 
inspiring and illuminating him as well as causing him to 
be inflamed or consumed with passion - the latter himself 
is revealed as a shrewd and skilful rhetorician. 
The playful exploration of the name "Loli ta" which 
fol lows these opening s ta temen ts suggests that, far from 
being an arbitrary and exchangeable signifier 1 ike "Lo," 
"Lola," "Dolly" or "Dolores," the name "Lolita" is a reposi-
tory of private meanings - meanings which will be revealed 
to the reader as the text unfolds. • Lo 1 i ta " then , w i 11 
stand as the very particular name designated to a child 
by her middle-aged lover, and also as the text which at-
tempts to justify the transgressive Desire which gave rise 
to the name "Lolita." 
After this introductory eulogy, Humbert, as if acknow-
ledging the growing interest of the reader, next poses 
4 Vladimir Nabokov, Lolita (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1980 rpt 1982) p. 5: hereafter cited as "L". I have been unable 
to use Alfred Appel Is excellent annotated version of this text be-
cause of its unavailability. 
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the question, •nid she have a precursor?" This seems to 
anticipate the reader's expectation that the story must 
have an origin, and while the author appears to indulge 
this expectation with the prompt response, •she did, indeed 
she did," he also seems to toy with it in proffering infor-
mation evasively and mysteriously: "In point of fact, 
there might have been no Loli ta at all had I not loved, 
one summer, a certain initial girl-child. In a princedom 
by the sea." If this is the origin of the "truth" which 
Humbert is setting out to confess, it bears an unsettling 
resemblance to the formulaic introduction of the fairy 
tale which, in its evasion of precise chronological setting 
("Once upon a time ••• "), and of precise geographical loca-
tion (• ••• in a far off land ..• "), announces the fictional 
nature of its contents. This may seem to the reader an 
incongruous stylistic mode to adopt for a confession. 
The next rhetorical question and answer may appear 
even more perturbing: "Oh when? About as many years before 
Lolita was born as my age was that summer." While the 
question suggests Humbert's anticipation of the reader's 
growing interest in his tale, the calculated evasion with 
which he meets this interest suggests his consciousness 
of the control he has both over his story and therefore 
over the reader of that story. The comment with which 
this paragraph concludes may reinforce the reader's mis-
givings: •you can always count on a murderer for a fancy 
prose style.• What is startling about this observation, 
is not so much the revelation of the author's status as 
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•murderer• - a revelation for which the reader may have 
been prepared by the editor's reference to Humbert's "trial,• 
"legal captivity," "crime" and so forth - but the suggestion 
that Humbert Humbert, as confessant, is not only a brilliant 
rhetorician, but is aware that language, far from being 
transparent, is a representative medium by which "the truth" 
must always be in some way distorted. 
In the light of this implication, the quest upon which 
Humbert Humbert invites the reader to embark in the con-
eluding paragraph is strangely ambiguous. He addresses 
his readers as jurymen who may regard his confession as 
"exhibit number one." Clearly then the reader is required 
to embark on a "truth-seeking" activity. Furthermore, 
the material he is to examine might be expected to deal 
with experiences blissful and perhaps even divine, since 
they are "what the seraphs, the misinformed, simple, noble-
winged seraphs, envied. 115 On the other hand, "exhibit 
number one" is a "tangle of thorns,• a metaphor suggesting 
a confusion of pain and suffering, in which the expectation 
of finding "the truth" would seem doomed from the outset. 
5 As Carl Proffer has demonstrated in his Keys to Lolita 
(London and Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968) pp. 
34-44, this reference to the seraphs can be traced to the following 
lines of Edgar A. Poe's poem Annabel Lee: 
•sut we loved with a love that was more than love 
I and my Annabel Lee -
With a love that the winged seraphs of heaven 
Coveted her and me. " 
Edgar Allan Poe, •Annabel Lee", The Portable Poe, ed. Philip 
van Doren Stern (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1957 rpt 1977) 
p. 633. 
Further discussion of Humbert Humbert's reference to this poem 
will be offered shortly. 
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Thus the chapter concludes with the ambivalent fusion of 
exhaltation and frustration with which it began in the 
memorable opening line. 
THE CONFESSANT AS SPLIT SUBJECT 
Before the reader, cast overtly in the role of juryman 
by Humbert Humbert, begins his quest for •the truth" in 
Humbert's confession, it seems important for him to give 
some consideration to the notion of "confessant• on which 
this text draws. 
It may on first reflection seem that inherent in the 
notion of the confessant, there lies the presupposition 
of an autonomous confessing consciousness and a full or 
complete truth which, having been wholly or partially con-
cealed is finally to be acknowledged. However, also in-
herent in the notion of a confessant there seems to lie 
the implication of a split or duplication of the subject 
who confesses. In his position as murderer who addresses 
his confession to a jury, Humbert Humbert would seem to 
conform to the description of the retrospective, converted 
narrator offered by William Spengemann in his text The 
Forms of Autobiography. Describing the narrative mode 
of The Confessions of St Augustine (Books I through IX), 
Spengemann comments, 
• • • The mode is grounded ultimately in the conviction 
that the retrospective narrator can see his life from 
a point outside it, that his view is not subject to the 
limiting oonditi.ons of the life he is recounting. While 
the past self, the protagonist, can see each event in 
his life only in its ever-changing relation to a past 
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which is being continually reshaped by the addition 
of new experience in the present, and to future expecta-
tions which experience is continually rev1S1ng, the 
narrator can see each past event in its fixed relation 
to a past which has presumably achieved its final form. 
Because the narrator does not stand within the temporal 
span of the action he is reporting, because he does 
not stand in time at all, his perspective is not altered 
by new experience. He contemplates each past event 
from the same, unmoving point, the point of immutable 
truth. 6 
As will be discussed in greater detail later, this distinc-
tion between the self-deluded protagonist and the self-
aware narrator is terminated by a moment of conversion 
or enlightenment, the moment at which the roles of narrator 
and protagonist fuse. 
Now it would seem that in the text of Lolita, the 
pseudonym "Humbert Humbert" supports the notion of the 
split or doubled subject that the act ion of confess ion 
produces. Humbert as author (whom for convenience I shall 
refer to now and subsequently as HUMBERT) is the enlightened 
subject who is separated from Humbert as protagonist (whom 
I shal 1 refer to as Humbert) by virtue of his capacity 
to understand the events past. In other words it is his 
progress through the events which he will now describe 
in his confession that has brought him to this enlightened 
position. The alienation of confessant from protagonist 
is frequently foregrounded in the text by the abandonment 
of the first person narration in favour of third person 
narration. The reader's quest is to follow HUMBERT's con-
6 William Spengemann, The Forms of Autobiography (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1980) pp. 6-7. 
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fession to the point where he too will reach the state 
of enlightenment which HUMBERT appears to have acquired. 
It seems relevant at this point to consider the role 
attributed to the "real• author Nabokov, in the discussion 
which follows. It seems clear that Nabokov has effectively 
written himself out of his own novel by casting Humbert 
Humbert not merely in the role of narrator, but in the 
role of author - an academic who has followed the education 
and career of a 1 i terary scholar. 







Occasion ally HUM.BERT 
which appear to him to 
yet he finds himself 
agent of such events. 
An example of such a situation can be found in the circum-
stances which lead to Charlotte Haze's death. Under such 
circumstances, HUMBERT ascribes the pattern of meaning 
to an imaginary agent, Aubrey McFate. Now, while it is 
possible for the reader standing outside the text to iden-
tify Aubrey McFate as an alias for Vladimir Nabokov or 
the authorial presence, it would seem that the figure of 
McFate points to a more important textual issue. If HUM.-
BERT as author finds himself confronted with patterns of 
meaning which he did not consciously produce and which 
he must attribute to an agent Other than himself, so too 
Nabokov as author is likely to be confronted with patterns 
of meaning of which he is not the controlling subject. 
To whom is he to attribute these patterns? To his own 
McFate, Chance, Destiny or God? In Lacanian terms he must 
attribute them to the locus of the Other or the compound 
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of alternative subjective positions which by their repression 
give definition to the author's subjectivity and his dis-
course. Thus to be entirely accurate, it must be argued, 
not that McFate is Nabokov, but that Nabokov casts himself 
in the role of the Other which HUMBERT identifies as McFate. 
Nabokov as the authorial presence remains written out of 
his own text. 
NYMPHANCY, THE ORIGINAL NYMPHET AND THE TWOFOLD WORLD 
One of HUMBERT's first tasks at the start of his con-
fession is to identify the origins of the transgressive 
impulses which have been his downfall. He beg ins with 
the description of his childhood in .the paradise of the 
luxurious Hotel Mirana which his father owned on the French 
Riviera, and identifies his "fall from grace" with the 
loss of his childhood sweetheart Annabel Leigh. He declares, 
and, 
I am oonvinced, however, that in a certain magic and 
fateful way Lolita began with Annabel (L p. 14) 
• • • today, in September 1952, after twenty-nine years 
have elapsed, I think I can distinguish in her the 
initial fateful elf in my life { L p. 18). 
HUMBERT's allusion, with the name "Annabel Leigh," to Edgar 
Allan Poe's poem Annabel Lee has already been mentioned. 
The most obvious connection that can be made between Hum-
bert and Poe is that both were in love with girl-children. 7 
7 HUMBERT frequently attempts to justify his taste for nym-
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Poe married the thirteen year old Virginia Clemm and wrote 
the poem Annabel Lee in 1849 after Virginia's death in 
1847. The implication is therefore that Poe's Annabel 
Lee is a fiction which may represent a •real" girl-child, 
but HUMBERT's "Annabel Leigh" is a fiction founded on a 
fiction. That HUMBERT is uncertain of the •origin" of 
his desire for a nymphet is suggested in his description 
of Annabel as magical and fateful. It seems that he uses 
an arbitrary fictional construct in the place of •origin", 
just as later in his confession he is to use a name from 
Lolita's Ramsdale class list, "Aubrey McFate," as the nomi-
nation for the unidentifiable agent of apparently meaning-
ful patterns of events. Just as McFate in Lacanian terms 
could be described as "the Other,• the locus of subjective 
difference, so Annabel Leigh could be seen as the fictional 
construct embodying that "Otherness• or difference which 
phets by referring to eminent literary figures whom he claims 
to have shared this taste. As Carl Proffer demonstrates, he often 
"distorts a few of the facts and adds some details. " Proffer ex-
tracts and indicates the distortions in the following passage: 
•'After all, Dante fell madly in love with his Beatrice when 
she was nine, a sparkling girleen, painted and lovely, and 
bejewelled , in a crimson frock, and this was in 127 4, in 
Florence, at a private feast in the merry month of May. 
And when Petrarch fell in love with his Laureen, she was 
a fairheaded [sic] nymphet of twelve running in the wind, 
in the pollen and dust, a flower in flight, in the beautiful 
plain as descried fran the hills of Vaucluse' (p. 121) [L p. 19]. 
•oante 's first meeting with Beatrice is described in his Vit.a Nuova; 
he doesn't specify the month. Petrarch didn't fall in love with 
Laureen (Laura - Lolita?) when she was twelve and running through 
the pollen near Vaucluse. She was about eighteen, and it was 
in the church of St. Clara in Avignon ( April 6, 1327). • 
Keys to •Lo].ita• pp. 26-27. 
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by its repression or absence determines meaning, yet which 
constitutes the lack which gives rise to "Desire." Humbert's 
desire then is the "Desire of the 8 Other" and, as shall 
be demonstrated shortly, this "Other" is represented for 
him by "nymphancy". 
A brief digression is necessary at this point in order 
to comment on the apparent parody of many "orthodox" Freud-
ian views in Loli ta to which both Alfred Appel and Carl 
Proffer draw attention. Appel comments: 
Nabokov burlesques the case study by puqosely providing 
the childhood "trauma" which supposedly accounts for 
Humbert's nympholepsy: the incomplete coitus which 
the thirteen year old Humbert experienced on the French 
Riviera with Annabel who died four months later •.. 
By naming Humbert's lost love "Annabel Lee" Nabokov 
fuses Freud with Poe~ 
Proffer comments: 
• • • when Humbert identifies Lolita with Annabel ••• 
we should realize the parallels are consciously contrived, 
that they are "psychological" only in the purely literary 
sense, that Annabel is a literary echo, not proof for 
the theories of the Viennese healers. The only place 
King Sigmund has in the novel (or any of Nabokov's 
other works) is in a cage with the bet.es noiresl 0 
In relation to these comments, the following irony can 
be pointed out: the very subject of parody - the childhood 
•trauma" as "origin" - which Appel and Proffer identify 
8 Jacques Lacan, "The Direction of the Treatment and the 
Principles of its Power," Ecrits p. 264 
9 Alfred Appel, "Lolita: The Springboard of Parody," in 
Nabokov: The Man and His Work, ed. L.S. Dembo (Wisconsin: Univ. 
of Wisconsin Press, 1967) pp. 121-123. 
lO Carl Proffer, Keys to "Lolita", p. 45. 
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here rests on one of the misinterpretations of Freud's 
work that Lacan's wreturnw to Freud sought to rectify. 
Commenting on the wtraumatic experiencew Lacan states, 
If this event was recognized as being the cause of the 
symptom, it was because the putting into words of the 
event (in the patient's wstoriesw) determined the lifting 
of the symptomll 
In other words, what was, and still is, important in the 
Freudian analysis is not so much the identification of 
the experience itself, which relieved the symptom for 
as the inverted commas around "stories" indicates, there 
was doubt as to whether such experiences had in fact taken 
place - but the experience of being able to express in 
language that which had previously been repressed as the 
Other, or the unspeakable forbidden. It seems to be pre-
cisely this naming of the forbidden Other with an obviously 
fictional name (Annabel Leigh) that HUMBERT undertakes 
here. 
Returning once more to the confession, the signifier 
"nymphancy" is chosen by HUMBERT to designate a particular 
state of girlhood which he introduces as follows: 
Between the age limits of nine and fourteen there occur 
maidens who, to certain bewitched travellers, twice 
or many times older than they, reveal their true nature 
which is not human, but nymphic (that is, demoniac); 
and these chosen creatures I propose to designate as 
'nymphets' (L p. 16). 
The particularity of nymphancy seems to lie in its differ-
11 Jacques La.can, Speech and Language, p. 16. 
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ence from the norm or the predictable. It is neither an 
attribute belonging to all girl-children of the age nine 
to fourteen years, nor particularly to those who conform 
to the criteria conventionally determining "good" looks. 
Instead, nymphancy is determined by, 
certain mysterious characteristics, the fey grace, 
the elusive, shifty, soul-shattering, insidious charm 
that separates the nymphet from such coevals of hers 
as are incomparably more dependent on the spatial world 
of synchronous phenomena than on that intangible island 
of entranced time where Lolita plays with her likes 
(L p. 17). 
In this description · there is a noticeably high density 
of words and phrases which suggest the inadequacy of lin-
guistic signification to elucidate the nature of the signi-
fied, for example, "mysterious," "elusive," "shifty," in-
sidious charm," "intangible island of entranced time." 
It seems that even as HUMBERT attempts to represent the 
"essence" of nymphancy, that "essence" escapes him in the 
inadequacy of the signifiers he uses. In this sense nymph-
ancy appears to be the sexual counterpart of the je ne 
sais quoi recognized in literature by, for example, the 
Nee-classicists and described as follows: 
'Ihe je ne sais quoi in a work of art, recognized only 
by the intuitions of sensibility, cannot be explained 
in terms of its causes, nor precisely defined, nor even 
named except by a phrase which is an expression of 
our ignorance. There is often the implication that 
these happy chances have a way of occurring only to 
poets capable of calculating well; but when they luck-
ily occur, he knows not how, they licence him not 
only to transcend existing rules, but even to "offend" 
or break these rules, in order to achieve a sublimer 
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h . ] 12 poetry than rules can comprehend [my emp as1s • 
Another connection between nymphancy and literature 
is made by Lionel Trilling when he comments that it was 
on a demoniac quality that the Greeks based "their idea 
of the disease of nympholepsy and later peoples their con-
ceptions of Undines, Belles Dames Sans Merci and White 
Goddesses. 1113 
As has already been suggested, nymphancy translated 
into Lacanian terms could be regarded as that Other or 
locus of difference, the repression of which both allows 
for the definition of "meaning", but simultaneously gives 
rise to unconscious Desire. 
Returning once more to HUMBERT's narrative, the experi-
ence of recognizing nymphancy is described as a form of 
revelation which permits the enlightened subject to appre-
ciate that the nymphet is "Other• than what she may appear 
to be to "normal" vision. However, just as nymphancy is 
not the property of all •normal• girl-children, so it is 
not a property recognizable by all •normal" men: 
You have to be an artist and a madman, a creature 
of infinite melancholy, with a bubble of hot poison 
in your loins and a super-voluptuous flame permarent-
ly aglow in your subtle spine • • • in order to discern 
at once, • • • the little deadly demon among the whole-
some children ( L p. 17). 
Now according to a certain Romantic conception, the common 
12 M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1957 rpt 1980) p. 195. 
13 Lionel Trilling, "The Last Lover,• Encounter, 11 ( 1958) 
p. 12. 
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attribute of Artist and Madman is the inability to accept 
the rules for •normative" behaviour imposed upon him by 
society. While the Artist may articulate this refusal 
by demonstrating the arbitrariness of the norm and there-
fore achieving at worst a measure of toleration from society 
and at best society's acclaim for his "genius•, the Madman, 
unable to articulate the reasons for his refusal of the 
norm, earns the rejection of society. 
Yet what is it in the Artist and the Madman that causes 
the refusal of social norms? According to HUMBERT it is 
his •infinite melancholy," the "bubble of hot poison in 
his loins," the "super-voluptuous flame permanently aglow• 
in the "subtle spine." Once again this appears to be a 
sexualisation of the concept of natural poetic genius, 
that "special gift" or "touch of madness" described by 
Aristotle 14 or the •natural genius" which Abrams, referring 
to the work of Joseph Addison, describes as follows: 
Natural geniuses, a class comprising Horner, Pindar, 
the Old Testament poets, and Shakespeare, are 'the 
prodigies of mankind, who by the mere strength of 
natural parts and without any assistance of art or learn-
ing, have produced works that were the delight of their 
own times, and the wonder of posterity. '15 
By translating "nymphancy" into the je ne sais quoi, and 
Humbert's sexual Desire into the artistic longing for per-
fection, HUMBERT strives to make his past transgression 
acceptable. He attempts to demonstrate that his Desire 
14 Aristotle, Poetics, quoted in M.H. Abrams, The Mirror 
and the Lamp, p. 188. 
15 Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 187. 
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for the •perfect union• with a nymphet was no more perverted 
and despicable than the artist's Desire to achieve the per-
fect masterpiece.• 
To focus once again on nymphancy, it seems that the 
split which Humbert discovers in the nature of femininity -
the split between nymphet and normal girl-child - manifests 
itself on a wider scale as a split between his own world 
view and that of society: 
No wonder, then, that my adult life during the Euro-
pean period of my existence proved monstrously two-
fold. Overtly, I had so-called normal relationships 
with a number of terrestrial women having pumpkins 
or pears for breasts; inside, I was consumed by a 
hell furnace of localized lust for every passing nymphet 
whom as a law-abiding poltroon I never dared approach. 
The human females I was allowed to wield were but 
palliative agents. I am ready to believe that the sen-
sations I derived from natural fornication were much 
the same as those known to normal big males consorting 
with their normal big mates in that routine rhythm 
which shakes the world. The trouble was that those 
gentlemen had not, and I had, caught glimpses of an 
incomparably more poignant bliss. The dimmest of my 
pollutive dreains was a thousand times more dazzling 
than all the adultery the most virile writer of genius 
or the most talented impotent might imagine. My world 
was split. I was aware of not one but two sexes, neither 
of which was mine; both would be termed female by 
the anatanist. But to :rce, through the prism of my senses, 
'they were as different as mist and mast' {L p. 18). 
It would seem from this account that a discrepancy arises 
between the differences which society recognizes in the 
world and represents in language and the differences which 
Humbert recognizes in the world and represents in language. 
For example, society recognizes the signifieds of the terms 
men and women as different and their sexual relationship 
as natural and stimulating. From Humbert's perspective 
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however, the signifieds represented by the terms men and 
women are recognized as barely distinguishable and their 
sexual relationship as conventionalised and tedious. 
sense of tedium is mimed in the following passage: 
This 
I am ready tD believe that the sensations I derived 
from natural fornication were much the same as those 
known tD normal big males consorting with their normal 
big mates in that routine rhythm which shakes the ~rld. 
The two parties who participate in the sexual activity 
are described in almost identical phrases, "normal big 
males" and their "normal big mates." Only the _!_ and the 
t of the words "males" and "mates" indicate that there 
might be any difference in the participants signified. 
The sexual activity itself is represented with the signi-
fiers "routine rhythm" in which the alliterative initial 
consonants E suggest a repetitive conformity in the action 
signified. This is foregrounded by the ironic use of the 
qualifying clich~ "which shakes the world." 
If patterning and repetition of signifiers is used 
particularly to signify a conventionalised and repetitive 
activity, the implication is also apparent that to express 
any experience in language is to impose upon it the pat-
terning and conventions of language. To express an experi-
ence in language is to render it linguistically repeatable 
and thereby destroy its uniqueness. The unique or perfect 
experience must necessarily remain beyond language, as 
Humbert suggests, in the realms of dream or phantasy. 
The "split• in Humbert's world depends not only on 
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society's recognition of difference (men/women) where Hum-
bert recognizes sameness or monotony (males/mates) but 
on society's recognition of sameness (femininity) where Hum-
bert recognizes difference ( nymphancy/terrestr ial women). 
Thus Humbert repeats: 
My world was split. I was aware of not one but two 
sexes, neither of which was mine; both would be terrred 
female by the anatomist. But to me, through the prism 
of my senses, 'they were as different as mist and mast.' 
While earlier in his argument he played on the similarity 
of two signifiers males and mates to convey the recognition 
of corresponding similarity in signifieds represented, 
he now plays on the similarity of two signifiers mist and 
mast to convey the recognition that similar signifiers 
may represent vastly differing signifieds. Thus, in the 
course of his argument that there are two vastly different 
kinds of womanhood, he simultaneously demonstrates that 
the relation between the signifier and the signified is 
purely arbitrary. Similarities in signifiers may not neces-
sarily represent similarities in signifieds (as in the 
case of homonyms) while differences in signifiers may not 
necessarily represent differences in signifieds (as in 
the case of synonyms). The relation between signifier 
and signified, between language and the ostensive world 
is therefore dependent on convention. It thus follows 
that while the signifiers mist and mast may appear barely 
distinguishable, the first signifier represents the concept 
of water vapour with its accompanying associations - intan-
gibility and elusiveness obscured visibility or Baze-iness 
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- while the second signifies the pole supporting a ship's 
sails with all its associations of functionality, solidity 
and tangibility. This distinction could be read as a meta-
phor for Humbert's recognition that while in physical appear-
ance women may be barely distinguishable, the body of one 
woman (the "terrestrial woman" with "pumpkins or pears 
for breasts") may signify the tangible solidity of a func-
tional mast, while the body of another ( the nymphet) may 
signify the intangible elusiveness of mist. 
Humbert's implicit comparison of the differences in 
women to the differences in linguistic signifiers encourages 
the view that women like all objects of the ostensive world 
are signs which derive their identity in the world as a 
result of their difference from, or similarity to, other 
ostensive objects. The ostensive or "real• world is there-
fore, like language, a system of difference, in which the 
similarities and differences of its components are either 
recognized or repressed. The components of one system 
of difference (language) may be used to represent the com-
ponents of another (the ostensive world) although the rela-
tion between the signifier and the signified is dependent 
on convention: it is not dependent on any necessary dif-
ference or similarity between the components of the sign. 
THE LAW, THE FORBIDDEN AND UNCONSCIOUS DESIRE 
The recognition that the relation between the signifier 
and signified is arbitrary has important implications for 
a concept of the law and the transgression of the law as 
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the following argument may demonstrate. 
The society in which Humbert lives recognizes a dif-
ference in the sexuality of females only in terms of their 
age. Sexual maturity is represented in the signifier woman 
(female + adult) but not in the signifier girl ( female 
+ child). Humbert however recognizes sexual maturity by 
the terms woman ( female + adult) and nymphet ( female + 
child+ magical), but not by girl (female+ child+ ordin-
ary). This idiosyncratic refusal to conform to social 
convention may appear to be a "forerunner of insanity" (~ 
p. 19). However, social convention is arbitrary, as HUMBERT's 
comparative description of the definition of the terms 
girl or female-child shows: 
Let me remind my reader that in England, with the 
passage of the Children and Young Persons Act in 1933, 
the term 'girl-child' is defined as 'a girl who is over 
eight but under fourteen years' (after that from four-
teen to seventeen, the statutory definition is 'young 
person' ) • In Massachusetts, US, on the other hand, 
a 'wayward child' is, technically, one 'between seven 
and seventeen years of age' (who, moreover, habitually 
associates with v1c1ous or immoral persons). Hugh 
Broughton, a writer of controversy in the reign of Janes I, 
has proved that Rahab was a harlot at ten years of 
age ( L p. 19). 
It would seem then that because the relationship between 
signifier and signified is arbitrary, that signified which 
is designated child in one society is likely to be consider-
ably different from that designated child in another. Fur-
thermore, in some societies, sexual difference may not 
be considered relevant to the definition of childhood at 
all. 
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Once again the use of Lacanian theory may prove illumi-
nating in this context. As already indicated earlier in 
this chapter, for Lacan, language is a principle part of 
a Symbolic Order of exchange which holds society together 
by allocating roles to individuals within the system. Lin-
guistic nomination determines the place and therefore the 
exchange value of the individual. Within the Symbolic 
Order of Humbert's society, the exchange of sexual relations 
is permissible to two individuals who are classifiable 
firstly as heterosexual, male and female (but presumably 
not homosexual); and secondly as adult. While two adults 
may exchange sexual relations, an adult and a child may 
not, nor may two children (as was suggested in HUMBERT's 
description of the frustrating vetoes imposed on his rela-
tionship with Annabel Leigh). As a male adult, Humbert 
may therefore exchange sexual relations with a female adult, 
but not with a female child, since the latter exchange 
is "Other" than, or repressed by, the law. Thus a legal 
system, like a linguistic system and the ostensive world, 
operates as a system of difference: that which is unlawful 
is that which by virtue of its difference from the lawful 
must be repressed in order to give meaning or definition 
to the lawful. 
By emphasizing the view that laws are determined by 
convention, and that the convention may change from one 
society or Symbolic Order to another, HUMBERT implies that 
that which is forbidden or Other is arbitrarily defined 
as such. However he simultaneously evades the possibility 
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that the transgression of the law and the attainment of 
the Other leads to the destruction of the order preserved 
by the law. Translated into terms of language, he evades 
the possibility that the attainment of the Other is out-
lawed by the sys tern of difference in order to preserve 
"meaning". He therefore refuses to recognize that the 
transgression of the laws of linguistic difference will 
lead to the loss of "meaning" which these laws initially 
establish. 
HUMBERT LE BEL: MLLE HUMBERT: 
JEAN-JACQUES HUMBERT AND HIS TRUTH 
At the start of this chapter, attention was drawn 
to the implications of HUMBERT' s remark, "You can always 
count on a murderer for a fancy prose style" (L p. 9), 
whici1 seemed to suggest that since it is in a murderer's 
interests to please his jury, he is likely to make linguis-
tic choices which present his story in the light most advan-
tageous to himself. Since HUMBERT is the author of the 
text, it might be supposed that he alone controls aril inter-
prets the discourse within the text. He is at liberty 
to adopt any subjective position he chooses as is clearly 
evident in the constant revision of the linguistic nomina-
tions he attributes to himself: he may for example be 
"Mlle Humbert - Berthe au Grand Pied" (L p. 65) , or "Herr 
Doktor Humbert" (L p. 111) , or simply "H.H." {~ p. 307). 
He is moreover in a position to impose changes both deli-
berate or perhaps accidental on all discourses presented 
in the course of his confession be they quotations of other 
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publications, extracts of letters or representations of 
dialogues. For example, while commenting on the literature 
available to him in the prison library, HUMBERT transcribes 
a significant page of Who's Who in the Limelight. Although 
this transcription contains a concentration of signs for 
the reader, I shall for the present select only one for 
attention, the "error" occurring in the final paragraph 
which reads as follows: 
Quine, D:>lores. Born in 1882, in Dayton, Ohio. 
Studied for stage at American Academy. First played 
in Ottawa in 1900. Made New York debut in 1904 in 
Never Talk to Strangers. Has disappeared since in [a 
list of some thirty plays follows.] { L p. 32, square 
brackets are HUMBERT'S). 
HUMBERT, commenting on this paragraph, draws attention 
to his error of transcription as follows: 
Born 1935. Appeared {I notice the slip of my pen in 
the preceding paragraph, but please do not correct 
it, Clarence) in The Murdered Playwright (~ p. 32). 
If initially the reader had noticed the error in HUMBERT's 
transcription, he may now believe that without HUMBERT's 
acknowledgement of this error, he would have had no yard-
stick, no authority, to which to appeal, in order to verify 
his judgement. This must seem even more apparent to the 
reader who has not noticed the error, and must therefore 
recognize his dependence on HUMBERT for drawing attention 
to it at all. However, what HUMBERT does not seem to bar-
gain for is the possibility that by the frequent changes 
of his subjective position, which he allows himself as 
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protagonist he may betray himself as confessant, and unwit-
tingly draw the reader's attention to that which is •other" 
or repressed by the particular subjective position he has 
previously adopted. An incident which demonstrates this 
particularly clearly is the account offered of Humbert's 
first marriage to Valeria Zborovski. 
HUMBERT's first description of Valeria is offered 
from the position of a young man who has decided that mar-
riage might help to purge him of his "degrading and dangerous 
desires" or "at least to keep them under pacific control" 
(~ p. 25). Thus, in search of a suitable wife, Humbert 
is initially attracted to Valeria by the "imitation she 
gave of a little girl" (L p. 25): 
She looked fluffy and frolicsome, dressed ~ la gamine, 
showed a generous amount of smooth leg, knew how 
to stress the white of a bare instep by the black of 
a velvet slipper, and pouted, and dimpled, and romped, 
and dirndled, and shook her short curly blonde hair 
in the cutest and tritest fashion imaginable ( L p. 26). 
Valeria thus described, is the daughter of Humbert's doctor, 
and since she is temporarily inaccessible and initially 
a stranger to Humbert, her vivacity and cultivated girlish-
ness have an allure for him akin to the Otherness of nym-
phancy. However this allure vanishes in a post-marital 
transformation: 
The bleached curl revealed its melanic root; the down 
turned to prickles on a shaved shin; the mobile moist 
mouth, no matter how I stuffed it with love, disclosed 
ignominiously its resemblance to the corresponding part 
in a treasured portrait of her t:oadlike dead mama; and 
presently, instead of a pale little gutter girl, Humbert 
Humbert had on his hands a large, puffy, short-legged, 
255 
big-breasted and practically brainless baba (!! p. 26}. 
HUMBERT seems to attribute his disillusionment to the dis-
covery of the "real• Valeria who had been hidden under 
a false appearance. However the features which he identi-
fies as offensive in her such as her mouth, her short legs 
and her big breasts are not features which can have been 
easily disguised. The conclusion is therefore invited 
that this change described in Valeria is the product of 
a change in the subjective position of the describer rather 
than a change in the being described. Once he has married 
Valeria, Humbert views her as part of the order of the 
permitted, the accessible and the signifiable. Her Other-
ness and therefore her desirability seem to him to disappear. 
Yet if he believes that he has a "true" knowledge of Val-
eria, of her capabilities, her whereabouts and her activi-
ties, he fails to recognize that by attributing to her 
a particular identity and casting her in a particular role, 
he rejects as "false" all the alternatives by which this 
identity and role are given definition. When Valeria an-
nounces that "There is another man in my life" (L p. 27), 
she presents him with the revelation that his supposedly 
"true• perspective of her is arbitrary. 
dictably outraged: 
Humbert is pre-
A mounting fury was suffocating me - not because I 
had any particular fondness for that figure of fun, 
Mme Humbert, but because matters of legal and illegal 
conJunction were for me alone to decide, and here she 
was, Valeria, the comedy wife, brazenly preparing to 
dispose in her own way of my canfort ari3 fate (L p. 28). 
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He is forced to recognize that his authority and control 
over Valeria are open to subversion. Judged from a position 
•other" that Humbert's, namely from her Russian lover's 
perspective, Valeria the •brainless baba • and "figure of 
fun" becomes "Valechka," the "child-wife", worthy of tender-
ness and devotion. Her "Otherness" and desirability which 
were denied by Humbert are recognized by Maximovich. 
If the reader is invited to witness the subversion 
of Humbert's authority as Valeria's husband, by the appear-
ance of her lover, he is also presented with the possibility 
that the authority of a literary author in presenting "the 
truth" about a character may be subverted by an authorial 
or interpretive position Other than his own. However much 
he may attempt to close his text on a single meaning, the 
possibility will always remain that a change in interpre-
tive position will allow the textual alternatives which 
have been repressed to manifest themselves in a new form 
of "the truth". 
It therefore follows that if HUMBERT appears to revel 
in the undignified conclusion of the Maximovich marriage, 
he could be viewed as the author who attempts to exercise 
full control over a literary character by imposing upon 
her the final closure of death. First however, he rein-
forces her identity as a laughing stock: 
I had my little revenge in due time. A man from Pasa-
dena told me one day that Mrs Maximovich n~ Zborovski 
had died in childbirth around 1945; the couple had 
somehow got over to California and had been used there, 
for an excellent salary, in a year-long experiment con-
ducted by a distinguished American ethnal.o:Jist. The 
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experiment dealt with human and racial reactions to 
a diet of bananas and dates in a constant position on 
all fours. My informant, a doctor, swore he had seen 
with his own eyes obese Valechka and her colonel, 
by then grey-haired and also quite corpulent, diligently 
crawling about the well-swept floors of a brightly lit 
set of rooms (fruit in one, water in another, mats in 
a third and so on) in the company of several other 
hired quadrupeds, selected from indigent and helpless 
groups. I tried to find the results of these tests in 
the Review of Anthropology; but they appear not to 
have been published yet. These scientific products 
take of course some time to fructuate. I hope they 
will be illustrated with good photographs when they 
do get printed • • • ( L pp. 30-31). 
The reader may notice that as his narrative authority HUM-
BERT cites the traditionally "incontrovertible" source 
of "the truth" - the doctor. Furthermore, the references 
to the imminent publication of the ethnological experiment 
in the Review of Anthropology might be regarded as increas-
ing the truth-value of the story. However, in an immedi-
ately subsequent passage of the text, the •other• or con-
verse possibility of this •truth" is suggested: while 
convalescing after a •breakdown•, Humbert is included on 
an expedition into Arctic Canada as a •recorder of psychic 
reactions• {L p. 33). Finding that his investigations 
are a source of irritation to the other members of the 
team, he takes the following course of action: 
• • • I soon dropped the project completely and only 
toward the end of my twenty months of cold labour (as 
one of the botanists jocosely put it) concocted a perfect-
ly spurious and very racy report that the reader will 
find published in the Annals of Ad ult Psychophysics 
for 1945 or 1946 as well as in the issue of Arctic Ex-
plorations devoted to that particular ex:pedi tion {L p. 34). 
This admission demonstrates the •otherness• of the •truth" 
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claimed earlier: if scientific publications are recognized 
as reliable and a record of "fact", this recognition is 
dependent on the rejection of the possibility that such 
fact is actually invention. If at first HUMBERT presented 
"the truth" of the Valeria story from the position of one 
who respects the authority of science, he subverts the 
truth-value of the story by his subversion of the authority 
of science. If his "perfectly spurious and very racy re-
port" is anything to go by, his "biography" of Valeria's 
misfortune is no more than an uproarious fiction. HUMBERT 
thus becomes "hoist with his own petard" and his own relia-
bility as confessant is betrayed by his indulgence in sub-
version. It is on the basis of this betrayal that he is 
to describe to the reader his first encounter with Lolita. 
LOLITA: OTHERNESS AND ITS ATTAINMENT 
a. The discovery 
Humbert's first encounter with Lolita is presented, 
not as the product of his own machinations, but as the 
product of a series of coincidences. Having been discharged 
from a sanitoriurn, he is looking for a summer retreat. 
An employee of his late uncle has an impoverished cousin, 
Mccoo, who has a room in his home available to a lodger. 
Humbert finds the prospect of the room, the prospect of 
a nearby lake suitable for summer bathing, but most particu-
larly the prospect of McCoo's twelve year old daughter, 
"perfectly perfect" {L p. 35). However, by chance McCoo's 
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house burns down. Again by chance, a friend of McCoo's, 
Charlotte Haze, has a room available and also by chance, 
as Humbert is to discover, she has a twelve year old daughter. 
From this description it would appear that Humbert 
is the innocent victim of "Otherness" which manifests itself 
as a series of chance events which subvert his own decisions 
and lead him to his discovery of Lolita. He is thus pre-
sented by HUMBERT as the pawn of "the Other" rather than 
the quester after "the Other." However in the light of 
HUMBERT' s previous self betrayal, the reader may suspect 
this interpretation as that of a confessant who seeks to 
excuse himself before his jury. Certainly HUMBERT' s authorial 
control is made repeatedly apparent in comments such as, 
his house had just burned down - possibly owing to 
the synchronous conflagration that had been raging all 
night in my veins (~ p. 35). 
By suggesting that the figurative (Humbert 1 s burning lust 
for a nymphet) might give rise to the "real" ( the fire 
at Mccoo' s home), HUMBERT seems covertly to acknowledge 
that the relation of cause and effect, and therefore the 
"meaning" in a narrative sequence is the construct of the 
authorial consciousness rather than a pattern of truth 
inherent in the nature of events themselves. As W.W. Rowe 
comments, these devices which draw attention to the •recip-
rocal relationship between the real and the unreal, serve 
the purpose of pointing up the narrator's delightfully 
treacherous selection of what we are told. 1116 What HUMBERT 1 s 
16 
York: 
William Woodin Rowe, Nabokov's Deceptive 
New York University Press, 1971) p. 75. 
World (New 
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narrative understates in this case is that, even if Humbert 
did not calculatedly seek out Lolita, it was his affinity 
for the "Otherness" of nymphancy that led him to accept 
McCoo's offer of summer lodging and ultimately made him 
vulnerable to the subsequent play of "the Other." 
As a result of the Mccoo fire Humbert finds himself 
in the presence of Charlotte Haze who is presented to the 
reader as follows: 
I think I had better describe her right away, to 
get it over with. The poor lady was in her middle 
thirties, she had a shiny forehead, plucked eyebrows 
and quite simple but not unattractive features of a 
type that may be defined as a weak solution of Marlene 
Dietrich. • • • She was, obviously, one of those women 
whose polished words may reflect a book club or bridge 
club, or any other deadly oonventionality, but never 
her soul; women who are oompletely devoid of humour; 
women utterly indifferent at heart to the dozen or so 
possible subjects of a parlour conversation, but very 
particular about the rules of such oon versations, through 
the sunny cellophane of which not very appetizing frus-
trations can be readily distinguished. I was perfectly 
aware that if by any wild chance I became her lodger, 
she would methodically proceed to do in regard to me 
what taking a lodger probably meant to her all along, 
and I would again be enmeshed in one of those tedious 
affairs I knew so well. 
But there was no question of my settling there. I 
could not be happy in that type of household with 
bedraggled magazines on every chair and a kind of 
horrible hybridization between the oomedy of so-called 
'functional modern furniture' and the tragedy of decrepit 
rockers and rickety lamp tables with dead lamps 
(L pp. 37-38). 
If HUMBERT expressed frustration at the inadequacy of lan-
guage to represent the mystery of nymphancy, he expresses 
no such uneasiness in describing Charlotte Haze since she 
conforms to the very stereotype which the conventions of 
language both initiate and allow to be reproduced. Her 
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conformity to •the norm" is identified by HUMBERT firstly 
in her "polished words," a phrase suggesting both the shine 
of repeated use and the studied articulation which favours 
elegant production of the signifier above the effective 
representation of the signified. It is also evident in 
her lack of humour. In terms of Lacan's identification 
of the joke as a manifestation of the Other, Charlotte's 
lack of humour might be interpreted as an indication of 
her repression of Otherness or linguistic play as that 
non-sense which would surely threaten the sense and order 
of the conventions by which she seems to set so much store. 
The only changes in convention which Charlotte does seem 
able to accept are those which the Laws of social order 
define as permissible. These changes are identified by 
HUMBERT in the "horrible hybridization" of the furniture 
which seems to stand witness to the frequent changes in 
the conventions of furnishing which are permitted by soci-
ety. It is precisely such evidence of potential for change 
in convention which is irksome to Humbert who is frustrated 
by the law's inflexibility on the issue of sex with girl-
children. 
In his description of Charlotte Haze, HUMBERT is clear 
in his indication of where he considers the reader should 
stand in relation to such stereotypes. Firstly, with the 
presuppositions •one of those women,• •one of those tedious 
affairs,• and •that type of household• he indicates his 
assumption that the reader is already aware of the stereo-
typical. Then with the choice of the deictics •those• 
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and •that• he co-opts the reader as a sympathiser with 
his own critical view of the stereotype. Having thus estab-
lished that •normality• is a wornout clich~ he then intro-
duces Lolita - the revelation of Otherness: 
I was still walking behind Mrs Haze through the dining-
room when, beyond it, there came a sudden burst of 
greenery - 'the piazza', sang out my leader, and then, 
without the least warning, a blue-sea wave swelled 
under my heart and, from a mat in a pool of sun, half-
naked, kneeling, turning about on her knees, there 
was my Riviera love peering at me over dark glasses. 
It was the same child - the same frail, honey-hued 
shoulders, the same silky supple bare back, the same 
chestnut head of hair. A polka-dotted handkerchief 
tied around her chest hid from my aging ape eyes, 
but not from the gaze of young memory, the juvenile 
breasts I had fondled one immortal day. And, as if 
I were the fairy-tale nurse of some little princess (lost, 
kidnapped, discovered in gypsy rags through which 
her nakedness smiled at the kind and his hounds), 
I recognized the tiny dark-brown mole on her side. . •• 
I find it most difficult to express with adequate 
force that flash, that shiver, the impact of passionate 
recognition (!:! p. 39). 
The •otherness• of Lolita is expressed in the unexpectedness 
of her appearance "without the least warning,• suggesting 
a magical capriciousness that is the anti thesis of Char-
lotte Haze's predictable conformity. The image of the 
·blue-sea wave• in which the cynical reader may detect 
the operation of the confessant's "fancy prose style,• 
suggests Humbert's experience of •otherness• as irrepres-
sible even in the context of supposedly atrophied convention. 
With the reference to the Riviera, the •blue-sea wave• 
suggests the exoticism and incongruency of nymphancy in 
the staid setting of •green and pink Ramsdale,• and implies 
a return to the lost paradise of the •princedom by the 
sea.• 
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Once more HUMBERT indicates the incompatibility 
between nymphancy and the limits of the linguistic medium: 
•1 find it most difficult to express with adequate force •..• • 
His insistence that Lolita is "the same" as Annabel, with 
"the same frail honey-hued shoulders, the same silky supple 
bare back, the same chestnut head of hair" identifies Lo-
lita as "the Other" whose loss or absence was the "origin" 
of his unconscious Desire. With Loli ta' s appearance, the 
Haze home is transformed for Humbert into a potential para-
dise where union with the lost "Riviera love" and the con-
sequent state of fulfilled bliss - the "happily ever after" 
of the fairy tale - seems not only possible but imminent. 
However, the obvious obstruction restraining such bliss 
is the presence of Charlotte Haze who, as Lolita's mother, 
could be seen in the role of the Lacanian "Symbolic Parent" 
standing as an affirmation of the Law and as the authority 
marking the place of "the Other" as that which is forbidden. 
Simultaneously she stands as the embodiment of that which 
is permitted: the "normal big mate" accessible to Humbert 
as the "normal big male." One might say that for Humbert 
as literary scholar, Charlotte Haze is a conventional text 
approved by linguistic law as "normal," while Lolita is 
the transgressive text implying subversive play with "the 
Other,• or linguistic difference. A similar interpretation 
is offered by Julia Bader when she argues, 
While the theme of an affair between the lodger and 
the mother is an obvious clich~, the agonising love 
for a slangy twelve-year-old is a delectable taboo. • •• 
• . . it is possible, on one level, to regard the slangy, 
b. 
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vulgar, irresistible nymphet as an embodiment of the 
possibilities inherent in the stock "wayward-child" 
character, or as an example of how "literary originality" 
can utilize a moral taboo for its subject. As I will 
try to show, moral taboo merges with literary taboo, 
and we get the supreme subject of literary originality 
posing as the main character of a novel about literary 
originality. 1 7 
Simulating the Attainment of the Other 
Humbert's quest after the bliss of union with Loli ta 
is described by means of a diary. Since by definition, 
a diary is a daily, and therefore supposedly "immediate", 
record of events, it might be supposed that the truth value 
of the diary would be high and would add credibility to 
HUMBERT's confession. This seems the supposition that 
Michael Bell works on when he comments in his article, 
"Loli ta and Pure Art," 
The early part of Humbert's narrative is based not 
simply on his memory but also on the diary he kept 
while at the Haze house, so that we have not just an 
earlier and later Humbert, but an earlier and later 
writer. We might describe this diary as • • • actually 
fX)rnographic. Like a scribbling on a jakes wall, it 
expresses the unrealisable or public unadmissable desire 
[sic] at a fairly simple and crude symbolic remove 
from actual fulfilment. And yet, as connoisseurs of 
such graffiti will testify, even that unpromising context 
can provide scope for a play of wit and a grosser kind 
of artistry. 18 
While Bell's comparison of the diary to graffiti seems 
plausible, his reference to the diary as a text which was 
17 Julia Bader, Crystal Land ( Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1972) pp. 63-67. 
18 Michael Bell, ·Lolita and Pure Art,• Essays in Criticism, 
24 (April 1974) pp. 178-179. 
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written prior to the confessional text of Exhibit Number 
One seems to overlook the warnings with which HUMBERT' s 
introduction of the diary bristles. 
proceeds as follows: 
This introduction 
Exhibit Number Two is a pocket diary bound in black 
imitation leather, with a golden year, 1947, en escalier, 
in its upper left-hand corner. I speak of this neat 
product of the Blank Blank Co. Blankton, Mass, as 
if it were really before me. Actually, it was destroyed 
five years ago and what we examine now (by courtesy 
of a photographic memory) is but its brief materialisa-
tion, a puny unfledged phoenix. 
I remember the thing so exactly because I wrote it 
really twice. First I jotted down each entry in pencil 
( with many erasures and corrections) on the leaves 
of what is commercially known as a 'typewriter tablet'; 
then, I copied it out with obvious abbreviations in 
my smallest, most satanic, hand in the little black 
book just mentioned (!: p. 40). 
Although apparently authenticating the diary's existence 
by recording the name of its manufacturer, HUMBERT actually 
seems to imply that the diary is a fiction. Since the 
signifier "Blank", like •zero• is commonly used to represent 
absence, the diary is described as a presence derived from 
absence - an imagined or fictional text. This suggestion 
that the diary is a fiction is reinforced by HUMBERT's 
admission that the document itself is no longer existent, 
but is being represented "by courtesy of a photographic 
memory.• The accurate recall of events five years previous 
would seem a considerable challenge even to a memory that 
is supposedly "photographic.• The text read by HUMBERT'S 
jury is therefore the representation of the diary which 
represented the rough draft, which represented the •real• 
events of which only HUMBERT' s assurances guarantee the 
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•reality•. References to "many erasures and corrections" 
and "obvious abbreviations" seem only to confirm that the 
diary is a fiction within a confession. Far from being 
an "authentic document" it appears to be a device designed 
to give the reader the illusion of experiencing irn.~ediately 
Humbert's twenty-two-day co-existence with Lolita before 
she is dismissed by her mother to a summer camp. Watching 
the hunt from the privileged position of the hunter who 
stalks his prey, the reader is able to witness the imple-
mentation of various hunting strategies, the evasion of 
these by the prey, and the frequent intervention of the 
maternal presence which thwarts the progress of the hunt. 
As Humbert's frustration and Desire for the Other increases, 
so must the reader's Demand to know the outcome of his 
quest. At last Humbert declares, •the devil realized that 
I was to be granted some relief if he wanted to have me 
as a plaything for some time longer" (~ p. 55}. If Hum-
bert's lust is to be partially relieved, so too is the 
reader's curiosity, with the narration of the following 
event. 
19 On a Sunday in June, Charlotte Haze departs alone 
for church after an altercation with Lolita whom she leaves 
at home with Humbert. After some preliminary horseplay 
on the davenport in the living-room, Humbert contrives 
the masturbatory performance of rubbing himself to the 
19 
earl Proffer has worked out -with a little Pninian research" 
that this Sunday is "June 21 (the summer equinox and, appropriate-
ly, a traditional day for pagan orgies in ancient and medieval 
times} ••• • - Keys to 'Lolita' p. 46. 
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point of orgasm against Lolita's legs. In this scene Lo-
1 i ta is clearly cast in the role of the forbidden fruit: 
she holds n in her hollowed hands a beautiful banal Eden-
red apple" (~ p. 57) which she consumes, she herself seem-
ing to Humbert •musical and apple-sweet.• However, she 
seems oblivious of Humbert's bliss which in its final stages 
is described as follows: 
I was above the tribulations of ridicule, beyond the 
possibilities of retribution. In my self-made seraglio, 
I was a radiant and robust Turk, deliberately, in the 
full consciousness of his freedom, postponing the moment 
of actually enjoying the youngest and frailest of his 
slaves. Suspended on the brink of that voluptuous 
abyss (a nicety of physiological equipoise comparable 
to certain techniques in the arts) I kept re_peating chance 
words after her - barmen, alarmin', my charmin', my 
carmen, ahmen, ahahamen - as one talking and laugh-
ing in his sleep while my happy hand crept up her 
sunny leg as far as the shadow of decency allowed 
(~ p. 60). 
While Humbert does not actually consume the forbidden fruit, 
he simulates its consumption; his masturbation could be 
regarded as the representation of actual transgressive 
intercourse with a nymphet. He effectively constructs 
a fictional world in which he can be •fantastically and 
divinely alone" with Lolita and where the law - embodied, 
for example, in Charlotte Haze - ceases to be effective. 
What contributes to the success of his enactment is its 
verbal accompaniment - the garbling of the Little Carmen 
song. Lolita is kept •under the spell• of the verbal play 
into which she enters with Humbert: 
The stars that sparkled_, arid the cars that park.led, 
and the bars, and the barmen, were presently taken 
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over by her; her voice stole and corrected the tune 
I had been mutilating ( L p. 58-59). 
Thus Humbert's escape from the restrictions of social law 
is fused with his escape from the restrictions of the laws 
of linguistic difference. He plays with the lyrics of 
the song until the meanings of the signifiers defined by 
the repression of difference become blurred: for example, 
"carmen" becomes ironically transformed into the inc an ta tory 
conclusion to prayer "ahahamen." Similarly the differences 
between "stars," "sparkled," "cars" and •parked" become 
confused in the neologism "parkled," a combination of sounds 
composing a signifier that, although possible phonologically 
in English, is not recognizable as belonging to the English 
lexicon, does not represent any known signified, and there-
fore is not a meaningful sign. If the law of difference 
rules that within a given signification, a signifier can 
only have meaning by virtue of the absence of those signi-
fiers from which it differs, the transgression of the law 
by the indulgence in the play of difference allows the 
order of meaningful "sense" to be threatened by playful 
"non-sense". Humbert's simulation of sexual transgres-
sion is thus accompanied by the simulation of linguistic 
transgression. He does not construct a playful text, but 
only plays with a text the meaning of which has already 
been written and fixed. Thus it is possible for the dis-
order engendered by his playful transgression to be recti-
fied by reversion to the original text. 
While it may be possible to argue that Humbert's simu-
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lation of the attainment of •the Other• is ingenious, daring 
and imaginative, it would seem nevertheless that it is 
only successful as a solipsistic activity. While as a 
representation or simulation of sexual arrl linguistic trans-
gression it may not appear to inflict any harm on social 
or linguistic order, it is evident that if social and lin-
guistic order are determined by the laws of difference, 
the representation of transgression must be as threatening 
in its implications as transgression itself. For the rep-
resentation of transgression suggests that the actual trans-
gression is possible even if its representation implies 
the absence of actual transgression from the immediate 
context. 
In summary it would seem that sexually, this mastur-
bation allows Humbert to approach in simulated form the 
sexual perfection of the attainment of the •otherness• 
of nymphancy; linguistically the garbling of textual mean-
ing suggests that numerous possible textual interpretations 
may be held in suspension thereby simulating the perfect 
state of •full meaning•. Yet implicit in the action of 
masturbation with a girl-child is the threat of the des-
truction of social order; implicit in textual play is 
the threat of the destruction of the order of meaning per 
se. 
c. Eliminating the Symbolic Parent 
Initially delighted by the satisfaction he has achieved 
from simulating the attainment of Otherness and the sub-
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version of the law, Humbert soon discovers the inadequacies 
of such simulation. Firstly, his Desire, which had appeared 
satisfied, returns: " ••• desire even stronger than before, 
began to afflict me again" (L p. 62). Since he has only 
represented the fulfilment of his Desire and since repre-
sentation implies the lack of the "real", his Desire is 
perpetuated in the absence implied by the signifiers with 
which he represented its satisfaction. Since it has been 
displaced onto these signifiers it is a Desire further 
alienated from Humbert and therefore more frustrated than 
before. In Lacan's words his Desire is "caught in the 
rails - eternally stretching forth towards the desire for 
something else - of metonymy. 1120 
Furthermore, it becomes clear to Humbert that while 
Lolita had appeared •safely solipsized" this solipsism 
only lasted for the duration of the representation. There-
after, she falls under the rule of the law by which she 
can once more be repressed - or dismissed to summer camp. 
It is therefore clear to Humbert that if his attainment 
of Lolita is to be sustained, he will have to devise a 
more permanent means of overcoming the law. This means 
presents itself in Charlotte's "love-letter" which suggests 
that Humbert "link up your life with mine for ever and 
ever and be a father to my little girl" (L p. 67). Humbert 
is quick to recognize how much being Father to his nymphet 
would increase both his accessibility to her and his control 
20 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits, p. 167. For an explanation of 
Desire as irreducible, see pp. 28-32 of my Introduction. 
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over her. Just how absolute he intends to make his authority 
is suggested in the following admission: 
I did not plan to marry poor Charlotte in order to 
eliminate her in some vulgar, gruesome and dangerous 
manner such as killing her by placing five bichloride-
of-mercury tablets in her preprandial sherry or anything 
like that; but a delicately allied, pharna.copoeial thought 
did tinkle in my sonorous and clouded brain. Why 
limit myself to the modest masked caress I had tried 
already? Other visions of venery presented themselves 
to me swaying and smiling. I saw myself administering 
a powerful sleeping potion to both mother and daughter 
so as to fondle the latter through the night with perfect 
impunity (_!: p. 70). 
Although this admission begins with a negation 21 the pre-
cision of the visualized poisoning emphasized by details 
such as •five bichloride-of-mercury tablets• and •prepran-
dial sherry,• suggests that thoughts of murder have crossed 
Humbert's mind already. If the reader's expectations of 
murder are aroused, they are likely to be promoted by sub-
sequent sinister references. For example, with the refer-
ence to •the fifty days of our cohabitation• (_!: p. 77) 
Humbert implies the brevity of the marriage's duration; 
in introducing John Farlow to the reader he comments, " ••• 
it was he who got me the cartridges for that Colt arrl showed 
me how to use it, during a walk in the woods one Sunday• 
(L p. 78). More overtly he remarks, ·A few more words 
about Mrs Humbert while the going is good (a bad accident 
21 In his discussion of the rhetorical feature •negative com-
parison• which he describes as •a figure especially typical of 
old Russian folklore but occurring to this day in both poetry and 
prose ••• • W.W. Rowe in Nabokov's Deceptive World draws particu-
lar attention to the positive descriptive force of such negation 
in Nabokov 's work ( p. 3). 
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is to happen quite soon)" (L p. 79). The reader may also 
bear in mind the more obscure "clue" that a copy of Ren~ 
Prinet's "Kreutzer Sonata" hangs above the bed in Humbert's 
room in the Haze home. In the novel of the same name by 
Tolstoy, the protagonist kills his wife - ironically, in 
f . f . 1 . 22 a 1t o Jea ous passion. 
At length the eradication of Charlotte Haze seems 
imminent: 
There was a woodlake (Hourglass Lake - not as I 
had thought it was spelled) a few miles from Ramsdale, 
and there was one week of great heat at the end of 
July when we drove there daily. I am now obliged 
to describe in some tedious detail our last swim there 
together, one tropical Tuesday morning ( L p. 81). 
The correction with which this passage begins seems itself 
an omen of Charlotte's doom. Up to this point HUMBERT 
has referred to the local Ramsdale lake as •our Glass Lake" 
mimicking Charlotte's habit of co-opting into the order 
of comfortable convention various items such as •our Great 
Little Town" (L p. 73) and •our Christian God" (L p. 74). 
His sudden change to the homonym "Hourglass• seems to re-
flect Humbert's final rebellion against the order of Char-
lotte's world, and assertion of his own affinity for verbal 
play. It may also arouse temporal associations in the 
reader, for example the possibility that Charlotte's "time 
has come,• or her "hours are numbered." 
It is her attempt to impose final closure over her 
22 See Carl Proffer, Keys to •Lolita•, p. 33. 
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relationship by banishing Lolita - "repressing the Other" -
to a "good boarding school with strict discipline and some 
sound religious training" (L p. 82) that brings Humbert 
to his decision to rid himself of Charlotte's restrictive 
authority: "The natural solution was to destroy Mrs Hurrbert. 
But how?" (~ p. 84). Following the earlier alternatives 
of poisoning and shooting, the alternative of drowning 
Charlotte is now presented, yet at the moment of execution 
Humbert stalls. 
argued as follows: 
His justification for this refusal is 
Nowadays you have to be a scientist if you want to 
be a killer. No, no, I was neither. Ladies and gentle-
men of the jury, the majority of sex offenders that 
hanker for some throbbing, sweet-moaning, physical 
but not necessarily coital, relation with a girl-child, 
are innocuous, inadequate, passive, timid strangers 
who merely ask the community to allow them to pursue 
their practically harmless, so-called aberrant behaviour, 
their little hot wet private acts of sexual deviation with-
out the police and society cracking down upon them. 
We are not sex fiends! We do not rape as good soldiers 
do. We are unhappy, mild, dog-eyed gentlemen, suffi-
ciently well integrated to control our urge in the pres-
ence of adults, but ready to give years and years of 
life for one chance to touch a nymphet. Emphatically, 
no killers are we. Poets never kill ( L p. 87). 
In this argument HUMBERT's earlier sexualisation of poetic 
"natural genius" is developed in the overt identification 
of the sex offender with the poet. The dichotomy he estab-
lishes by comparing this identity with that of killer/ 
scientist has interesting implications. Juxtaposed to 
the "poet", the "scientist• may regard himself as an •ob-
jective authority", a producer of •fact" or indisputable 
"truth" which he has derived from the application of laws 
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to matter. The "poet" on the other hand is more likely 
to regard himself as a "subjective" authority, a producer 
of opinion which is arbitrary and open to debate. In order 
to preserve the apparent indisputability of his position, 
the scientist is forced to discredit or repress any position 
which would threaten his own. It is this capacity in the 
scientist for imposing closure on meaning which HUMBERT 
identifies as a "killer instinct". The poet on the other 
hand, particularly the poet who has recognized the impli-
cations of the materiality of language, is likely to recog-
nize his own inability to control fully either the play 
of language or the "meaning" which he may generate by poetic 
discourse. If he does not seek to establish one particular 
"truth" as infallibly right, he has no need to denounce 
alternatives which threaten his own views, but may indulge 
in the play of these alternatives. 
By comparing poets, supposedly innocuous sex offenders 
or indulgers in the play of meaning, to scientists, sup-
posedly ruthless murderers or repressers of the play of 
meaning, HUMBERT calculatedly disguises the possibility 
that the former "unhappy dog-eyed gentlemen" might pose 
as great a threat to the Symbolic Order as the latter. 
It is clear that murder and rape as overt acts of trans-
gression cannot be condoned by social law. 23 Similarly, 
23 If within the anarchic context of war the rape of the 
good soldier, as Humbert implies, might be condoned, this is be-
cause his action is likely to be judged as the aggression of a 
defender of one Symbolic Order towards a member of the opposition; 
as such it does not stand as a threat to Symbolic Order per se. 
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the attempt to repress linguistic play completely cannot 
be permitted by linguistic law for •meaning" itself is 
dependent on a certain play of difference. Because the 
extremity of murder and rape make them easily recognizable 
by the law and therefore readily punishable, the threat 
they pose to the Symbolic Order is rapidly diffused. On 
the other hand, the apparently innocuous "little hot wet 
private acts of sexual deviation" threaten Symbolic Orders 
per se by their covert implication that such order is worthy 
of only extrinsic respect. The indulgence in the play 
of difference, instead of supporting the authority of a 
Symbolic Order, as the good soldier does, implies that 
the "authority" of all subjective positions is equally 
tenable and that the notion of supreme authority inherent 
in Symbolic Order is the tenuous product of consensus and 
convention rather than that of any "natural" supremacy. 
However, what is not foregrounded by Humbert's view is 
the fact that it is only by means of a Symbolic Order 
despite its dependence on convention for its authority 
that "meaning" can be established. 
Finally then, Humbert does not murder Charlotte Haze; 
she is removed by a fatal accident. It could be argued 
that Nabokov, as McFate, relieves Humbert of the role of 
common murderer in order to preserve him for the more sala-
cious role of child-seducer. Charlotte is therefore written 
out of the text as the victim of an accident. However, 
if Humbert is viewed as the •poetic intelligence• who is 
attempting to construct a •perfect context• in which the 
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Other is not repressed and "full meaning" is potentially 
brought into play, he can be interpreted as refusing to 
contradict or "kill" the law which prohibits his attempts 
as transgressive. Instead, he discovers that the law may 
be subverted by the manifestation of Otherness, the differ-
ences which by their repression have defined the authori-
tative position of the law. In this alternative set of 
circumstances the order preserved by the law is temporarily 
repressed, and that which was Other or different manifests 
itself. Under the initial order, it is accepted that Char-
lotte Haze is the beloved wife of Humbert; it is usual 
that she send her daughter to summer camp. It is also 
usual that the "Junk setter:a dog belonging to Charlotte's 
neighbours, chases passing cars. Usually these cars ignore 
the dog's onslaughts. Usually the asphalt pavement in 
front of the Haze home is dry and cracked. This order 
of the usual or accepted can be replaced by an alternative 
or unusual combination: Charlotte Haze discovers that 
she is the object of Humbert's scorn; she discovers that 
he is in love with her twelve year old daughter; she rushes 
out of her home to post letters which are the product of 
her latter discovery; she loses her footing on the asphalt 
pavement which is slippery after a recent watering; she 
plunges headlong into the car of Frederick Beale who has 
swerved to avoid the "Junk setter•. Charlotte's position 
thus changes from authoritative parent in the first order 
to accident victim in the second. 
If earlier in this chapter it has been argued that 
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the manifestation of Otherness frequently takes the form 
of jocularity or non-sense which threatens the order of 
sense, this non-sense is clearly evident throughout HUMBERT's 
description of the accident. Even his description of Char-
lotte's remains as "a porridge of bones, brains, bronze 
hair and blood" (L p. 98) is comically bizarre, for it 
contains a subversion of the taboos of both cannibalism, 
according to which the human body and human food are kept 
strictly separated, and death, according to which the re-
mains of the dead should be treated with respect. HUMBERT 
not only suggests profanely that Charlotte's remains are 
comparable to a commonplace food-sort, but emphasizes the 
amorphous confusion of these remains by linking the signi-
fiers "bones", "brains", bronze hair" and "blood" which 
represent the remains, with the alliterated consonant "b". 
By taking advantage of a change of circumstances, 
an unexpected appearance of Otherness or difference in 
which the effectiveness of the law is temporarily repressed, 
Humbert is thus able both to avoid eradicating the law 
himself, and to gain accessibility to full play with the 
nymphic Other. 
d. The Consummation 
With Charlotte Haze's death, Humbert, ironically assum-
ing the authority of Symbolic Parent to his nymphet, is 
at last able to realize his transgressive dreams. Fetching 
Lolita from Camp Q, he transports her to the Enchanted 
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Hunters Hotel, and feeds her one of the sleeping tablets 
he has procured for the purpose of her seduction. At this 
point, the distance between HUMBERT the enlightened confes-
sant who has the advantage of hindsight, and Humbert the 
ignorant protagonist who quests blindly after the Other, 
is marked. Evoking once again the pattern of the fairy 
tale quest, HUMBERT presents his protagonist-quester as 
falling unwittingly under a spell the implications of which 
can only be estimated in retrospect. 
Human beings, attend! I should have undersb::x)d that 
Lolita had already proved to be satEthing quite different 
from innocent Annabel, and that the nymphean evil 
breathing through every pore of the fey child that I 
had prepared for my secret delectation, would make 
the secrecy impossible, and the delectation lethal. 
I should have known ( by the signs made to me by some-
thing in Lolita - the real child Lolita or some haggard 
angel behind her back - that nothing but pain and 
horror would result from the expected rapture. Oh, 
winged gentlemen of the jury!(~ p. 124). 
In HUMBERT's imperative address, •Human beings, attend!" 
the reader may detect a note of warning. Since he is view-
ing the progress of events from the unenlightened perspec-
tive of the protagonist, he is more in a position to learn 
from the fate of a fellow human being than in a position 
to sit in judgement over him. Moreover, as indicated earlier, 
the reader's quest runs in conjunction with Humbert's quest. 
While the latter seeks the attainment of sexual perfection 
by union with a nymphet, or the attainment of •full meaning" 
in textual perfection by the attainment of linguistic Other-
ness, the reader seeks the attainment of the •full truth•, 
by the unveiling not only of HUMBERT's •truth•, but of 
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that which his truth has sought to repress or distort. 
Only once he has read the confession to its conclusion 
will the reader, like Humbert, come to recognize the •evil" 
inherent in the attainment of Otherness. 
Even before he has attempted to seduce Lolita, Humbert 
is confronted with warnings that the Other, once attained, 
will not be what it promises to be before its attainment. 
For example, convinced of his mastery over Lolita he des-
cribes his "final picture" of her: 
Naked, except for one sock and her charm bracelet, 
spread-eagled on the bed where my philtre had felled 
her - so I for~limpsed her; a velvet hair ribbon 
was still clutched in her hand; her honey-brown body, 
with the white negative image of a rudimentary swimsuit 
patterned against her tan, presented to me its pale 
breastbuds; in the rosy lamplight, a little pubic fl.o.ss 
glistened on its plump hillock ( L p. 124-12 5). 
Yet when he opens the bedroom door he sees her in • the 
darkness of the bedroom": 
Clothed in one of her old nightgowns, my Lolita lay 
on her side with her back to me, in the middle of 
the bed. Her lightly veiled body and bare limbs formed 
a z. She had put both pillows under her dark tousled 
head; a band of pale light crossed her top vertebrae 
(L p. 127). 
The contrast between the •rosy lamplight" of the first 
description and the •darkness• of the second; the eroticism 
of the first child naked and spread-eagled, and the demure-
ness of the second clothed in an old nightgown and lying 
in an inaccessible •z• position with her back turned; the 
vulnerability of the first child and the comical opportun-
ism and selfishness of the second lying • in the middle 
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of the bed" and appropriating "both pillows"; all these 
differences indicate the unpredictability of the Other, 
and its potential to operate beyond the control of the 
author. Both this unpredictability and the tendency of 
the Other to subvert the author's control are evident in 
HUMBER'r' s description, not of Humbert's seduction of Loli ta, 
but of his seduction £Y_ Lolita: 
My life was handled by little Lo in an energetic, matter-
of-fact manner as if it were an insensate gadget uncon-
nected with me. While eager to impress me wit..ri the 
world of tough kids, she was not quite prepared for 
certain discrepancies between a kid's life and mine. 
Pride alone prevented her from giving up; for, in 
my strange predicament, I feigned supreme stupidity 
and had her have her way - at least while I could 
still bear it. But really these are irrelevant matters; 
I am not concerned with so-called 'sex' at all. Any-
body can imagine those elements of animality. A great 
endeavour lures me on: to fix once for all the perilous 
magic of nymphets (~ p. 133). 
As the climax of Humbert's quest to attain a nymphet, this 
scene has been a focal point of critical debate, at the 
heart of which is predictably the question of how severely 
Humbert's actions should be judged by the reader. Common 
to the conclusions drawn seems to be the experience of 
a certain ambivalence towards Humbert. On one hand Lionel 
Trilling argues that the reader is likely to feel a •1oss 
of certitude" about his moral feelings: 
• • • it is likely that any reader of Lolita will discover 
that he oomes to see the situation as less and less 
abstract and moral and horrible, and more and more 
as human and "understandable•24 
24 Lionel Trilling, •The Last Lover,• p. 14. 
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Another critic, Mark Lilly, draws attention to the comical 
effect of the scene which, he argues, tends to undermine 
the weight of any moral judgement: 
• • • both the deaths [the deaths of Charlotte Haze and 
of Clare Quilty] and the sexual scenes are hilariously 
funny; and it is precisely this type of qrotesquerie 
that confuses the reader's moral assumptions2S' 
Alfred Appel draws attention to the possibility that Hum-
bert's displacement of responsibility onto Lolita might 
simply be another distortion of evidence on HUMBERT's part 
to evade culpability for the seduction: 
Because Lolita seduces Humbert she might seem to 
be the agent of immorality, but the irony is another 
trap in the game: this is just the kind of easy release 
from culpability which we are too ready to accept; 
it does not mitigat.e the exist.ence of their ensuing two 
years together, nor the fact that Humbert has denied 
Lolita her youth, what.ever its qualities may be26 
I would argue that any ambivalence which the reader does 
experience towards the scene of the consummation is the 
product of something more than HUMBERT' s shrewd interpre-
tation of his own crime as the responsibility of Lolita. 
After all, if Humbert is guesting after possession of the 
forbidden nymphet, is the reader not repeating his trans-
gressive Desire by guesting after revelation of the "full 
truth" of this salacious confession? What Humbert discovers 
at the final unveiling of the mystery is that the Phallus 
25 Mark Lilly, ·Nabokov: Homo Ludens, • in Vladimir Nabokov 
- A Tribut.e, ed. Peter Quennel (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1979) p. 96. 
26
. Alfred Appel, ·Lolita: The Springboard of Parody,• p. 126. 
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is quite Other than he thought it to be: the innocence 
and modesty he anticipated are replaced by initiated pre-
cociousness. The reader however, is not even permitted 
to witness a "final unveiling." If he hoped to be witness 
to a "full" account of the forbidden - a rape of a child 
by a paederast - his hopes are to be subverted, not only 
by the comical seduction of the bemused sex of fender by 
a precocious "teeny-bopper," but by the censoring of the 
"full truth" by the confessant. The reader has quested 
energetically only to be told at the moment of full reve-
lation that, 
• . . these are irrelevant matters; I am not o::mcerned 
with so-called 'sex' at all. Anybody can imagine those 
elements of animality ( L p. 13 3 } • 
I would suggest that the "loss of certitude" which Lionel 
Trilling describes arises from the reader's disappointment 
at being denied full revelation, yet his (perhaps guilty} 
awareness that such denial is what preserves HUMBERT's 
description from becoming sordid an:3 boringly blatant porno-
graphy. If Humbert was to experience the tragedy of lost 
meaning in "full attainment,• HUM.BERT knows better than 
to repeat his mistake. He tells only enough to illustrate 
the nature and implications of his transgression. Similar-
ly, at the level of the discourse, the reader may notice 
that he has indulged in only enough play with linguistic 
Otherness to show how threatening to the order of sense 
such play can be. At no point yet has he allowed the •mean-
ing" of his text to deteriorate into the suspension of 
sense in "full play• with the Other. 
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PART II 
THE SUSPENSION OF MEANING: EVADING SYMBOLIC LAW 
In retrospect, it is impossible for HUMBERT to of fer 
a linguistic demonstration of the consequences of Humbert's 
sexual attainment of Otherness, without running the risk 
of incurring the same disastrous loss of meaning which 
Humbert faces after his transgression. Yet the description 
of the consequences of the latter's sexual attainment of 
Otherness provides a clear indication of what the corres-
ponding textual consequences would be. 
Having transgressed the law and brought the Other 
into play, Humbert's immediate objectives become to sustain 
his activity of play with the Other, and simultaneously 
to attempt to evade punishment by the law for his trans-
gression. In order to do this, he is forced to devise 
an existence beyond or outside the law. Since it is impos-
sible for him to remove himself from human society alto-
gether, the best alternative that he is able to contrive 
is the nomadic life of tourism. By evading a "proper place" 
in any one Symbolic Order or social context, he is able 
to sustain his relationship with Loli ta - he is able to 
keep the Other in play - while nevertheless encountering 
severe problems. 
First of all, beyond enabling him to maintain play 
with the Other, his journey has no clear direction. This 
lack of direction is reflected in HUMBERT' s text which 
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becomes a playful j ux tapos i tion of percept ions and loca-
tions. The scarcity of finite verbs suggests that agency, 
determining purpose or meaning in the journey, has been 
suspended. For example, 
Indian ceremonial dances, strictly commercial. ART: 
American Refrigerator Transit Company. Obvious Arizona, 
pueblo dwellings, aboriginal picb:>3raphs, a dinosaur 
track in a desert canyon, printed there thirty million 
years ago, which I was a child (~ p. 155). 
As this passage illustrates, HUMBERT's frequent use of 
irony invites unexpected meaning, for example, "Indian 
ceremonial dances," which might initially be assumed to 
be religious, yet which are subsequently qualified as "strictly 
commercial." Similarly ART does not apply to aesthetic 
masterpieces but to a trucking company. Since Humbert 
is attempting to live on the "nymphic island of entranced 
time," the sustained record of time which characterized 
the first part of the confession - for example in the form 
of the diary - is abandoned. Instead, the temporal con-
tinuum seems suspended; for example, in HUMBERT's comment 
"printed there thirty million years ago, when I was a child," 
the prehistoric and the contemporary become strangely fused. 
This absence of any clear direction in the journey 
is accompanied by Humbert's difficulty in controlling Lo-
lita as the Other. He is forced to adopt two strategies 
to maintain his position as author-ity: firstly he threat-
ens to impose "total closure" on her by exiling her to 
a dilapidated Appalachian farmhouse or in other words com-
pletely withdrawing her from play. He also points out 
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to her that if she subverts his authority completely by 
exposing him as kidnapper and rapist, she will, without 
him, simultaneously expose herself to the closure imposed 
by the Department of Public Welfare where the laws of the 
Symbolic are most rigidly enforced. Secondly, Humbert 
attempts to construct "meaning" or "purpose" in their jour-
ney/text by devising short-term goals towards which their 
otherwise meaningless play can be directed: 
Every morning during our yearlong travels I had to 
devise some expectation, some special point in space 
and time for her to look forward to, for her to survive 
until bedtime. Otherwise, deprived of a shaping and 
sustaining purpose, the skeleton of her day sagged 
and collapsed (!: p. 149). 
Thus, having defied the conventions of the Symbolic Order, 
conventions such as spatio-temporal laws by which the mean-
ing of the text is created, having attempted to escape 
such order by attaining "that intangible island of entranced 
time where Lolita plays with her likes• (L p. 17), Humbert 
is forced to reconstruct these conventions if he is not 
to lose control completely over the nymphic Other. 
Humbert's decision to adopt the nomadic life of a 
tourist is likely to have a significant effect upon the 
reader of the confession. In the following remarks for 
example, Alfred Appel refers to the apparently frequent 
criticism of Part II of the confession as "less interesting" 
than Part I: 
• • • 'I am not concerned with so-called •sex• at all,' 
Humbert says ( p. 136) ( L p. 133) ; on the contrary, 
Nabokov is very much concerned with it, but with the 
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reader's expectations rather than Humbert's machinations. 
'Anybody can imagine those elements of animality,' 
he says, and yet a great many readers wished that 
he had done it for them, enough to have kept Lolita 
at the top of the bestseller list for a year, although 
librarians reported that many readers never finished 
the novel. The critics and readers who complain that 
the second half of Lolita is less interesting are not 
aware of the possible significance of their admission. 27 
To elaborate on Appel's remarks, I would argue that, on 
one hand, Humbert, having transgressed the law and attained 
the forbidden Other, is confronted with the meaningless 
life which his transgression has produced. Only the re-
peated threat of being discovered and punished provides 
him with any clear motivation. For the reader, on the 
other hand, the promise of a spicy, taboo story is trans-
formed in the second part of the narrative into a witty, 
playful, but directionless discourse in which "meaning" 
occasionally threatens to become suspended altogether. 
Once the unknown Otherness has been translated into the 
known and iterable it loses its mysteriousness and conse-
quent fascination. Only the likelihood of the arrest and 
punishment of the criminal remains to lure the reader on. 
To return once more to HUMBERT's confession, 
one of the most alarming consequences which Humbert is 
forced to face once he has secured Loli ta as his mistress 
is the discovery of her unpredictably strong attraction 
for other men. He recalls for example, 
Oh, I had to keep a very sharp eye on Lo, little 
limp Lo! Owing perhaps to constant amorous exercise, 
27 Alfred Appel, "Lolita: The Springboard of Parody,• p. 123. 
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she radiated, despite her very childish appearance, 
some special languorous glow which threw garage fellows, 
hotel pages, vacationists, goons in luxurious cars, maroon 
morons near blued pools, into fits of concupiscence 
which might have tickled my pride, had it not increased 
my jealousy . • • I had only to turn away for a moment 
- to walk, say, a few steps in order to see if our 
cabin was at last ready after the morning change of 
linen - and lo and behold, upon returning, I would 
find the former les yeux perdus, dipping and kicking 
her long-toed feet in the water on the stone edge of 
which she lolled, while, on either side of her, there 
crouched a brun adolescent whom her russet beauty 
and the quicksilver in the baby folds of her stomach 
were sure to cause to se tordre - oh Baudelaire! 
in recurrent dreams for months to come ( L pp. 15 7 + 
159-160). -
Humbert's oscillation between a position of authoritative 
control over Lolita to a position of losing control over 
her is reflected in the discourse with which HUMBERT des-
cribes this predicament. The reader cannot be certain, 
for example, whether HUMBERT himself has managed •to keep 
a very sharp eye" on the various irruptions which "lo" 
makes into this passage in phrases such as •10 and behold• 
and •she lolled." 
It may also be noticed in this passage that HUM.BERT 
frequently indulges in the use of French phrases. Since 
French is foreign or "Other" to Eng 1 ish its incl us ion in 
an English text seems yet another invitation to the play 
of difference, its presence suggesting the possibility 
of extending linguistic play beyond the boundaries of a 
single language. While at this point Humbert is portrayed 
as the instigator of play, he is later to become its victim: 
for example, when reading a letter addressed to Lolita 
which he believes to have been written by her school-friend 
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Mona Dahl, he fails to recognize the linguistic play which 
suggests the identity of the actual author. The play occurs 
in the following context: 
"As expected, poor Poet stumbled in Scene m when 
arriving at the bit of French nonsense. Remember? 
Ne manque pas de dire ~ ton amant Chim~ne, oomme 
le lac est beau car il faut qu 'il t'y m~ne. Lucky 
beau! Qu'il t'y - What a tongue-twister! Well, be 
good, Lollikins. Best love from your Poet, and best 
regards to the Governor. Your Mona" {L p. 221). 
Missing the sense in the "French nonsense," the Quilty 
in "Qu'il t'y," Humbert also fails to recognize that "your 
Poet" might be the Other author who is about to abduct 
his nymphet and that he might be more appropriately named 
the "Governed" than the "Governor" at this stage of events. 
It is the possibility of losing Lolita to another 
suitor which initially alarms Humbert when he discovers 
that she appeals to other men. For once he has removed 
Lolita from her place propre as an orphaned child in Rams-
dale where she was protected by the law of the Symbolic 
Order as the Other who is inaccessible, Humbert finds that 
in contriving her accessibility for himself, he has simul-
taneously rendered her accessible to others. If earlier 
he had argued that nymphic magic was appreciated only by 
the Madman and the Artist, it seems that now his trans-
gression has transformed that magic into a readily accessi-
ble and therefore devalued commodity. A similar point 
is made by Robert T. Levine when he introduces his discus-
sion of the loss of Loli ta' s childhood with the following 
argument: 
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Lolita the Nymphet dwells on an enchanted island 
whose boundaries are not spatial but temporal: the 
age limits of nine and fourteen. Humbert Hunt>ert aspires 
to live out his days on that island. • . • In his desperate 
effort to climb ont.o the island, he pulls Lolita off 
it into the unenchanted ocean of adulthood too soon. 28 
If during the course of the first tour of America 
HUMBERT is able to lay claim to the bliss which he had 
envisaged as the product of cohabitation with a nymphet, 
the nature of this bliss seems by definition beyond the 
reach of the reader's comprehension. For as the following 
description suggests, such bliss can have no meaningful 
representation in language: 
Oh, do not scowl at me, reader, I do not intend 
to convey the impression that I did not manage to be 
happy. Reader must understand that in the possession 
and thraldan of a nymphet the enchanted traveller stands, 
as it were, beyond happiness. For there is no other 
bliss on earth comparable to that of fondling a nymphet. 
It is hors concours, that bliss, it belongs to another 
class, another plane of sensitivity. Despite our tiffs, 
despite her nastiness, despite all the fuss and faces 
she made, and the vulgarity, and the danger and the 
horrible hopelessness of it all, I still dwelled deep in my 
elected paradise - a paradise whose skies were the 
colour of hell-flames - but still a paradise (~ p. 164). 
Humbert's "bliss" then, is a form of "enchantment" which 
defies the differences between "happiness" and "unhappiness", 
or "ecstasy" and "agony", but allows the combination of 
both in a state of being that is beyond the control or 
representative powers of language. Since language can 
only establish meaning on the basis of difference, the 
28 Robert T. Levine, • 'My Ultraviolet Darling' : The Loss 
of Lolita's Childhood,• Modern Fiction Studies, 25, 3 (Autumn 
1979) p. 471. 
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abolition of difference must concomitantly result in the 
attainment of a state beyond conventional •meaning• - a 
state of transcendence which by definition cannot be shared. 
The strain which this state of transcendence or sus-
pended meaning imposes on its author necessitates an inevit-
able return to the order of the Symbolic. Humbert's choice 
of new home is in the Eastern town of Beardsley where he 
may assume the role of visiting lecturer at Beardsley Col-
lege, while Lolita may return to her supposed place propre 
at Beardsley School for girls. Humbert assumes the role 
of father and Lolita the role of daughter. 
directionless journey concludes: 
Thus the first 
And so we rolled East, I more devastated than braced 
with the satisfaction of my passion, and she glowing 
with health, her bi-iliac garland still as brief as a 
lad's, although she had added two inches to her stature 
and eight pounds to her weight. We had been every-
where. We had really seen nothing. And I catch myself 
thinking today that our long journey had only defiled 
with a sinuous trail of slime the lovely, trustful, dreamy, 
country that by then, in retrospect, was no more to 
us than a collection of dog-eared maps, ruined tour 
books, old tyres, and her sobs in the night - every 
night, every night - the ~nt I feigned sleep (L p. 173). 
Gradually it seems, the implications of his transgress ion 
begin to become evident to Humbert. What he had envisaged 
as a blissful relationship with his nymphet proves to be 
a sordid defilement of a twelve year old girl's childhood. 
As Denis de Rougemont points out, the attainment of nyrn-
phancy which Humbert had envisaged as •'the supreme joy,' 
the hochste Lust of the dying Isolde• fails because, 
in reality Humbert Humbert and Lolita have never 
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known what I call 'unhappy reciprocal love.' Lolita 
has never responded to the fierce and tender passion 
of her elder lover. Hence the failure of the Myth [the 
myth of Tristan] and the 'savagely facetious' tone of 
the novel. 29 
Despite his rhetorical skills, his wit, his extensive vocabu-
lary and knowledge of literature, HUMBERT is unable to 
translate his bliss into linguistic terms or to present 
his crime to his jury as "acceptable". Ultimately, he 
cannot evade the sterile desolation of his transgressive 
life with his miserable step-daughter. 
THE PLAYFUL TEXT AND THE ORDER OF THE SYMBOLIC: 
Humbert and Lolita in Beardsley 
If the reader experienced a suspension of his Demand 
during the directionless journey of Humbert and Lolita 
across America, this Demand is likely to be stimulated 
once more by their return to the college town of Beardsley. 
The immediacy of social order and propriety once again 
foregrounds the transgressive nature of their relationship 
and augments the threat of exposure and punishment. In 
the process of establishing a place for himself and Lolita 
in the society of Beardsley, Humbert is necessarily brought 
into contact with social authorities. For example, having 
entered Loli ta at Beardsley School for girls, Humbert is 
obliged to have an interview with "headmistress Pratt•. 
As the following passage may indicate, this interview is 
29 Denis de Rougemont, •Lolita, or Scandal,• in The Myths 
of Love, trans. Richard Howard (London: Faber and Faber, 1964) 
pp. 51-53. 
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a parody of the jargon of education theory and popular 
media: 
"We are not so much concerned, Mr Humbird, with 
having our students become bookworms or be able to 
reel off all the capitals of Europe which nobody knows 
anyway, or learn by heart the dates of forgotten battles. 
What we are concerned with is the adjustment of the 
child to group life. This is why we stress the four 
D's: Dramatics, Dance, Debating and Dating. We are 
confronted by certain facts. Your delightful Dolly will 
presently enter an age group where dates, dating, date 
dress, date book, date etiquette, mean as much to her 
as, say, business, business connections, business suc-
cess, mean to you, or as much as [smiling] the happi-
ness of my girls means to me. Dorothy Humbird is 
already involved in a whole system of social life which 
consists, whether we like it or not, of hot-dog stands, 
corner drugstores, malts and cokes, movies, square-
dancing, blanket parties on beaches, and even hair-
fixing parties! Naturally at Beardsley School we dis-
approve of some of these activities; and we rechannel 
others into more constructive directions. But we do 
try to turn our backs on the fog and squarely face 
the sunshine" (L p. 175, square brackets are HUMBERI' 1 s). 
The irony evident in this passage suggests Pratt's inability 
to control the excess of meaning which she unwittingly, 
but repeatedly brings into play in her discourse. For 
example, during the course of the interview the correct 
form of Humbert's name constantly eludes her: it slips 
from "Mr Humbird," to "Dr Humburg," to "Mr Humberson" to 
"Dr Hummer" and with each transformation a corresponding 
set of transgressive associations is brought into play. 
The reader may associate "Humbird" with the recent descrip-
tion of hummingbirds in a town on the Mexican border, "There 
and elsewhere, hundreds of grey hummingbirds in the dusk, 
probing the throats of dim flowers" (L p. 155). The erotic 
associations of assault and penetration in this description 
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seem clearly evocative of Humbert's relationship with Lo-
lita. The name •Humburg" might remind the reader of Hum-
bert's reservation at the Enchanted Hunters hotel, the 
night of his first intercourse with Lolita: 
•The name,• I said coldly, "is not Humberg and not 
Humbug, but Herbert, I mean Humbert ••• • ( L p. 117). 
Then, it was "Humbert the Hummer" who played the main char-
acter of the sexual scenario on Sunday morning in June 
at the Haze home in Ramsdale (L p. 57). As Pratt slips 
from one transformation of Humbert's name to another, she 
simultaneously evokes the frequent changes of subjective 
position he has adopted during his playful interaction 
with his nymphet. 
Lolita on the other hand, not only undergoes t~e trans-
formations of "delightful Dolly," "Dorothy Humbird," "Doro-
thy Hummerson" - all comically distorted versions of "Do-
lores Humbert"- but like her father/lover, she is ironically 
misinterpreted by Pratt: 
•. • • Your delightful Dolly will presently enter an age 
group where dates, dating, date dress, date book, date 
etiquette, mean as much to her as, say, business, busi-
ness connections, business success, mean to you.• 
The primary irony provoked is that since Humbert shows 
no apparent interest in •business,• •aelightful Dolly" 
according to Pratt's logic is likely to be completely bored 
by •aating." After being for a year the mistress of an 
adult male of hearty sexual appetite, Lolita is hardly 
likely to show any interest in the tame initiatory sexual 
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activities of dating that Pratt assumes will fascinate 
her. 
Pratt's apparently innovative theory of education 
summarized in the neat formula of the •four D's" - a parody 
of rudimentary education by the "three R's", Reading, 'Rit-
ing and 'Ri thmetic - is unlikely to accommodate Humbert's 
precocious child-mistress. It is not surprising therefore 
that Lolita is soon to prove beyond the control of both 
Pratt and her staff, and that her subversion of their dis-
cipline manifests itself as a saucy delight in verbal taboo. 
As Pratt is to complain in a subsequent interview with 
Humbert: 
"Dolly has written a most obscene four-letter word which 
our Dr Cutler tells me is low-Mexican for urinal with 
her lipstick on some health pamphlets which Miss Red-
cock, who is getting married in June, distributed among 
the girls, •.• • (L p. 195). 
Most amusing is the suggestion that Lolita's overt play 
with linguistic taboos is somewhat obscure and barely com-
petes with the "obscenities" which Pratt herself produces 
by her unconscious juxtapositioning of •health pamphlets," 
"Redcock" and "marriage." 
While Loli ta assumes the role of rebellious school-
girl, Humbert attempts to play the role of a conventional 
father. His sole associate in Beardsley is another covert 
transgressor, his colleague and friend, Gaston Godin. Like 
·H.H.•, ·G.G.• has a taste for fruit vert. He enjoys the 
company of faunlets as Humbert enjoys the company of nym-
phets. In mitigation of his own actions, HUMBERT presents 
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Gaston as an illustration of a "sex offender" who was per-
mitted to enjoy his •throbbing, sweet-moaning, physical 
but not necessarily coital relations• (~ p. 87) without 
the police or society of Beardsley "cracking down on him." 
What HUMBERT'S envy of Gaston Godin's circumstances reveals 
is the ambiguous, or undecidable status of the phantasy 
of transgression in relation to Symbolic Order. It seems 
that in the society of Beardsley, as long as Godin's trans-
gression is restricted to phantasy, to "knowing by name 
all the small boys in our vicinity," or "feeding them fancy 
chocolates with real liqueurs inside - in the privacy of 
an orientally furnished den in his basement ••• " (L p. 
179), he remains •crooned over by the old and caressed 
by the young." It takes the overt transgress ion of becoming 
•involved in a sale histoire, in Naples• (L p. 181) to 
incur the intervention of the law and the rejection of 
Godin. In •G.G. 's" case then, it appears that a boundary 
is drawn between •real" transgression and the phantasy 
of transgression. While the former is treated as punish-
able by the law, the latter is not. However, it becomes 
clear that this boundary is arbitrary when the law decides 
to recognize the phantasy of transgression as a form of 
participation in the "real" act. The text of Lolita itself 
provides a clear illustration of this. As a phantasy of 
transgression, this text has been treated both as an imagin-
ary participation in the •real• act of paederasty anl there-
fore inadmissibly subversive or "to-be-censored", and yet 
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on the other hand it has also been treated as belonging 
to an order Other than the •real• and therefore not punish-
able as a "real" transgression. 
For all his envy of Godin, Humbert himself remains 
a •real" transgressor living in fear of punishment by the 
law. During their sojourn at Beardsley, he initially main-
tains control over Lolita by a system of monetary bribes. 
At this stage of their cohabitation, the bliss of the attain-
ment of the Other degenerates to sordid prostitution. It 
is only his fear that her earnings will enable her to escape 
him that decides Humbert to substitute financial payment 
with permission to participate in the school's theatrical 
programme. Unwittingly, he thereby provides her with the 
opportunity to play roles other than those which he, Hum-
bert, has prescribed for her. While appearing to remain 
under his authority, she slips further and further from 
his control. As HUMBERT himself admits in retrospect, 
By permitting Lolita to study acting I had, fond fool, 
suffered her to cultivate deceit. It now appeared that 
it had not been merely a matter of learning the answers 
to such questions as what is the basic conflict in ·Hedda 
Gabler"?, or where are the climaxes in •Love Under 
the Lindens•?, or analyse the prevailing mo:>d of •cherry 
Orchard"; it was really a matt.er of learning to betray 
me { L p. 2 2 8 ) • 
Loli ta becomes increasingly vulnerable to the interpreta-
tions and influences of Other •authorial" positions, one 
manifestation of which is Clare Quilty. Despite the obvious 
differences in his perspective, Brent Harold makes a simi-
lar observation in his article •Lolita: Nabokov's Critique 
of Aloofness• when he argues, 
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In Part 2, as Humbert loses the manipulative aloof-
ness which the reader has been led to associate with 
aesthetic distance, he finds himself for the first time 
out-authored, to use a metaphor suggested by the novel, 
in his own life. Previous annoyances - such as the 
defection of his ex-wife Valeria - have served only 
to emphasize Humbert's attitudinal and verbal authority; 
now, however, other hands without his permission begin 
to make marks on his page. One of the unauthorized 
authors is fate itself, personified either as Mc Fate, 
or as "absurd builders" who "as soon as they had erec-
ted a sufficient amount of material to spoil [Humbert's 
view of nymphets playing in a schoolyard] suspended 
their work and never appeared again" (181) [L p. 176]. 
Lolita herself reverses the roles of part I, manipulating 
the manipulator by her various deceptions. • .• 
But the greatest threat to Humbert's authority comes 
from the professional playwright Quilty. 30 
While Harold identifies the "unauthorized authors" as fate, 
personified either as McFate or as "absurd builders" it 
has already been proposed that these unidentifiable pro-
ducers of meaning are manifestations of the Other which 
subverts Humbert's authorial control in the play of differ-
ence. At this point in the text the Other, as the locus 
of the individual unconscious, manifests itself in the 
"person" of Clare Quilty. 
It is only in retrospect that Humbert becomes aware 
of Quilty's influence over Lolita during her participation 
in the Beardsley School production of his play The Enchanted 
Hunters. At the time Humbert is only aware that Lolita 
is beginning to lead a life that defies his authority. 
His attempts to discipline her make him only more desperate-
ly aware of her increasing independence. 
30 Brent Harold, "Lolit.a: Nabokov's Critique on Abofness, • 
Papers on Language and Literature, 11 ( Winter 1975) p. 78. 
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It is finally Lolita who makes the proposition that 
she and Humbert leave Beardsley and embark on another jour-
ney: 
'Look, ' she said as she rode the bike beside me, 
one foot scraping the darkly glistening sidewalk, 'look, 
I've decided something. I want to leave school. I 
hate that school. I hate the play, I really do! Never 
go back. Find another. Leave at once. Go for a 
long trip again. But this time we go wherever .!.. want, 
won't we?' 
I nodded. My Lolita. 
'I choose? C'est entendu?' she asked wobbling a 
little beside me. Used French only when she was a 
very good little girl ( L p. 2 0 5 ) • 
Each of her utterances is a curt declaration of her own 
autonomy: "Look, I've decided"; ".!.. want"; "I hate". 
The French which she uses "only when she was a very good 
little girl," is an index to the transgression of Symbolic 
Law which her life with Humbert has fostered, and which 
she now practises to her own advantage in order to subvert 
his control. Humbert is no longer the dee is ion-maker as 
HUMBERT poignantly seems to acknowledge in his nostalgic 
retrospective aside, "My Lolita." 
THE SECOND JOURNEY AND THE LOSS OF THE PLAYFUL OTHER 
As the second journey begins HUMBERT presents the 
reader with an overt warning: 
I now warn the reader not to mock me and my mental 
daze. It is easy for him and me to decipher now a 
past destiny; but a destiny in the making is, believe 
me, not one of those honest mystery stories where all 
you have to do is keep an eye on the clues. In my 
youth I once read a French detective tale where the 
clues were actually in italics; but that is not McFate's 
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way - even if one does to learn to recognize certain 
obscure indications ( L p. 209). 
In this warning the reader may recognize HUMBERT's cynicism 
towards the concept of a world that inherently manifests 
meaning. Humbert, as protagonist surrounded by the play 
of numerous possible meanings, is unable to recognize or 
establish a particular pattern of meaning, until in retro-
spect he adopts a particular fixed subjective position -
the position of HUMBERT the confessant - from which he 
can impose a particular interpretation on his experiences. 
Thus if the confession is to develop the characteristics 
of a detective novel such as the quest to solve the mystery 
of the identity of Humbert's rival and Lolita's abductor, 
HUMBERT refuses to follow the convention of foregrounding 
particular signs as s igni f iers for the reader. It is there-
fore impossible for the reader to establish the identity 
of Humbert's rival, as it is for Humbert himself to do 
so. Ironically even when clues are provided in italics, 
for example Qu'il ~ (L p. 221), it is not likely that 
the reader will recognize their significance. 
On his first odyssey with Lolita, Humbert had been 
conscious of the power of two forces to deprive him of 
his nymphet. On one hand he ran the risk of apprehension 
by the police for his crime of child-abduction; on the 
other hand he ran the risk that other admirers might in 
their turn abduct Lolita from him. On his second odyssey 
the precariousness of his position is increased by the 
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diminishment of his authority over Lolita. His only certain 
form of defence against threats of intervention appears 
to be his pocket automatic: 
• • • 'Particularly well adapted for use in the home and 
car as well as on the person.' There it lay, ready 
for instant service on the person or persons, loaded 
and fully cocked with the slide locked in safety posi-
tion, thus precluding any accidental discharge. We 
must remember that a pistol is the Freudian symbol 
of the Urfather's central forelimb (L p. 214). 
The presence of the gun seems to promise at last fulfil-
ment of one of the first questions that the text might 
have provoked in the reader, the question of who Humbert 
eventually murdered. 
While HUMBERT's comparison of the gun to the phallus 
may be dismissed as another parodic gibe at Freudian psycho-
analytic theory, the Lacanian translation of Freudian sexual 
imagery in linguistic terms adds a further dimension to 
this passage. If the gun is translated as the Phallus 
rather than the phallus, Humbert's faith in his Phallic 
gun, his power to signify, is to prove ill-founded, for 
he is soon to discover that the Phallus is the possession 
of Other unknown authors who like him are fascinated by 
the prospect of play with the forbidden nymphet. If initi-
ally he suspects then that his shadow is "a detective whom 
some busybody had hired to see what exactly Humbert Humbert 
was doing with that minor stepdaughter of his• (L p. 215), 
he gradually recognizes that this shadow is his rival. 
For there is no doubt that the Other is also the possessor 
of the phallus/Phallus: 
301 
There he stood, in the camouflage of sun and shade 
• • • his hirsute thighs dripping with bright droplets, 
his tight wet black bathing trunks bloated and bursting 
with vigour where his great fat bullybag was pulled 
up and back like a padded shield over his reversed 
beasthood ( L p. 2 3 5 ) • 
Even his car has phallic qualities: " a red hood pro-
truded in somewhat codpiece fashion ••• " (L. p. 212). 
That Clare Quilty can be interpreted as Humbert's 
h f . . 31 Double seems t e consensus o numerous cr1t1cs. However 
what appears to be missing from discussions of the nature 
and role of Quilty in HUMBERT' s text is an elucidation 
of his paradoxical nature as both a part of Humbert, yet 
not a part; the same as Humbert yet different from him. 
This paradox is suggested both in HUMBERT' s description 
of Quilty as "my shadow" (L p. 218), and in the more com-
prehensive descriptions, for example, 
I saw him scratch his cheek and nod, and turn, and 
walk back to his convertible, a broad and thickish 
man of my age, somewhat resembling Gustave Trapp, 
a cousin of my father's in Switzerland - same smoothly 
tanned face, fuller than mine, with a small dark mous-
tache and a rosebud degenerate mouth (L p. 216). 
Here Quilty's similarity to Humbert in age and family resem-
blance are balanced by the difference in facial shape and 
the presence of the aoustache which Humbert had once con-
sidered growing (L. p. 48). 
31 For example: Alfred Appel, "Lolita: The Springboard of 
Parody," p. 127. Julia Bader, crystal Land, p. 70 & 74. 
G. M. Hyde, Vladimir Nabokov - America's Russian Novelist (London: 
Marion Boyars, 1977) pp. 115-122. L.L. Lee, Vladimir Nabokov 
(London: George Prior, 1976) p. 120. Robert Levine, ''My Ultra-
violet Darling': The Loss of Lolita's Childhood," p. 473. Robert 
Merrill, "Nabokov and Fictional Artifice,• Modern Fiction Studies, 
25 (1979) p. 453. 
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The possibility that •quilted Quilty• (L p. 304), 
as Humbert's Other, is the collection or compound of sub-
jective positions which in their difference from Humbert's 
give definition to his identity, is supported by Julia 
Bader who remarks that the name Quilty • ••• denotes the 
idea of his being a patchwork of a number of characters." 32 
Bader' s reading also corroborates the view of Quilty as 
an alternative authorial position which reveals the •other 
perspective" of play with a nymphet. Al though it is in 
HUMBERT' s interests to interpret his crime as the action 
of an artist who is infinitely susceptible to, and appreci-
ative of, the mysteriousness of nymphancy, from the Other 
position of Quilty - the position which Humbert had attemp-
ted to repress - play with a nymphet is no more than the 
sordid indulgence of a pervert. As Bader argues, 
Quilty, ••• as a rival, is a practitioner of thoroughly 
conventional art. He is a •public• author; he appears 
in cigarette ads and teenage magazines, and makes porno-
graphic movies. He also •files little girls,• and the 
prison Who's Who informs Humbert that Quilty's •many 
plays for children are notable,• such as The Little 
Nymph (in which Lolita plays the main character in 
the Ramsdale production). Quilty makes use of art 
in a cold, calculating way, he has no creative power 
(significantly, he oonfesses to Humbert that he did 
not enjoy Lolita because he is impotent) ; he uses 
Lolita for a brief scene and then discards her. 
The amorphous figure of Quilty is a threat to the 
artistic integrity of Humbert's creation. 33 
Although Humbert attempts to repress the existence of this 
Other which takes the form of a threatening shadow, he 
32 Julia Bader, p. 73. 
33 Julia Bader, p. 73. 
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cannot evade the fact that Lolita is now beyond his control. 
Repeatedly she threatens to disappear from him completely 
and he is forced to recognize that any semblance of autho-
rity that he had over her is no longer effective. Eventu-
ally his worst fears are fulfilled and she is abducted 
34 by •uncle Gustav• on Independence Day. Humbert the bereft 
author/lover/father is left only with his gun/Phallus and 
the freedom to use it - •1 still had my gun, and was still 
a free man - free to trace the fugitive, free to destroy 
my brother• (L p. 245). 
THE CRYPTOGRAMMIC PAPERCHASE 
Once he has lost Loli ta, Humbert embarks on a vain 
quest after her and her abductor. Be at tempts to fol low 
the textual network of signs which Quilty appears to have 
left in various hotel registers. In following the frag-
3 4 Carl Proffer offers the following calculations whereby this 
date can be deduced : 
•Humbert is in a nearby motel when Quilty checks Lolita 
out of the Elphinstxme hospital just after two o'clock. The 
date can be deduced. That very day as Humbert lay ill: 
•.. • there was some great national celebration in town judging 
by the firecrackers, veritable bombs, that exploded all the 
time ••• • {p. 247). At five minutes to two he receives a 
solicitous phone call from the hospital; he assures the nurse 
he won't visit until the next day. But the next day he 
learns that Lolita had checked out of. the hospital - and 
his life - just after two o'clock. In the next chapter, buried 
not too obtrusively in a passage describing Humbert's itine-
rary for June and July, he notes that Lo and he had reached 
Elphinstone •aoout a week before Independence nay• (p. 249). 
Quilty, with a Nabokovian sense of. irony, had oontrived 
to liberate Lolita from Humbert on the Fourth of July. But 
lucky Humbert does not make the oonnection and is spared 
the cruel wit. • - Keys to Lolita p. 7. 
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ments of this text, Humbert ceases to be the •author• in-
vi ting and controlling the play of the Other, but must 
take instead the role of the reader faced with establishing 
meaning from playful signifiers which seem recognizable 
as signs yet which refuse to fit satisfactorily into an 
order of clear signification. He becomes fearfully con-
scious that he is the object or victim of meanings which 
play beyond his control. 
Quilty, 
As Brent Harold argues, it is 
• • • (as Trapp) who by his playful manipulation and 
dropping of hints makes Humbert feel throughout most 
of part 2 that he is less an artist than a character 
in somebody else's book. 3 5 
HUMBERT recounts his humiliations as follows: 
'Oh,' I would say, 'I am almost positive that I stayed 
here once - let me look up the entries for mid-June 
- no, I see I'm wrong after all - what a very quaint 
name for a home town, Ka wtagain. ' ( L p. 246 ) • 
On other occasions the elusiveness of the literary allusions 
is more frustrating: 
• • • 'N.S. Arist:Dff, Catagela, NY'? What was the sting 
in 'Catagela'? And what about 'James Manor Morell, 
Hoaxton, England'? 'Aristophanes'., 'hoax' - fine, 
but what was I missing? (L p. 249).3b 
35 Brent Harold, •Lolita: Nabokov's Critique on Aloofness," 
p. 78. 
36 Once again Carl Proffer' s research is interesting: 
•catagela is the punningly comic name of a nonexistent city 
in Aristophanes' Archarnians ( 1 606). The name is derived from 
the Greek verb katagelao, iito sneer", •to smirk.• This is the 
'sting"' Humbert does not feel. .Jaaes Mavor Morell is one of the 
characters in George Bernard Shaw's candida and Boxton is one 
ex the towns where the play is set.• - Keys to Lolita, p. 15. 
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Humbert's vain pursuit of Quilty and Lolita is reminiscent 
of his earlier quests after nymphic Otherness in Ramsdale. 
At that time he had felt himself to be the plaything of 
a power beyond him, some devil who was using Loli ta as 
the means of torment: 
for all the devil's inventiveness, the scheme re-
mained daily the same. First he would tempt me 
and then thwart me, leaving me with a dull pain in 
the very root of my being ( L p. 55). 
Now once again Lolita is affiliated with a "demoniacal", 
malicious gamester: 
• • • he succeeded in thoroughly enmeshing me and my 
thrashing anguish in his demoniacal game. With infinite 
skill, he swayed and staggered, and regained an impos-
sible balance, always leaving me with the sportive hope 
- if I may use such a term in speaking of betrayal, 
fury, desolation, horror and hate - that he might give 
himself away next time. He never did - though coming 
damn close to it ( L p. 24 7). 
While Humbert's earlier quest had been characterized 
by his obsessive wish to attain the Other, his second quest 
is punct4ated by a series of recognitions. Firstly, he 
becomes increasingly aware of the many similarities between 
his rival and himself: 
The clues he left did not establish his identity but 
they reflected his personality, or at least a certain 
homogeneous and striking personality; his genre, his 
type of humour - at its best at least - the tone of 
his brain, had affinities with my own. Be mimed and 
mocked ae. His allusions were definitely highbrow. 
He was well-read. Be knew French. Be was versed 
in logodaedaly and logomancy. Be was an amateur of 
sex lore (L p. 247-248). 
Secondly, Humbert reaches the conclusion that while he 
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is still susceptible to the attractions of nymphancy, he 
no longer envisages their attainment, but respects their 
forbidden nature: 
I would be a knave to say, and the reader a fool 
to believe, that the shock of losing Lolita cured me 
of pederosis. My accursed nature could not change, 
no matter how my love for her did. On playgrounds 
and beaches, my sullen and stealthy eye, against my 
will, still sought out the flash of a nymphet's limbs, 
the sly tokens of Lolita's handmaids and rose-girls. 
But one essential vision in me had withered: never 
did I dwell now on possibilities of bliss with a little 
maiden, specific or synthetic, in some out~f-the-way 
place; never did my fancy sink its fangs into Lolita's 
sisters, far far away, in the coves of evoked islands. 
That was all over, for the tinE being at least (L p. 255). 
While the ideal of play with the Other is still profoundly 
fascinating to Humbert, and while he still is the victim 
of Desire, he has abandoned the phantasy of attaining Other-
ness in a state of transcendent perfection. At this point 
his relationship with Rita, the substitute for Lolita seems 
to reflect his agreement to compromise between the sublime 
but taboo relationship with a nymphet and the tedious but 
conventio~al relationship with •ordinary• women. In Rita 
there is a blend of the transgressive and the permissible 
which renders her a comfortable companion to Humbert. Being 
"three-quarters• his age, she does not carry the sexual 
taboo of childhood which defined Lolita as forbidden fruit. 
However, Rita does have the traces of nymphic charm, • the 
oddly prepubescent curve of her back, her ricey skin, her 
slow languorous columbine kisses• (L p. 257) that comfort 
Humbert. If she is neither subtle nor intelligent, she 
is "such a good sport,• an appreciator of nonsense, farce 
and antics but not of rare wit. 
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Rita, like a nymphet, 
is sexually attractive; however she does not possess the 
subtle Otherness recognizable only by Artists and Madmen, 
but instead the unremarkable attraction of accessible dif-
ference which is freely played with and discarded by in-
numerable lovers. Her promiscuity is suggested in Humbert's 
remark that while she had "recently divorced her third 
husband - and a little more recently had been abandoned 
by her seventh cavalier servant - the others, the mutables, 
were too numerous and mobile to tabulate" (~ p. 256). Dur-
ing her cohabitation with Humbert, she becomes involved 
with a variety of men: •a pretty awful crook" ( L p. 257), 
"Roland MacCrum" (L p. 259), •a pocket-sized wizened trucu-
lently tight old man" ( L p. 261); yet none of these passing 
infidelities disturbs Humbert. He seems to accept them 
as an inherent part of the accessibility which had made 
her available to him in the first place. He comments, 
"I dare say she would have given herself to any pathetic 
creature qf fallacy, an old broken tree or a bereaved por-
cupine, out of sheer chumminess and compassion" (L p. 256). 
If it is not stretching a point to interpret a pun on the 
word "fallacy" (phallus-y) it could be argued that Rita 
is the embodiment of obvious, accessible linguistic play 
which is easily recognized and freely played with by all 
linguistic subjects as possessors of the Phallus. 
It has already been argued that the latter portion 
of HUMBERT's confession follows the pattern of a detective 
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novel in which the quest object is Humbert's rival. It 
is only after three years, when Loli ta, transformed into 
the undistinguished, pregnant and impecunious housewife, 
Dolly Schiller, appeals to Humbert for financial assistance, 
that the identity of his rival is disclosed. 
Gun at the ready, Humbert traces Loli ta to her pre-
vious address at •10 Killer Street,• and thereafter to 
•aunter Road, last house.• During the course of their 
strained conversation Lolita reveals the name of her abduc-
tor. HUMBERT's description of this revelation is fascina-
ting from a Lacanian perspective. It is recalled as follows: 
She said really it was useless, she would never tell, 
but on the other hand, after all - 'Do you really want 
to know who it was? Well, it was -' 
And softly, confidentially, arching her thin eyebrows 
and puckering her parched lips, she emitted, a little 
mockingly, somewhat fastidiously, not untenderly, in 
a kind of muted whistle, the name that the astute reader 
has guessed long ago. 
Waterproof? Why did a flash from Hourglass Lake 
cross my consciousness? I, too, had known it, without 
knowing it, all along. There was no shock, no sur-
prise. Quietly the fusion took place, and everything 
fell into order, into the pattern of branches that I 
have woven throughout this memoir with the express 
purpose of having the ripe fruit fall at the right ID:m=nt; 
yes, with the express and perverse purpose of rendering 
- she was talking but I sat melting in my golden peace 
- of rendering that golden and monstrous peace through 
the satisfaction of local recognition, which my most 
inimical reader should experience now (L p. 270}. 
The primary irony of this passage is that, even for a re-
markably astute reader, the name of the seducer is almost 
certain to remain concealed. HUMBERT, without giving the 
reader the name, only assures him that he ought to know 
it, or more tantalizingly, that he does know it. The name -
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the answer to the riddle - has been woven into the textual 
discourse and awaits recognition. Yet, even with HUMBERT's 
assurance, the reader is unlikely to be able to translate 
this apparently unconscious knowledge into the conscious. 
A page later, HUMBERT translates it for him as he recounts 
Dolly Schiller's continued conversation: 
Did I know - it had been horrid of her to sidetrack 
me into believing that Clare was an old female, maybe 
a relative of his or a sometime life mate - and oh, what 
a close shave it had been when the Wace Journal carried 
his picture ( L p. 271). 
This passage then, translates what had appeared untrans-
latable. •c1are" which conventionally signifies "woman" 
is revealed to signify "man.• If earlier the reader had 
read •c1are Quilty" as "female playwright" and therefore 
irrelevant to his quest for the name of a male sexual per-
vert, he is now allowed to recognize the ambiguity he had 
overlooked. 37 
•waterproof. 
Furthermore, if he takes up HUMBERT's clue, 
Why did a flash from Hourglass Lake cross 
my consciousness?" he may, in a form of textual "regres-
sion," trace his way back to the "primal scene" in which 
the repression of the ambiguity an:'3 the subsequent misunder-
standing of the name "Clare Quilty" first arose. The day 
Humbert had contemplated drowning Charlotte Haze at Hour-
37 It may be that the astute reader will have noticed HUM-
BERT' s retrospective reference to Clare Quilty as male, for example, 
in his quotation of the prison copy of Who's Who (L pp. 31-32). 
However, fo.llowing the perspective of Humbert who-is oblivious 
of this ambiguity at the time of his affair with Lolita, it is most 
likely that the reader would either overlook, or even forget, such 
clues. 
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glass Lake, Jean Farlow, who had been painting in the woods 
surrounding the lake appeared on the scene. 
sation ran like this: 
Their conver-
From the debouchment of the trail came a rustle, 
a fcx:>t:fall, and Jean Farlow marched down with her 
easel and things. • •• 
'I almost put both of you into my lake,' she cried. 
'I even noticed something you overlooked. You [addres-
sing Humbert] had your wrist watch on in, yes, sir, 
you had.' 
'Waterproof,' said Charlotte softly, making a fish 
mouth. 
Jean took my wrist upon her knee and examined Char-
lotte's gift, then put back Humbert's hand on the sand, 
palm up. 
'You could see anything that way,' remarked Charlotte 
coquettishly. 
Jean sighed, 'I once saw,' she said, 'two children, 
male and female, at sunset, right here, making love. 
Their shadows were giants. And I told you about Mr 
Tomson at daybreak. Next time I expect to see fat 
old Ivor in the ivory. He is really a freak, that man. 
Last time he told me a completely indecent story about 
his nephew. It appears-' 
'Hullo there,' said John's voice ( L pp. 88-89, square 
brackets are HUMBERT'S). 
With the name "Ivor," Jean Farlow refers to Ivor Quilty, 
uncle of Clare Quilty. John Farlow's arrival and the con-
sequent interruption of Jean Farlow's anecdote, causes 
two "repressions" to take place. Firstly the name "Clare 
Quilty," which is likely to have come to light in the anec-
dote, is repressed so that Humbert and therefore the reader, 
fail to make the connection between Ivor Quilty' s nephew 
and Clare Quilty, or in other words, the connection that 
"Clare Quilty" is ambiguously a female name which represents 
a man. Secondly, Jean Farlow's "indecent• story is "cen-
sored" and with it the knowledge of Clare Quilty's profane 
sexual tastes. The "meaning" that remains after the re-
311 
press ion is that Ivor Quilty has an indecent nephew, and 
that Clare Quilty who is not mentioned in this conversa-
tion, is a female playwright who works with her partner, 
Vivian Darkbloom. 
To return to Humbert's revelation then: if up to 
this point Humbert has viewed himself as Lolita'a apprecia-
tive lover, he now is able to recognize the Otherness in 
his role - the perversion of a child-violator. Like Oedi-
pus, like Special Agent Wallas, he finds that he has pur-
sued a relentless quest after an anonymous criminal, only 
to discover that he himself is clearly guilty 
Q ·1 38 Ul ty. 
REPRESSING THE TRANSGRESSIVE OTHER: 
THE "DEATH" OF CLARE QUILTY 
Clare 
If Humbert's mistake was to transgress the law by 
playing with the forbidden nymphic Other in the hope of 
attaining a state of •transcendent perfection•, he now 
recognizes the failure of his aspirations and resolves 
to •murder• or repress the playfulness of his own trans-
gressive Other. 
The setting of Quilty' s home, Paver Manor, in which 
Humbert's final encounter with his Other takes place, has 
an unreal, dreamlike or fictional character, rationally 
accounted for in HUMBERT's narrative as the effects of 
the aftermath of a thunderstorm, of Humbert's •alcoholic 
38 I owe this pun to Appel, •Lolita: The Springboard of 
Parody,• p. 127. 
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stimulation," and of the strangely unguarded front door 
which swings open "as in a medieval fairy tale" {L p. 292). 
This suggestion of unreality prevails throughout the con-
frontation of Humbert with Quilty, for al though Humbert 
has planned the latter's execution with deadly logic, the 
resolution of his actions and the progress of his plan 
are constantly threatened by the intrusion of "non-sense" 
and the unexpected. This problem presents itself simul-
taneously at the level of the reading, for this scene re-
fuses interpretation as either simply "real" - a part of 
Humbert's conscious experience - or as "unreal• - an imagined 
event. Any at tempt to read it as part of Humbert's bio-
graphy, as the brutal, vengeful murder of a rival in love, 
is liable to be subverted by repeated irruptions of the 
comical, fantastic and bizarre, which mock the sense and 
order of any rational reading. 
Where earlier then, Quilty had been the unrecognized 
shadow who hovered on the periphery of Humbert's "artistic" 
world, now the converted Humbert intrudes into the decadent 
luxury of Quilty's "den" as the unrecognized, lurking sha-
dow. 'Ibis is illustrated when Humbert, beginning his "closure 
of play" by "turning whatever keys in whatever locks there 
were and pocketing them with my free hand" {L p. 293), 
comes unexpectedly upon Quilty as the latter emerges from 
the bath room. 
his presence: 
Quilty, however, does not appear aware of 
• • • he swept by me in a purple bathrobe, very like 
one I had. He either did not notice me, or else dis-
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missed me as some familiar and innocuous hallucination -
(L p. 293). 
While Quilty wears the purple bathrobe of the formerly 
sensuous, decadent Humbert, the converted Humbert, a "rain-
coated phantasm," wears under his raincoat "a black suit, 
a black shirt, no tie" (L p. 294) of Quilty's dark repres-
sor. As already indicated however, this repression or 
"murder" of the guilty self is by no means easily executed. 
Play constantly threatens the resolution of Humbert's act-
ions. When, for example, he unwraps what should be his 
carefully oiled gun, he finds it absurdly befouled: "I 
think I got the wrong product; it was black and awfully 
messy" ( L p. 293). And if the oily gun is to be read as 
the Phallus, Humbert's verbal confrontation with Quilty 
is confounded by the slipperiness of the signifier. Quilty 
has a penchant for logodaedaly and 1 ike the former trans-
gressive Humbert, interpolates smatterings of French and 
literary references into his discourse. As Humbert attempts 
to eliminate the ambiguities in their conversation and 
force Quilty to understand the particularity of his crime, 
Quilty evades Humbert's accusations by introducing digres-
sions and verbal play into their dialogue: 
'People,' he said, • •• people invade this damned 
house without even knocking. They use the vaterre, 
they use the kitchen, they use the telephone. Phil 
calls Philadelphia. Pat calls Patagonia. I refuse to 
pay. You have a funny accent, Captain. ' 
'Quilty, ' I said , 'do you recall a little girl called 
Dolores Haze, Dolly Haze? Dally called Dolores, Colo.?' 
'Sure, she may have made those calls, sure. Any 
place, Paradise, Wash., Bell canyon. Who cares?' 
'I do, Quilty. You see, I am her father. ' 
( L p. 294-295). 
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While Quilty evades reminders of his earlier cryptogrammic 
play, Humbert identifies himself in his proper place as 
Loli ta' s father who has the right to take her seducer to 
task. Occasionally both Humbert and Quilty seem to lose 
control of their own utterances, for example, Quilty burbles 
" Woolly-woo-boo-are?" as if lost in the play of the 
French sounds, "Voulez-vous boire?" while Humbert on the 
other hand becomes lost in the convolutions of English 
syntax, "I said I had said I thought he had said he had 
never - (L p. 294). 
When Humbert eventually attempts to shoot Quilty, 
his gun at first does not go off at all, and when on the 
second attempt it does, the sound it makes seems to Humbert 
"ridiculously feeble and juvenile The bullet entered 
the thick pink rug, and I had the paralysing impression 
that it had merely trickled in and might come out again" 
(L p. 296). When Quilty knocks the gun out of his hand, 
it slides beyond the reach of both of them under a chest 
of drawers. The struggle which ensues, focusing on the 
possession of the gun/Phallus, is the struggle for authorial 
supremacy. In the fight for possession of the signifying 
power, the contending subjective positions of Self and 
Other are temporarily indistinguishable as one asubjective, 
struggling conglomerate: 
We rolled all over the floor, in each other's arms, 
like two huge helpless children. He was naked and 
goatish under his robe, and I felt suffocated as he 
rolled over me. I rolled over him. We rolled over 
ne. 'Ibey rolled over him. We rolled over us (L p. 297). 
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Even when Humbert, having regained his dominant position, 
attempts to shoot Quilty, he realizes that each attempt 
to use his "power of signification" on the Other, seems 
to provide the latter with the opportunity for further 
play: 
in distress, in dismay, I understood that far from 
killing him I was injecting spurts of energy into the 
poor fellow, as if the bullets had been capsules wherein 
a heady elixir danced (L p. 302). 
What begins as the stealthy stalking of the victim by the 
murderer, explodes into a carnival of "non-sense" as the 
murderer pursues the victim in a series of kangaroo jumps 
"remaining quite straight on straight legs while bouncing 
up twice in his wake,• and the victim, like a clown who 
uses even death as material for comedy, refuses to be silen-
ced. Even in "death", the macabre image of the victim, 
"a quarter of his face gone,• is transformed into bizarre 
comedy by the detail of "two flies beside themselves with 
a dawning sense of unbelievable luck" ( L p. 303). Evocative 
of the earlier description of Charlotte Haze's "porridge 
of bone, brains, bronze hair and blood" (L p. 98), the 
taboos of death and cannibalism are profaned by the anthro-
pomorphised flies, and the implication that the corpse 
is a goodly feast. 
As Humbert departs from Pavor Manor, he announces 
to Clare Quilty's friends who have assembled in the drawing-
room for drinks, that he has murdered the playwright. 
The response he receives supports the interpretation of 
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his "murder" as an "interior" or "private" repression rather 
than a literal action. The three responses, "Good for 
you"; "Somebody ought to have done it long ago"; and "I 
guess we all should do it to him some day" suggest that 
the kind of "killing" Humbert has performed is more rele-
vant to himself than to anyone else. 
action that anybody can perform. 
It is an i terable 
Furthermore, it does 
not have the finality of 1 i teral murder, for even when 
he has been "conclusively" silenced, the Other is able 
to emerge again, to "crawl out on to the landing," so that 
HUMBERT's assurance that Quilty subsides "for ever this 
time, in a purple heap" cannot be entirely trusted. After 
so many refusals of closure, the reader may come to expect 
the reappearance of the Other as inevitable. Thus, although 
Humbert, departing, affirms to himself that this is "the 
end of the ingenious play staged for me by Quilty" ( L p. 
304), a playfulness, subdued to wry absurdity still hovers 
about his narrative: 
With a heavy heart I left the house and walked through 
the spotted blaze of t.""le sun to my car. Two other 
cars were parked on both sides of it, and I had some 
trouble squeezing out (L p. 304). 
Thus Humbert's exit from the "stage of play" is made to 
the comically profane sound of grinding motorcar bodywork. 
IN CONCLUSION 
Once Humbert has "killed" Quilty, there is little 
more to tell, • ••• the rest is a little flattish and faded" 
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{L p. 304). To enliven this flatness, Humbert decides, 
• • • not by way of protest, not as a symbol, or anything 
like that, but merely as a novel experience - that 
since I had disregarded all laws of humanity, I might 
as well disregard the rules of traffic (L p. 304, my 
emphasis). 
With this "novel experience,• Humbert's travels, HUMBERT's 
confession, and NABOKOV's novel, approach their respective 
conclusions. As Humbert swerves to avoid a road-block, 
his car leaves the road and comes to rest high on a grassy 
slope. Waiting for the arrival of the police and the ambu-
lance men, Humbert recalls the following scene: 
And while I was waiting for them to run up to me on 
the high slope, I evoked a last mirage of wonder and 
hopelessness. One day, soon after her disappearance, 
an attack of abominable nausea forced me to pull up 
on the ghost of an old mountain road that now accompan-
ied, now traversed a brand new high way, with its popu-
lation of asters bathing in the detached warmth of a 
pale-blue afternoon in late summer. After coughing 
myself inside out, I rested a while on a boulder, and 
then, thinking the sweet air might do me good, walked 
a little way toward a low stone parapet on the precipice 
side of the highway. Small grasshoppers spurted out 
of the withered roadside weeds. A very light cloud 
was opening its arms and moving toward a slightly more 
substantial one belonging to another, more sluggish 
heavenlo3ged system. As I approached the friendly 
abyss, I grew aware of a melodious unity of sounds 
rising like vapour from a small mining town that lay 
at my feet, in a fold in the valley. One could make 
out the geometry of the streets between blocks of red 
and grey roofs, and green puffs of trees, and a ser-
pentine stream and the rich, ore-like glitter of the 
city dump, and beyond the town, roads criss-crossing 
the crazy guilt of dark and pale fields, and behind 
it all, great timbered mountains. But even brighter 
than those quietly rejoicing oolours - for there are 
colours and shades that seem to enjoy themselves in 
good oompany - both brighter and dreamier to the ear 
than they were to the eye, was that vapoury vibration 
of accumulated sounds that never ceased for a moment, 
as it rose to the lip of granite where I stood wiping 
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my foul mouth. And soon I realized that all these 
sounds were of one nature, that no other sounds but 
these came from the streets of the transparent town, 
with the women at home and the men away. Reader! 
What I heard was but the melody of children at play, 
nothing but that, and so limpid was the air that within 
this vapour of blended voices, majestic and minute, 
remote and magically near, frank and divinely enig-
matic - one could hear now and then, as if released , 
an almost articulate spurt of vivid laughter, or the 
crack of a bat or the clatter of a toy wagon, but it 
was all really too far for the eye to distinguish any 
movement in the lightly etched streets. I stood listen-
ing to that musical vibration from my lofty slope, to 
those fl.ashes of separate cries with a kind of demure 
murmur for background, and then I knew that the hope-
lessly poignant thing was not Lolita's absence from 
my side, but the absence of her voice from that concord 
(L pp. 305-306). 
The particularly striking feature of this reminiscence 
is the change of tone which it manifests: it is devoid 
of the digressive playfulness which throughout the confes-
sion has threatened to divert the reader's attention away 
from the textual message toward the code by which that 
message is represen tea. Suddenly it would seem that the 
Desire to play with linguistic difference and expose the 
arbitrary nature of meaning is superseded by the Desire 
to reduce the play of difference and delimit the meaning 
of the text precisely. This del imitation is established 
by the overt patterning of the text. The image on which 
this patterning focuses is nthe melody of children at play.• 
At first this melody is perceived by Humbert as •a melodious 
unity of sounds rising like vapour from a small mining 
town.• It seems that the elements of concord and delicate 
ephemerality are identified as peculiar to the sound, since 
these elements are apparent in each reference to it: •that 
vapoury vibration of accumulated 
of blended voices," "that musical 
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sounds," "this vapour 
vibration" and finally 
"tha t concord. " However, the sound is also described by 
the juxtaposition of contradictory adjectives: it is "ma-
jestic and minute, remote and magically near, frank and 
divinely enigmatic. n Each adjectival couple suggests the 
ambivalence of Humbert's response to the sound as both 
unremarkable, yet simultaneously mysterious or Other, as 
that which defies satisfactory representation in language, 
since its Otherness can only be indicated by semantic contra-
diction. 
Reinforcing Humbert's experience of this "melody" 
is the concord which he notices in his surroundings and 
which he interprets by personifying various features of 
the scene as members of an harmonious community: the old 
mountain road is described as "accompanying" the new highway; 
the asters "bathe" in the afternoon warmth; two clouds 
are personified as an embracing couple - "a very light 
cloud was opening its arms and moving toward a slightly 
more substantial one" - the abyss Humbert approaches is 
"friendly," and the colours of the distant view are "quiet-
ly rejoicing." 
Syntactically, the many co-ordinations, subordinations, 
parenthetical elaborations and qualifications are all direc-
ted towards the finer definition of the harmony of the 
scene. Devices such as alliteration in, for example, "Small 
grasshopper~ ~urted" or "criss-crossing the crazy quilt• 
seem to reinforce at the level of the signifier the semantic 
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connection that is being made at the level of the signified. 
If there is potential for semantic play in the passage -
for example, the use of the word "quiltn in ncriss-crossing 
the crazy quilt" may evoke in the reader the expectation 
of a play on "quilted Quil tyn - the digression of such 
play is not invited to disrupt the cohesion of the discourse. 
What this reminiscence seems to emphasize then is 
that Humbert has come to appreciate the concord which is 
only possible if the Otherness of the forbidden is respect-
ed and al lowed to occupy its place as the inaccessible. 
By making twelve year old Dolores Haze his "Lolita", he 
violated the very Symbolic Order which gave her her nymphic 
charm and transformed her into a devalued, easily accessi-
ble plaything. Only when he finds that he has lost Lolita 
for ever, when she becomes transformed into Dolly Schiller, 
does Humbert realize that he loves rather than Desires 
her. Furthermore, he would have been able to continue 
to love her had he been content, from the start, to take 
his proper role as her father, and allowed her to remain 
one of the children whose playful cries he now so poignantly 
respects. 
HUMBERT's confession, then, reaches full circle as 
Humbert experiences the conversion, a process described 
by William Spengemann as follows: 
Conversion completes both the doctrinal lesson of faith 
and the form that was projected by the initial distinc-
tion between the self-deluded protagonist and the self-
aw are narrator. When the protagonist gives way to 
the narrator, his story ends. At the same instant, 
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the narrator is born to tell the story already told. 
The end joins the beginning to form an endless circle, 
which is at once the figure described by the narrative, 
the symbol of mortal life made et.ernal by faith, and 
the mystical emblem of God. 39 
As Humbert becomes HUMBERT, the "tangle of thorns" of the 
confession reaches full circle, evoking the Christian image 
of the crown of thorns, the symbol of suffering in the 
interest of common salvation. If Humbert had made the 
fatal error of believing that a state of transcendent per-
fection was attainable in play with the Other, as HUMBERT 
he has been able to record the tragedy of his experience 
as a lesson to the reader. If the latter had hoped initi-
ally to discover the "full truth" of Humbert's transgres-
sion, and had thereby re-enacted Humbert's mistaken Desire 
for "full revelation", he may appreciate in retrospect 
that he has been spared the consequences of his mistake 
by HUMBERT'S enlightenment. The latter has refused to 
represent "full play with the Other" either by graphic 
sexual description which would render the forbidden boringly 
accessible, or by unrestricted linguistic play which must 
result in the loss of any "meaning". 
In conclusion, the common dilemma of the enlightened 
confessant, the dilemma of demonstrating how the enlight-
ened subject proceeds in his newfound wisdom, is resolved 
by Humbert Humbert's acknowledgement that he must die. 
Just as the nymphic Loli ta has "died" in the transforma-
tion to pale, bespectacled, pregnant Dolly Schiller, so 
39 Willia' S 15-16 m pengemann, pp. • 
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Humbert Humbert, the ravisher of nymphets "dies" in the 
process of his conversion to a law-abiding, child-honouring, 
father-figure. Humbert Humbert acknowledges his "death-
sentence" by requesting that his "memoir" - which might 
by its educated wit, rhetorical skill and irresistible 
humour, have defended his "life" - be published "only when 
Lolita is no longer alive." If the reader, then, as jury-
man is tempted to sympathize with Humbert's Desire for 
play with the Other in spite of its "tragic" consequences, 
this sympathy is repressed by Humbert Humbert himself as 
not permissible. H.H. 's only respite then, is to "die" 
before he is tried. The lives of Lolita arrl Humbert Humbert 
close with the conclusion of the text that created them. 
However, for the "benefit of old-fashioned readers who 
wish to follow the destinies of the 'real' people beyond 
the 'true' story" {L p. 6), John Ray Jnr provides the overt 
closure: 
'Humbert Humbert' • • • died in legal captivity, of coro-
nary thrombosis, on November 16, 1952, a few days 
before his trial was scheduled to start. ..• Mrs 'Richard 
F. Schiller' died in child bed , giving birth to a still-
born girl, on Christmas Day 1952, in Gray Star ••• 
( L pp. 6-7). 
Yet if Humbert Humbert and Lolita must be "dead" or textu-
ally closed before the memoir is published, they are para-
doxically immortalized within the "eternal circle" 
confess ion. 
* * * * * 
of the 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE READER AS TEXTUAL UNCONSCIOUS 
IN HENRY JAMES'S WHAT MAISIE KNEW 
• • • the reading must always aim at a certain relation-
ship, unperceived by the writer, between what he 
commands and what he does not command of the patterns 
of the language that he uses. 
Jacques Derrida 
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Before beginning this final chapter of my thesis, 
I want to pause briefly to outline the central issues I 
have discussed in the three preceding chapters. In Chapter 
One, I explored the poss ibi 1 i ty that reading, instead of 
being regarded as the quest to "unveil the truth" of the 
text, may be seen as the quest to discover what the textu-
al discourse must undertake to conceal so as to make an 
•unveiling of the truth" possible. Then, in the second 
chapter, I discussed the possibility that narrative is 
an effect of reading an effect produced by an irresolvable 
conflict or mystery that reproduces itself in its reader 
as the Desire to make meaning or find a resolution. In 
the third chapter, I explored the identity between the 
Desire to transgress social law (in particular sexual law) 
and the Desire to transgress linguistic law, and the social 
and linguistic implications of an attempt to satisfy Desire 
by attaining the forbidden Other. Now in this, the last 
chapter of the thesis, I aim to some extent to synthesize 
these various issues in a reading of Henry James' s novel 
What Maisie Knew. 
Let me begin by remarking that a special fascination 
of What Maisie Knew - and one of the reasons why I have 
chosen it as the text with which to end this thesis - is 
the insight with which it engages with problems which were 
only to be overtly identified and explicated by theorists 
such as Freud and Lacan years after the publication of 
this novel. In brief it is the account of a little girl's 
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quest for "knowledge" or "meaning" within the confusion 
which arises from her parents' divorce and subsequent adul-
terous affairs. The challenge which Maisie Farange faces 
is to know and understand her world when the very dynamic 
principle according to which that world operates - the 
principle of "sexual Desire" 1 - is that which is most stu-
diously hidden from her. What the reader, following Mai-
sie's quest might first of all ask is, what are the impli-
cations of a quest for knowledge in which the unknown would 
appear to be the sexual? 
Now I pointed out in the Introduction to this thesis 
(vide pp. 28-32 ) and again in Chapter Three (vide pp. 229-
230) that one of the most radical undertakings of Lacan' s 
"return to Freud" is his translation of Freudian sexuality 
into linguistic meaning. What Lacan's translation demon-
strates is that Freud's recognition of sexuality as involv-
ing more than the act of copulation, can be read as the 
recognition that meaning involves more than the act of 
literal signification. The argument that there can be 
no such thing as "simple sex" 2 is translatable as the argu-
ment that there can be no such thing as "simple meaning." 
Just as "simple sex" is the product of the conflict between 
a primal urge (the libido) and the social codes which trans-
1 I place the term "sexual Desire" in quotation marks since 
it is an ambiguous term whose significance in this context will, 
I hope, become clearer as this chapter progresses. 
2 See Felman' s commentary on Freud's discussion of this 
issue - "'rurning the Screw of Interpretation,• pp. 108-110. 
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late that urge into "simple" permissible possibilities 
and the repressed excess of forbidden •complications•, 
so the notion of "simple meaning• is the product of the 
conflict between the urge to mean (in French, vouloir dire) 
and the laws of language by which that urge is expressed 
and simple meaning produced, by the repress ion of differ-
ence. This relationship between sexuality and meaning 
is particularly clearly investigated by Shoshana Felman 
in her Freudian reading of another Henry James text, The 
Turn of the Screw. Felman argues, 
If, far from implying the simplicity of a self-present 
literal meaning, sexuality points rather to a multiplicity 
of conflicting forces, to the complexity of its own di-
visiveness and contradiction, its meaning can by no 
means be uni vocal or unified, but must necessarily 
be ambiguous. It is thus not rhetoric which disguises 
and hides sex; sexuality is rhetoric, since it essen-
tially consists of ambiguity: it is the coexistence of 
dynamically antagonistic meanings. Sexuality is the 
division and divisiveness of meaning; it is meaning 
as di vision, meaning as conflict. 3 
If the Lacanian reader is aware of this identity between 
sexuality and rhetoric - an identity which I have already 
explored to some extent in my reading of Nabokov's Loli ta 
in Chapter Three - is it possible for him to identify in 
the text of What Maisie Knew strategies which authorize 
a reading of Maisie's quest in the light of this identity? 
I wish to argue that one of the clearest suggestions of 
this authorization is apparent in the structuring of the 
narrative discourse. However, before I become involved 
3 Felman, •Turning the Screw of Interpretation,• p. 112. 
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in this discussion let me outline the other issues which 
I want to raise in this chapter. 
In her reading of The Turn of the Screw, Shoshana 
Felman argues that narration is a participation in, or 
a performance of, a conflict in meaning which is experienced 
by the reader as an "effect to produce.• This was the 
argument that I followed in my reading of Faulkner's Absalom, 
Absalomt However, while I restricted my argument to a 
discussion of the interpretive activity that took place 
within the framework of the text, and only mentioned peri-
pherally the implication of the reader as a participant 
who is drawn into the text's framework, Felman undertakes 
to explore in detail the possibility that a critical inter-
pretation of a text, and at an even further remove, the 
critical debate about such interpretations, is in fact 
also a performance or repetition of the conf 1 ict drama-
ti zed in the text. She argues, 
The scene of the critical debate is th us a repetition 
of the scene dramatized in the text. The critical inter-
pretation, in other words, not only elucidates the text 
but also reproduces it dramatically, unwittingly parti-
cipates in it. Through its very reading, the text, 
so to speak, acts itself out. As a reading effect, this 
inadvertent "acting out" is indeed uncanny: whichever 
way the reader turns, he can but be turned by the 
text, he can but perform it by repeating it. 4 
By comparing the reading activity to the psychoanalytic 
situation, Felman identifies strategies in the text of 
The Turn of the Screw whereby the story-teller - implicitly 
4 Felman, "Turning the Screw of Interpretation,• p. 101. 
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compared to the analysand in a psychoanalytic situation -
"transfers" on the reader making him the addressee of his 
unconscious, investing him with the authority and prestige 
f h . 1/( • 5 o t e s u Jet- s u ppo s 1::- s av o 1 r ; the reader in a counter-
transference invests the story-teller with like authority. 
Such "transference" or projection of knowledge is effec-
tively a structure of repetition which in analysis links 
the psychoanalyst and the discourse he analyses, or which 
in reading links the reader and the text he reads. In 
psychoanalysis the 'truth' of the unconscious, becomes 
manifest as the analyst finds himself repeating through 
the transference and the counter-transference the dominant 
structures of the analysand's unconscious. Similarly, 
according to Felman's view, the most significant structures 
of a literary text emerge in the reader's transferential 
repetitions of and participation in, the seminal conflicts 
of the textual discourse. Jonathan Culler, reviewing, 
in his work On Deconstruction, recent critical perspectives, 
offers the following summary of the insights which Felman 
achieves, at the same time usefully establishing the place 
which Felman' s own text occupies in relation to the literary 
text she interprets, and the other er i tical interpreta-
tions of that text. He writes, 
5 For explanations of the terms "transference,• •counter-
transference" and sujet-sup~voir in Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
see pages 56-63 of the Introduction. 
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If transference is a structure of re:petition linking ana-
lyst and the analyzed discourse - the patient's or the 
text's - we have something comparable in the situation 
Felman describes: the interpreter replays a pattern 
in the text; reading is displaced re:petition of the 
structure it seeks t.o analyse. In that case, the prior 
readings an interpreter confronts are not errors to be 
discarded, nor partial truths to be complemented by 
contrary truths, but revealing re:petitions of textual 
structures. The value of these readings emerges when 
a later critic - here Felman - transferentially anticipa-
ting a transferential relation between critic and text, 
reads The Turn of the Screw as anticipating and drama-
tizing the quarrels and interpretive moves of earlier 
critics. 6 
Now, following Felman's example, I propose in this chapter 
to take the kind of reading which I offered of Absalom, 
Absalom! a step further, by considering the prior readings 
of What Maisie Knew as performances of the conflict drama-
tized in the text. Because this is only one of various 
tasks of the chapter, I shall, of course, be forced to 
restrict the number of illustrations that I can offer of 
such readings. However, let me remind my reader from the 
outset, that my own reading of What Maisie Knew which con-
stitutes this chapter, stands, like any other, as a "reading 
effect" - the ef feet of my own experience of conf 1 ict in 
the text and my subsequent Desire to resolve that conflict 
by "rewriting" Henry James's discourse. 
Finally, my chief concern in this chapter will be 
to attempt to anticipate transferentially, a transferential 
relation between critic and text, hoping thereby to identify 
in the course of my reading, repeated structures of textual 
6 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction ( London & Henley: Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, 1983) p. 271. 
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conflict and thus the "truth" of the textual unconscious. 
In other words, this will involve an attempt to go beyond 
the exploration undertaken in Chapter One - an attempt 
to reveal, not what may be known, but consciously repressed 
from the textual discourse, but rather what is implicit 
in the discourse as the unrecognized, marginal or uncons-
cious knowledge of the authorial consciousness. 
In summary then, the quest of the chapter is three-
fold: to explore the identity between sexuality and lin-
guistic meaning in What Maisie Knew, to explore prior read-
ings as performances of the textual conflict, but most 
importantly, to attempt to unveil the "unconscious know-
ledge" implicit in the text. To explain the course of 
this threefold project more clearly, let me return again 
to the question of the narrative discourse and how it is 
structured in What Maisie Knew. 
The Reader in the Place of the Other: 
The Narrative Structure of What Maisie Knew 
It has frequently been observed that in his later 
novels, Henry James uses a technique of internal perspec-
tive describable as the point-of-view of a "central intelli-
gence" or "central consciousness". This technique has 
been lucidly described by Roger Fowler as follows: 
• • • the novels are constructed so that the whole of 
their represented world is filtered through the vision 
of one central character, who thus becomes both subject 
and viewpoint simultaneously. • • • A third person narra-
tor deliberately restricts what he tells us to what the 
character has experienced, and relates the experiences 
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in a style which displays the quality of the character's 
engagement with the world. 7 
What Maisie Knew is an example of this use of "central 
intelligence". The subject matter of this text does how-
ever, present a particular problem for this technique, 
for while a child's perceptions and feelings at the age 
of six - the age at which Maisie is introduced to the reader 
- may be both profoundly complex and sensitive, her/his 
linguistic skills at this age must inevitably prevent the 
articulation of these feelings and perceptions to any degree 
of sophistication. The convention is therefore established 
in this text, that the narrator will act as the translator 
of Maisie's perceptions. The reader is invited to expect 
and accept a discourse restricted to Maisie's viewpoint, 
but manifesting the linguistic control of a well-spoken, 
articulate narrator. The place constructed for the reader 
within the text is that of a spectator who has at his side 
a translator, the narrator. The two adults look over the 
shoulder of Maisie, the "mite of a half-scared infant in 
a great dim theatre 118 and observe with her the "images 
bounding across the wall in the slide of a magic lantern" 
(WMK p. 15). These three observers appear to "read II the 
text of Maisie's world simultaneously aN3 if Maisie's inter-
7 Ro3er Fowler, Linguistics and the Novel (London: Methuen 
& Co., 1977), p. 109. 
8 Henry James, What Maisie Knew (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1966 rpt 1980) p. 15. Subsequent references to this work 
will be included in the body of the chapter, using the abbrevia-
tion "WMK" followed by the relevant page number. 
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pretations of this text are not immediately accessible 
to the reader, they are relayed to him by the mediating 
presence of the narrator. 
In this configuration, the reader and the narrator, 
presumably both adults, occupy a different subjective posi-
tion to Maisie in relation to the events they observe, 
so that their interpretations of those events are equally 
liable to be different from hers. Meanings which are in-
accessible to a child such as Maisie may be readily accessi-
ble to the adult interpreters. Limitations in Maisie's 
knowledge manifest themselves as gaps or flaws - otherwise 
recognizable as ironic implications - which open in the 
discourse inviting the interruption or intrusion of the 
adults. 
one of 
Since the role of the narrator is specifically 
translation rather than elaboration of Maisie's 
percept ions, he very rarely interrupts the discourse with 
his own interpretations. Instead, it is the role of the 
reader to elaborate on Maisie's interpretation, to articu-
late that •meaning• which has been excluded from her know-
ledge as unrecognized. 
Any reader's view of what is not recognized in Maisie's 
knowledge will obviously be determined by his particular 
critical perspective. ( In Lacanian terms, the reader's 
view of the •other• will depend on the nature of the codes 
and conventions governing the Symbolic Order to which he 
belongs, the subjective position he adopts within that 
Symbolic Order, and hence the meanings which he will choose 
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to authorize). Since every new reader carries with him 
the potential to belong to a different social context or 
critical school (Symbolic Order) and to adopt a particular 
stand within that context, and since the text of Maisie's 
knowledge itself contains many ambiguities which the narra-
tor only very rarely assists the reader in resolving, it 
is not surprising that the numerous readings of that know-
ledge reflect the "difference" at play in the loci of both 
reader and text. It is worth considering briefly some 
of the more marked differences of meaning which arise in 
these readings. 
Many critics regard Maisie's knowledge as "corrupt". 
Amongst these is firstly, Oscar Cargill who concludes that 
the little girl is the "refuse-catching vortex about whom 
a current of dissolute life pulses and whirls. " 9 Like 
Cargill, Harris W. Wilson regards Maisie as corrupted by 
her knowledge. He chooses to recognize this knowledge 
as 'literal sexual information' and her 'corruption' as 
the willingness to take advantage of this knowledge: 
What Maisie saw was Sir Claude's sexual promiscuity, 
'his weakness', and the secret she discovered in Bologne 
[sic] was that to win him for herself and Mrs. Wix, 
she must do battle with her stepmother in terms of 
that weakness. Her greatest asset opposed to Mrs. 
Beale's lush worldliness is her virginity, and that 
she is prepared to offer. 10 
Taking a quite different stand, Walter Isle interprets 
9 Oscar Cargill, The Novels of Henry James (New York: Mac-
millan, 1961), p. 258. • 
lO Harris W. Wilson, "What Did Maisie Know?" College English, 
17 (Feb. 1956) p. 281. 
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Maisie's ultimate knowledge as pure, incorrupt. He con-
eludes that, •An the patterns then are complete. Education 
has resulted in knowledge, the withdrawal to France has 
given new life, the temptations have been overcome, and 
Maisie returns 11 uncorrupted." Kenny Ma rot ta, who also 
views Maisie as •innocent", qualifies the nature of this 
innocence as "redemptive": 
One of the first novels in his late style, Henry James' s 
What Maisie Knew ( 1897) shows how that style grew 
out of his characteristic theme: the redemptive power 
of innocence. Like Christopher Newman or Isabel Archer, 
Maisie Farange preserves her integrity and her capacity 
for love ~ainst the attacks and temptations of a corrupt 
society.12 
In contrast with these views, Maxwell Geismar dismisses 
the project of What Maisie Knew: 
••• the whole concept of an immaculate infantine 'inno-
cence' shining forth in the midst of all this adult 'cor-
ruption' - and even redeeming it - was sentimental 
and implausible; and also highly questionable. In 
the story itself Maisie is another one of the improbable 
Jamesian infants who in fact serves mainly as a 'voyeur-
glass' so to speak, for the obliquely reflected sexual 
antics of her elders. 13 
I hope to demonstrate later in the text some of the over-
simplifications which appear to lead Geismar to such con-
cl us ions. For the present, I suspend discussion of other 
11 Walter Isle, Experiments in Form: Henry James' s Novels, 
1896-1901 (Canbridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968) p. 164. 
12 Kenny Marotta, •what Maisie Knew: The Question of Our 
Speech,• English Literary History, 46 ( 1979) p. 495. 
13 Maxwell Geismar, Henry James and the Jaoobites (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963) p. 150. 
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critical disagreements, such as the famous Scrutiny debate 
of Marius Bewley and F.R. Leavis, and from the examples 
above, draw the following conclusion: each critic, in 
the very process of supplying the "lack" which he detects 
in Maisie's knowledge thereby produces a new discourse 
which itself manifests gaps or lacks evident to an alter-
native reader, the Other of the reader himself. For example, 
Harris Wilson's interpretation of Maisie's knowledge is 
described by a later critic, Carren Osna Kaston, as having 
"a literalness that James did not intend." Kaston then 
proceeds in her turn to supply the "meaning" which she 
feels that Wilson has unwittingly repressed: 
The complication which interests James, however, is 
not exactly whether Maisie will go to bed with Sir Claude, 
but whether her sexual feelings will be so engaged 
by him that she will be unable to extend them to men 
who do not stand in a paternal relation to her.14 
If the reading activity is viewed in this light, can the 
reading of What Maisie Knew which this chapter offers claim 
to be any more than another effort to participate in the 
game of infinite irony which reading appears to be? Can 
this reading be anything more than another attempt to res-
pond to the "absences" in the text which coerce the reader 
to produce the "unconscious" discourse whereby Maisie's 
"conscious" discourse may gain its meaning? Perhaps one 
privilege that this reader can claim is the freedom to 
agree consciously to take the role of resigned dupe to 
14 Carren Osna Kasten, "Houses of Fiction in What Maisie 
Knew,• Criticism 18 ( 1976) , p. 35. 
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the ironic play of meaning instead of finding himself its 
unwitting pawn. However, it would seem that there is more 
that a reading of this nature can attempt, and it is in 
this respect that Shoshana Felman's insights into the "trans-
ferential relation• of text and reader can be of particular 
use. 
If we reconsider the role demanded of the reader by 
the text of What Maisie Knew it is possible to anticipate 
that a shuttling pattern will develop in the reading act-
ivity as the reader, interrupting the discourse of the 
text, produces the meaning absent from Maisie's perceptions, 
and then once again resumes his progress through the text. 
This shuttling pattern between text arrl reader is comparable 
to the shuttling between the analysand's discourse and 
the analyst which Felman identifies as the "transferential 
relation•. 15 Yet, 'what Maisie knows' and that which she 
does not know but which the reader is required to produce, 
are the conceptions and products of an authorial conscious-
ness, so the •transferences" which take place between Mai-
sie's discourse arrl the reader's are "represented" or "drama-
tized" transferences, also consciously devised by the imp-
lied author. What is more intriguing is the possibility 
of a second, unconscious transferential relation which 
this first one paradigmatically suggests, arrl which Felman's 
observations encourage us to anticipate. 
Just as there was observed to be a difference between 
15 Felman, p. 135. 
the subjective positions of the 
adults on one hand, and Maisie, 
so there is also liable to be 
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reader and narrator as 
the child, on the other, 
a difference between the 
interpretive position of the reader and that of the narra-
tor. For example, the narrator, whose identity in this 
text is indistinguishable from that of the authorial con-
sciousness, translating perceptions in the context of late-
nineteenth century London must attempt to articulate con-
cepts which are only years later to become recognized and 
accounted for through the work of theorists such as Freud 
and Lacan. Thus, if the narrator appears in his conscious 
discourse to treat nsexuality" as nliteral sexual informa-
tionn that is lacking from Maisie's knowledge, it may be 
possible for the reader - who, years later is familiar 
with Freudian and Lacanian thought, and therefore occupies 
the locus of the Other - to identify in such "sexuality" a 
paradigm for nexcess rneaningn or Otherness that is repressed 
from any conscious linguistic discourse. Furthermore, 
this second configuration between the authorial conscious-
ness and the reader implies the possibility of a second, 
a 'real' transferential relation in which the unconscious 
transferences and countertransferences are the product 
of the gaps or absences in the knowledge of the authorial 
consciousness itself, when, unable to offer a rational 
account of Maisie's knowledge from the perspective which 
he holds, the authorial consciousness, or narrator, trans-
fers unconsciously to the implied reader. It is to these 
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transferences then, that particular attention will l:>e drawn. 
An attempt will be made to identify the precise moment 
of transference, the consequent commencement of the reader's 
response to that transference, as well as the point at 
which the reader countertransfers to the narrator once 
again. 
While it may not be possible to identify every narra-
torial transference, the aim of this reading must be to 
identify sufficient transferences to establish a pattern 
of repetition indicating that which is consistently absent 
from the authorial consciousness and which can therefore 
be regarded as the unconscious, the present absence of 
the text of What Maisie Knew. 
* * * * * 
The Prologue 
Before assuming his role as mediator of Maisie's per-
ceptions, the narrator outlines for the reader the circum-
stances from which the events to be narrated arise and 
the context in which Maisie's quest for knowledge is to 
take place. Assuming no restriction on the range of his 
perspective, the narrator changes point-of-view rapidly 
from that of the uninvolved spectator to that of Beale 
Farange, of Ida Farange, of Maisie and finally of the Lon-
don social set to which the Faranges belong. With each 
change of perspective, ironic implications are brought 
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into play so that beyond the apparently civilized rationale 
of each point-of-view the reader may be conscious of sup-
pressed counterrneanings which threaten to erupt in contra-
diction. The reader is thus initiated into the play of 
difference, the subversiveness of the Other which Maisie 
experiences as she finds herself tossed and hurled from 
player to player, from parent to step-parent, to governess 
to lover, in the incessant "game" of "sexuality" or "excess 
meaning". 
To illustrate this, I shall consider briefly, the 
opening description of the divorce suit of Beale and Ida 
Farange. At first this scene suggests the respect due 
to legal procedure and the gravity of divorce as annulment 
of a legal contract. Using terminology such as "litiga-
tion," "decision on the appeal• and "assignment of the 
child," the narrator appears to assume a narrative distance 
sustained in his references to "the father," "the mother• 
and "the child." However, if restraint and discretion 
are principles which might be expected to dominate within 
courts of law, there is a suggestion of Otherness or dif-
ference at play in these court proceedings. By intro-
ducing into the ostensibly grave discourse metaphors not 
only of mud-slinging - "the father• was "bespattered from 
head to foot" (WMK p. 11) - but of armed battle - Beale 
Farange was •compelled perceptibly to lower his crest• 
- the narrator implies the presence of a viciousness and 
fury alarmingly incongruous with the highly coded realm 
of legal procedure. 
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When it is revealed moreover that 
Beale Farange is unable to account for twenty-six hundred 
pounds, when it is implied that this money - supplied by 
Ida on condition that Beale "would take no proceedings" -
is effectively a bribe coercing Beale to ignore his wife's 
extra-marital affairs, when Beale's public embarrassment 
over this monetary issue is quite evidently Ida I s public 
victory, then the proper, discreet and restrained legal 
proceedings are transformed into a riotous orgy of spite. 
The courts, however, seem both impotent to control the 
squabbling adults, and incapable of protecting the interests 
of the six-year-old child embroiled in the fray. Since 
nobody can be found in the Fa range I s fashionable London 
set to act in loco parentis for Maisie, she is •abandoned 
to her fate• (WMK p. 13). She becomes a useful instrument 
in the battle which her parents wage against each other, 
• • • a ready vessel for bitterness, a deep little porcelain 
cup in which biting acids could be mixed. They had 
wanted her not for any good they could do her, but 
for the harm they could, with her unconscious aid, 
do each other (WMK p. 13). 
EDUCATION BY OPPOSED PRINCIPLES: 
Maisie learns to •read• and •write• 
Having established the context and circumstances from 
which Maisie's quest-to-know embarks, the narrator reduces 
the focus of the discourse to the perspective of the six-
year-old child, introducing her from the outset as a quester 
after the •meaning• of her world, •a young intelligence 
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intensely aware that something had happened which must 
matter a good deal and looking anxiously out for the effects 
of so great a cause" (WMK p. 15). The first four chapters 
of the text describe Maisie's initially regular oscillations 
between the polarised homes of her parents. The first 
invaluable lesson she learns from this education by "op-
posed principles" (WMK p. 13) is to recognize the ambiguity 
which the opposition of her parents produces in the •mean-
ing" of her world. This recognition enables her to graduate 
from the status of passive malleable instrument, the •1ittle 
feathered shuttlecock" (WMK p. 19) who plays a central, 
if unwitting role in her parents' game of spite, to the 
place of an independent "reader" of her experiences. 
Initially, while she is perceptive and observant, 
Maisie is often unable to fit her perceptions into any 
significant pattern. She is forced to wait until her powers 
of interpretation have developed sufficiently for her to 
be able to read the "texts" she encounters. If to the 
reader, observing her in this position, she is poignantly 
vulnerable, she is soon to discover her own means of self-
defence. 
At the close of Chapter One, when she is on the point 
of being transferred from her father's home to her mother's, 
Maisie experiences the following incident. 
it vividly as, 
She remembers 
• • • a strange outbreak in the drawing-room on the part 
of Moddle, who, in reply to something her father had 
just said, cried aloud: "You ought to be perfectly ashamed 
of yourseli - you ought to blush, sir, for the way 
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you go on!• The carriage, with her mother in it, was 
at the door; a gentleman who was there, who was al-
ways there, laughed out very loud; her father, who 
had her in his arms, said to Moddle: •My dear woman, 
I '11 settle you presently!" - after which he repeated, 
showing his teeth more than ever at Maisie while he 
hugged her, the words for which her nurse had taken 
him up. Maisie was not at the moment so fully cons-
cious of them as of the wonder of Moddle's sudden 
disrespect and crimson face; but she was able to pro-
duce them in the course of five minutes when, in the 
carriage, her mother, all kisses, ribbons, eyes, arms, 
strange sounds and sweet smells, said to her: •And 
did your beastly papa, my precious angel, send any 
message to your own loving mamma?" Then it was that 
she found the words spoken by her beastly papa to 
be, after all, in her little bewildered ears, from which, 
at her mother's appeal, they passed, in her clear shrill 
voice, straight to her little innocent lips. •He said 
I was to tell you, from him,• she faithfully reported, 
"that you' re a nasty horrid pig!" ( WMK p. 18). 
While to Maisie, Moddle's outburst may appear "strange", 
to the reader this rupture of domestic order is some indi-
cation of the degree of shabbiness to which Beale Farange 
stoops on this occasion. His indiscretions and irresponsi-
bility provoke overt disgust even in his unsophisticated 
employees. To Maisie, the contradictory effect of humo~r 
and disgust which her father's words generate is confusing. 
To the reader, however, it may be evident that these contra-
dictory effects arise from the ambiguity inherent in the 
role which she is being required to play. The humour shared 
by Beale Farange and his male companion stems from their 
awareness that Maisie will perform her role of messenger 
and ironically of insulter with all the enthusiasm of a 
child's eagerness to please. Moddle's disgust on the other 
hand stems from her awareness that while Maisie may delight 
her father by the faithful delivery of his message, she 
343 
is likely to incur the wrath of her mother for performing, 
with dutiful naivety, the task her father has given her. 
It is precisely this experience of her mother's wrath that 
provokes Maisie to new understanding. 
After the incident recounted above, it becomes increas-
ingly evident to her parents that Maisie is failing to 
retain the messages they give her to deliver to each other. 
Initially they are unsure whether to conclude that she 
is "extremely cunning" or "extremely stupid". At length 
they adopt the latter opinion, although the reader is given 
the following more privileged perspective of Maisie's de-
velopment: 
The theory of her stupidity, eventually embraced 
by her parents, corresponded with a great date in her 
small still life: the complete vision, private but final, 
of the strange office she filled. It was literally a 
moral revolution and accomplished in the depths of 
her nature. The stiff dolls on the dusky shelves began 
to move their arms and legs; old forms and phrases 
began to have a sense that frightened her. She had 
a new feeling, the feeling of danger; on which a new 
remedy rose to meet it, the idea of an inner self or, 
in other words, of concealment. She puzzled out with 
imperfect signs, but with a prodigious spirit, that she 
had been a centre of hatred and a messenger of insult, 
and that everything was bad because she had been em-
ployed to make it so. Her parted lips locked themselves 
with the determination to be employed no longer. She 
would forget everything, she would repeat nothing, 
and when, as a tribute to the successful application 
of her system, she began to be called a little idiot, 
she tasted a pleasure new and keen. When therefore, 
as she grew older, her parents in turn announced before 
her that she had grown shockingly dull, it was not 
from any real contraction of her little stream of life. 
She spoiled their fun, but she practically added to 
her own. She saw more and more; she saw too much 
(WMK pp. 19-20). 
What Maisie seems to recognize on this occasion is that 
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the "dolls" she has been carrying and playing with, are 
not toys, but "real" and "living" - she has been partici-
pating not in a game, but in a "real" and vicious battle. 
She recognizes moreover that the role she has been playing 
in this battle, the role of parental messenger, has involved 
the inevitable counter-role of parental insulter. Thus 
she intuits the outcome of her education according to two 
"opposed principles": the effect of ambiguity. That which 
is commendable according to the paternal principle will 
by definition be condemnable according to the maternal 
principle. In response to this discovery Maisie resolves 
to withdraw from the role she has been ascribed. To do 
this, she constructs for herself a public or substitute 
self, the "little idiot" who stands in the place of the 
messenger, yet cannot be of effective use since she is 
incapable of remembering or conveying any message success-
fully. This construct enables the "real" Maisie to with-
draw to a concealed, safe position from which she can ob-
serve and attempt to understand the parental game. In 
effect then, Maisie could be said to make her first asser-
tion of freedom as an author who may adopt subjective posi-
tions she chooses from which to exercise her ability to 
make meaning. At the same time she takes her first step 
towards becoming a productive and independent reader in 
that she is no longer an unwitting mouthpiece for the inter-
pretations of others, but can produce or withhold her own 
reading of texts. 
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Knowledge and the Governess 
Miss Overmore As Maisie grows older, her education ac-
cording to opposed principles continues at the hands of 
her governesses, the first of whom is Miss Overmore. The 
latter, the eldest daughter of an impecunious family of 
eight girls, is to Maisie extraordinarily pretty and accom-
plished, particularly in comparison to Meddle, her former 
nurse. She can nsay lots of dates straight off (letting 
you hold the book yourself) state the position of Malabar, 
play six pieces without notes and, in a sketch, put in 
beautifully the trees and houses and difficult parts" (WMK 
p. 28). Maisie's admiration for Miss Overmore is described 
as "her first passion• (WMK p. 25), and she concludes that 
her affection is reciprocated, nThere was no doubt that she 
was dear to th is beautiful friend" ( WMK p. 2 3-24). Th is 
•unquestionable fact• is established by the following cir-
cumstances. On the conclusion of her sojourn with her 
mother and the commencement of a new term with her father, 
Maisie is told that she must relinquish Miss Overmore since 
Mrs. Farange has decreed that "Beale's was a house in which 
no decent woman could consent to be seen• (WMK p. 23). 
In Miss Overmore's words to Maisie, "She [Ida] says that 
if I ever do such a thing as enter his service I must never 
expect to show my face in this house again• (WMK p. 23). 
At this point such a veto, unexplained, is a mystery to 
Maisie although to the reader its sexual implications will 
be obvious: Ida wishes to deprive her former husband of 
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the availability of a pretty, unattached young woman. Short-
ly after Maisie's establishment at her father's home, cir-
cumstances change: 
There was indeed no doubt that she was dear to this 
beautiful friend. What could have proved it better 
than the fact that before a week was out, in spite of 
their distressing separation and her mother's prohibition 
and Miss Overmore' s scruples and Miss Overmore' s prom-
ise, the beautiful friend had turned up at her father's? 
(WMK pp. 23-24). 
An explanation of this change is soon forthcoming from 
Miss Overmore herself: 
The bright creature told her little charge frankly what 
had happened - that she had really been unable to 
hold out. She had broken her vow to Mrs. Farange; 
she had struggled for three days and then had come 
straight to Maisie's papa and told him the simple truth. 
She adored his daughter; she could n 't give her up; 
she'd make for her any sacrifice. On this basis it 
had been arranged that she should stay; her courage 
had been rewarded; she left Maisie in no doubt as 
to the amount of courage she had required. Some of 
the things she said made a particular impression on 
the child - her declaration for instance that when her 
pupil should get older she'd understand better just 
how "dreadfully bold" a young lady, to do exactly what 
she had done, had to be ( WMK p. 24). 
Miss Overmore 's explanation, presented with the narrative 
immediacy of free indirect speech, is dense with modifiers 
which suggest the speaker's effort to eliminate any possi-
bility of ambiguity from her speech, for example, she "told 
her 1 it tle charge frankly what had happened"; "she had 
really been unable to hold out"; she "had come straight 
to Maisie's papa and told him the simple truth". While 
in the apparent lucidity of this explanation Maisie may 
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read the •simple truth" that she is adored by her governess, 
the reader on the other hand may detect Miss Overmore' s 
awareness of alternative meaning which she chooses to re-
press firmly. It becomes particularly clear that a measure 
of information is being withheld from Maisie when Miss 
Overmore declares that she will need to be older to appre-
ciate her governess's daring. If the knowledge necessary 
for such appreciation is absent from the consciousness 
of Maisie as sexually innocent child, it may be evident 
in the locus of the •other" 16 - the sexually knowledgeable 
reader; Miss Overmore' s action requires daring because 
it exposes her to the accusation that as a young, single, 
impoverished but pretty woman she is seeking to make her-
self available to the attractive, apparently affluent and 
unattached father of the child she tutors. The fact that 
Beale Farange has, a short while previously, demonstrated 
his interest in Miss Overmore, and the latter, if bereft 
of Maisie will be denied any opportunities in the immediate 
future of cultivating that interest, may lead the reader 
to suspect that being available to Beale Farange is likely 
to be what Miss Overmore wishes to accomplish. Viewed 
in this light, Miss Overrnore's "bold" behaviour seems less 
likely to mean •simply" that she is devoted to Maisie. 
It involves the additional possibilities, for example, 
that she is fond of both Maisie and her father; or that 
16 It seems necessary to establish a distinction here between 
the reader who acts as Maisie's "Other• at a •meta•- level and 
the reader who acts as actual Other to the authorial oonsciousness. 
To maintain this distinction the former will be written in inverted 
ooru mas as above. 
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she is fond of Maisie and moreover sees in her a means 
of becoming better acquainted with her father; or that 
she is fond of Maisie because she provides a pretext for 
becoming better acquainted with her father; or perhaps 
that she cares little for Maisie but uses the child as 
a useful pretext for making herself available to the father. 
It is because Maisie's interpretation of Miss Overmore 
excludes such nuances of meaning that it is so clearly 
defined as •innocent" or "naive". If to Maisie Miss Over-
more is the source of "simple truth", to the reader she 
is likely to be simply the conscious represser of ambiguity. 
Mrs. Wix While Miss Overmore seems to Maisie to eliminate 
ambiguity through her cleverness, her second governess, 
Mrs. Wix, seems surprisingly unaware that the possibility 
of ambiguity might even exist. Maisie's first encounter 
with the old woman fol lows her term with Miss Overmore 
and her father, when, collected by her surly mother, she 
is brusquely delivered into Mrs. Wix's care. If initially, 
with her •straighteners," her antiquated coiffure and her 
"ugly snuff-coloured dress,• Mrs. Wix •struck• Maisie as 
"terrible• (WMK pp. 25-26), this effect is modified as 
the old woman comes to "touch• her • in a spot that had 
never even yet been reached.• This change is apparently 
the product of Mrs. Wix's account of the loss of her own 
child. What this loss suggests to Maisie is that there 
is a place for a child in Mrs. Wix' s world where there 
has been no place in Ida Farange's, and only an artificial 
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h 1 f , , • Q I 17 place - t e pace o pupil - in Miss vermore s. Without 
her child Mrs. Wix regards herself as "broken-hearted", 
as ceasing to exist. Her very definition as "mother" de-
pends on the presence of her child. Thus if Ida Farange's 
neglect has left the locus of Mother vacant in Maisie's 
world and available to Mrs. Wix, Clara Matilda's death 
has left the locus of Child vacant in Mrs. Wix' s world 
and available to Maisie. 
Increased contact with Mrs. Wix enables Maisie to 
identify in her an unexpected "charm" which is apparently 
beyond the perception of her more scornful critics: 
At first she had looked cross and almost cruel; but 
this impression passed away with the child's increased 
perception of her being in the eyes of the world a 
figure mainly to lauqh at. She was as droll as a char-
ade or an animal toward the end of the •natural history" 
- a person whom people, to make talk lively, described 
to each other and imitated. 
• • • She (Maisie] knew governesses were EXJC)r; Miss 
Overmore was unmentionably and Mrs. Wix ever so pub-
licly so. Neither this, however, nor the old brown 
frock nor the diadem nor the button, made a difference 
for Maisie in the charm put forth through everything, 
the charm of Mrs. Wix 's conveying that somehow, in 
her ugliness and her poverty, she was peculiarly and 
soothingly safe; safer than any one in the world, 
than papa, than mamma, that the lady with the arched 
eyebrows; safer even, though so much less beautiful, 
17 Ida Farange' s lack of interest in Maisie can be interpreted 
in the light of Tony Tanner's interesting comments on this subject 
in his book Adultery in the Novel. He points out that in novels 
of adultery, 
•. • • although there in variably are children, or at least a 
child, often there is curiously little interest in them or it, even 
on the part of the mother ( or especially on the part of the mother). 
• • • The negative or reverse aspect of an inclination to adultery 
would seem to be a disinclination to maternity, and it might be 
a mistake to try and find an order of priority for these feelings 
or to attempt to relate them in a cause-and-effect sequence. It is 
all part of the decomposition of that unstable, supposedly unitary 
trinity - the wife-mother-lover.• - Adultery in the Novel (Baltimore 
and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, pbk. rpt. 1981) 
p. 98. 
350 
than Miss Overrcore, on whose loveliness, as she supposed 
it, the little girl was faintly conscious that one could 
n 't rest with quite the same tucked-in and kissed-
for-good-night feeling. Mrs. Wix was as safe as Clara 
Matilda, who was in heaven and yet, embarrassingly, 
also in Kensal Green, where they had been toget.l-ier 
to see her little huddled grave. It was from something 
in Mrs. Wix 's tone, which in spite of caricature remained 
indescribable and inimitable, that Maisie, before her 
term with her mother was over, drew this sense of 
a support, like a breast-high banister in a place of 
"drops," that would never give way (WMK pp. 27-28). 
From the reader's position of "Otherness," it may be appar-
ent that this charm of the new governess which seems to 
evade definition consists in that which has been denied 
or repressed from Maisie's experience up to this point. 
In a social set such as the Faranges', transgression, capri-
ciousness and flux are the norm, taking the form of imperma-
nent sexual alliances, constantly changing fashions and 
so forth. Although to such a set, Mrs. Wix, with her anti-
quated appearance and strong moral opinions is comically 
bizarre, to Maisie the old woman has the charm of stability 
and order - the "safety" - which the little girl has been 
previously denied. 
While Miss Overmore, conscious of the subversive effect 
that ambiguity may produce on "simple truth" is careful 
to repress the divisiveness of meaning, Mrs. Wix, by virtue 
of the "straightness" of her vision, seems unable to notice 
ambiguity which even to Maisie is embarrassingly obvious. 
Confident of her own judgement, Mrs. Wix does not flinch 
from thorny problems such as, what happens to loved ones 
who die? To her the answer is clear: They go to heaven, 
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and if later a contradictory answer manifests itself such 
as, They are buried in places such as Kensal Green, Mrs. 
Wix, for whom the body/soul dichotomy of the Christian 
faith is no doubt unquestionably acceptable, seems happily 
unaware of the contradiction. Nevertheless, it is not 
surprising that so unshakeable an interpretive stand should 
make a little girl, searching for "the truth" in a treacher-
ously unpredictable world, feel "safe", as might a "breast-
high banister in a place of 'drops,' that would never give 
way."18 
18 Maisie's experience of Mrs. Wix as "safe" yet also, on 
occasion oppressive, the grave defender of her •moral sense• (the 
Symbolic Order), yet the comically incongruous caricature (the 
"Other•) within the Faranges' social set, clearly illustrates the 
ambiguity which she perceives in the world. It is this ambiguity 
which is liable to produce the correspondingly wide range of read-
ings t."1at we have already witnessed ( vide pp. 333 - 335) and that 
is once again evident in critical discussions of Mrs. Wix. For 
example, Tony Tanner identifies Mrs. Wix as a restrictive threat 
to a young quester after knowledge. He writes, 
"She [Mrs. Wix] has no capacity for wonder and ideally 
would like to close Maisie's eyes for good. Yet Maisie's 
supreme virtue is her very unprejudiced inquiringness. JaIIes 
describes Maisie as 'only, more than anything else, curious' 
and so it is not surprising that the presence of Mrs. Wix 
sometimes depresses her. • • • Maisie wants to 'see' the world: 
Mrs. Wix wants to prevent her seeing and make her 'judge' 
it. Mrs. Wix 's desire to protect is also a desire to :i;x>ssess; 
and that :i;x>ssessi veness includes an instinct to arrest, to 
impose a state of sensory imprisonment.• 
See Tony Tanner, The Reign of Wonder: Naivety and Reality in 
American Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965) 
p. 292. 
F.R. Leavis, on the other hand, describes Mrs. Wix as an 
embodiment of decent behaviour: 
"She represents good nature, affectionateness and maternal 
feeling, these virtues being altogether unrecommended by 
external advantages. • • The virtues, that Mrs. Wix represents 
are solid and strongly self-rea::moerrlatory and she represents 
too • • • respectability. • 
See F. R. Leavis, "What Maisie Knew A Disagreement by F. R. Leavis" 
in Marius Bewley The Complex Fate (London: Chatto and Windus, 
1952) p. 128. 
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The Dual Rature of Knowledge: 
the accessible and the forbidden 
As Maisie's quest proceeds, she becomes aware of a 
dichotomy in the knowledge which she strives to acquire. 
She notices, for example, that the text/society she is 
reading, resists her efforts to interpret it. 
ence of the world is that, 
Her experi-
Everything had something behind it: life was like 
a long, long corridor with rows of closed doors. She 
had learned that at these doors it was wise not to knock 
- this seemed to produce from within such sounds of 
derision (WMK pp. 32-33). 
The simile that compares life to a corridor of closed doors 
implies that to Maisie, the world is an intimate environ-
ment where adult action takes place behind closed doors 
that exclude her from participation. For her, only the 
straightness of the corridor is accessible and any attempt 
to open doors, or to investigate what the closed doors 
might hide is met with strong disapproval from those •with-
in.• 
Investigating the very process of acquiring knowledge, 
Maisie constructs a questing situation in which she visual-
izes herself in the position of the knowledgeable, the 
authority, who has the power to open and close doors, and 
Lee Ann Johnson argues that Mrs. Wix emerges as •a signifi-
cant comic character whose self-interested, misguided attempts 
to educate her charge serve as a source of humor and irony within 
the novel.• - Johnson, •James' s Mrs. Wix: the 'Dim, Cr<x:>ked 
Reflector•• Nineteenth Century Fiction, 29 (1974) pp. 164-172, 
particular reference to pp. 164-165. 
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she puts her French doll Lisette in the position of quester 
who knocks at doors: 
Litt.le by little, however, she understood more, for 
it befell that she was enlightened by Lisette's questions, 
which reproduced the effect of her own upon those 
for whom she sat in the very darkness of Lisette. Was 
she not herself convulsed by such innocence? In the 
presence of it she often imitated the shrieking ladies. 
There were at any rate things she really could n 't 
tell even a French doll. She could only pass on her 
lessons and study to produce on Lisette the impression 
of having mysteries in her life, wondering the while 
whether she succeeded in the air of shading off, like 
her mother, into the unknowable. When the reign of 
Miss Overmore followed that of Mrs. Wix she took a 
fresh cue, emulating her governess and bridging over 
the interval with the simple expectation of trust. Yes, 
there were matters one could n 't "go into" with a pupil. 
There were for instance days when, after prolonged 
absence, Lisette, watching her take off her things, 
tried hard to discover where she had been. Well, 
she discovered a little, but never discovered all. There 
was an occasion when, on her, being particularly indis-
creet, Maisie replied to her - and precisely about the 
motive of a disappearance - as she, Maisie, had once 
been replied to by Mrs. Farange: • Find out for your-
self!" She mimicked her mother's sharpness, but she 
was rather ashamed afterwards, though as to whether 
of the sharpness or of the mimicry was not quite clear 
(WMK p. 33). 
In this role-playing experiment, Maisie discovers firstly, 
that she as an "authority", a holder of knowledge, can 
experience a sense of advantage and power over the ignorant 
quester. She discovers that she is in control over what 
the quester may be permitted to know and that which must 
remain a mystery to him. In Lacanian terms, she can be 
interpreted as discovering unwittingly, the arbitrary nature 
of authority and the meaning which it chooses to express 
or consciously repress. 
As yet however, there is no indication that she has 
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any criteria whereby she could select what she would choose 
to conceal and what she would permit to be revealed. While 
she is discovering the locus of the "Other" as the "for-
bidden", the unknown which lies "behind closed doors," 
and which it is indiscreet to investigate, she has not 
yet established what the nature of that "Other" might be. 
What is particularly interesting about her discovery 
from a Lacanian perspective, is that while she detects 
the nature of knowledge or "the truth" to be "split", she 
does not appear to detect any similar split in her know-
ledge of herself. Although she has apparently identified 
a split in her conscious self between a "public" and a 
"private" self (vide pp. 343-344) comparable to the "Self-
for-Itself" and the "Self-for-Others" proposed by Sartre 
and by Merleau Ponty19 there is no implication that she 
experiences any sense of division between the "self" which 
she knows consciously and can express, and any "self" that 
is hidden from her or inaccessible to her. Mysteriousness 
may arise for example between the "self" of her mother 
and "the other" (in this case, Maisie}, and she may "study" 
to imitate a similar mysteriousness, "the air of shading 
off, like her mother, into the unknowable" between her 
19 This point is made by Paul Armstrong who offers a particu-
larly interesting phenomenological reading of What Maisie Knew 
arguing that such an approach to James' s work seems invited by 
its many affinities to the philosophy of his brother William. In 
philosophical circles, the latter has won increasing recognition 
as an early member of the phenomenological tradition. See Paul 
B. Armstrong, "How Maisie Knows: The Phenomenology of James' s 
Moral Vision,• Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 20, 4 
(Winter 1978) pp. 522-523. 
•self" and "the other" as Lisette. 
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However, there is no 
suggestion that such 
as a mystery of the 
mysteriousness is ever experienced 
Se 1 f ( as unconscious Other) to the 
self (as the conscious). 
Ambiguity in the role of governess 
As time passes, it becomes apparent to Maisie that 
her parents are no longer as prompt as they had initially 
been to assert their respective rights to an equal share 
of her company. One day, while sounding out Miss Overmore 
as to whether she might be considered to have overstayed 
her welcome with her father, Maisie discovers that the 
absence of her mother is the result of an "improper" rela-
tionship which she is enjoying abroad at Florence. She 
learns from her governess that, while her father's relation-
ship with Miss Overmore is to be judged "perfectly proper," 
her mother's relationship with her new companion, who is 
later identified as "Sir Claude", does not share this ap-
proved status. The factor determining this difference 
in the nature of the two relationships appears to be Maisie 
herself. Miss Overmore has frequently declared to Maisie, 
"I don't know what in the world, darling, your father and 
I should do without you, for you just make the difference, 
as I've told you, of keeping us perfectly proper" (WMK 
p. 37). While Maisie is aware that Miss Overmore' s role 
as governess is split between "duties" to her pupil and 
"duties" to her pupil's father, Maisie does not realize 
that one of these roles, 1 ike her mother's present rela-
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tionship with her new companion, falls into the category 
of "the forbidden" or "improper". It therefore occurs 
to her that she might extend the usefulness of her own 
position by being pupil to her mother's companion just 
as she is pupil to her father's: 
• • • she had heard somehow of little girls - of exalted 
rank, it was true - whose education was carried on 
by instructors of the other sex, and she knew that 
if she were at school at Brighton it would be thought 
an advantage to her to be more or less in the hands 
of masters. She turned these things over and remarked 
to Miss Overmore that if she should go to her mother 
perhaps the gentleman might become her tutor. 
"The gentleman?" The proposition was complicated 
enough to make Miss Overmore stare. 
"The one who's with mamma. Might n 't that make 
it right - as right as your being my governess makes 
it for you to be with papa?" (WMK p. 37). 
Once again, in Lacanian terms Maisie's suggestion manifests 
the unwitting recognition of the arbitrariness of a subjec-
tive position: a "lover" might be also a "tutor" as easily 
as a "governess• might be also a "lover". As Miss Over-
more's reaction suggests, Maisie has innocently exposed 
the transgressive ambiguity or "Otherness" in her role 
as governess. In order to recuperate the former propriety 
of her position, Miss evermore attempts to assert the pri-
macy of her role as "mentor of the child," over that of 
"lover of the father": 
Miss Overmore considered; she coloured a little; 
then she embraced her ingenious friend. "You 're too 
sweet! I'm a real governess.• 
"And could n 't he be a real tutor?" 
"Of course not. He's ignorant and bad.• 
"Bad -?" Maisie echoed with wonder. 
Ber oompanion gave a queer little laugh at her tone. 
"He's ever so much younger -• But that was all. 
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•younger than you?" 
Miss Overmore laughed again; it was the first time 
Maisie had seen her approach so nearly to a giggle. 
•Younger than - no matter whom •••• " (WMK pp. 37-38). 
Each step of this argument opens an ironic gap in which 
the reader can detect counter-meanings at play, for example, 
Miss Overmore declares that Sir Claude could not be a "real" 
tutor as she is a "real" governess because he is "ignorant 
and bad". The implication of this argument is that "real" 
governesses and tutors are well-educated and good. Although 
Maisie does not query the first of these attributes, the 
reader may well smile at the irony of Miss Overmore's "quali-
fications.• Being able to "say lots of dates straight 
off" and "in a sketch, put in beau ti fully the trees and 
houses and difficult parts" (WMK p. 28) hardly presents 
an overwhelming challenge to Sir Claude's subsequently 
revealed accomplishments, such as his competent French-
speaking and his knowledge of music (WMK p. 239, p. 254; 
p. 104). 
Maisie does inquire into Sir Claude's "badness", but 
Miss Overmore, on the verge of explaining that Sir Claude 
is bad because he is younger than Maisie's mother, aban-
dons her argument, no doubt recognizing that since she 
is considerably younger than Maisie's father {WMK p. 66), 
she must according to her own logic be •bad" too. Having 
effectively proved that the difference or impropriety she 
wishes to see in Sir Claude's relationship with Ida is 
actually similarity to her relationship with Beale Farange, 
Miss Overmore represses the entire argument in an unchal-
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lengeable statement of personal taste: •He's not my sort, 
and I'm sure, my own darling, he's not yours" (WMK p. 38). 
Maisie has no alternative, but to trust to the apparent 
firmness of such authority: "Parents had come to seem 
vague, but governesses were evidently to be trusted" (WMK 
p. 38). 
Thus, while Maisie initially assumes that the position 
of the governess is one of absolute authority, she comes 
to discover that the interpretations of her two governesses 
are confusingly inconsistent with each other. When, for 
example, Mrs. Wix, as Ida Farange's messenger arrives at 
Beale Farange 's home with the news that Ida is to marry 
Sir Claude, the picture she presents of this young man 
is very different to Miss Overmore 's description. He is 
transformed from "ignorant" and "bad" to "a dear friend 
of Mrs. Farange's, who had been of great assistance to 
her in getting to Florence and in making herself comfort-
able there for the winter" (WMK p. 42). It is only some 
time later, when Miss Overmore, having married Beale Fa-
range, has begun to weary of her lot as "Mrs Beale•, that 
Maisie is given the opportunity to form her own opinion 
of Sir Claude. 
Interpreting the Role of Sir Claude: 
the Stepfather, the R.ollantic Bero, the Phallus 
Presented with Mrs. Wix' s photograph of Sir Claude, 
Maisie had been greatly impressed by •the fair smooth face, 
the regular features, the kind eyes, the amiable air, the 
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general glossiness and smartness of her prospective step-
father" (WMK p. 43). When he subsequently appears to her 
in person, in the drawing-room of her absent father's home, 
her initial impressions are endorsed: he is "by far the 
most shining presence that had ever made her gape" (WMK 
p. 49). It is not surprising that Maisie, who is no longer 
required as a pretext for the affair between her father 
and her governess; who has already long over-stayed the 
prescribed limits of her current term with her father; 
who has been left chiefly to the mercy of Susan Ash the 
under-housemaid; should look upon Sir Claude as a 'knight-
in-shining-armour', a saviour who will deliver her from 
her "fallen state" (WMK p. 49). She identifies him as 
fit ting Mrs. Wix' s descriptions of romantic heroes, "the 
lovers of her distressed beauties - 'the perfect gentleman 
and strikingly handsome ••• '" (WMK p. 52), so that from 
the start he seems to take for her the role of "object 
20 
of Desire," the Phallus. 
Addressing her directly, Sir Claude explains his re-
lation to her through his marriage to her mother. If he 
is her step-father, to the Lacanian reader he may also 
be interpreted as her Symbolic Father bearing the implicit 
20 At this point I emphasize once again the distinction to 
be made in Lacanian theory between "the phallus" as male sexual 
organ, and "the Phallus," the "signifier of signifiers." The Phal-
lus, by its presence appears to hold the promise of fulfilment 
of the primal lack but paradoxically is also signifier of the lack 
or absence inherent in linguistic representation. For more detailed 
explication of this distinction, please see pages 32-36 of my 
Introduction. 
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promise of Law and the very Symbolic Order which Maisie 
had lacked in order to make consistent meaning of the ambi-
guities which she confronts in the "text" of her world. 
This would imply that he has the potential to transform 
the world into a new Order in which Maisie at last receives 
a place propre. Certainly his attentive manner of address-
ing the little girl illustrated, for example, in his fre-
quent use of phatic signals such as "my dear child," "don't 
you know," "of course," is 1 ikely to suggest to her that 
through his arrival she has acquired a new importance. 
Yet while she recognizes herself now as the catalyst of 
adult friendships causing otherwise unrelated parties to 
become allied by their mutual interest in her, the reader 
may well detect more significance - more "sexual play" -
in Sir Claude and Mrs. Beale's conversation than Maisie 
is able to perceive. 
Once he has delivered Maisie to her mother's home, 
Sir Claude shows his interest in her through occasional, 
but by no means regular visits to the schoolroom: 
He disappeared at times for days, when his patient 
friends understood that her ladyship would naturally 
absorb him; but he always came back with the drollest 
stories of where he had been, a wonderful picture of 
society, and even with pretty presents that showed 
how in absence he thought of his home { WMK p. 59). 
If to the reader, such unpredictable behaviour may suggest 
far less responsibility than might be expected of a step-
father and self-proclaimed "family-man• {WMK p. 52) to 
Maisie and Mrs. Wix it would seem to be Sir Claude's very 
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elusiveness, his evasion of routine and discipline that 
constitutes his mysterious charm and that defines him as 
belonging to a world "Other" than that of the mundane school-
room. While they may be entranced by the "wonderful pie-
ture of society• which Sir Claude paints for them, the 
reader may bear in mind the glimpses he himself has had 
of the extravagant living, the transgressive and caprici-
ous sexual alliances and the repression of any inhibiting 
codes of responsibility which the "Otherness" of the Fa-
range social set also involves. 
Al though initially the charm of Sir Claude seems to 
entrance Ida as much as it does Maisie and Mrs. Wix, the 
harmony of this relationship is short-lived: 
• • • there befell at last a period six months brought 
it round - when for days together he scarcely came 
near them. He was "off," and Ida was "off," and they 
were sometimes off together and sometimes apart; 
At one of these times Maisie found her [Mrs. Wix] open-
ing it out that, though the difficulties were many, 
it was Mrs. Beale who had now become the chief. Then 
somehow it was brought fully to the child's knowledge 
that her stepmother had been making attempts to see 
her, that her mother had deeply resented it, that her 
stepfather had backed her stepmother up, that the latter 
had pretended to be acting as the representative of 
her father, and that her mother took the whole thing, 
in plain terms, very hard. The situation was, as Mrs. 
Wix declared, an extraordinary muddle to be sure 
(WMK p. 62). 
Still unaware of the "sexual game" - the excess of meaning 
- in play behind these events, Maisie reads her stepmother's 
attempts to see her literally, and if Mrs. Wix suspects 
such significance, she is likely to repress it as contra-
dictory to her view of Sir Claude, and certainly as un-
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suitable for discussion with her charge. It is not sur-
prising therefore that without knowledge of the motivating 
principle - the sexual desire - behind the adult "game", 
Maisie finds the moves of the game bewildering. To the 
reader, Ida's resentment of Mrs. Beale's intrusion and 
Sir Claude's support of that intrusion seem to indicate 
that Mrs. Beale is looking for an excuse to rendezvous 
with Sir Claude, and he in turn is not averse to encouraging 
his admirer. 
In parenthesis, it may also be noted that in What 
Maisie Knew adultery within the Farange's social "set" 
is never attributed any greater importance than the exchange 
of partners in a game. Love affairs are fleeting and the 
lovers involved never seem inspired to any great passion. 
Again, Tony Tanner, referring to Denis de Rougemont's study 
of passionate love - Love in the Western World - offers 
the following useful comments: 
21 
It is part of Rougemont' s pessimistic view of modern 
times that, in his opinion, as there has been a decay 
in "institutional obstructions," so there has been a 
slackening of tension between passion and society. 
There is no longer any real conflict between them, 
and what results is a "mutual neutralization,• and a 
loss of meaning on both sides. When a society ceases 
to care much about marriage, and all that is implied 
in that transaction, by the same token it will lose 
contact with the sense of intense passion. 21 
Tanner, Adultery in the Novel, p. 89. Tanner refers 
to Denis de Rougemont, Love in the Western World (New York: 
Anchor Bcx:>ks, 1957) pp. 45, 36, 298, 290. 
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Maisie's Divided Self: Participation and Passivity 
As Maisie's term with her mother continues, it becomes 
clear that Sir Claude, far from providing her with a place 
propre or clarifying the rules that govern the adult "game" 
which Maisie so often witnesses, appears only to have added 
to the ambiguity and confusion in the various players' 
moves. Maisie herself remains in the strangely divided 
position whereby her "public social self" is involuntarily 
caught up in the "game" while her "private real self" is 
a passive, but anxiously interested spectator. She feels 
the involuntary passivity of her "real" position particular-
ly intensely when she witnesses Mrs. Wix's proposal to 
Sir Claude that he abandon Ida and find accommodation for 
the three of them, Maisie, Mrs. Wix and himself. Mrs. 
Wix apparently hopes that Sir Claude will "save" himself 
from "corruption" by making Maisie's future and education 
his personal concern: 
So the sharpened sense of spectators hip was the child's 
main support, the long habit, from the first, of seeing 
herself in discussion and finding in the fury of it -
she had had a glimpse of the game of football - a sort 
of compensation for the doom of a peculiar passivity. 
It gave her often an odd air of being present at her 
history in as separate a manner as if she could only 
get at experience by flattening her nose against a pane 
of glass. Such she felt to be the application of her 
nose while she waited for the effect of Mrs. Wix' s elo-
quence. Sir Claude, however, did n 't keep her long 
in a position so ungraceful: he sat down and opened 
his arms to her as he had done the day he came for 
her at her father's, and while he held her there, look-
ing at her kindly, but as if their catpanion hcrl brought 
the bkx:>d a good deal to his face, he said : 
"Dear Mrs. Wix is magnificent, but she's rather too 
grand about it. I mean the situation is n 't after all 
quite so desperate or quite so simple. But I give you 
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my word before her, and I give it to her before you, 
that I'll never, never, forsake you. Do you hear that, 
old fellow, and do you take it in? I' 11 stick to you 
through everything" (WMK p. 85). 
The description of Maisie I s "peculiar passivity" in this 
passage as "the doom" which requires "compensation" implies 
that she is very eager to participate in the adult decis-
ions which involve her fate. She would be very ready to 
transform her position from that of object - the ball or 
shuttlecock that is kicked or whacked - to that of active 
participant, the kicker or whacker. For the present how-
ever, she resigns herself to the conclusion that she has 
not yet acquired sufficient "knowledge" to be considered 
able to participate in the "game". Mysteriously, though, 
the two adults she watches seem to be "playing" from dia-
metrically opposed positions. To Mrs. Wix on the one hand, 
it is apparently easy to distinguish "being good" from 
"being bad," "high" motives and "the highest good" (WMK 
pp. 83-84) from "harm" and the "fatal.• To Sir Claude, 
on the other hand, the circumstances before him are far 
less easily evaluated, and his role as stepfather is awk-
wardly complicated. He would 1 ike as his declaration 
of loyalty to Maisie suggests - to live up to the ideal 
of resolute, unflinching hero that Mrs. Wix holds up to 
him. He even goes as far as to erect for Maisie and Mrs. 
Wix the fixed, unambiguous monument of his paternal •word" 
as an absolute - the Phallic authority - on which they 
can rely. However, put to the test, his resolution and 
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his "Word" prove as mutable, as ephemeral, as surely centred 
on "absence" as any other absolute that Maisie has yet 
hoped to rely on. This is clearly illustrated in the fol-
lowing episode, which also describes Maisie's first chance 
to "play" rather than "be played". 
Sir Claude takes Maisie on an excursion one morning, 
evading her questions as to where they are going. When 
they eventually stop at an unfamiliar house Sir Claude 
explains to Maisie that this is her father's new home and 
that they have come to call on Mrs. Beale. It takes little 
time for Maisie to guess the most likely meaning of his 
explanation: 
She stared, very white, and, with her hand on his 
arm, though they had stopped, kept him sitting in the 
cab. "To leave me, do you mean'?" 
He could scarce bring it out. "It's not for me to 
say if you can stay. We must look into it." 
(WMK p. 93). 
Maisie's appeal to Sir Claude, her paleness and her stare, 
suggest that she is frightened. Yet Sir Claude not only 
evades responding to her fear - a fear which he has been 
to some extent instrumental in provoking and which his 
embarrassment suggests that he has noticed - but he evades 
identifying his own position in their circumstances. Through-
out their conversation, Sir Claude is careful to avoid 
taking any standpoint which might define him as responsible 
for Maisie's unhappiness. It is his very fear of responsi-
bility which provokes him to draw her gradually into active 
participation in the game that up to now she has only been 
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able to watch: "Look here, if you say so we won't after 
all go in" and then, "I leave the thing, now that we' re 
You must settle it. We'll here, absolutely with you. 
only go in if you say so. If you don't say so we'll turn 
right round and drive away" (WMK p. 94). 
Maisie's response to this invitation to participate 
in deciding her own fate reflects the alertness to ambiguity 
which her education according to "opposed principles" has 
taught her. She subjects Sir Claude to a rigorous question-
ing which suggests her intuitive appreciation of possible 
variables on which her decision may depend: 
"But all the same," he continued, "I leave the thing, 
now that we're here, absolutely with you. You must 
settle it. We' 11 only go in if you say so. If you 
don't say so we'll turn right round and drive away." 
"So in that case Mrs. Beale won't take me?" 
"Well - not by any act of ours." 
"And I shall be able to go on with mamma?" Maisie 
asked. 
"Oh I don't say that!• 
She considered. "But I thought you said you had 
squared her?" 
Sir Claude poked his stick at the splashboa.rd of 
the cab. "Not, my dear child, to the point she now 
requires." 
"Then if she turns me out and I don't come here -?" 
Sir Claude promptly took her up. "What do I offer 
you, you naturally enquire? My poor chick, that's 
just what I ask myself. I don't see it, I confess, 
quite as straight as Mrs. Wix." 
His companion gazed a moment at what Mrs. Wix saw. 
"You mean we can't make a little family?" 
"It's very base of me, no doubt, but I can't wholly 
chuck your mother." 
Maisie, at this, emitted a low but lengthened sigh, 
a slight sound of reluctant assent which would certain-
ly have been amusing to an auditor. "Then there is 
n't anything else?" 
"I vo,, I don't quite see what there is.• (WMK i;:p. 94-95). 
Ironically then, what her questioning in fact reveals is 
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that there are no variables in her position for her "choice" 
is no choice at all. The Law, in constituting the terms 
of her parents' divorce, has ruled that she be returned 
to her father's home, and Sir Claude as her stepfather, 
is compelled to fulfil this requirement. Al though he has 
sworn to "stick" to Maisie "through everything," he is 
not in a position to carry out this promise literally. 
Maisie, recognizing that she will have to give him up and 
return to her father and Mrs. Beale, nevertheless begs 
Sir Claude to support her at least by visiting her "often 
and of ten.• Even this amount of responsibility seems op-
pressi ve to Sir Claude, perhaps because he can read in 
it the danger of exposing his clandestine relationship 
with Mrs. Beale, or alternatively, the danger of encounter-
ing Mrs. Beale more frequently than he would ideally choose. 
To avoid having to adopt a firm position of refusal, how-
ever, he reluctantly concedes to Maisie's request. Having 
secured Sir Claude's support, Maisie accepts her fate: 
• All right!• Maisie jumped out. Mrs. Beale was 
at home, but not in the drawing-room, and when the 
butler had gone for her the child suddenly broke out: 
"But when I'm here what will Mrs. Wix do?" 
"Ah you should have thought of that soonerl • said 
her companion with the first faint note of asperity 
she had ever heard him sound ( WMK p. 95). 
This apparently insignificant "slip" is, I would argue, 
particularly interesting for it suggests a new order of 
division in Maisie's •self•. Earlier in th is chapter I 
pointed out that, while there are often suggestions in 
368 
the text, of a division in Maisie's concept of herself -
a division between her •public" and her "private• selves 
there is no suggestion of division in her consciousness 
per se. She is presented as a subject fully present to 
herself and fully in control of the knowledge that she 
is gradually managing to acquire. The •slip" described 
in the passage above implies that in fact, she is not in 
full control of this knowledge. For all her efforts to 
interpret her circumstances accurately, the question of 
Mrs. Wix - which is undoubtedly of great importance to 
Maisie - has eluded her consideration. Her interpretation 
has already been made when this question reasserts itself 
as a variable that she has failed to consider. In the 
light of this variable, what had passed as the systematic 
and thorough reading of a responsible individual, threatens 
to be transformed into the self-centred reading of an in-
grate. 
Although at this stage of Maisie's quest after •full 
knowledge" it is possible for the narrator to gloss over 
this •slip" as a matter of childish forgetfulness, this 
"hair-line crack" is later to develop into a fascinating 
•gap" in the narrator's knowledge which will bring about 
the need for transference to the reader as suj et-suppos~-
savoir. 
The Captain and Countess: 
Adult-ery or Playing with the •other• 
During Maisie's term at her father's Regent's Park 
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home, the •game" of transgression played by her parents 
and step-parents reaches a climax in two parallel incidents. 
The first occurs when Sir Claude takes Maisie on an outing 
to Hyde Park where they unfortunately interrupt an illicit 
rendezvous between Ida and her current lover, "the Captain." 
The second incident takes place when Mrs. Beale and Maisie, 
hoping to meet Sir Claude at the great Exhibition, instead 
bump into Beale Farange and his current lover, "the Count-
ess" or "the brown lady." While on the first occasion 
Maisie's stepfather believes her mother to be playing billi-
ards in Brussels, on the second, her stepmother understands 
her father to be yachting at Cowes. On the first occasion, 
the "Forest of Arden" is transformed into a battlefield 
in which Ida and Sir Claude clash swords; on the second, 
the sideshow which Maisie is watching - "the Flowers of 
the Forest" - is supplanted by a brief and bitter skirmish 
between Beale Fa range and Mrs. Beale, after which Maisie 
finds herself hustled from the Exhibition by her father 
and transported by cab to the elegant home of his mistress. 
It is on this latter occasion that a significant change 
is introduced into the pattern of Maisie's life, for in 
brief, the purpose of Beale Farange's tete-~-tete with 
her proves to be that he wishes to be absolved of his duties 
as her father. Since he has not the courage to abandon 
his daughter overtly, he devises the plan of declaring 
that he is going to America and offering Maisie the chance 
of accompanying him. He hopes that when she discovers 
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that this will entail abandoning both Sir Claude and Mrs. 
Beale, she will reject her father's offer and thus "let 
him off with all the honours - with all the appearance 
of virtue and sacrifice on his side" (WMK p. 142). On 
this occasion, even the narrator appears to lose patience 
with Beale Farange. Breaking the narrative convention 
of "central consciousness" he interrupts Maisie's patient, 
uncritical perspective of her father, and - fores tall ing 
the operation of irony which might have enabled the reader 
to judge Beale Farange's behaviour himself - declares the 
man to be •stupid,• "so stupid al 1 through.• Not only 
is he too imperceptive to appreciate his daughter's intel-
1 igence, but even on the point of deserting her, he is 
unable to read in her the signs of generosity and tolerance 
which might have eased the awkwardness of even his present 
shabby plan. Instead he invents the proposition of the 
American journey and the invitation to Maisie to accompany 
him. She responds as follows: 
Planted once more before him in the middle of the 
room she felt herself turning white. ·I?· she gasped, 
yet feeling as soon as she had spoken that such a note 
of dismay was not altogether pretty. • • • It helped her 
in a few seconds to appear more as he would like her 
that she saw, in the lovely light of the Countess's 
splendour, exactly, however she aH?eared, the right answer 
to make. •0ear papa, I'll go with you anywhere.• 
(WMK p. 139). 
In the ambiguity of this response, the reader may once 
again identify an interesting division in Maisie between 
the conscious self over whose responses she has control, 
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and the unconscious Self whose responses are irrational 
and unpredictable. Once again, this division is different 
from that which she had consciously identified between 
her "public self" and her "private self" (vide pp. 344 + 354). 
Here the discrepancy occurs between what she rationally 
and consciously feels to be the right answer for a daughter 
to make to her father under such circumstances, and the 
answer which emanates from her before her rational thought 
has exercised its control. Her pallor and her gasp are 
signs which convey Maisie's fear and dismay at her father's 
proposal, yet they are not signs in a discourse consciously 
authorized by the rational Maisie. In fact the rational 
Maisie identifies them as "not altogether pretty," and 
certainly not what her father would like to hear. What 
she sees to be "exactly • • • the right answer to make" is 
an absolute expression of tenderness and loyalty from which 
all suggestion of fear and dismay have been edited: "Dear 
papa, I'll go with you anywhere." This editing process 
is not accounted for in the textual discourse of the "cent-
ral consciousness." The fear and dismay of Maisie's ini-
tial response are not reasoned away, they simply disappear 
from her "right" and conscious answer. Here once again, 
a slight "crack" appears in the narrator's discourse, al-
though it does not yet manifest itself as a large enough 
"gap" to warrant transference to the reader. Through this 
•crack" the reader may glimpse the narrator's unwitting 
suggestion of an unconscious in Maisie, which, having momen-
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tarily manifested itself as an irruption of fear and dismay, 
is once again repressed as a childish mistake, and sup-
planted by the conscious discourse which identifies the 
duty required of the child, to the Father, by the Symbolic 
Order. 
It is because the ambiguity in Maisie's response is 
not consciously controlled that Beale Farange appears in-
accurate and unfair in identifying it as deliberate, cons-
cious, deception. However, it is because he himself occu-
pies the ambiguous position of transgressive Father that 
he does not wish to recognize his child's expression of 
loyalty. Instead he chooses to recognize the response 
of fear and dismay that has been repressed: 
•That's a way, my dear, of saying 'No, thank you!' 
You know you don't want to go the least little mite. 
You can't humbug me!• Beale Farange laid down. •r 
don't want to bully you - I never bullied you in my 
life; but I make you the offer, and it's to take or 
to leave. Your mother will never again have any more 
to do with you than if you were a kitchenmaid she 
had turned out for going wrong. Therefore of course 
I'm your natural protector and you've a right to get 
everything out of me you can ••• • ( WMK p. 141). 
Interestingly, the very conscious deception which Beale 
Farange claims to identify in the ambiguity of Maisie's 
response, is evident in the obvious contradictions which 
his conscious discourse expresses. For example, the sup-
posedly democratic ·I don't want to bully you - I never 
bullied you in my life;• is immediately preceded by the 
tyrranical, • 1 You can't humbug me!' Beale Farange laid 
down.• 
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What Beale Farange's misreading of his daughter's 
position reflects is the commonplace oversimplification 
of "the Other" as "the opposite" rather than "the differ-
ent." In other words, he reads Maisie's affirmations of 
loyalty as "the opposite" of the "truth" which he thinks 
she hides - the "truth" that she actually wants to renounce 
her father. He cannot, or perhaps does not want to, see 
that this loyalty is a part of "the truth"; that she would 
like to be loyal and loving to her father, but ambiguously, 
her fear of him makes her wish to renounce him too. As-
suming that she wishes to be rid of him, he guesses that 
the more absolute the riddance he can of fer her, the more 
tempted she will be to abandon him. He is therefore con-
founded when she rejects the very finality that he imagined 
would be most attractive to her. 
It is at this point of stalemate, when Maisie refuses 
to accept that she will "never, never, never!" see her 
father again, that the Countess herself returns. The situ-
ation which follows is embarrassing both for Maisie and 
for the Countess. It seems that the latter has had no 
previous knowledge that her paid escort, Beale Fa range, 
has a daughter, and in her efforts to hide from Maisie 
the invidiousness of her own position as his Patroness, 
she resorts to ingratiating toadyism. Maisie, on the other 
hand, expecting the Countess to be beautiful and poised 
- as storybooks have led her to believe that Countesses 
always are, and as the elegant home of the Countess has 
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suggested that she will be - is repulsed by the "short 
fat wheedling whiskered person" (WMK p. 147) whom she meets 
instead. In spite of her disgust, Maisie does recognize 
an "Otherness" in the Countess, a pathos and vulnerability 
of one who would like to be accepted, but by her very defi-
nition inspires inevitable rejection: 22 
The great pain of the thing was that she could see 
the Countess liked her enough to wish to be liked in 
return, and it was from the idea of a return she sought 
utterly to flee. It was the idea of a return that after 
a confusion of loud words had broken out between the 
others brought to her lips with the tremor preceding 
disaster: "Can't I, please, be sent home in a cab?" 
Yes, the Countess wanted her and the Countess was 
wounded and chilled, and she could n 't help it, and 
it was all the more dreadful because it only made the 
Countess more coaxing and more impossible. The only 
thing that sustained either of them perhaps till the 
cab came was its being in the air somehow that 
Beale had done what he wanted (WMK p. 148). 
22 The Countess, being negroid and therefore subject to the 
kind of racial prejudice expressed by Mrs. Beale (the latter refers 
to black ladies as "always hideous" and their dress as "the vul-
garest of the vulgar" (WMK pp. 131-132)), being far from conven-
tionally good looking, a foreigner and a woman, appears to have 
only one attribute to save her from utter alienation in late-Victo-
rian London: her financial resources. She is able to hire Beale 
Farange as an escort. It seems important to point out however, 
that if the Countess is condemned by the unambiguous judgements 
of Mrs. Beale and later of Mrs. Wix, these readings are not errlorsed 
by the text. This seems to be the point which Maxwell Geismar 
misses when he offers the following comment on What Maisie Knew 
as an example of Henry James' s later novels: 
•To this later James also, it almost appeared that Jews, 
Negroes and Lovers were the worst culprits in his fin de si~cle 
scene of bohemian decadence. • • • The 'brown Countess' is described 
as 'a clever frizzled pcxxne in a frill, or a dreadful human monkey 
in a spangled petticoat. ' ( Is it possible that she is an American 
Negro?) Earlier in the novel, also, we have been introduced to 
another of Ida's rich friends, Mr. Perriam, who has a bald head, 
a black mustache, eyes like 'polished little billiard globes,' and 
a large diamond of dazzling luster. 'He's quite my idea,' says 
Mrs. Wix, 'of a Heathen Jew.' But he will be immensely rich. 
'On the death of his papa?' asks the bright little Maisie. 'Dear 
no - nothing hereditary,' answers the refined well-informed govern-
ess. 'I mean he has made a mass of money!" - Geismar, p. 154. 
(continued -4) 
375 
Since Beale Farange has been unable to inveigle the required 
renunciation from Maisie, he has simply put the appropriate 
words of disloyalty into her mouth, telling the Countess 
that "she declines to have anything to do with us." Thus, 
in spite of her attempts to be loyal to her father, Maisie 
finds herself with no choice but to relinquish him to the 
claims of the Countess. 
In Search of a New Symbolic Order: 
the Launching of Mrs. Wix's Plan 
On the fifth day following her meeting with the Count-
ess and her father's abdication of his paternity, Maisie 
is unexpectedly swept up from the Farange residence at 
Regent's Park, and with Susan Ash in attendance, is trans-
ported by Sir Claude to Folkestone. As he discloses to 
Maisie, the force chiefly responsible for instigating this 
dramatic turn of events is Mrs. Wix. Evidently, the lat-
ter's plan that Sir Claude should establish a new home 
This would seem precisely the oversimplified int.erpretation of 
these alienat.ed charact.ers which James' s t.ext does not authorize. 
While the Count.ess, for example, is present.ea as the "Other" of 
the Symbolic Order, there is no authorial endorsement that the 
codes of this Order are "good" and the Count.ess therefore "bad". 
To assume that she is one of "the worst culprits" in a "scene 
of bohemian decadence" would surely be to follow the limit.ea read-
ing of the two governesses. As Maisie's response indicat.es, the 
Countess is ambiguously both repulsive in her toadyism, yet touch-
ingly pathetic in her efforts to reduce the alienation she suffers 
in late-Victorian London. I suggest that it is such oversimplifi-
cations which lead Geismar to dismiss What Maisie Knew in the 
manner already referred to on page 334 of this chapt.er. 
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where Maisie, her elderly governess and her stepfather 
might live uncorrupt lives, dissociated from the transgres-
sions of the Faranges and their London "set", has made 
steady progress during Maisie's sojourn at Regent's Park. 
Interestingly, however, while Maisie is a part of this 
plan, she does not appear to be its focus. Instead, this 
focal point appears to be Sir Claude: the necessity that 
he escape from his fellow transgressors and become rein-
stated on the side of "Symbolic Order." While Maisie does 
not consciously detect this preoccupation in Mrs. Wix's 
plan, it does occur to her as strange that Mrs. Wix, who 
has herself agreed that Maisie is "morally at home in at-
mospheres it would be appalling to analyse" (WMK p. 155), 
should now be so insistent on this move to a "foreign land." 
She wonders furthermore why Mrs. Wix has not appeared "at 
first hand" in her own plan, but she resolves to wait pati-
ently for the disclosure of the answers to these mysteries. 
On the eve of their flight from England to France, 
Sir Claude and Maisie, waiting in the hotel garden for 
the announcement of the evening meal, are disturbed on 
their peaceful garden bench by the unexpected appearance 
of her ladyship, Ida. It would seem that the purpose of 
her visit is to take her leave of Maisie and, like her 
former husband, Beale, absolve herself from her parental 
responsibilities while receiving, simultaneously, "all 
the honours.• Al though, like Beale, she claims to be on 
the brink of departure for a foreign country - South Africa 
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- and offers Maisie the opportunity of accompanying her, 
she does not press the of fer and it becomes somehow lost 
in the "profuse and prolonged" but "not exhaustively lucid" 
(WMK p. 164) monologue she performs before Maisie. Amongst 
the "muddle of inconsequent things" she makes her claims: 
that she is "crazily • • • criminally good,• "awfully i 11," 
"formed to suffer," "very, very tired," "very, very deter-
mined," and so forth. 
Maisie in her eagerness to show sympathy and loyalty 
to her mother corroborates Ida's claims by remarking that 
•the Captain" (with whom she had had to wait in Hyde Park 
while Ida and Sir Claude did battle with each other) had 
also declared that her mother was remarkably "good". Un-
fortunately for Maisie it appears that "the Captain" has 
since fallen from Ida's favour. The little girl's naive 
belief in •the Captain" as a loyal lover rather than one 
of many flee ting admirers, only incenses her mother who 
abandons her child with the final alliterative denounce-
ment: 
"You' re a dreadful dismal deplorable little thing," ••• 
And with this she turned back and rustled away over 
the lawn (WMK p. 170). 
Maisie, at least for the present, is rescued from the dusk 
of this parentless world by the figure of Sir Claude looking 
out for her from the lighted hotel doorway, the prospect 
of the table d'hOte and the promise of the journey to France 
the following day. 
378 
FRANCE AND THE UNVEILING OF THE PHALLUS 
Knowledge as an Absent Presence 
Initially, "being abroad" seems to promise Maisie 
the long awaited opportunity to attain "full knowledge". 
Not only does she escape the inhibiting effect of familiar 
rules and recognized prohibitions, but she confronts with 
delight a seemingly limitless abundance of fascinating 
and readily accessible difference: 
This 
She was "abroad" and she gave herself up to it, resrx>nded 
to it, in the bright air, before the pink houses, among 
the bare-legged fishwives and the red-legged soldiers, 
with the instant certitude of a vocation. Her vocation 
was to see the world and to thrill with enjoyment of 
the picture; she had grown older in five minutes and 
had by the time they reached the hotel recognized in 
the institutions and manners of France a multitude of 
affinities and messages. . • • On the spot, at Boulogne, 
though there might have been excess there was at least 
no wavering; she recognized, she understood, she 
adored and took possession; feeling herself attuned 
to everything and laying her hand, right and left, 
on what had simply been waiting for her 
(WMK pp. 173-174). 
apparent . . 23 Jou1ssance is predictably short-lived. 
23 The reader of this thesis who 
of this word both in the work of Lacan 
ously in the work of Roland Barthes, 
to use it without translation. For the 
explanation may be helpful. 
is familiar with the use 
and perhaps more notori-
will appreciate my wish 
uninitiated, the following 
Lacan, sustaining the recognition of the equivalence of sexu-
ality to meaning already described in the Introduction of this 
chapter, uses jouissance which is literally translatable as the 
bliss of sexual orgasm, to refer to that state of "absolute bliss," 
•full subjectivity," •full presence," "full meaning" and so forth 
that man denies himself in the primal linguistic repression. It 
is a state only conceivable as "between the lines" of language: 
•. • • jouissance is forbidden to him who speaks as such, al though 
it can only be said between the lines for whoever is subject 
of the Law, since the Law is grounded in this very prohibition" 
( Ecrits p. 319). 
It is this location of jouissance as occurring "between the lines• 
that Barthes uses in establishing the opposition between his some-
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In conversation with Sir Claude, Maisie learns that already 
prohibitions intrude on the freedom of foreign travel, 
one of the severest restrictions to be observed being the 
shortage of money. The second factor that governs their 
immediate decisions is the projected arrival of the guardian 
of Symbolic Law, Mrs. Wix. It is in response to Maisie's 
inquiry about how long they will stay in Boulogne that 
Sir Claude responds, 
"We shall stay till she arrives." 
She [Maisie] turned upon him. "Mrs. Beale? 0 
"Mrs. Wix. I've had a wire,• he went on. "She has 
seen your mother. " 
"Seen mamma?" Maisie stared. "Where in the world?" 
• Apparently in London. They've been together. " 
For an instant this looked ominous a fear came into 
her eyes. "Then she hasn't gone?" 
"Your mother? - to South Africa? I give it up, dear 
boy." Sir Claude said; and she seemed literally to see 
him give it up as he stood there and with a kind of absent 
gaze - absent, that is, from her affairs - followed the 
fine stride and shining limbs of a young fishwife who 
had just waded out of the sea with her basketful of shri.Jt\)S. 
what esoteric concepts of the "text of pleasure" and the "text 
of bliss/jouissance" - see The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Richard 
Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975) p. 22. 
In my use of this term, I wish to imply Maisie's experience 
of the "difference" or "Otherness" of France as an unrestricted 
and therefore blissful play of new meanings, which give the impres-
sion that the "full knowledge" after which she quests is now acces-
sible to her. In the scene described, the reader may recognize 
that a fundamental component of this "accessible meaning" that 
up to now has been repressed, is "sexuality". In the phrases, 
"gave herself up to it," "thrill with enjoyment,• "she adored and 
took possession," Maisie's response is identifiable as an enjoyment 
of that "sexual" play, that "play of difference• which up to now 
has been forbidden to her. For, as the image of the "bare-legged 
fishwives and the red-legged soldiers" suggests, "sexuality" or 
that meaning which has been repressed as the forbidden Other 
in the Symbolic Order of late-Victorian London, is clearly accessi-
ble as the norm in the Symbolic Order of France. 
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His thought came back to her sooner than his eyes. 
•aut I dare say it's all right. She would n 't come 
if it was n 't, poor old thing: she knows rather well 
what she's about." 
This was so reassuring that Maisie, after turning 
it over, could make it fit into her dream . "Well, 
what is she about?" 
He finally stopped looking at the fish wife he met 
his companion's enquiry. "Oh you know!" There was 
something in the way he said it that made, between 
them, more of an equality than she had yet imagined; 
but it had also more the effect of raising her up than 
of letting her down, and what it did with her was 
shown by the sound of her assent. 
"Yes - I know!" What she knew, what she could 
know is by this time no secret to us: it grew and 
grew at any rate, the rest of that day, in the air of 
what he took for granted. It was better he should 
do that than attempt to test her knowledge; but there 
at the worst was the gist of the matter: it was open 
between them at last that their great change, as, speak-
ing as if it had already lasted weeks, Maisie called 
it, was somehow built up round Mrs. Wix. Before she 
went tn bed that night she knew further that Sir Claude, 
since, as he called it, they had been on the rush, 
had received more telegrams than one. But they sepa-
rated again without speaking of Mrs. Beale 
(WMK pp. 176-177). 
Earlier it was noted that Maisie, in the flurry of her 
departure from Folkestone, had wondered firstly, why Mrs. 
Wix had not at that point appeared in the execution of 
her own scheme, and secondly, why - if she had al ready 
conceded that Maisie seemed "morally at home in atmospheres 
it would be appalling to analyse" (WMK p. 155) - she should 
suddenly be so insistent that Sir Claude transport the 
child to •some foreign land." Now these questions appear 
about to be resolved: Mrs. Wix is due to participate act-
ively in her plan, yet strangely, this participation does 
not seem to be authorized by Sir Claude, but rather by 
her ladyship in London. However, Sir Claude does seem 
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to accept Mrs. Wix' s arrival as likely to be compatible 
with the rest of her scheme, "she knows rather well what 
she's about." This surmise gives Maisie the opportunity 
to resolve the second mystery, "Well, what is she about?" 
Ambiguously, Sir Claude meets this with, "Oh you know!" 
On one hand, Sir Claude's reply might be interpreted 
1 i teral ly as ref erring to the plan that he should set up 
a home for himself, Maisie and Mrs. Wix where the three 
friends could 1 i ve in peace away from the squabbling and 
intrigues of the likes of Ida and Beale. However, even 
at the time of its proposal, there had been aspects of 
this plan which Maisie had been unable to understand. She 
had, for example, noticed but had been unable to comprehend 
why Sir Claude had been incredulous to hear Mrs. Wix des-
cribe his possible decampment with her as "beautiful" (vide 
WMK p. 84). She also noticed that Mrs. Wix "faintly smiled" 
and "faintly coloured" at Sir Claude's incredulity. She 
could not understand moreover who the "real bad" woman 
was from whose corrupting influence Mrs. Wix seemed to 
consider it necessary to "save" Sir Claude. On that occa-
sion, Sir Claude was "not mystified" by Mrs. Wix's scheme; 
on the contrary, a "smile of intelligence broke afresh 
in his eyes" (WMK p. 84). If the reader too, can deduce 
that Mrs. Wix would judge decamping with Sir Claude as 
"beautiful" because she is •over head and ears" (WMK p. 61) 
about him; that the unnamed "bad" woman is Mrs. Beale; 
and that the "corruption" from which Mrs. Wix wishes to 
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save Sir Claude is an illicit affair with Mrs. Beale, Maisie 
cannot grasp these excess significances behind Mrs. Wix' s 
plan. 
This division between meaning that is accessible to 
Maisie and meaning that is repressed from her knowledge 
is manifested once again in the dynamics of her conversa-
tion with Sir Claude here at Boulogne. When, for example, 
she asks him if her mother has gone to South Africa, he 
replies that he "gives it up," that he can make no meaning 
of the subject they discuss, namely Ida. To the reader, 
it may be evident that if Sir Claude cannot explain Ida's 
behaviour to Maisie, it is because the information on which 
such an explanation depends is "forbidden". Even as he 
says "I give it up," it is evident to the reader that while 
his gaze is "absent • • • from her affairs" he continues 
to play with the forbidden meaning which is withheld from 
Maisie and which continues to manifest itself in the "signs" 
of the "fine stride and shining limbs of a young fishwife.• 
Significantly, the point at which Sir Claude removes his 
•absent gaze" from the fishwife - represses "play• with 
the Other - and turns back to Maisie and the conscious 
discussion of her affairs, is also the point at which he 
represses Maisie's enquiry as to the nature of the Other 
- "Well what is she about?" - with the utterance "Oh you 
know!" 
With this response, "Oh you know!", Sir Claude evades 
the task of explaining Mrs. Wix's actions by treating Maisie 
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as one who, like him, is "in-the-know." Maisie, feeling 
that this reply makes "between them more of an equality 
than she had yet imagined," and moreover "has more the 
effect of raising her up than of letting him down," responds 
with the discretion that agrees implicitly not to pursue 
the request for an explanation of the unknown, but instead, 
to follow Sir Claude's cue of treating it as that which 
the discreet need not trouble to discuss. In other words, 
her response "Yes I knowl" is an agreement that Mrs. 
Wix' s reasons for acting as she does belong to the locus 
of the "unmentionable." 
Now, this response is followed by the narrator's "aside" 
to the reader: 
What she knew, what she could know is by this time 
no secret to us: it grew and grew at any rate, the 
rest of that day, in the air of what he took for granted. 
Here, I would argue is the first clearly identifiable ins-
tance of unconscious transference from the text to the 
reader. While the narrator claims that Maisie's knowledge 
is known to us - "what she could know is by this time no 
secret to us" - he is actually following Sir Claude's strat-
egy, inviting the reader to accept as "known" or "under-
stood" that excess of Maisie's knowledge which is inacces-
sible or "forbidden" to narrative discourse. He transfers 
to the reader as sujet-suppos~-savoir, unconsciously invit-
ing him to produce that "meaning" which is beyond the recog-
nition of the authorial consciousness. From the locus 
of the Other, 
nized by the 
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the reader may see that the division recog-
authorial consciousness between knowledge 
which is accessible to Maisie and knowledge which is for-
bidden, is as applicable to our knowledge of Maisie's know-
ledge. There is that part of her knowledge which she can 
articulate as conscious discourse and which the narrator 
can claim to translate, and there is that part of her know-
ledge which is unconscious and which is Other than, or 
inaccessible to conscious discourse. It is th is excess 
which is in fact a secret to us, and must remain so. 
Having produced this apparently repressed information, 
the reader may transfer back to the narrator who resumes 
his discourse, informing us that Maisie's knowledge "grew 
and grew", so that by the end of this first day at Boulogne, 
she has established that the "great change" which she and 
Sir Claude have experienced, "... was somehow built round 
Mrs. Wix" and if this conclusion depends on "unspoken, 
absent knowledge" it would seem thereby to relate to the 
obviously absent, but apparently unmentionable, Mrs. Beale. 
Mrs. Wix's Unconscious Desire 
On her arrival at Boulogne, Mrs. Wix eagerly explains 
to Maisie and Sir Claude how she has at last managed to 
assume the role which she had originally conceived for 
herself in her own scheme: she has been appointed by Ida 
as the "clean• and "decent" moral guardian of Maisie. 
However, she herself seems to attribute more importance 
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to her additional role of "saving" Sir Claude from "the 
worst person of all" - Mrs. Beale. In the very energy 
of Mrs. Wix's repudiation of Mrs. Beale, the reader may 
interpret the unspoken "Otherness" of her motives: the 
repressed Desire which she herself harbours for Sir Claude. 
In spite of her efforts to uphold her identity as moral 
guardian by keeping her transgressive Desire firmly re-
pressed, there are occasions on which this Desire irrupts 
unexpectedly into her discourse, disrupting the very moral 
order which its repression should define. A particularly 
comical, if somewhat bizarre example of such an irruption 
can be found in the following scene which takes place late 
in the evening, the day of Mrs. Wix's arrival at Boulogne. 
Mrs. Wix and Maisie are together in their private 
salon shortly before retiring to bed. Sir Claude bursts 
in with a letter from Mrs. Beale in which she encloses 
a communication just received from her husband at Spa -
notably not America - declaring to her his irrevocable 
desertion of her as his wife. Sir Claude and Mrs. Wix 
produce very different readings of this text. To the former 
the letter is cause for great rejoicing for it means that 
Mrs. Beale is, by the desertion of her husband, as free 
as Sir Claude is by the desertion of his wife. Since he 
has been free to leave England and live with his step-
daughter and her governess, so Mrs. Beale is free now to 
do the same. While Mrs. Wix agrees that Mrs. Beale is 
now free, as Sir Claude is, not to have to pretend to live 
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with her former spouse, she will not concede that Mrs. 
Beale is free to join Sir Claude at Boulogne for she recog-
nizes the difference, the play of illicit sexuality, which 
underlies such a proposition. Sir Claude then challenges 
the logic of Mrs. Wix's interpretation: 
"Then why the deuce do you grant so - do you, I may 
even say, rejoice so - that by the desertion of my 
own precious partner I'm free? 0 
Mrs. Wix met this challenge first with silence, then 
with a demonstration the most extraordinary, the most 
unexpected. Maisie could scarcely believe her eyes 
as she saw the good lady, wit.l-i whom she had associated 
no faintest shade of any art of provocation, actually, 
after an upward grimace, give Sir Claude a great giggling 
insinuating naughty slap. "You wretch - you know 
why!" And she turned away. The face that with this 
movement she left him to present to Maisie was to abide 
with his stepdaughter as the very image of stupefaction; 
(WMK p. 191). 
In challenging Mrs. Wix's interpretation of his own free-
dom and the freedom of Mrs. Beale, Sir Claude represses 
the sexuality which defines Mrs. Beale's position as dif-
ferent from his own. He implies that Mrs. Wix should be 
as delighted by the freedom of one step-parent (Mrs. Beale) 
to live with stepdaughter and governess as she is by the 
freedom of the other/Other step-parent (Sir Claude). Mrs. 
Wix reprimands him verbally and consciously for refusing 
to recognize what he consciously "knows" to be wrong or 
in other words for refusing to recognize sexual difference 
in his relationship with Mrs. Beale. Simultaneously, she 
unconsciously reprimands him for his repressed, unconscious 
knowledge. The signs of her body language - the "upward 
grimace," the "great giggling insinuating naughty slap," 
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- disturb the sense of her solemn verbal reprimand, •play-
fully• rebuking Sir Claude for having failed to recognize 
the sexual difference in his relationship to her. While 
Maisie is confused by the •non-sense• produced by this 
irruption of "excess meaning," Sir Claude is faced with 
the confounding possibility that he is the object of Mrs. 
Wix's Desire, just as much as he is the object of Mrs. 
Beale's. The elderly governess is only free to live with 
him because in conformity to Symbolic Law she agrees to 
repress her Desire, to play the role of Symbolic Parent 
to Sir Claude as well as to Maisie and thereby to identify 
herself as •clean" in a way that the •unclean• Mrs. Beale 
will surely refuse to do. Yet, as was the case earlier 
in Mrs. Beale's relationship as "Miss Overmore• to Beale 
Farange, Mrs. Wix's role as •governess/mentor• only serves 
to exclude the "Otherness" of her role as •governess/lover• 
and correspondingly, Maisie's role as "child/pupil" only 
serves to exclude the •otherness" of her role as "child/ 
pretext". 
It is this conflict between the role which Mrs. Wix 
is permitted to play and that which she is forbidden to 
play that can be seen to repeat itself in the critical 
conflict waged between Marius Bewley and F. R. Leavis in 
the Scrutiny articles of 1950. 24 I should like to digress 
24 Martha Banta offers the following useful summary of this 
debate: 
·The Scrutiny debate began when Bewley insisted upon the 
presence of the 'metaphysically appalling' in The Turn of the 
Screw and of 'horror' in What Maisie Knew, and developed when 
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here, if only briefly, to demonstrate how each of these 
critics, in offering his interpretation of the text can be 
seen to participate in, or dramatize the conflict contained 
within the text. 
In Bewley' s first article, he described Mrs. Wix' s 
affection for Sir Claude as follows: 
Elderly, ugly, fantastic as she is, Mrs. Wix falls in 
love with Sir Claude. The fact isn't insisted on, and 
it might even be possible to interpret in non-erotic 
terms her passionate avowal to Maisie that she 'adores' 
Sir Claude, although I doubt it. The revealing glimpse 
we are given into the real situation - so shocking to 
our nerves just because it is so sudden and only a 
glimpse - occurs in Chapter XXN. Al though the allusions 
are veiled, Mrs. Wix' s behaviour and speeches are 
such as to be understandable only in terms of an utter 
infatuation for the young man, and there are moments 
when our belief in her disinterestedness wears thin. 
Her desire to keep Sir Claude and Mrs. Beale separated, 
if it arises primarily from her concern for Maisie, seems 
at some points not to be untouched by sexual jealousy. 
And the ugly possibility arises in the reader's mind 
that Mrs. Wix 's attachment to Maisie may match Mrs. 
Beale's in this: that for them both, and however much 
they may like Maisie for herself, the little girl provides 
a means of closing in on Sir Claude. 2 5 
In this description, the conflict in the conscious discourse 
of What Maisie Knew, the conflict between permissible mean-
Leavis denied the presence of such traditional elements of tragedy. 
The crux of the disagreement lies in Leavis' particular definition 
of evil (as that which finds its center in the sexual), his refusal 
to find evil in Maisie's world, and his resulting labeling of the 
novel as a comedy. Bewley also pronounced James' s novel a o:JlE<jy; 
he also agreed that sexuality is not the central preoccupation; 
but he found 'horror' and 'evil' just the same.• - •The Quality 
of Experience in What Maisie Knew,• New England Quarterly, 42 
(Dec. 1969) p. 484. 
25 Marius Bewley, The Complex Fate, p. 100. Bewley' s book 
contains the articles originally published in Scrutiny, XVII, 2 
(Summer 1950) pp. 90-127 and Scrutiny XVII, 3 (Autumn, 1950) 
pp. 255-263. 
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ing such as Mrs. Wix' s role as "mentor of the child" and 
forbidden meaning, such as Mrs. Wix's Desire to be "lover 
of the (step)father," is repeated in Bewley's discourse. 
On one hand, he would appear to want to repress his know-
ledge of the sexuality in Mrs. Wix's role, seeing her only 
as "mentor of the child." He argues, for example, that 
such sexuality "isn't insisted on," that "it might even 
be possible to interpret in non-erotic terms her passionate 
avowal n On the other hand however, he describes his 
identification of sexuality as the product of a "revealing 
glimpse .•• into the real situation"(my emphasis) implying 
that evidence of Mrs. Wix's Desire to be "lover to the 
father" is indeed accessible in the discourse of the text. 
In his next statement that "allusions are veiled" 
he participates again in the text's conflict: "sexuality" 
or excess meaning is included in the text as "allusion", 
an inclusion which is paradoxically excluded behind a veil. 
The double negative: "Her desire to keep Sir Claude and 
Mrs. Beale separated • . . seems at some points not to be 
untouched by sexual jealousy" (my emphasis) manifests again 
Bewley's involvement in the conflict: are we to deny, 
or must we admit this excess of meaning, the "sexuality" 
which in its absence is so obviously present? 
F. R. Lea vis, arguing against Bewley, repressing more 
strongly the "play" of "sexuality", nevertheless also par-
ticipates in the conflict which the text dramatizes: the 
conflict between meaning which is to be recognized and 
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meaning which is to be repressed. Leavis replies to Bew-
ley's observations about Mrs. Wix with the following argu-
ment: 
• • • Sir Claude is an attractive man, and 'erotic' in 
these days is a term of extensive and uncertain appli-
cation. But it is surely a very odd term to apply 
to pcor Mrs. Wix 's state, and the context given it by 
Mr. Bewley adds to the emphasis with which it must 
be rejected. 
Sir Claude, in short is the beau id~al of her 
romantic daydreams, and her feeling about him is as 
much, and as little, 'erotic' as Maisie's, j£ more posi-
tively a matter of comedy - since, after all, a childish 
'adoration' in her is less in place than in a child. 
I concede to Mr. Bewley, without embarrassment, that 
perhaps Maisie as well as Mrs. Wix is jealous of Mrs. 
Beale. 
An element of jealousy may contribute to Maisie's 
decision to go back to England with Mrs. Wix. But 
I have to insist that sex, in this story, is only marginal 
to James 's precx::cupation; he shows, here no moral 
feeling at all that is directed upon sex as such. 26 
For the moment, I shall suspend the question of Maisie's 
feeling towards Sir Claude which will be discussed in detail 
in due course. The points of Leavis's argument upon which 
I wish to focus are, firstly his contention that "erotic" 
is "a very odd term to apply to poor Mrs. Wix' s state,• 
(my emphasis), and secondly that Mrs. Wix' s "adoration" 
of Sir Claude is "a matter of comedy." It is surely because 
Desire of a young man (represented in the Oedipal myth 
by the figure of the son) by an old woman ( the mother) 
is "Other• than "the norm" permitted by the Symbolic Order 
- or in Leavis's terms, is "odd" - that "poor" Mrs. Wix's 
26 F. R. Lea vis, "What Maisie Knew: A Disagreement by F. R. 
Leavis," in Marius Bewley, The complex Fat.e, pp. 128-129. 
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Desire must be, and for the most part is, repressed. When 
therefore, this forbidden Desire is detectable, when it 
escapes repress ion and erupts as obvious meaning, it is, 
just as Leavis describes it, "comical•, for it is a mani-
festation of that "non-sense" which threatens to subvert 
Symbolic "sense• that can only be sustained by the exclusion 
of such "play". 
Leavis again replays a pattern dramatized in the text 
when he argues that "sex, in this story, is only marginal 
to James' s preoccupation" for in the very repression of 
"sex" as "marginal" he unwittingly defines it as that excess 
or excluded meaning which gives definition to that "non-
sexual" meaning included in the text as "central.• 
Suspending conclusions about these conflicting inter-
pretations until the "Conclusion" of this interpretation, 
let us proceed with the present reading. 
The Absence of Maisie's Moral Sense 
Observing both Mrs. Wix and Sir Claude closely during 
the discussions of her stepmother, Maisie is able to deduce 
that Mrs. Wix objects vehemently to Mrs. Beale's joining 
the party at Boulogne, but she cannot fathom the reasons 
for that objection. It is to this issue therefore that 
she returns when she and Mrs. Wix bide their time at Bou-
logne, awaiting the outcome of Sir Claude's return to London: 
•why after all should we have to choose between 
you? ltly should n 't we be four?" she finally denarrled. 
Mrs. Wix gave the jerk of a sleeper awakened or 
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the start even of one who hears a bullet whiz at the 
flag of truce. Her stupefaction at such a breach of 
the peace delayed for a moment her answer. "Four 
improprieties, do you mean? Because two of us happen 
to be decent people! Do I gather you to wish that 
I should stay on with you even if that ~ is capable -?" 
Maisie took her up before she could further phrase 
Mrs. Beale's capability. "Stay on as .!!!Y_ companion 
- yes. Stay on as just what you were at mamma's. 
Mrs. Beale would let you!" the child said. 
Mrs. Wix had by this time fairly sprung to her arms. 
"And who, I'd like to know, would let Mrs. Beale? 
Do you mean, little unfortunate, that you would?" 
"Why not, if now she's free?" (WMK pp. 201-202). 
It is evident from Maisie's use of pronouns in her opening 
question - "Why after all should we have to choose between 
you?" (my emphasis) - that she identifies herself in this 
situation as the partner of Sir Claude and that in her 
view it is he and she who are being forced to choose bet-
ween Mrs. Wix and Mrs. Beale. In order to avoid the ex-
clusion of one of the latter which such a choice implies, 
Maisie is prepared to relinquish her position as Sir Claude's 
partner in order to create both a place for Mrs. Beale 
and also a place for Mrs. Wix, "Stay on as !!!Y_ companion 
- yes." Notably Maisie at this point appears to feel no 
regret at relinquishing Sir Claude to her stepmother, but 
sees this as a means to achieving a peaceful resolution 
of the conflict. Mrs. Wix however, refuses to recognize 
Mrs. Beale's authority as Symbolic Mother - the position 
to which she herself aspires. Since Maisie is unable to 
understand the transgressi veness which Mrs. Beale's role 
as Sir Claude's partner involves, she cannot follow Mrs. 
Wix's objections: 
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•well," said Mrs. Wix, •nobody, you know, is free 
to commit a crime.• 
•A crime!• The word had come out in a way that 
made the child sound it again. 
•You'd commit as great a one as their own - and 
so should I - if we were to condone their immorality 
by our presence." 
Maisie waited a little; this seemed so fiercely con-
clusive. •why is it immorality?• she nevertheless pre-
sently enquired. 
Her companion now turned upon her with a reproach 
softer because it was somehow deeper. "You 're too 
unspeakable! Do you know what we 're talking about?" 
In the interest of ultimate calm Maisie felt that she 
must be above all clear. "Certainly; about their taking 
advantage of their freedom." 
"Well, to do what?" 
"Why, to live with us." 
Mrs. Wix's laugh, at this, was literally wild. "'Us?' 
Thank you!" 
"Then to live with me." 
The words made herfriend jump. "You give me up? 
You break with me for ever? You turn me into the 
street?" 
Maisie, though gasping a little, bore up under the 
rain of challenges. •Those, it seems to me, are the 
things you do to me.• (WMK pp. 202-203). 
Maisie's "obtuseness," her inability to recognize what 
is clearly "crime• and "immorality" to Mrs. Wix, provokes 
the latter to investigate the nature of her pupil's know-
27 ledge. 
27 
It would seem that with the question, "Well, 
Tanner's remarks on the concept of adultery as a "crime• 
against •unspoken• "silent" laws are interesting here: 
"It is perhaps worth noting in passing that up to the end 
of the eighteenth century, adultery was an offense that could be, 
and still was, prosecuted in the court of law. In the nineteenth 
century, though the law remained in the books, it was, I gather, 
never publicly prosecuted in a court of law - i.e. , it moves to 
the unspoken realm of those silent secondary laws of society, where 
the rules and the punishments are applied and meted out privately. 
This is another reason why adultery is one of the central problems 
for the bourgeois novel - unlike, for example, murder, which 
is arguably a greater threat to person, property, and law, but 
was never unspeakable in society and thus never undescribable 
in fiction.• - Adultery in the Novel, p. 14. 
I would argue that it is this problem of how to describe "the 
undescribable• that Henry James' s text dramatizes - a conflict 
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to do what?• she is on the verge of exposing the issue 
of sexuality that has been up to this point the repressed 
source of Maisie's confusion. However, Maisie's answer 
to the question unconsciously excludes sexuality once again 
as knowledge al ready accepted. Instead of answering, as 
Mrs. Wix and even the reader, might have expected, •why, 
to 1 i ve with each other," thereby consciously naming the 
source of the argument as "adultery", Maisie answers "Why, 
to live with us" thereby excluding the issue of adultery 
as the accepted premise, and naming the issue under debate 
as "the cohabitation of adulterers and the 'decent'". The 
"wild laugh" which erupts from Mrs. Wix expresses her sur-
prise at the unexpectedness of this response. If literally 
her disgruntled "'Us?' Thank you!• can be read as the 
moral guardian's reproof to her pupi 1 for inc 1 ud ing her 
in the implicit acceptance of adultery, it can also be 
read as the indignance of the would-be lover who is required 
to recognize as acceptable in another, the transgressive 
behaviour which she has been required to repress in herself. 
Yet when Maisie appears resigned to the possibility that 
she cannot expect to have her governess if she accepts 
her step-parents together, Mrs. Wix realizes the price 
she will have to pay for her unflinching moral stand. Un-
less she can compromise and accept the implicit transgres-
siveness, the •play• in the step-parents' relationship, 
which is passed on as a •reading effect• to all its interpreters 
who in turn attenpt to resolve the tension between overt aoo covert, 
or articulated and repressed, •meaning• in the text. 
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she cannot hope to find a place in the new •symbolic Order• 
at Boulogne. 
Ultimately, the conclusion to which these arguments 
bring Mrs. Wix is that Maisie, in spite of the extraordinary 
range of her knowledge, lacks a "moral sense.• To the read-
er the absence which Mrs. Wix identifies in Maisie's know-
ledge, could also be described as the presence of the ability 
to recognize the "place of the Other.• As we have already 
witnessed, Maisie, having been educated according to "op-
posed principles• in a social set where transgression of 
the Law is the norm, has never been presented with a clear 
description of the codes of a Symbolic Order. Consequently, 
she has also never acquired a clear sense of that which 
is forbidden by the Symbolic Law. Instead, what she has 
learned to accept is not that one opinion or perspective 
is right and permissible and another wrong and forbidden, 
but rather that such perspectives are as incompatible as 
the parents from whom they are initially learned, and can 
only be treated as incorrigibly different from each other. 
She therefore comes to accept that no matter how clearly 
she appears to understand an issue, that understanding 
viewed from a new position, is liable to change. This 
characteristic of Maisie as an interpreter or reader, mani-
fests itself as the treatment of literal meaning as that 
behind which excess significance invariably lies, excess 
significance which she accepts as likely to become as clear 
to her in the future as she assumes it to be to an adult 
interpreter. It is because she appears to understand that 
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innuendos are at play beneath literal statements such as 
•to live together,• or to be "in~ out of the upper rooms" 
(WMK p. 75), that her adult companions come to believe 
that there is "nothing• which Maisie does not know. In 
fact it is precisely because she recognizes the locus of 
the "Other" - by which is implicit not merely the place 
of 1 i teral sexual meaning, but that "play• of repressed 
difference by which alternative meaning is producible -
that Maisie has such an incongruously mature affinity for 
understanding new relations. Her knowledge is not restric-
ted or •straightened" as is Mrs. Wix's, by her education 
to Symbolic Law which compels her to make moral judgements, 
even if in its plurality such knowledge frequently threatens 
to dissipate into meaningless ignorance. 
The Otherness of Mrs. Beale 
As she and Mrs. Wix continue to wait at Boulogne, 
without news of Sir Claude, Maisie's feelings towards Mrs. 
Beale undergo a gradual change. When Mrs. Wix had earlier 
denounced Mrs. Beale as "bad", Maisie had refused to accept 
this opinion with the retort, "She's beautiful and I love 
her, I love her and she's beautiful• (WMK p. 205). At 
that point, Mrs. Beale appeared still to be the object 
of Maisie's •first passion" (WMK p. 25). Now it begins 
to dawn on her that Mrs. Beale is to be regarded less as 
an object of adoration than as an object of suspicion. 
Because Sir Claude has admitted his fear of Mrs. Beale 
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(WMK p. 90), Maisie is aware that the latter has the power 
to bully him, and perhaps even to prevent him from writing 
or returning to his friends at Boulogne. On Mrs. Wix's 
provocation, she even recognizes that "jealousy" is some-
thing that she has felt towards Mrs. Beale "lots of times." 
The change in her feeling toward Mrs. Beale is perhaps 
most evident in the following exchange: 
"If I thought she was unkind to him - I don't know 
what I should do!" 
Mrs. Wix dropped one of her squints; she even 
oonfirmed it by a wild grunt. "I know what I should!" 
Maisie at this felt that she lagged. "Well, I can 
think of one thing." 
Mrs. Wix more directly challenged her. "What is 
it then?" 
Maisie met her expression as if it were a game with 
forfeits for winking. "I'd kill her!" That at least, 
she hoped as she looked away, would guarantee her 
moral sense (WMK pp. 213-214). 
In judging "unkindness to Sir Claude" as a er ime worthy 
of death, Maisie thereby identifies him as the Supreme 
Being of her world, her Perfect Friend. Mrs. Beale on 
the other hand is identified as one of the many devotees 
of this Supreme Being who must suffer extermination if 
she violates his sacredness. Maisie's declaration of Sir 
Claude's supremacy moves Mrs. Wix to tears: 
She [Maisie] looked away, but her oompanion said noth-
ing for so long that she at last turned her head again. 
Then she saw the straighteners all blurred with tears 
which after a little seemed to have sprung from her 
own eyes. There were tears in fact on both sides of 
the spectacles, and they were even so thick that it 
was presently all Maisie could do to make out through 
them that slowly, finally Mrs. Wix put forth a hand. 
It was the material pressure that settled this and even 
at the end of some minutes more things besides. It 
settled in its own way one thing in particular, which, 
398 
though often, between them, heaven knew, hovered round 
and hung over, was yet to be established without the 
shadow of an attenuating smile. Oh there was no gleam 
of levity, as little of humour as of deprecation, in 
the long time they now sat together or in the way in 
which at some unmeasured point of it Mrs. Wix became 
distinct enough for her own dignity and yet not loud 
enough for the snoozing old women. 
"I adore him. I adore him. " 
Maisie took it well in; so well that in a moment 
more she would have answered profoundly: "So do 
I.• But before that moment passed something took place 
that brought other words to her lips; nothing more, 
very possibly, than the closer consciousness in her 
hand of the significance of Mrs. Wix' s. Their hands 
remained linked in unutterable sign of their union, 
and what Maisie at last said was simply and serenely: 
"Oh I know!" 
Their hands were so linked and their union was so 
confirmed that it took the far deep note of a bell, 
borne to them on the summer air, to call them back 
to a sense of hours and proprieties. They had touched 
bottom and melted together, but they gave a start at 
last: the bell was the voice of the inn and the inn 
was the image of luncheon (WMK p. 214). 
In this description, the narrator's transfer to the reader 
as sujet-suppos~-savoir is once again identifiable. In 
their weeping and holding of hands, Maisie and Mrs. Wix 
share their mutual feeling for Sir Claude, establishing 
their common identity as his devotees. However, a change 
can be detected in Maisie's expression of her feeling -
a change which the reader is presumed to be able to under-
stand without conscious explanation from the narrator. 
This change causes Maisie to alter the expression of her 
affection for Sir Claude from an overt declaration, •so 
do I [adore him].• to the discreet synoptic statement of 
assent "Oh I know!• which earlier (vide p. 383) signalled 
her recognition of that knowledge which defies conscious 
discourse and must be left unspoken. The moment at which 
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this change occurs is described as follows: " .•• something 
took place that brought other words to her lips; nothing 
more, very possibly, than the closer consciousness in her 
hand of the significance of Mrs. Wix's.• The indefinite 
noun "something" signals the transference to the reader: 
what exactly took place escapes the narrator's verbal dis-
course, but the reader may from his position in the locus 
of the Other, articulate th is "absent" significance, the 
only clue to which is the image of the linked hands: "the 
unutterable sign of their union" (my emphasis). Once again 
the reader is drawn into the conflict, his task being to 
produce that meaning which is Other than, or beyond, the 
conscious command of the narrator. 
I suggest then that the "something" which takes place, 
for which the narrator can only offer a tentative, a "pos-
sible" explanation, amounts to Maisie 1 s recognition in 
the unconscious, that the nature of her affection for Sir 
Claude is "forbidden". In other words, Maisie's affection 
for Sir Claude, like that of Mrs. Wix - the similarity 
of whose subjective position is suggested in the image 
of linked hands - must become an unspoken secret. It is 
no longer a spontaneous nursery affection for a best friend 
to be shared in comical declarations of being •over head 
and ears" in love, or "never so far gone• (WMK p. 61). 
It can only be shared •without the shadow of an attenuating 
smile ••• no gleam of levity, as little of humour as of 
deprecation.• It assumes a place in the realm of the sac-
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red and taboo, for just as Mrs. Wix, in the Symbolic place 
of Mother must repress the possibility that Sir Claude, 
in the Symbolic place of her son, is the object of her 
Desire, so Maisie, in the Symbolic place of daughter must 
repress the possibility that Sir Claude, her Symbolic (step)-
Father is the object of her Desire. In repressing their 
Desire for the forbidden, Maisie and Mrs. Wix seem to cling 
to each other for support in their loss. In • touching 
bottom and melting together" they seem to sink in their 
united banishment as Sir Claude's lovers, to the "Other-
world" of irreducible, repressed difference. At length 
this "Other-world" is superseded by the "far deep note" 
of the luncheon bell, the Symbolic Sign which beckons them 
back to the world of the Symbolic Order, a less sacred, 
less solemn world that offers "the image of luncheon.• 
This is also the sign to the reader to "counter-transfer" 
back to the conscious discourse of the narrator, the sub-
ject who knows what happens next: that Mrs. Beale, newly 
arrived from London, awaits them at their hotel. 
* * * * * 
Mrs. Beale wastes no time in offering her interpre-
tation of the roles which she, Mrs. Wix and Maisie are 
to play from now on at Boulogne. The authority of her 
command, •near lady, please at tend to my daughter• (WMK 
p. 219), establishes her as Mother and employer, Mrs. Wix 
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as employee and mentor of the pupil, and Maisie as daughter 
and pupil. Only Sir Claude remains to be allocated a place 
in the group, and faced with his continuing absence, Maisie 
begins to fear that she may have become the dupe of an 
inadequate exchange. Observing Mrs. Beale closely over 
luncheon, she reads in that lady's behaviour the suggestion 
of ulterior, implicit ("sexual") meaning: 
There was a phrase familiar to Maisie, so often was 
it used by this lady to express the idea of one's getting 
what one wanted: one got it - Mrs. Beale always said 
she at all events always got it or proposed to get it 
- by "making love." She was at present making love, 
singular as it appeared, to Mrs. Wix, and her young 
friend's mind had never moved in such freedom as 
on thus finding itseli face to face with the question 
of what she wanted to get ( WMK p. 222). 
What it is that Mrs. Beale wants, Maisie deduces from com-
ments such as, "Well, if she [Maisie) can live with but 
one of us alone, with which in the world should it be but 
me?" (WMK p. 223). She believes that Mrs. Beale's intention 
is to act as a replacement for Sir Claude, to establish 
herself in Mrs. Wix's eyes as stepmother and therefore 
as an acceptable alternative to Sir Claude as stepfather. 
Since Mrs. Beale, by keeping Mrs. Wix and Maisie cons-
tantly with her, prevents them from conferring in private 
on her behaviour, Maisie is compelled to wait until "bed-
time" before she can discover from Mrs. Wix whether she 
has detected and responded to the implications of Mrs. 
Beale's charm. It seems from Mrs. Wix's halting, mystified 
responses to Maisie's urgent enquiries, that she has not 
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up to this point recognized in Mrs. Beale's behaviour any 
ulterior, excess meaning that might be identified by Mai-
sie's comical but appropriately suggestive term "making 
love." Reading Mrs. Beale's charm literally, Mrs. Wix 
understands her to want her, Mrs. Wix, to accept Mrs. Beale 
as Maisie's mother. Although Mrs. Wix would have preferred 
to have worked for Maisie's stepfather alone, she appears 
to have recognized the value of a compromise in which at 
least she and Maisie will be able to remain together. 
To Maisie, the suggestion of such a compromise is appalling, 
for as already discussed, she no longer considers Mrs. 
Beale as at all worthy of the kind of adoration which is 
due to Sir Claude. 
a conclusion: 
Doggedly, she presses Mrs. Wix for 
•you don't answer 
•r want to know if you 
Mrs. Wix continued 
you do!" 
Maisie persisted. my question," 
accept her." 
to hedge. •r want to know if 
Everything in the child's person, at this, announced 
that it was easy to know. "Not for a moment.• 
"Not the two now?" Mrs. Wix had caught on; she 
flushed with it. •on1y him alone?" 
•aim alone or nobody." 
"Not even me?" cried Mrs. Wix. 
Maisie looked at her a moment, then began to undress. 
"Oh you're nobody!" (WMK pp. 228-229). 
What is perfectly clear in Maisie's mind is that she is 
no longer prepared either to share Sir Claude, or to accept an 
al terna ti ve to him. If earlier she had envisaged a four-
some in which differences between •decency• arii •indecency", 
•1overs• and •1ittle girls" were not considered important, 
now she recognizes such differences as vital. If Mrs. 
403 
Beale and Sir Claude are supposedly "step-parents", they 
are not, to Maisie, "the same". Mrs. Beale, as a woman, 
cannot replace Sir Claude in Maisie's world/text, although 
she certainly can replace Maisie in Sir Claude's. In other 
words, because in Maisie's world Mrs. Beale represents 
too much sameness (to Maisie) and too much difference (to 
Sir Claude) she must be repressed or excluded. 
28 
can accept "Hirn alone or nobody." 
Maisie 
Alarmed by Maisie's new stand, Mrs. Wix tries to es-
tablish her own position in the new Order. With Maisie's 
enigmatic identification of the old woman, "Oh you're no-
body!" the chapter closes leaving the reader to interpret 
the significance of this remark. What it seems to imply 
is that for Maisie Sir Claude is the Supreme Being, the 
symbolic "phallus" whom she envisages as having the poten-
tial to trans f orrn her 1 if e in to a state of "perfection". 
He can be neither duplicated, nor replaced. 
the other hand, is the Symbolic Mother; 
Order of the Law and of Desi re repressed. 
Mrs. Wix on 
she is of the 
Unlike Mrs. 
Beale, who is the "Other," she is the representative, the 
substitute, the "nobody" who inadequately attempts to fill 
28 What Maisie does not suspect is that Mrs. Wix has already 
agreed to compromise her "cleanness" and has told Mrs. Beale that 
she is prepared to stay on in a foursome when Sir Claude arrives. 
This arrangement is hinted at in Mrs. Wix' s question, "Not the 
two now? • • • Only him alone?" but it is only disclosed to Maisie 
(and the reader) the following day (later in the text), after she 
has made her own conclusive decision (see WMK pp. 258-259). 
I shall return to this decision of Mrs. Wix' s shortly. 
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the gap of the only "somebody", and with whose company 
Maisie would be content if she was, like Mrs. Wix, com-
pelled to repress her Desire for "the phallus," Sir Claude. 
The Return of Sir Claude: 
having/losing the Phallus/phallus 
The morning after the conversation described above, 
Mrs. Wix announces to Maisie that Sir Claude has just ar-
rived once more at Boulogne and although Maisie tries to 
respond to the news with her usual unambiguous delight, 
she is vaguely aware that "what had happened was oddly 
less of a simple rapture than any arrival or return 
of the same supreme friend had ever been before" (WMK p. 
230). Encountering Sir Claude in person, and agreeing 
to breakfast alone with him at a quay-side caf~ where they 
may enjoy each other's company undisturbed, Maisie becomes 
increasingly conscious of an excess significance, playing 
beneath the surface of Sir Claude's attempts to be "normal•. 
She senses a disparity between the meaning that he tries 
to convey that they are, as they had been on similar 
occasions in London, two happily reunited comrades or cro-
nies - and the contradictions - the fear and nervousness 
which intrude into that meaning in spite of his efforts 
to conceal them. This disparity frightens Maisie for it 
suggests to her a duplicity in Sir Claude which she had 
suspected earlier at the hotel when he claimed not to have 
seen Mrs. Beale since his arrival that morning at Boulogne. 
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While she is also conscious that Sir Claude is afraid, 
she has difficulty in deducing what the cause of his fear 
could be. 
At last Sir Claude explains to Maisie that he has 
returned to Boulogne for the particular purpose of asking 
her something: 
"What is it you meant you came over to ask me?" 
•well,• said Sir Claude, "I was just going to say. 
Let me tell you it will surprise you.• She had finished 
breakfast now and she sat back in her chair again: 
she waited in silence to hear. He had pushed the 
things before him a little way and had his elbows on 
the table. This time, she was convinced, she knew 
what was coming, and once more, for the crash, as 
with Mrs. Wix lately in her room, she held her breath 
and drew together her eyelids. He was going to say 
she must give him up. He looked hard at her again; 
then he made his effort. "Should you see your way 
to let her go?" 
She was bewildered. 
"Mrs. Wix simply. 
you see your way to 
what I'm asking." 
"To let who -?" 
I put it at the worst. Should 
sacrifice her? Of course I know 
Maisie's eyes opened wide again; 
ferent from what she had expected. 
you alone?" 
this was so dif-
" And stay with 
He gave another push to his coffee-cup. "With me 
and Mrs. Beale. Of course it would be rather rum; 
but everything in our whole story is rather rum, you 
know. What's more unusual than for any one to be 
given up, like you, by her parents?" (WMK p. 246). 
If Maisie expected Sir Claude to request that she give 
him up, she is confused by the difference, the unforeseen 
"Otherness" of his proposal. To the reader this differ-
ence will be easier to comprehend. In ef feet what Sir 
Claude proposes is that Maisie relinquish the old "Symbolic 
Order• of morality and literal meaning into which Mrs. 
Wix had been attempting so energetically to initiate her, 
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and accept in its place a new "Symbolic Order" in which 
the actions condemned by the old Order as "sexual" trans-
gress ions are recognized as "the norm." Yet in this new 
Order Maisie is offered a place which is different both 
to the place she had held in the old Order as Sir Claude's 
friend and equal "an awfully good 'chap'" (WMK p. 6 3) , 
and "also a man of the world," (WMK p. 65) - and to the 
place she had conceived for herself in the new Order as 
his complement, in perfect equilibrium with "Him alone ••• " 
(WMK p. 229). In the new Order he now offers, Sir Claude 
will be neither her friendly companion, nor the Supreme 
Being (the "phallus"), but will adopt his place propre 
as her Symbolic Father while Maisie must assume the new 
role of "daughter." She will thus be required to repress 
her Desire for Sir Claude and recognize instead the Desire 
of Mrs. Beale who in spite of being unmarried to Sir Claude 
- for neither has yet been legally freed from former mar-
riage by divorce - will nevertheless assume the role of 
his partner and of Symbolic Mother, representative of the 
Law, to Maisie. Faced with so unexpected and confusing 
a choice, she can only plead for time in which to weigh 
her decision. 
It is eventually at the station, where they go to 
buy the Paris papers, that the conflict of Maisie's choice 
reaches a climax. The Paris train which has just arrived 
in Boulogne, is waiting in the station for its return trip. 
Suddenly the dream of escape alone with Sir Claude to the 
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"Other-world" of this foreign city, which had seemed so 
nearly fulfilled on her first arrival at Boulogne, appears 
once again accessible to Maisie. 
her wish known to Sir Claude: 
Tentatively, she makes 
"I wish we could go. Won't you take me?" 
He continued to smile. •would you really come?• 
"Oh yes, oh yes. Try." 
"Do you want me to take our tickets?" 
"Yes, take them." 
"Without any luggage?" 
She showed their two armfuls [armfuls of daily papers 
just bought] , smiling at him as he smiled at her, but 
so conscious of being more frightened than she had 
ever been in her life that she seemed to see her white-
ness as in a glass. Then she knew that what she saw 
was Sir Claude's whiteness: he was as frightened as 
herself. "Have n 't we got plenty of luggage?" she asked. 
"Take the tickets - have n 't you time? When does 
the train go?" 
Sir Claude turned to a porter. "When does the train 
go?" 
The man looked up at the station-clock. "In two 
minutes. Monsieur est pl.are?" 
"Pas encore." 
"Et vos billets?~ vous n 'avez que le temps." Then 
after a look at Maisie, "Monsieur veut-il que je les 
prenne?" the man said. 
Sir Claude turned back to her. "Veux-tu bien qu 'il 
en prenne?" 
It was the most extraordinary thing in the world: 
in the intensity of her excitement she not only by 
illumination understood all their French, but fell into 
it with an active perfection. She addressed herself 
straight to the porter. "Prenny, prenny. Oh prenny 1" 
"Ah si mademoiselle le veut -1 • He waited there 
for the money. 
But Sir Claude only stared - stared at her with his 
white face. •you have chosen then? You'll let her 
go?" 
Maisie carried her eyes wistfully to the train, where, 
amid cries of "En voiture, en voiturel • heads were 
at windows and doors banging loud. The porter was 
pressing "Ah vous n 'avez plus le temps!• 
"It's going - it's going 1" cried Maisie. 
They watched it move, they watched it start; then 
the man went his way with a shrug. "It's gone!• Sir 
Claude said. 
Maisie crept some distance up the platform; she 
stood there with her back to her companion, following 
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it with her eyes, keeping down tears, nursing her pink 
and yellow books. She had had a real fright but had 
fallen back to earth. The odd thing was that in her 
fall her fear too had been dashed down and broken. 
It was gone. She looked round at last, from where 
she had paused, at Sir Claude's, and then saw that 
his was n 't. It sat there with him on the bench to 
which, against the wall of the station, he had retreated , 
and where, leaning back and, as she thought, rather 
queer, he still waited. . She came .down . to him and 
he continued to offer his 1nef fectual 1ntent1on of pleas-
antry. "Yes, I've chosen," she said to him. "I '11 let 
her go if you - if you - " 
She faltered; he quickly took her up. "If I, i£ I -?" 
"If you '11 give up Mrs. Beale." 
"Oh!" he exclaimed; on which she saw how much, 
how hopelessly he was afraid. She had supposed at 
the caf~ that it was of his rebellion, of his gathering 
motive; but how could that be when his temptations 
- that temptation for example of the train they had 
just lost - were after all so slight? Mrs. Wix was 
right. He was afraid of his weakness - of his weakness 
(WMK pp. 254-255). 
Maisie's response to this unexpected opportunity is des-
cribed by the narrator as a conflict between her enthusi-
asm at the idea of escaping to Paris with Sir Claude, and 
her fear of such an escape. As she expresses her eagerness 
to Sir Claude, her growing excitement overpowers her fear; 
considerations such as her luggage and time become unim-
portant, while any thoughts of the two governesses, the 
embodiments of Symbolic Law waiting at the hotel, are quite 
excluded from the dialogue. Then, at a moment that the 
narrator can only describe as Other than the norm, "the 
most extraordinary thing in the world," and the product 
of a mysterious insight, an "illumination,• Maisie is able 
not only to understand, but to participate in the French, 
the discourse of the Other spoken by Sir Claude and the 
porter. Again in his apparent inability to account ratio-
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nally for Maisie's sudden wunderstanding", the narrator 
unconsciously transfers to the reader who may recognize 
in Maisie's aberrant discourse a subject who speaks neither 
in English nor in French or perhaps both in English and 
in French. For the wPrenny, prenny. Oh prenny!" is neither 
English, "Take, take. Oh take!" nor French, wPrenez, pre-
nez. Oh prenez!" In the play of its meaning this utterance 
suggests neither a subject who asks simply for tickets, 
nor one who asks simply for sexual fulfilment (vide the 
remarks of Harris W. Wilson quoted on p. 333 of this chap-
ter), but a play of repressed subjective positions which 
articulate the meaning less play of 1 ingu is tic difference 
that has been repressed by the subject which identifies 
itself in meaningful conscious discourse. 
back to the narrator, the story continues. 
Transferring 
If Maisie is momentarily transported by her unconscious 
Desire to subvert Symbolic Order and attain wperfect know-
ledge" by the wsexual" fulfilment, the attainment of the 
forbidden wphallus", Sir Claude in his fear clings to the 
conventions of Symbolic Order whereby the train traveller 
is expected to be in possession of luggage, a reservation, 
a ticket and so forth. He thus manages to evade either 
meeting or repressing Maisie's Desire, for as he stalls, 
the train, with the offer of •other-worldliness" slips 
away, and Maisie feels her impulse of rebellion, her un-
conscious Desire, to be •aashed down and broken.• However, 
in the repression of the rebellion, or the falling •back 
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to earth" her dream of escaping with her hero, of attaining 
the object of Desire, becomes translated into a carefully 
ordered rational solution to the proposal made to her by 
Sir Claude: she will give up Mrs. Wix if Sir Claude will 
give up Mrs. Beale. If she is to repress her Desire for 
the "phal 1 us" she must receive in its place the Ph all us, 
the power of signification which requires for the signify-
ing subject a clear identity, a place propre in a Symbolic 
Order. If Maisie is to give up Mrs. Wix who up to now 
has acted as the representative of Symbolic Order, then 
she must receive in the place of the old governess a res-
ponsible Symbolic parent. If Sir Claude is to prove him-
self worthy of such Authority he too must repress his trans-
gressive Desire and reciprocally give up the company of 
Mrs. Beale. 
As she presents him with her response to his proposal, 
Maisie realizes that Sir Claude's fear which has not, like 
hers, been "broken down" by the departure of the tempting 
train, is not relieved, but intensified by her proposition. 
His fear is not the same as hers. While she was fearful 
of the consequences of indulging her own gathering motive 
to rebel or transgress authority in the pursuit of her 
Ideal, Sir Claude is fearful of the consequences of taking 
a firm subjective position, of repressing the "Otherness" 
of Womanhood embodied in Mrs. Beale, and accepting the 
responsibility of parental authority within the Symbolic 
Order. Thus while Maisie declares herself prepared to 
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give up Mrs. Wix in order to achieve a lawful relation 
with Sir Claude, he, •the poor sunk slave to his pas-
sions• (WMK p. 231), has yet to find the courage to reci-
procate. As Maisie waits for him to make his decision, 
they gradually make their way back to the hotel. 
Symbolic Order, Meaning and the Other: 
What Maisie Comes to Know 
At the hotel, Maisie and Sir Claude discover that 
in their absence, Mrs. Beale and Mrs. Wix have had a violent 
quarrel, and that Mrs. Wix is on the point of departing 
on the ferry for Folkestone. The basis of their argument 
appears to be that Mrs. Wix, having agreed the previous 
day to remain with the foursome as Maisie's governess, 
has now decided to leave because Maisie and Sir Claude 
hava "been out too long.• She has declared herself "dis-
gusted" with Maisie for "having no moral sense.• Never-
the less, having promised earlier that she would never volun-
tarily abandon Maisie (WMK p. 205), she wants to find out 
before she leaves, whether the 1 i ttle girl accepts this 
world of immorality or whether she has retained sufficient 
"moral sense" to be still accessible to Mrs. Wix' s moral 
tutelage: 
• • • Mrs. Wix raised a hand that forestalled every evasion. 
•0on't move till you've heard me. I'm going, but 
I must first understand. Have you lost it again?• 
Maisie surveyed - for the idea of a describable loss 
- the immensity of space. Then she replied lamely 
enough: •1 feel as if I had lost everything.• 
Mrs. Wix looked dark. •0o you mean to say you 
have lost what we found together with so much diffi-
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culty two days ago?" As her pupil failed of response 
she continued: •0o you mean to say you've already 
forgotten what we found together?" 
Maisie dimly remembered. •My moral sense?" 
•your moral sense. Have n 't I, after all, brought 
it out?" She spoke as she had never spoken even in 
the schoolroom and with the book in her hand. 
It brought back to the child's recollection how she 
sometimes could n 't repeat on Friday the sentence that 
had been glib on Wednesday, and she dealt all feebly 
and ruefully with the present tough passage. Sir Claude 
and Mrs. Beale stood there like visitors at an "exam." 
She had indeed an instant a whiff of the faint flower 
that Mrs. Wix pretended to have plucked and now with 
such a peremptory hand thrust at her nose. Then it 
left her, and, as if she were sinking with a slip from 
a foothold, her arms made a short jerk. What this 
jerk represented was the spasm within her of something 
still deeper than a moral sense. She looked at her 
examiner; she looked at the visitors; she felt the 
rising of the tears she had kept down at the station. 
They had nothing - no, distinctly nothing - to do with 
moral sense. The only thing was the old fl.at shameful 
schoolroom plea. "I don't know - I don't know. n 
(WMK p. 260-261) •'' ' 
If earlier, Maisie had appeared to Mrs. Wix to be acquiring 
the beginnings of a "moral sense" it was because Sir Claude 
had come to stand as an "absolute" against which she could 
measure "right" from "wrong". She had been able, for exam-
ple, to judge irreverence to Sir Claude as a crime worthy 
of capital punishment (vide p. 397). Through her experi-
ence at the station, however, she has discovered that her 
view of Sir Claude's perfection is an illusion. She has 
come to recognize that he neither reciprocates her Desire 
for him, nor has the courage to accept responsibility. 
Thus Maisie's loss of her Ideal (the •phallus"), and accep-
tance of compromise (the Phallus), is followed by the recog-
ni tion of perfection as irrecoverably lost: •I feel as 
if I had lost everything.• If she has had the •whiff of 
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the faint flower" of morality in her earlier attempts to 
distinguish "right" from "wrong", now even this is lost. 
As the narrator describes her actions, he once again trans-
fers to the reader: "as if she were sinking with a slip 
from a foothold, her arms made a short jerk. What this 
jerk represented was the spasm within her of something 
still deeper than a moral sense." This enigmatic "some-
thing" seems describable as the unspoken and unspeakable 
Other of Maisie's conscious knowledge, authorized by her 
unconscious Self. This Other, associated with her tears 
of loss on the station, defies the simple clarity of "moral 
sense" and produces in Maisie the sense of indeterminacy 
which she expresses in her desperate repetition, "I don't 
know - I don't know." 
To return once again to the narrator's discourse, 
if Maisie is unable to respond positively to Mrs. Wix's 
investigation of her moral sense, she is also unable to 
confirm Mrs. Beale's prompt assumption that she accepts 
the place of "daughter" to Sir Claude and Mrs. Beale. At 
the point when she is being besieged by the authoritative 
demands of the two governesses who compete for the posi-
tion of Symbolic Mother, Sir Claude - the "slave" of the 
"Other" - at last assumes a firm responsible stand in de-
fence of Maisie's freedom. Reassuring her with the words, 
"You' re free - you' re free," (WMK p. 26 2) , he enables her 
to resume the interpretive position which she had earlier 
decided was "right." 
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The validity of the choice which Maisie makes from 
this position and the "exquisitenessn of the condition 
that her choice entails, lies in the implicit acknowledge-
ment of the need to respect Symbolic Law in order to es-
tablish "meaning." Not only does she herself assume a 
firm subjective position as one who knows what she wants, 
but she insists that Sir Claude too assume the responsi-
bility of stating what he wants. Thus, while Maisie recog-
nizes the locus of "Otherness", her choice reflects an 
unconscious awareness of the need to repress the Desire 
to "play" with such "Otherness" if any "knowledge" or "mean-
ing" is to acquire a degree of determinacy. 
However while Sir Claude is unable to meet Maisie's 
demands to state whether he wishes to be Father to her, 
or Lover to Mrs. Beale, the latter is in her turn "scan-
dalised to tears" at Maisie's suggestion that she give 
up Sir Claude. Her tearful outrage provokes Sir Claude 
to one of his gallant, gentlemanly declarations: " . . . my 
dear, I have n't given you up ••• and if you'd like me 
to treat our friends here as solemn witnesses I don't mind 
giving you my word for it that I never never will." (WMK 
p. 267). This is, of course, not the first time that Sir 
Claude has offered his "Phallic Word" as an absolute, and 
it will no doubt not be long before it displays its inevit-
able wilting notherness•. 
long enough to defend 
If he was able to be responsible 
Maisie's freedom, he now resumes 
"play• with Mrs. Beale in the meaningless capricious •game• 
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of transgression. 
take her leave. 
Little remains now, but for Maisie to 
On the threshold Maisie paused; she put out her hand 
to her stepfather. He took it and held it a moment, 
and their eyes met as the eyes of those who have done 
for each other what they can. "Gcx>d-bye," he repeated. 
"Gcx>d-bye." And Maisie followed Mrs. Wix. 
They caught the steamer, which was just putting 
off, and hustled across the gulf, found thenselves on 
the deck so breathless and so scared that they gave 
up half the voyage to letting their emotion sink. It 
sank slowly and imperfectly; but at last, in mid-
channel, surrounded by the quiet sea, Mrs. Wix had 
courage to revert. "I did n 't look back, did you?" 
"Yes. He was n 't there." said Maisie. 
"Not on the balcony?" 
Maisie waited a moment; then "He was n 't there" 
she simply said again. 
Mrs. Wix also was silent a while. "He went to her," 
she finally observed. 
"Oh I know!" the child replied. 
Mrs Wix. gave a sidelong look. She still had room 
for wonder at what Maisie knew ( WMK pp. 267-268). 
As their hand-shake suggests, Maisie and Sir Claude part 
on a note of businesslike resignation. Each has assisted 
the other in attaining the freedom to choose, and each 
returns to the world of that choice. Sir Claude returns 
to his world of empty "play"; Maisie returns to the laws 
of Symbolic Order, the "safety" of Mrs. Wix and the irre-
ducible quest for more knowledge, more meaning. If the 
reader fears that Maisie may suffer oppression under the 
moral laws of Mrs. Wix 29 this fear may be alleviated first-
29 Tony Tanner for example, identifies Mrs. Wix as the •em-
bodiment par excellence" of Henry James' s •conscious conscience -
the very home of the literal, the haunt of so many pedantries."* 
Tanner goes on to argue, •... we are to infer that Maisie's charac-
ter will 'suffer much' by close association with it [Mrs. Wix's 
'conscious conscience'] by enforced subjugation to it.• - Tanner, 
The Reign of Wonder p. 219. *Henry James, Autohlographies, quoted 
by Tanner, p. 291. 
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ly, by the thought of Mrs. Wix's earlier compromise of 
her "absolute" morality {vide p. 403), and secondly, by 
the implications of her closing dialogue with Maisie. While 
Mrs. Wix, governed by the "straightness" of her vision, 
has not had the courage to look back to see if Sir Claude 
is watching their departure, Maisie has looked back. Her 
questing instinct - her hope or unconscious Desire that 
her Ideal ( the "phallus") embodied by Sir Claude, might 
still be hers and manifesting itself as such in some small 
gesture such as a wave of the hand - is far from extin-
guished. Nevertheless, it is balanced by a resignation 
to the rational awareness that Sir Claude belongs to another 
- to the world of the "Other" and he returns to "her". 
The inevitable presence of the "Other" perspective, Maisie 
quietly accepts in the little phrase which "deranges" the 
straightness of Mrs. Wix's moral vision. The old governess 
can only "look sidelong" at the little girl's apparent 
appreciation of an infinity of unspoken meaning implicit 
in her simple phrase: "Oh I know." 
* * * * * 
IN CONCLUSION 
At the start of this chapter I described the quest 
of my reading as threefold: in brief, my chief concern 
was to be the attempt to unveil the text's "unconscious 
knowledge," and my secondary concerns, to explore the iden-
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ti ty between sexuality and linguistic meaning in What Mai-
sie Knew and to explore prior readings of the text as per-
formances or repetitions of the textual conf 1 ict. 
conclusions does this quest lead us to? 
What 
First of all, in the reading I have offered, it seems 
clearly evident that the view adopted by the authorial 
consciousness towards concepts such as "knowledge," "mean-
ing," and "truth" is a view which anticipates widely-held 
current opinion that such concepts are ambiguous rather 
than absolute, ephemeral rather than constant, and arbi-
trary rather than inherent. The possibility of transcend-
ing the ambiguity of the world and achieving either "full 
knowledge" or "full meaning" or "full truth" is portrayed 
in What Maisie Knew as the vain hope of an innocent which 
is doomed to frustration. The implication at the close 
of the novel is that Maisie as the quester after knowledge 
can never hope to "arrive", but can only ever continue 
to "proceed". 
The nature of human consciousness which such an autho-
rial view would seem to suggest, is one that is incomplete 
and constantly seeks to redefine itself. It is this kind 
of consciousness which John Carlos Rowe identifies when 
he describes the "self" portrayed in James's The Portrait 
of a Lady as, 
a oonstant process of drawing and redrawing that in-
oomplete circle whereby the aesthetic oonsciousness 
expresses its shifting locus. 3 0 
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Rowe goes on to argue that Henry James, 
• • • prefigures his brother's formulation of conscious-
ness as a function and relation rather than a substance 
• • . The Jamesian novel is fundamentally one of relation, 
the character's self defined as he sees himself and 
as others see him.31 
While this view of the Jamesian consciousness seems to 
me a val id one, the point I wish to make is th is: while 
indeed James's view of the "self" as presented in What 
Maisie Knew seems to be defined by the way Maisie as cen-
tral consciousness sees herself ( the "private self") and 
the way in which others see her, (the "public self"), what 
this view does not apparently recognize is the "self's" 
definition by that which is not seen by the central cons-
ciousness, which is inaccessible both to her and to others, 
namely, the "self's" Other or unconscious. 
In the course of this reading, I have identified four 
instances of transference, each of which seems to arise 
from the narrator's inability to account for particular 
choices which Maisie makes. It is notable that these nar-
ratorial uncertainties only arise in the latter portion 
of the text, as Maisie gradually comes to assume responsi-
bility for her choices and the narrator is required to 
•translate" both choices and their sources in his narrative 
30 John Carlos Rowe, Henry Adams and Henry James: The 
Emergence of a Modern Consciousness (Ithaca and London: COrnell 
University Press, 1976) p. 34. 
31 Rowe, pp. 34-35. 
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discourse. In other words, the focus of the text on issues 
relating to subjectivity, intensifies. 
In the first instance of transference, the narrator 
requires the reader to establish for himself that portion 
of Maisie's knowledge which is beyond the narrator's power 
to describe (vide p. 383 ) ; in the second instance he un-
consciously requires the reader to establish the source 
of Maisie's recognition that her feeling for Sir Claude 
is "forbidden" (vide pp. 398-400); in the third instance 
he unconsciously requires the reader to name the source 
of Maisie's aberrant plea "Prenny, prenny. Oh prenny!" 
{vide p. 409); and finally in the fourth instance he re-
quires the reader to establish the source of Maisie's sense 
of indeterminacy (vide p. 413). 
The conflict which seems to arise in each of these 
transferences is a conflict between the knowledge which 
is present to the narrator, and the knowledge which is 
absent. While he appears to recognize a division in know-
ledge itself, a division between the accessible and the 
forbidden that would imply an equivalent split in subjec-
tivity between the accessible conscious self and the for-
bidden unconscious self, his discourse reflects at these 
points of transference, the failure to pursue such an :i..npli-
cation to its final conclusion. I would argue then that 
just as "sexuality" is to Maisie's consciousness the excess 
or excluded "marginal" meaning which gives definition to 
her "non-sexual", innocent but "central" knowledge, so 
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the issue of the unconscious or split-subjectivity is, 
to the authorial consciousness that "marginal" or excess 
meaning which gives definition to the Jamesian view of 
the "self". 
From this conclusion it becomes apparent that the 
conflict between accessible "non-sexual" knowledge, and 
forbidden "sexual" knowledge which is dramatized in the 
conscious discourse of the text, is re-enacted beyond the 
textual boundaries between the knowledge that is accessible 
to the narrator and the knowledge that is beyond him. 
It is the latter knowledge which the reader in the locus 
of the Other, is compelled to produce. Yet, in the very 
act of producing the unconscious knowledge of the text, 
the reader finds himself caught up in a repetition of the 
problem dramatized by the conscious discourse of the text: 
the experience of the Desire to know and articulate that 
meaning which has been repressed, yet the simultaneous 
discovery that such articulation itself can only be given 
meaning as a result of an act of repression. And if we 
return again to the Scrutiny debate of Marius Bewley and 
F.R. Leavis, or (as another lesser known example) the dif-
ference of opinion between Carren Kaston and Harris Wilson 
( vide p. 335 ) it is clear that the problem drama ti zed by 
the text - having reproduced itself in each of these critics 
as an "effect to produce" or Desire to make meaning and 
resolve conflict - repeats itself once again at a further 
remove in the arguments arising from the readings of these 
readings. 
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Seen in this light, this chapter itself then, is no 
more than a "return" to, and participation in, the conflict 
dramatized by Henry James an effort to resolve the con-
flict in the terms of this reader's Desire. 
* * * * * 
EPILOGUE 
The cultural division • • • of scholarly "disciplines" 
of research is by no means a natural geography: there 
are no natural boundaries between literature aoo psycho-
analysis, which clearly define and distinguish them; 
the border between them is undecidable since they 
are really traversed by each other. 
- Shoshana Felman 
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In the Introduction to this thesis, and in the chapters 
that follow, I have repeatedly drawn attention to the di-
vided nature of my quest as both an investigation of the 
reading activity (a commentary-upon-the-quest) and simul-
taneously, a participation in the very activity to be in-
vestigated ( a performance-of-the-quest). For the duration 
of this epilogue however, I ask my reader to suspend the 
awareness of this division which I have up to now tried 
to cultivate; for to draw conclusions I must claim to 
adopt an "authoritative" position outside the reading acti-
vity and ask, "What 'truth' has the quest of this thesis 
unveiled?" 
The conclusion which I would perhaps name as "central• 
to this investigation - and I place the epithet "central• 
in inverted commas to emphasize its arbitrariness, its 
vulnerability to decentring by an Other reading - is that 
a revised view of the role of the reader is called for 
and with it a revised view of the reading activity and 
of the truth at which narrative interpretation arrives. 
In the light of Lacanian insights, the reader can no longer 
be viewed as an au tonornous subject, fully in control of 
the interpretation he produces and having the potential 
to decode the •full meaning" of the text he reads. He 
can no longer be seen as a witness standing outside the 
text and asking, •what does the text mean?• •What is its 
'truth' or message?• Instead, he must be seen as a divided 
or split subject who even in the action of commenting on 
424 
the text, of attempting 
finds himself caught up 
to control the text's meaning, 
in the textual conflict and per-
the very division in meaning that forming or re-enacting 
he sought to resolve. 
The reader's role then, being one of participation 
in the text, is not so much to discover what the truth 
might be but to decentre that "truth" in order to discover 
at what price it stands. In the process of assuming this 
role, his position as reader or narratee, although distin-
guishable from that of the text's writer or narrator, is 
inseparable from it. The two roles should be seen as inter-
acting with and informing each other, while differing from 
or pulling against each other - a model of the reader which 
answers to Lacan' s view of subjectivity as split between 
the subject of the signifier (or utterance) and the subject 
of the signified (or statement), which interact not as 
two distinct "gravitational centres" but as two "gravita-
tional counter-forces.• 
This thesis then, does not call simply for a change 
of focus from the view of reading as a quest after the 
truth, to a view which recognizes that there can be no 
truth. Instead, it calls for a deconstruction of •truth" 
per se, asking "What does 'the truth' disregard or fail 
to account for in order to be 'the truth'?" According 
to this •new way of reading," it is possible to arrive 
at some kind of •truth," but the status of that truth re-
tains an element of undecidability which renders it irre-
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ducibly open to revision. Because the Other as the unknow-
able remains beyond the reach of knowledge, "the truth" 
must be defined as that solution which by consensus is 
seen to account for the most aspects of a particular mys-
tery. In fact we must conclude that the attainment of 
"full truth" must be relinquished as an impossible ideal 
since, immanent to the "complete revelation" which "full 
truth" implies, is the transgression of all boundaries 
or laws and therefore the destruction of any "truth" or 
"meaning" which such laws bring into being. 
If then, this thesis concludes that the view of the 
author as "the master," and the reader as "the eager ques-
ter after the master's knowledge," is to be abandoned, 
if it views author and reader, narrator and narratee as 
counterforces, between whom the relationship is coordinate 
rather than in any way subordinate, it implicitly echoes 
the call for a revision in the relationship between litera-
ture and psychoanalysis which has been one of the most 
fascinating effects of Lacan's "return to Freud." 
In her prefatory article to the Yale French Studies 
special issue on "Literature and Psychoanalysis" Shoshana 
Felman justifies the suspicion which literary critics fre-
quently express towards so-called "psychoanalytic" readings 
of literary texts. Only too of ten such readings imply, 
• • • a relation in which literature is submitted 
authority, to the prestige of psychoanalysis. 
literature is considered as a body of language 
be interpreted psychoanalysis is considered 







to interpret. Psychoanalysis, in other words, occupies 
the place of a subject, literature that of an object; 
the relation of interpretation is structured as a relation 
of master to slave; • • . literature's function, like that 
of the slave, is to serve precisely the desire of psycho-
analytical theory - its desire for recognition; exer-
cising its authority and power over the literary field , 
holding a discourse of masterly competence, psycho-
analysis, in literature, thus seems to seek above all 
its own satisfaction. 1 
What Felman and other literary theorists and critics have 
tried to introduce is a dialogue between literature and 
psychoanalysis, in which each informs the other. I hope 
that this thesis, if only by its implications, has con-
tributed to this redressing of the balance between the 
two fields, so that psychoanalysis may be viewed not as 
an authoritative science against which literary critics 
and theorists need to defend themselves and literature, 
but as "the Other• which differs from, but participates 
in, literature; and similarly, literature is no longer 
seen as the slave to the Desire of psychoanalysis, but 
is recognized and respected in its turn as the locus of 
repressed difference, the unknown Other of psychoanalysis. 
If, with these "conclusions" I give my reader to under-
stand that we have "arrived" at "the truth", let me sound 
once again the reminder that this "truth" must stand at 
the cost of some repression of Otherness beyond the range 
of my discourse to identify. Although at this point, then, 
I arrest my reading quest, it can only be to abdicate my 
1 Shoshana Felman, "To Open the Question,• Yale French 
Studies, 55/56 (1977) pp. 5-6. 
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place as an interpreter of the ambiguities in the role 
of the reader to "an-Other" quester, who may rewrite my 
text in the terms of his own Desire. 
* * * * * 
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